FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 103613. February 23, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ELADIO C. TANGAN, respondents.
[G.R. No. 105830. February 23, 2001]
ELADIO C. TANGAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
At around 11:30 p.m. of December
1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard
heading south. He had just come from
Buendia Avenue on an intelligence operation.
At the same time, Generoso Miranda, a 29-year old optometrist, was
driving his car in the same direction along Roxas Boulevard with his uncle,
Manuel Miranda, after coming from the Ramada Hotel. Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generoso’s way, causing him
to swerve to the right and cut Tangan’s path.
Tangan blew his horn several times.
Generoso slowed down to let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and overtook Generoso, but when he got in
front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso
tried four or five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking
his lane. As he approached Airport
Road, Tangan slowed down to make a U-turn.
Generoso passed him, pulled over and got out of the car with his
uncle. Tangan also stopped his car and
got out. As the Mirandas got near
Tangan’s car, Generoso loudly retorted, “Putang ina mo, bakit mo ginigitgit
ang sasakyan ko?” Generoso and
Tangan then exchanged expletives.
Tangan pointed his hand to Generoso and the latter slapped it, saying, “Huwag
mo akong dinuduro! Sino ka ba, ano ba
ang pinagmamalaki mo?” Tangan countered, “Ikaw, ano ang gusto mo?”
With this, Tangan went to his car and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front
seat. The subsequent events per account
of the parties’ respective witnesses were conflicting:
According to the prosecution witnesses, particularly, Mary Ann Borromeo, Rosalia Cruz and Manuel Miranda, the accused pointed his gun at Generoso Miranda and when Manuel Miranda tried to intervene, the accused pointed his gun at Manuel Miranda, and after that the accused pointed again the gun to Generoso Miranda, the accused shot Generoso Miranda at a distance of about a meter but because the arm of the accused was extended, the muzzle of the gun reached to about more or less one foot away from the body of Generoso Miranda. The shot hit the stomach of Generoso Miranda causing the latter to fall and while still conscious, Generoso Miranda told Manuel Miranda, his uncle, to get the gun. Manuel Miranda grappled for the possession of the gun and during their grappling, Rosalia Cruz intervened and took hold of the gun and after Rosalia Cruz has taken hold of the gun, a man wearing a red T-shirt took the gun from her. The man in T-shirt was chased by Manuel Miranda who was able to get the gun where the man in red T-shirt placed it.
On the other hand, the defense, particularly the accused and his
witness by the name of Nelson Pante claimed that after the gun was taken by the
accused from inside his car, the Mirandas started to grapple for possession of
the gun and during the grappling, and while the two Mirandas were trying to
wrest away the gun from the accused, they fell down at the back of the car of
the accused. According to the accused,
he lost the possession of the gun after falling at the back of his car and as
soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell, and it exploded hitting Generoso
Miranda.[1]
After the gun went off, Tangan ran
away. Meanwhile, Generoso lay on the
ground bloodied. His uncle, Manuel,
looked for the gun and ran after Tangan, joining the mob that had already
pursued him. Tangan found a policeman
who allowed him to enter his patrol car.
Manuel arrived and told the policeman that Tangan had just shot his
nephew. Then he went back to where
Generoso lay and there found two ladies, later identified as Mary Ann Borromeo
and Rosalina Cruz, helping his nephew board a taxi. Manuel suggested that Generoso be brought to the hospital in his
car. He was rushed to the Philippine
General Hospital but he expired on the way.
Tangan was charged with the crime
of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm.[2] After a reinvestigation, however, the information was
amended to homicide with the use of a licensed firearm,[3] and he was separately charged with illegal possession
of unlicensed firearm.[4] On arraignment, Tangan entered a plea of not guilty
in the homicide case, but moved to quash the information for illegal possession
of unlicensed firearm on various grounds.
The motion to quash was denied, whereupon he filed a petition for certiorari with this Court.[5] On November 5, 1987, said petition was dismissed and
the joint trial of the two cases was ordered.[6]
During the trial, the prosecution
and the defense stipulated on the following:
that the amount of P126,000.00 was incurred for the funeral and burial
expenses of the victim;[7] that P74,625.00 was incurred for attorneys fees; and
that the heirs of Generoso suffered moral damages, the amount of which is left
for the courts to determine. After
trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but
convicted him of homicide. The
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary
mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended
party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor;
consequently, the trial court ordered him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
two (2) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four
(4) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the
heirs of the victim.[8] Tangan was released from detention after the
promulgation of judgment[9] and was allowed bail in the homicide case.
