EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142861.
December 19, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ROGELIO OMBRESO y MUTIA alias “ROWING,” accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
This case comes to us for review
from the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, which found
accused-appellant Rogelio Ombreso guilty of rape and accordingly sentenced him
to death and to pay complainant Lorlyn Dimalata moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
and indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00.[1]
The information against accused-appellant
alleged:
“That on or about the 17th day of March 1998, in the
morning at barangay Cayaga, municipality of San Fernando, province of Bukidnon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, prompted by lewd design by means of force and intimidation
on the person of LORLYN N. DIMALATA, a six (6) year-old-minor, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally remove the panty of the latter who
was asleep, insert his penis into the vagina of LORLYN N. DIMALATA and have
sexual intercourse with LORLYN N. DIMALATA, against her will, to the damage and
prejudice of the victim in such amount as maybe allowed by law.”[2]
Accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty to the charge, whereupon he was tried.
The evidence for the prosecution
established the following: Complainant Lorlyn Dimalata, the fourth of the five
children of Angelito and Lucita Dimalata, was born on January 29, 1992.[3] At the time material to this case, she was only six
years old. Accused-appellant Rogelio
Ombreso, whom Lorlyn calls “Uncle Rowing,” is the husband of her father’s elder
sister, Angelita Dimalata.[4]
On March 16, 1998, Lorlyn and her
older sister Honeybee were left to the care of their paternal grandmother,
Candelaria Dimalata, in Purok 2, Cayaga, San Fernando, Bukidnon by their
mother, Lucita, as the latter had to stay for a few days in Malaybalay.[5] The next morning, March 17,
1998, while Lorlyn was still asleep and alone in the house as her sister
Honeybee had to go to the bathroom, accused-appellant arrived. What transpired afterward is narrated by
Lorlyn in court:
“Q While you were sleeping, can you recall if you were awaken from your sleep?
A Yes.
Q Why were you awaken from your sleep?
A (Witness no answer)
Q Now, on that morning of March 17, 1998, where was your Uncle Rowing?
A First he was in his house because according to him there is much noise in their house he transferred to the house of my Lola.
Q When your Uncle Rowing transferred to the house of your Lola Cande, what happened if any?
A He took off my panty.
Q What else did he do if any?
A He also removed his brief and his short pants.
Q Now, after he removed your panty and also removed his short pants and brief, what happened next if any?
A He placed himself on
top of me.
Q Were you able to see his penis?
A No, because I was still asleep.
Q Was the penis of your uncle entered into your vagina?
A No, just here, (witness pointing to her vagina)
Q Lorlyn, if this is your vagina, where was the penis of your uncle?
A Just here. (witness pointing to the upper part of the vagina opening)
Q Where particularly, can you clearly demonstrate to the court where was the penis of your uncle in relation to your vagina?
A Here. (witness
pointing to the same spot)
ASST. PROS. TORIBIO:
Your Honor, I demonstrate the diagram of the vagina.
INTERPRETER:
The prosecuting Fiscal demonstrated to the
witness her right hand with her thumb and index finger that oval shape of the
vagina and witness pointed to the place of the two fingers to demonstrate
the position of the penis of his uncle with respect to her vagina.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q The penis of your
uncle was it hard?
A Yes.
ASST. PROS. TORIBIO: (to the witness)
Q Did it take so long
for the penis of your uncle to touch your vagina?
A Yes.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Did you feel something coming out of the penis?
A No, Your Honor.
Q No fluid?
A None, Your Honor.
ASST. PROS. TORIBIO:
Q When the penis of your uncle was touching your vagina, what did you feel?
A I felt pain.
Q Why did you feel pain Lorlyn?
A Because he
repeatedly pushed his penis (bangga-bangga).”[6]
Lorlyn’s testimony was
corroborated by her elder sister, Honeybee Dimalata, who told the court that on
March 16, 1998, she and Lorlyn slept in the house of their paternal grandmother
Candelaria Dimalata and that in the morning of the next day, March 17, 1998,
she saw, through a hole in the door, accused-appellant remove Lorlyn’s clothes,
place himself on top of her sister (gihapaan), and then cover themselves
with a blanket. She said accused-appellant
threatened to dump Lorlyn in a hole if she squealed.[7]
On cross-examination, Honeybee
said that only she and Lorlyn slept in the sala of their grandmother’s house on
the night of March 16, 1998 and that the next morning, March 17, 1998, their
grandmother went over to accused-appellant’s house, which was nearby.[8]
The last prosecution witness was
Lucita Dimalata. She testified that she
arrived from Malaybalay at 4:00 in the afternoon of March 21, 1998 at the same
time that Honeybee and Lorlyn came from the Seventh Day Adventist church. According to Lucita, she learned about the
incident because Lorlyn told her that she was not going to get near her Uncle
Rowing again, because he had removed her underwear and placed himself on top of
her and “made a pump of his private parts.”