Private complainants, the heirs of
Generoso Miranda, filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 102677, challenging the civil aspect of the court a quo’s decision,
but the same was dismissed for being premature. On the other hand, Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the judgment of the trial court but increased the award of civil
indemnity to P50,000.00.[10] His subsequent motion for reconsideration and a
motion to cite the Solicitor General in contempt were denied by the Court of
Appeals.[11]
The Office of the Solicitor
General, on behalf of the prosecution, alleging grave abuse of discretion,
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as G.R. No.
103613, naming as respondents the Court of Appeals and Tangan, where it prayed
that the appellate court’s judgment be modified by convicting accused-appellant
of homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating circumstance.[12] Subsequently, the Office of the Solicitor General,
this time acting for public respondent Court of Appeals, filed a motion for
extension to file comment to its own petition for certiorari.[13] Discovering its glaring error, the Office of the
Solicitor General later withdrew its motion for extension of time.[14] Tangan filed a Reply asking that the case be
submitted for decision.[15]
Meanwhile, Tangan filed a separate
petition for review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 105830.[16] Since the petition for certiorari filed by the Solicitor General remained unresolved, the two cases were
consolidated.[17] The Office of the Solicitor General filed a
manifestation in G.R. No. 105830, asking that it be excused from filing a
comment to Tangan’s petition for review, in order to avoid taking contradictory
positions.[18]
In the recent case of People v.
Velasco and Galvez,[19] we held that the prosecution cannot avail of the remedies
of special civil action on certiorari, petition for review on certiorari,
or appeal in criminal cases. Previous
to that, we categorically ruled that the writ of certiorari cannot be
used by the State in a criminal case to correct a lower court’s factual
findings or evaluation of the evidence.[20]
Rule 117, Section 7, of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is clear:
Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a pleas was entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended party, except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.
Based on the foregoing, the
Solicitor General’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that
no mitigating circumstance be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant and
that the penalty imposed on him be correspondingly increased, constitutes a
violation of Tangan’s right against double jeopardy and should be dismissed.
We now come to the petition for
review filed by Tangan. It is
noteworthy that during the trial, petitioner Tangan did not invoke self-defense
but claimed that Generoso was accidentally shot. As such, the burden of proving self-defense,[21] which normally would have belonged to Tangan, did not
come into play. Although Tangan must
prove his defense of accidental firing by clear and convincing evidence,[22] the burden of proving the commission of the crime remained
in the prosecution.
Both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals appreciated in favor of Tangan the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 13 (1), in relation to
Article 11 (1), of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ARTICLE 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
x x x x x x x x x
ARTICLE 13. Mitigating Circumstances. – The following are mitigating circumstances:
1. Those mentioned in the preceding Chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
Incomplete self-defense is not
considered as a justifying act, but merely a mitigating circumstance; hence,
the burden of proving the crime charged in the information is not shifted to
the accused.[23] In order that it may be successfully appreciated,
however, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-defense be
present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim.[24] Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with
either of the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete
self-defense. Absent the unlawful
aggression, there can never be self-defense, complete or incomplete,[25] because if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the
other two requisites of defense will have no basis.[26]
There is no question that the
bullet which hit the victim was fired from the caliber. 38, which was issued to
Tangan by the Philippine Navy. The
cause of death was severe hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound of the abdomen,
caused by the bullet fired from a gun of the said caliber. The prosecution claimed that Tangan shot the
victim point-blank in the stomach at a distance of about one foot. On the other hand, Tangan alleged that when
he grappled with Generoso and Manuel Miranda for possession of the gun, it fell
to the ground and accidentally fired, hitting the victim.