Honeybee confirmed what Lorlyn had said, because she saw the
incident. Lucita asked Lorlyn whether
she had told her grandmother about the incident. Lorlyn said she had not because accused-appellant had warned her
that he would throw her into a hole if she did.[9]
Lucita testified that she did not
confront accused-appellant at once out of fear considering that he was the
chairman of the Civilian Volunteers Organization (CVO) in their barangay. But, shortly afterward, accused-appellant
came to wash the motorcycle which he operated for hire in a water faucet near
her house. Upon seeing her, Lucita
claimed, accused-appellant was surprised and hurriedly left without cleaning
his motorcycle. As her suspicion was
confirmed, Lucita took Lorlyn to the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital in Malaybalay
on March 23, 1998 for an examination.
The following day, she and her daughters, Lorlyn and Honeybee, executed
affidavits in Camp Onahon, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, on the basis of which a complaint
for rape against accused-appellant was filed on March 30, 1998.[10] Lucita said the affidavits were executed in Camp
Onahon in Malaybalay City rather than in San Fernando because accused-appellant
had friends in the police force.[11]
On cross-examination, Lucita
admitted that she had a dispute with her husband’s siblings over
inheritance. She also admitted she did
not immediately tell her husband about the incident, but she claimed that she
kept quiet to ensure that accused-appellant would not be able to flee. She claimed that in 1987 her husband’s
nephew, Jovy Alabado, had raped her other daughter Hazel Faith but Alabado was
able to escape, because Candelaria Dimalata helped him.[12]
Accused-appellant, 43, testified
in his behalf. He denied the allegations
against him. A part-time motorcycle
driver plying the Calangan-San Fernando route, he claimed that at around 6:00
in the morning of March 17, 1998, he left his house in Cayaga, San Fernando,
Bukidnon and drove his motorcycle towards Calangan, two kilometers away, to
pick up passengers bound for poblacion San Fernando. On that day, he said he twice plied his route, stopping only for
lunch at San Fernando and going home to Cayaga at 4:00 in the afternoon. According to him, at no time on that day did
he ever see Lorlyn.[13]
Accused-appellant claimed that the
rape charge against him was instigated by Lorlyn’s mother, Lucita, whose claim
concerning a piece of land he had opposed.
He said that his wife and Lucita owned adjoining lots, but Lucita wanted
to extend her landholding beyond the creek, which served as the boundary
between the two lands. For opposing her
claim, accused-appellant said, Lucita vowed to take revenge against him.[14]
The other defense witness was
Candelaria Dimalata, Lorlyn’s grandmother, who was presented to corroborate
accused-appellant’s alibi. Candelaria
testified that Lorlyn, Honeybee, and her five other grandchildren slept in her
house in Cayaga, San Fernando, Bukidnon on the night of March 16, 1998. They had breakfast at 6:30 the next morning,
after which the children went out to play.
She denied ever leaving her house or having seen accused-appellant that
morning. She admitted, however, that
the distance of her house to the house of accused-appellant was only about 20
meters.[15]
Like accused-appellant, Candelaria
Dimalata said that Lucita filed the case against accused-appellant because they
had a dispute concerning lands owned by Lucita and accused-appellant’s wife.[16]
The defense presented in evidence
the medical certificate (Exh. “1”) issued by Dr. Joselyn Baeyens of the
Bukidnon Provincial Hospital, the authenticity of which was admitted by the
prosecution.[17] The certificate stated that Lorlyn was examined on
March 23, 1998 and that no laceration or abrasion was found in her hymen and
that she tested negative for spermatozoa.[18]
On February 7, 2000, the trial
court rendered judgment as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding accused Rogelio Ombreso y
Mutia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized
under Republic Act 8353 and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death. In line with recent
jurisprudence accused is further ordered to indemnify his victim Lorlyn
Dimalata the sum of P75,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00.”[19]
In this appeal, accused-appellant
alleges:
“I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WHEN THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH CONSIDERING THAT THERE WAS NO ACTUAL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE BETWEEN THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE ALLEGED RAPE VICTIM PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE VERSUS PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO.”[20]
FIRST. Accused-appellant
cites certain portions of the testimonies of Lorlyn, Honeybee, and Lucita
Dimalata which he claims are incredible, to wit: (1) Lorlyn’s testimony that
her mother Lucita arrived from Malaybalay, Bukidnon on March 17, 1998 is
inconsistent with Lucita’s testimony that she came back from Malaybalay on
March 21, 1998; (2) Lorlyn’s statement that accused-appellant did not penetrate
her allegedly contradicts her subsequent testimony that she felt pain in her
sex organ as accused-appellant kept pushing his penis into her vagina; (3)
Honeybee’s claim that she did not call for help despite the fact that she
allegedly saw her sister being molested by accused-appellant is contrary to human
nature; and (4) the claim of Lucita that she did not confront accused-appellant
after learning of her daughter’s misfortune, nor even tell her husband about
it, is likewise contrary to human experience.[21]
These contentions relate to the
evaluation of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. We have time and again said that the
evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses must be left to the trial court as
the agency in the best position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor on the
stand.[22] Unless shown that the trial court overlooked or
misunderstood some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could
affect the result of the case, its findings on questions of facts will not be
disturbed on appeal.[23] In this case, we have reviewed the record and found
nothing which would warrant a reversal of the trial court’s findings.
The discrepancy in the testimonies
of Lorlyn and Lucita as to the date when Lucita returned to Cayaga from
Malaybalay has no bearing on the principal question whether accused-appellant
had carnal knowledge of Lorlyn. Lorlyn,
who was only 6 years old, could have been mistaken as to the date her mother
came back from Malaybalay. It is more
probable her mother arrived on March 21, 1998, as testified by the latter,
since complainant was not examined until March 23, 1998. At all events what is noteworthy is that,
immediately after her mother arrived, Lorlyn told her about the incident.
Nor do we find it inconsistent for
Lorlyn to say that she felt pain in her sex organ and, in the next breath,
claim that accused-appellant’s penis did not penetrate her vagina. Her statement that accused-appellant’s penis
did not enter her sex organ simply means there was no full penetration. There can be no doubt, however, that there
was at least a partial entry, so as to make the crime consummated rape,
considering the pain the entry caused.
Complainant said she was hurt because accused-appellant repeatedly
pushed his penis into her vagina. When
a rape victim, as in this case, is of such age that she cannot be expected to
make a distinction between partial and full penile entry, her testimony that
the accused’s penis did not enter her
sex organ should be taken together with the rest of her testimony and not taken
out of context.
Neither do we find anything
unnatural in Honeybee’s failure to call for help despite the fact that she
witnessed her sister being molested.
Honeybee was herself a child of tender years, being only nine years old
at the time. Even in the case of
adults, this Court has found it not unnatural that they should fail to call for
help in situations like the one at bar.
In People vs. Torejos,[24] this Court
gave credence to the testimony of the victim’s mother pertaining to the rape of
her daughter despite the fact that, having caught the accused flagrante
delicto, she did not immediately raise an alarm. Instead, she told her husband about the incident only after it
had taken place.
Indeed, it is quite probable that
Honeybee was frightened when she heard accused-appellant threatening her sister
with harm, if she reported what he had done to her. The two were so frightened that neither of them disclosed the
incident to anyone except to their mother.
On the other hand, Lucita Dimalata
had a reason to keep quiet for a while.
As she testified:
“[ASST. PROS. TORIBIO]
Q Was there a time or occasion that you confronted Rogelio Ombreso of what he did to your daughter?
A No.
Q Why?
A Because I felt guilty to confront him considering that he is a chairman of the CVO, I was afraid.
Q When you said that you felt guilty you mean it that you were afraid?
A Yes.
Q How about your husband, did you inform your husband about what the accused did to his daughter?
A No.
Q Up to this very moment your husband does not know of what happened to your daughter?
A He already knew just recently.
Q What was the reaction of your husband when he knew about the incident?
A He in fact blame[d] me why I did not immediately inform him.
xx xx xx xx
Q You said also Mrs. Dimalata that you lied to your husband by not telling him of the filing of this case, why?
A Because of a previous incident wherein my daughter was raped by his nephew and when they knew about it they let that nephew flee and so with this case now I decided not to inform them so that they will not let the accused flee.