When the testimonies of witnesses
in open court are conflicting in substantial points, the calibration of the
records on appeal becomes difficult. It
is the word of one party against the word of the other. The reviewing tribunal relies on the cold
and mute pages of the records, unlike the trial court which had the unique
opportunity of observing first-hand that elusive and incommunicable evidence of
the witness’ deportment on the stand while testifying.[27] The trial court’s assessments of the credibility of
witnesses is accorded great weight and respect on appeal and is binding on this
Court,[28] particularly when it has not been adequately
demonstrated that significant facts and circumstances were shown to have been
overlooked or disregarded by the court below which, if considered, might affect
the outcome hereof.[29] The rationale for this has been adequately explained
in that,
The trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses
through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the
angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie
or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready
reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the
sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the
sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity
of an oath, and carriage and mien.[30]
Equally, when a person fabricates
a story, he usually adopts a simple account because a complex one might lead to
entanglement from which he may find it hard to extricate himself. Along the same line, the experience of the
courts and the general observations of humanity teach us that the natural
limitations of our inventive faculties are such that if a witness delivers in
court a false narrative containing numerous details, he is almost certain to
fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements which can be readily
refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of his message.[31] Aside from this, it is not also unusual that the
witness may have been coached before he is called to the stand to testify.
Somewhere along the painstaking
review of the evidence on record, one version rings the semblance of truth, not
necessarily because it is the absolute truth, but simply because it is the best
approximation of the truth based on the declarations of witnesses as
corroborated by material evidence.
Perforce, the other version must be rejected. Truth and falsehood, it has been well said, are not always
opposed to each other like black and white, but oftentimes, and by design, are
made to resemble each other so as to be hardly distinguishable.[32] Thus, after analyzing the conflicting testimonies of
the witnesses, the trial court found that:
When the accused took the gun from his car and when he tried to get
out of the car and the two Mirandas saw the accused already holding the gun,
they started to grapple for the possession of the gun that it went off hitting
Generoso Miranda at the stomach. The court
believes that contrary to the testimony of the accused, he never lost
possession of the gun for if he did and when the gun fell to the ground, it
will not first explode or if it did, somebody is not holding the same, the
trajectory of the bullet would not be perpendicular or horizontal.[33]
The Court of Appeals agreed -
The finding of the lower court that Generoso Miranda III was shot
while the accused and the Mirandas were grappling for the possession of the gun
immediately after the accused had taken his gun from inside his car and before
the three allegedly fell to the ground behind the car of the accused is borne
out by the record. The court also
agrees with the court below that it was the accused-appellant who shot and
killed Generoso Miranda III. If the
accused-appellant did not shoot Generoso III during the scuffle, he would have
claimed accidental killing by alleging that his gun exploded during the scuffle
instead of falsely testifying that he and the Mirandas fell to the ground
behind his car and the gun exploded in the possession of Manuel Miranda. The theory of the prosecution that the
shooting took place while the three were grappling for the possession of the
gun beside the car of appellant is completely in harmony with the findings and
testimony of Dr. Ibarrola regarding the relative position of the three and the
precarious nearness of the victim when accused-appellant pulled the trigger of
his gun. Dr. Ibarrola explained that
the gun was about two (2) inches from the entrance wound and that its position
was almost perpendicular when it was fired.
It was in fact the closeness of the Mirandas vis-à-vis appellant during
the scuffle for the gun that the accused-appellant was compelled to pull the
trigger in answer to the instinct of self-preservation.[34]
No convincing reason appears for
the Court to depart from these factual findings, the same being ably supported
by the evidence on record. In violent
deaths caused by gunshot wounds, the medical report or the autopsy on the
cadaver of the victim must as much as possible narrate the observations on the
wounds examined. It is material in
determining the truthfulness of the events narrated by the witnesses
presented. It is not enough that the
witness looks credible and assumes that he indeed witnessed the criminal
act. His narration must be
substantiated by the physical evidence available to the court.
The medical examiner testified
that the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the target was about 2
inches but definitely not more than 3 inches.
Based on the point of exit and the trajectory transit of the wound, the
victim and the alleged assailant were facing each other when the shot was made
and the position of the gun was almost perpendicular when fired.[35] These findings disprove Tangan’s claim of accidental
shooting. A revolver is not prone to
accidental firing because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already
first cocked and pressure was exerted on the trigger. If it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied
on the trigger to fire the revolver.[36]
Having established that the
shooting was not accidental, the next issue to be resolved is whether Tangan
acted in incomplete self-defense. The
element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person
defending himself but from the victim.