Q Now, who is that daughter of yours which was molested also by the nephew of your husband?
A Hazel Faith.
Q Wh[at] was the name of the nephew of your husband who molested your daughter Hazel Faith?
A Jovy Alabado whom my mother-in-law made to flee.
xx xx xx xx
COURT:
xx xx xx xx
Q When did this happen?
A April 27, 1987.”[25]
There is, it has been held, no
standard form of response to a strange, startling, or frightful experience.[26] Lucita’s explanation cannot simply be dismissed because
it is uncommon. Her reason for not
confronting the accused is plausible and is confirmed by the fact that her
affidavit and that of her children had to be executed in Malaybalay City rather
than in San Fernando because Lucita distrusted the local authorities. On the other hand, her explanation why she
did not tell her husband about the incident until the case was filed in court
and after accused-appellant’s arrest is plausible. Her husband’s nephew, Jovy Alabado, whom she claims raped her
eldest daughter Hazel Faith in 1987, was able to escape prosecution because her
husband’s mother, Candelaria Dimalata, helped the boy escape.
Indeed, it is accused-appellant’s
claim that the rape charge against him was merely fabricated by complainant’s
mother in order to get back at him which we find to be implausible. As the trial court well observed, it would
be contrary to human nature for a mother like Lucita to expose her daughter of
six years to the rigors of a trial for rape which may leave her stigmatized for
life, and, in addition, involve another daughter as corroborative witness, just
so she could exact her pound of flesh against accused-appellant. In several rape cases,[27] this Court has uniformly rejected similar defenses on
the ground that it is unbelievable.
Accused-appellant’s alibi is
unavailing. His claim that, at around
6:00 in the morning of March 17, 1998, he went to barangay Calangan to pick up
passengers bound for San Fernando, does not negate the possibility that he
might be present in Cayaga at the time of the commission of the crime, since
the distance between Cayaga and Calangan is only two kilometers. And even if accused-appellant proceeded to
San Fernando, the possibility that he committed the crime cannot be ruled out
since the distance of Cayaga to San Fernando is only 26 kilometers, and he was
using a motorcycle. For alibi to
prosper, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to
have been present at the crime scene at the time of its commission.[28]
Moreover, no witness was presented
to corroborate accused-appellant’s alibi.
To be sure, Candelaria Dimalata testified that accused-appellant did not
go to her house in the morning of March 17, 1998. Even so, however, her testimony is suspect not only because both
Lorlyn and Honeybee testified that at the time the former was molested,
Candelaria was in the house of accused-appellant, but also because she did not
deny Lucita’s allegation that Candelaria begged her (Lucita) to drop the case. As Lucita testified:
“[ASST. PROS. TORIBIO]
Q When your mother-in-law learned that Rogelio Ombreso was arrested, what was her reaction if any?
A She cried.
Q Did she not confront you?
A She did.
Q What was her purpose in talking with you?
A She requested for my pity that I allowed Rogelio Ombreso to be released.
Q What did you answer if any to your mother-in-law?
A I told her that I cannot decide on letting him be released.
Q Who will xx xx xx then decide to release him?
A The court.”[29]
Significantly, although Candelaria
testified that in the morning of March 17, 1998, her five other grandchildren
were in the house, none was presented by the defense to corroborate
Candelaria’s claim.
SECOND.