A mere threatening or intimidating
attitude is not sufficient.[37] Likewise, the exchange of insulting words and
invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter how objectionable,
could not be considered as unlawful aggression, except when coupled with
physical assault.[38] There being no lawful aggression on the part of
either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defense falls. Tangan undoubtedly had possession of the gun,
but the Mirandas tried to wrestle the gun from him. It may be said that the former had no intention of killing the
victim but simply to retain possession of his gun. However, the fact that the victim subsequently died as a result
of the gunshot wound, though the shooter may not have the intention to kill,
does not absolve him from culpability.
Having caused the fatal wound, Tangan is responsible for all the
consequences of his felonious act. He
brought out the gun, wrestled with the Mirandas but anticipating that the gun
may be taken from him, he fired and fled.
The third requisite of lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself is not
supported by evidence. By repeatedly
blocking the path of the Mirandas for almost five times, Tangan was in effect
the one who provoked the former. The
repeated blowing of horns, assuming it was done by Generoso, may be irritating
to an impatient driver but it certainly could not be considered as creating so
powerful an inducement as to incite provocation for the other party to act
violently.
The appreciation of the ordinary
mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and passion and obfuscation
under Article 13, paragraphs 4 and 6,[39] have no factual basis. Sufficient provocation as a requisite of incomplete self-defense
is different from sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance. As an element of self-defense, it pertains
to its absence on the part of the person defending himself; while as a
mitigating circumstance, it pertains to its presence on the part of the
offended party. Besides, only one
mitigating circumstance can arise out of one and the same act.[40] Assuming for the sake of argument that the blowing of
horns, cutting of lanes or overtaking can be considered as acts of provocation,
the same were not sufficient. The word
“sufficient” means adequate to excite a person to commit a wrong and must
accordingly be proportionate to its gravity.[41] Moreover, Generoso’s act of asking for an explanation
from Tangan was not sufficient provocation for him to claim that he was
provoked to kill or injure Generoso.[42]
For the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation to be appreciated, it is required that (1) there be an
act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition
of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which
the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.[43]
In the case at bar, Tangan could
not have possibly acted upon an impulse for there was no sudden and unexpected
occurrence which wuld have created such condition in his mind to shoot the
victim. Assuming that his path was
suddenly blocked by Generoso Miranda due to the firecrackers, it can no longer
be treated as a startling occurrence, precisely because he had already passed
them and was already the one blocking their path. Tangan’s acts were done in the spirit of revenge and lawlessness,
for which no mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation can arise.
With respect to the penalty, under
the laws then existing, homicide was penalized with reclusion temporal,[44] but if the homicide was committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, the penalty shall be death.[45] The death penalty, however, cannot be imposed on
Tangan because in the meantime, the 1987 Constitution proscribed the imposition
of death penalty; and although it was later restored in 1994, the retroactive
application of the death penalty is unfavorable to him. Previously, the accused may be prosecuted
for two crimes: (1) homicide or murder
under the Revised Penal Code and (2) illegal possession of firearm in its
aggravated form under P.D. 1866.[46]
P.D. 1866 was amended by R.A. No.
8294,[47] which provides that if an unlicensed firearm is used
in murder or homicide, such use of unlicensed firearm shall be appreciated as
an aggravating circumstance and no longer considered as a separate offense,[48] which means that only one offense shall be punished –
murder or homicide. However, this law
cannot apply retroactively because it will result in the imposition on Tangan
of the maximum period of the penalty.
Moreover, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure,[49] the aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the
information. Being favorable, this new
rule can be given retroactive effect as they are applicable to pending cases.[50] In any case, Tangan was acquitted of the illegal
possession case.
Consequently, Tangan should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, if the prescribed penalty is composed of three periods, and there
is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the medium period shall be
applied. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which, in
view of the attendant circumstances, may be properly imposed, which in this
case is reclusion temporal medium with an imprisonment range of from
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months. The minimum of the
indeterminate sentence shall be the next lower degree which is prision mayor
with a range of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.[51] Hence, petitioner Tangan is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
The death indemnity of P30,000.00
was correctly increased by the appellate court to P50,000.00 in line with
jurisprudence.[52] Moral damages are awarded in criminal cases involving
injuries if supported by evidence on record,[53] but the stipulation of the parties in this case
substitutes for the necessity of evidence in support thereof. Though not awarded below, the victim’s heirs
are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 which is considered
reasonable considering the pain and anguish brought by his death.[54]
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 103613 is DISMISSED. The appealed decision subject of G.R. No.