Accused-appellant argues that, if at all, he is only liable either for
attempted rape or for acts of lasciviousness following the ruling in People
vs. Campuhan.[30] For this
purpose, he cites the testimony of Lorlyn that accused-appellant’s organ “did
not enter” her genitalia and the results of Lorlyn’s medical examination which
show that she did not suffer hymenal laceration or abrasion.[31]
The contention has no merit. In that case, it was held that the crime was
merely attempted rape because all that the prosecution evidence showed, based
on the testimony of the victim’s mother, was that she saw the accused “with his
short pants down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel [the victim] x x x
forcing his penis into Crysthel’s vagina.”[32] For this reason, in finding the accused guilty of
attempted rape only, this Court held:
“It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that
Primo’s kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible. Not even a vantage point from the side of
the accused and the victim would have provided Corazon an unobstructed view of
Primo’s penis supposedly reaching Crysthel’s external genitalia, i.e., labia
majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and arms of
Primo would have hidden his movements from Corazon’s sight, not to discount the
fact that Primo’s right hand was allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking
it from Corazon’s view. It is the
burden of the prosecution to establish how Corazon could have seen the sexual
contact and to shove her account into the permissive sphere of
credibility. It is not enough that she
claims that she saw what was done to her daughter. It is required that her claim be properly demonstrated to inspire
belief. xx xx xx xx.”[33]
Indeed, all that the victim said
in that case was that the accused’s penis “touch[ed] her organ” but did not “penetrate
[it].”[34] Hence, this Court concluded:
“This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that
enshrouds the question of whether rape in this case was consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primo’s
penis penetrating her vagina, however slight xx xx xx xx. Nor can it be deduced that in trying to
penetrate the victim’s organ the penis of the accused touched the middle
portion of her vagina and entered the labia of her pudendum as
the prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to
penetrate Crysthel. Corazon did not
say, nay, not even hint that Primo’s penis was erect or that he responded with
an erection. On the contrary, Corazon
even narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing
that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim.”[35]
But, in the case at bar, the
victim herself testified. She told the
trial court:
“[ASST. PROS. TORIBIO]
Q Now, after he removed your panty and also removed his short pants and brief, what happened next if any?
A He placed himself on top of me.
xx xx xx
xx
Q Was the penis of your uncle entered into your vagina?
A No, just here. (witness pointing to her vagina).
Q Lorlyn, if this is your vagina, where was the penis of your uncle?
A Just here. (witness pointing to the upper part of
the vagina opening)
Q Where particularly, can you clearly demonstrate to the court where was the penis of your uncle in relation to your vagina?
A Here. (witness pointing to the same spot).
ASST. PROS. TORIBIO:
Your Honor, I demonstrate the diagram of the vagina.
INTERPRETER:
The prosecuting Fiscal demonstrated to the
witness her right hand with her thumb and index finger that oval shape of the
vagina and witness pointed to the place of the two fingers to demonstrate
the position of the penis of his uncle with respect to her vagina.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q The penis of your
uncle was it hard?
A Yes.
ASST. PROS. TORIBIO: (to the witness)
Q Did it take so long for
the penis of your uncle to touch your vagina.
A Yes.
xx xx xx
xx
Q When the penis of your uncle was touching your vagina, what did you feel?
A I felt pain.
Q Why did you feel pain Lorlyn?
A Because he
repeatedly pushed his penis (bangga-bangga).”[36]
Thus, although there was no full
penetration, and therefore no laceration of the hymen as the examining
physician said, accused-appellant’s penis nonetheless touched the upper part of
complainant’s vaginal opening. As
accused-appellant repeatedly pushed his organ into complainant’s vagina, the
latter suffered pain. Unlike in Campuhan,
where this Court found that accused did not attain erection, and his penis
was flaccid, here, accused-appellant’s penis, according to the victim, was
erect and, for a long time, accused-appellant tried to make a full
penetration. This was no mere
“stroking” or “grazing of the surface of the female organ,” as this Court
described what took place in the Campuhan case. What happened in this case was a
penetration, albeit not a full one because of the relative smallness of
complainant’s vagina. Although the
victim many times said “just here” in pointing to the spot in her genitalia
which was touched by accused-appellant’s male organ, “just here,” as she
demonstrated, meant the “upper part of [her] vaginal opening.” It was therefore consummated rape which
accused-appellant committed.
Thus, it is not People vs.
Campuhan, but the case of People vs. Puertollano,[37] which
governs this case. In Puertollano, the
victim was ten years old. She testified
that after undressing her, the accused lifted her and tried to insert his penis
into her vagina, but, encountering difficulty, he changed their position and
instead placed the victim on a bench, and lay on top of her. He then attempted to have sexual intercourse
with her, as a result of which, the child felt excruciating pain in her sex
organ. As in the case at bar, the
medical examination in that case showed that the child’s hymen was intact although
abrasion and hyperemia were noted in the vulva. Accused was found guilty of consummated rape. On appeal, he argued that, it at all, he was
liable only for attempted rape. This
Court dismissed his claim and affirmed his conviction, finding that there was
partial penetration. It was explained
that full or deep penetration is not necessary for rape to be consummated.