105830 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, with all the accessory penalties.
(2) Tangan is ordered to pay the victim’s heirs P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P42,000.00 as funeral and burial expenses, P5,000.00 as attorney’s
fees, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo
in G.R. No. 105830, pp. 125-126.
[2] Criminal
Case No. T-17587; “That on or about the 1st day of December, 1984, in
the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named with intent to kill, with
treachery and with the use of an unlicensed firearm, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot Generoso Miranda
III, thereby inflicting upon his mortal gunshot wounds which directly caused
his death, contrary to law.” (Rollo in G.R. No. 105830, p. 12).
[3] The
Amended Information reads: “That on or about the 1st day of
December, 1984, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named with intent to
kill and armed with a gun, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shot with the said firearm (licensed) one
Generoso Miranda III, thereby hitting the latter in the abdomen and inflicting
upon him mortal gunshot wounds which directly caused his death, contrary to
law.” (Rollo in G.R. No. 105830, p. 12).
[4] Criminal
Case No. T-19350: “That on or about the 1st day of December, 1984,
in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused willfully and
feloniously have in possession, custody and control a Smith and Wesson Cal. 38
revolver with Serial No. C61898 (Yoke No. 7566) and five (5) live ammunitions
and one (1) empty shell without having procured the corresponding license or
permit therefor and which the said accused used in the commission of the crime
of homicide against the person of Generoso Miranda III, contrary to law.” (Rollo
in G.R. No. 105830, p. 13).
[5] G.R.
No. L-73963.
[6] Tangan
v. People, 155 SCRA 435 (1987).
[7]Rollo,
p. 105.
[8] The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial
Court Decision dated August 16, 1989 penned by Judge xxxx reads: “WHEREFORE,
premises considered in Criminal Case No. 178587 for the crime of Homicide
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with the
attendance of the privileged mitigating circumstances of incomplete self
defense and ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the
part of the offended party, and passion and obfuscation. For which reason, the
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2)
months of ARRESTO MAYOR, as minimum to two (2) years and four (4) months of
PRISION CORRECCIONAL, as maximum, with all the accessories of the law.
The preventive confinement of the accused shall be credited full time in his favor.
The accused is further ordered to pay to the heirs of Generoso Miranda namely, Ruby Miranda and Maria Miranda the following:
1. P30,000.00 for and as indemnity for causing the death of Generoso Miranda;
2. P42,000.00 for funeral burial and other related expenses;
3. P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Costs against the accused.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 19350 for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and ammunitions Used in the Commission of Homicide, and finding
the accused innocent to the charge against him, he is hereby ACQUITTED.” (Rollo
in G.R. No. 105830, p. 14).
[9] Illegal
possession of firearms and homicide with the use of unlicensed firearm are
generally non-bailable offenses under the 1973 Constitution which was in force
at the time of the commission of the crimes herein.
[10] The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
dated October 30, 1991, penned by Justice Cacdac, Jr. with Justices de Pano,
Jr. and Guingona, concurring consisting of 51-single space pages reads:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED with respect to the
indemnity for the death of the victim Generoso Miranda in the amount of
P50,000.00.
In all other respects, the appealed decision is affirmed. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.” (Rollo
in G.R. No. 105830, p. 131).
[11] CA
Resolution promulgated June 23, 1992 penned by Justice De Pano, Jr., with
Justices Guingona and Garcia, concurring; Rollo in G.R. No. 105830, pp.
133-136.
[12] Petition
for Certiorari filed by the Solicitor General (Francisco Chavez); Rollo
in G.R. No. 103613, pp. 105-106.
[13] The
several motions for extension filed by the Office of the Solicitor General were
signed by Solicitor General Ramon S. Desuasido and the other by Acting
Solicitor General Eduardo G. Montenegro.
[14] Comment
signed by Solicitor General Montenegro dated July 22, 1992; Rollo in
G.R. No. 103613, p. 407.
[15] Reply
to Comment dated September 28, 1992 filed by private respondent in G.R. No.
103613, Rollo, p. 412
[16] Petition
for Review, pp. 1-71; Rollo in G.R. No. 105830, pp. 7-77.
[17] Rejoinder
in G.R. No. 103613 of the new Solicitor General (Raul Goco) dated November 25,
1992, p. 3; Rollo, p. 422.