Significantly, the Court in Campuhan
acknowledged that a victim’s testimony that she felt pain in her sex organ
during the assault constitutes sufficient proof that the rape was consummated,
thus:
“(I)n cases where penetration was not fully established, the Court
had anchored its conclusion that the rape was nevertheless committed on the
victim’s testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal finding of
discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia majora was already
gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer visible.”[38]
And, in People vs. Palicte,[39] in which
although the victim’s hymen was found intact and she claimed that during the
attack she felt pain in her genitalia, it was held:
“In the case before us, (private complainant) repeatedly testified that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina x x x, as a consequence of which she felt pain. This, at least, could be nothing but the result of the penile penetration sufficient to constitute rape. Being a virgin, as found by the examining physician, her hymenal resistance could be strong as to prevent full penetration. But just the same, penetration there was, which caused the pain. For, rape is committed even with the slightest penetration of the woman’s sex organ. Mere entry of the labia of lips of the female organ without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, as in this case x x x is sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated rape.”
It is true that in People vs.
Francisco[40] and People vs. Mariano,[41] the Court
found the accused liable for attempted rape only notwithstanding the
complainant’s testimony that accused-appellant kept pushing his sex organ
against her genitalia causing her much pain.
In none of these cases, however, was the complainant ever made to
demonstrate, with the use of an illustration of the female genitalia, the exact
spot penetrated by the accused’s sex organ.
Indeed, the ruling in Mariano was based, in large part, upon the
victim’s admission that there was no penile penetration of her vagina, but only
“fingering.” Similarly, the complainant
in Francisco testified that the accused merely poked his penis at her
genitalia, nudging instead her anus in the process. At the very least, therefore, it was doubtful whether there was
penetration of either the labia.
As to the doctor’s finding that
Lorlyn had no hymenal lacerations or abrasions, note should be made of the fact
that her examination was made only on March 23, 1998, six days after she had
been raped. In addition, it has also
been noted that the small vaginal orifice of child rape victims could explain
the lack of hymenal laceration/s.[42]
At any rate, it is settled that
the absence of hymenal lacerations or abrasions as well as of seminal fluid,
spermatozoa, or hematoma around the genital area does not negate the commission
of rape.[43] As observed in a recent case:
“There is no gainsaying that medical evidence is merely
corroborative, and is even dispensable, in proving the crime of rape. In child sexual abuse cases particularly,
normal physical findings are common due to several factors, such as delay in
seeking medical examination, the rapid healing of injuries, washing, urinating
or defecating after the sexual assault, the elasticity of the hymen, changes in
the hymenal tissue due to estrogen effect when the victim is at the pubertal
stage, or the type of sexual molestation involved, such as fondling, oral
sodomy, or cunnilingus, which leaves no physical marks. The child’s disclosure is the most important
evidence of the sexual abuse she has gone through.”[44]
Nor is there any question that
accused-appellant in this case committed rape by means of threat and
intimidation. A 43-year old motorcycle
driver and an uncle of private complainant, accused-appellant exercised not
only physical superiority but also moral ascendancy over his six-year old
victim such that his threat to inflict physical harm on her effectively cowed
the child into submitting to his lustful designs. This Court has repeatedly observed that in rape cases, it is not
uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be intimidated by the mildest threat
against her life.[45]
Under Art. 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, which took effect on October
22, 1997,[46] rape is consummated upon contact, however slight, of
the male organ with the labia of the victim’s genitalia by means of force,
threat, or intimidation.[47] On the other hand, attempted rape is committed when
the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts but does
not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance.
For the foregoing reasons, we find
that the elements of consummated rape have been duly proven in this case as
provided under Art. 266-A, par. 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
THIRD. The
trial court correctly imposed the death penalty on accused-appellant. Under Art. 266-B, as amended, the death
penalty is to be imposed if the offended party is a child below seven (7) years
old. In this case, Lorlyn’s birth
certificate shows that she was born on January 29, 1992. Hence, at the time of the commission of the
rape on March 17, 1998, she was less than seven years of age.
The Court likewise sustains the
award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 and moral damages
in the amount of P50,000.00 as they are in accord with prevailing
jurisprudence.[48]
Four (4) members of the Court,
although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People
vs. Echegaray[49] that R.A.
No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is unconstitutional,
nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, by the vote of 10 to 4 of its members (the latter
being of the opinion that the crime committed is attempted rape), the Court
AFFIRMED the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay City,
finding accused-appellant guilty of consummated rape and sentencing him to
death pursuant to Art. 266-A(1)(a) and Art. 266-B, par. 6(5) of the Revised
Penal Code and ordering him to pay the complainant Lorlyn Dimalata the sums of P75,000.00
as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The dissenting opinions, in one of which two members of the Court
concurred, are hereto attached as Annexes A and B.
In accordance with Section 25 of
R.A. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of
this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith transmitted to the
Office of the President for the possible exercise of the sovereign prerogative
of mercy.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo,
Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Buena, J., abroad on official business.
[1] Per Judge Vivencio
P. Estrada.
[2] Rollo, p. 5.
[3] As evidenced by a
copy of Lorlyn’s birth certificate (Exh. A).
[4] TSN (Lucita
Dimalata), Aug. 11, 1999, pp. 23, 28.
[5] Id., pp.
23-25.
[6] Id., pp.
13-16 (underscoring supplied).
[7] TSN (Honeybee
Dimalata), Aug. 11, 1999, pp. 3-6.
[8] Id., p. 9.
[9] TSN (Lucita
Dimalata), Aug. 11, 1999, pp. 24-27.
[10] Id., pp.
24-28, 32-33.
[11] Id., pp.
28-29, 36-37.
[12] Id., pp.
33-34, 37.
[13] TSN (Rogelio
Ombreso), Oct. 11, 1999, pp. 16-20.
[14] Id., pp.
22-24.
[15] TSN (Candelaria
Dimalata), Oct. 11, 1999, pp. 4-6, 11.
[16] Id., pp. 6-9.
[17] TSN, Oct. 11, 1999,
p. 27.
[18] Records, p. 6.
[19] Rollo, p. 15.
[20] Id., pp. 1-2.
[21] Accused-appellant’s
Brief, pp. 6-17; Rollo, pp. 6-17.
[22] See People vs.
Digma, G.R Nos. 127750-52, Nov. 20, 2000; People vs. Tundag, G.R. Nos.
135695-96, Oct. 12, 2000.
[23] People vs.
Ulgasan, 335 SCRA 441 (2000); People vs. Padilla, 301 SCRA 265 (1999).
[24] 326 SCRA 75 (2000).
[25] TSN (Lucita
Dimalata), Aug. 11, 1999, pp. 28-29, 37 (underscoring supplied).
[26] People vs.
Roncal, 272 SCRA 242 (1997); People vs. Barcelona, 325 SCRA 168 (2000).
[27] E.g., People
vs. Segui, G.R. Nos. 131532-34, Oct. 28, 2000; People vs. Villaraza, 339
SCRA 666 (2000); People vs. Cula, 329 SCRA 101 (2000); People vs.
Rosare, 264 SCRA 398 (1996).
[28] People vs. Gonzales,
G.R. Nos. 139445-46, June 20, 2001; People vs. Tabarangao, 303 SCRA 623
(1999).
[29] TSN (Lucita
Dimalata), Aug. 11, 1999, p. 30.
[30] 329 SCRA 270 (2000).
[31] Appellee’s Brief,
pp. 26-30; Rollo, pp. 26-30.
[32] People vs.
Campuhan, supra at 279.
[33] Id. at p. 283
[34] Id. at p.
284.
[35] Id. at pp.
284-285.
[36] TSN, Aug. 11, 1999,
pp. 14-16 (underscoring supplied).
[37] 308 SCRA 356
(1999). See also People vs.
Castromero, 280 SCRA 421 (1997).
[38] People vs.
Campuhan, supra at 285-286 (underscoring supplied).
[39] 229 SCRA 543,
547-548 (1994) (underscoring supplied).
See also the case of People vs. Gabris, 258 SCRA 663
(1996).
[40] G.R. Nos. 135201-02,
March 15, 2001.
[41] G.R. Nos. 135511-13,
November 14, 2001.
[42] People vs.
Ayo, 305 SCRA 543 (1999).
[43] People vs.
Domantay, 307 SCRA 1 (1999); People vs. Dela Peña, 233 SCRA 573 (1994).
[44] People vs. Bohol,
G.R. Nos. 141712-13, August 22, 2001 (underscoring supplied).
[45] People vs.
Villamor, 297 SCRA 262 (1998), citing cases.
[46] People vs. Tundag, G.R.
Nos. 135695-96, Oct. 12, 2000.
[47] See People vs.
Domantay, 307 SCRA 1 (1999); People vs. Evangelista, 282 SCRA 37 (1997).
[48] See People vs.
Brondial, G.R. No. 135517, Oct. 18, 2000.
[49] 267 SCRA 682 (1997).