[18] Manifestation
and Motion by the Office of the Solicitor General (Raul Goco) dated December 2,
1992, p. 3; Rollo in G.R. No. 105830, p. 264.
[19] G.R.
No. 127444, September 13, 2000.
[20] Soriano
v. Hon. Angeles, G.R. No. 109920, August 31, 2000.
[21] People
v. Galapin, 293 SCRA 474 (1998); People v. Timblor, 285 SCRA 64
(1998).
[22] People
v. Arroyo, 111 SCRA 689 (1982); People v. Capitania, 49 Phil.
475.
[23] Rule 119, Section 3. Order of trial. — The trial shall proceed in the following
order:
x x x x x x x x x
(e) However,
when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified
accordingly.
[24] See
People v. Navarro, 7 Phil. 713; People v. Martin, 89 Phil. 18.
[25] People
v. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700 (1990); Ortega v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA
38 (1989); People v. Picardal, 151 SCRA 170 (1987).
[26] People
v. Yuman, 61 Phil. 786.
[27] People
v. Mahinay, G.R. No. 122485, February 1, 1999.
[28] People
v. Mamalayan, 280 SCRA 748 (1997); People v. Jagolingay, 280 SCRA
768 (1997); Rabaja v. CA, 280 SCRA 290 (1997); Padilla v. CA, 269
SCRA 402 (1997).
[29] People
v. Dizon, G.R. No. 126044-45, July 2, 1999.
[30] People
v. Alitagtag, G.R. Nos. 124449-51, June 29, 1999 citing People v. Quijada,
259 SCRA 191, 212-213 [1996].
[31] People
v. San Juan, G.R. No. 130969, February 29, 2000 citing People v. Gana,
Jr., 265 SCRA 260 (1996) and US v. Burns, 41 Phil. 418.
[32] Johnson
v. Emerson, (1871).
[33] Rollo
in G.R. No. 105830, p. 126.
[34] CA
Decision, dated October 30, 1991, p. 49; Rollo in G.R. No. 105830, p.
129.
[35] Rollo,
p. 84.
[36] People
v. Reyes, 69 SCRA 475 (1976).
[37] People
v. Pasco, Jr., 137 SCRA 137 (1985); People v. Rey, 172 SCRA 149
(1989).
[38] U.S.
v. Carrero, 9 Phil. 544.
[39] Article 13.
The following are mitigating circumstances:
x x x x x x x x x
4. that sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act.
x x x x x x x x x
6. that
of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced
passion or obfuscation.
[40] People
v. delos Santos, 85 Phil. 870.
[41] People
v. Nabora, 73 Phil. 434.
[42] See
People v. Laude, 58 Phil. 933.
[43] I
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, p. 272 (1998).
[44] Article
249, Revised Penal Code. The penalty for
homicide was not changed by R.A. No. 7659 though another law (Section 10, R.A.
No. 7610) provides that if the victim is under 12 years of age, the penalty
shall be one degree higher.
[45] P.D.
1866.
[46] Pursuant
to the old provisions of Section 1, P. D. 1866 and the court’s ruling in People
v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).
[47] An
act amending the provisions of P.D. 1866, as amended, entitled “Codifying the
laws on illegal/unlawful possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition or
distribution of firearms, ammunitions, or explosives or instruments used in the
manufacture of firearms, ammunitions or explosives and imposing stiffer
penalties for certain violations thereof and for relevant purposes.” (Took
effect July 6, 1997).
[48] People
v. Nepomuceno, Jr., G.R. No. 130800, June 29, 1999 citing People v.
Bergante, 286 SCRA 629 (1998); People v. Narvasa, 298 SCRA 637 (1998);
People v. Molina, 292 SCRA 742 (1998).
[49] Took
effect December 1, 2000.
[50] See
Oriental Assurance v. Solidbank, G.R. No. 139882, August 16, 2000.
[51] People
v. Acuram, G.R. No. 117954, April 27, 2000.
[52] People
v. Pedroso, G.R. No. 125128, July 19, 2000.
[53] People
v. Cayago, G.R. No. 128827, August 18, 1999 citing People v. Arguelles,
222 SCRA 166 (1993).
[54] People
v. Reynaldo Langit, G.R. Nos. 134757-58, August 4, 2000; People v.
Mindanao, G.R. No. 123095, July 6, 2000.