THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140544.  December 7, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELMER DAMITAN Y MANTAWEL, defendant-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

In self-defense, the basic rule that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies on the prosecution is reversed and the burden of proof is shifted to the accused to prove the elements of his defense.  It then becomes incumbent upon him to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution, for even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after he had admitted the killing.[1]

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision[2] dated 14 September 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Branch 8, in Criminal Case No. 8965-98 finding Elmer Damitan y Mantawel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Charge

On 15 June 1998, Elmer Damitan y Mantawel was charged in an Information[3] for the crime of  Murder which reads:

“That on or about the 27th day of April 1998, in the morning, at Sitio Likoliko, Barangay Butong, Municipality of Quezon, Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill by means of treachery, armed with a sharp bladed weapon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and stab LEON CAHAPON, SR., inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries which caused the instantaneous death of LEON CAHAPON, SR., to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of LEON CAHAPON, SR. in such amount as may be allowed by law.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659.”

Arraignment and Plea

Upon arraignment, accused Damitan, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.[4] Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Trial

The prosecution presented Conrado Sumin-ao, Junine Cahapon and Trinidad Cahapon as witnesses. The defense presented as its sole witness accused Damitan himself who admitted having stabbed the victim Cahapon but invoked the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented as its first witness Conrado Sumin-ao, 61 years old, a farmer and a datu chieftain of the Manobo tribe and  resident of Butong, Quezon, Bukidnon.[5] He testified that on 27 April 1998, at around five o’clock in the morning, he was at the barrio hall in Butong with the victim Leon Cahapon, a purok leader in the sitio. They had agreed the day before to meet at the barrio hall to transfer the basketball court.[6] Cahapon’s grandson Junine, who was riding a horse, arrived at the barrio hall and asked his grandfather to fix the rope of the horse. While victim Cahapon was fixing the rope of the horse, accused Damitan arrived and suddenly stabbed Cahapon twice with a hunting knife about ten (10) inches long.[7]

Witness Sumin-ao was more or less one (1) meter away from the victim when the stabbing incident took place. He saw the first strike hit the victim’s right breast and the second hit the lower portion of the first stab wound. Witness Sumin-ao testified that the “strike of Elmer came from behind towards the front” of Cahapon.[8] When victim Cahapon  fell  down  after  the  first  stabbing,   witness  Sumin-ao  held  him.  Accused Damitan stabbed victim Cahapon for the second time while the latter was already lying down.[9] Thereafter, Damitan surrendered himself to the military detachment at BUSCO. Witness Sumin-ao went to the barangay captain to report the incident.[10]

Prosecution witness Junine Cahapon, a 13-year old  Grade 5 pupil and resident of Sitio Likoliko, Butong, Quezon, Bukidnon is the grandson of the victim.[11] He testified that he went to the barrio hall and requested his grandfather to fix the rope of his horse which was detached. He was about one and a half (1½) meters away from his grandfather when he saw accused Damitan stab his grandfather at the right side of the breast.[12]

Trinidad Cahapon, the 60-year old widow of the victim, testified that she grieved upon learning of her husband’s death.  Trinidad spent P27,000.00 for the burial expenses of her husband. [13]

The testimony of Dr. Romeo Egang, the attending physician, was dispensed with in view of the admission by the defense of victim Cahapon’s Death Certificate as proof of the fact of death. The cause of death was  “Cardio-respiratory arrest, blood loss due to stab wounds.”[14]

Version of the Defense

Accused Damitan admitted that he stabbed victim Cahapon but claimed that he acted in self-defense. Thereafter, he went to the military detachment at BUSCO, Butong,  Quezon,  Bukidnon  to  surrender.[15]

Accused Damitan testified that on 25 April 1998, at four o’clock in the afternoon, while he was cooking supper at their yard, he saw the victim’s wife shooing away his chickens to the house of the victim. He told her that the chickens belonged to him and in fact one of the chickens had a tie on its leg. On 26 April 1998, at two o’clock in the afternoon, accused Damitan saw victim Cahapon catch his chicken.  This prompted accused Damitan to see Datu Sumin-ao to complain against victim Cahapon who became angry and threatened the accused.

On 27 April 1998, at five o’clock in the morning, victim Cahapon went to Damitan’s house and, in a very harsh tone, challenged the accused to go down from his house. While accused Damitan was going down the third step of the “ladder”, victim Cahapon boxed him twice, causing him to fall on his back. Cahapon knelt on Damitan’s belly and tried to stab the latter with a knife. Damitan evaded the strike and  was able to wrest the knife from Cahapon. Then, Cahapon with his two hands choked Damitan who lost consciousness. Damitan did not realize that he had stabbed Cahapon twice until the latter fell down. Damitan ran away towards the military detachment at BUSCO to surrender.[16] On cross-examination, Damitan testified that he used the knife of Cahapon to stab the latter.[17]

Trial Court’s Ruling

On 14 September 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused Damitan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Elmer Damitan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and (sic) defined and penalized under the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, and there being no ordinary aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of his victim Leon Cahapon the sum of P50,000.00.”

The Issues

Hence, the present appeal. Accused-appellant Damitan raised the following assignment of errors:

“I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.”

The Court’s Ruling

We find the appeal without merit.

In the first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court failed to appreciate the justifying circumstance of self-defense. He avers that the elements of self-defense are present. He claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim Cahapon.  It was Cahapon who called him in a very harsh tone and challenged him to go down from his house. When appellant was going down the “ladder”, Cahapon allegedly boxed him. Thereafter, Cahapon tried to stab him with a knife but he was  able to disarm Cahapon and then they struggled. Appellant further argues that the knife belonged to the victim and he merely prevented or repelled the attack against his person.

We uphold the trial court’s rejection of appellant’s plea of self-defense.

When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of his defense.[18] However, appellant’s version of the incident was uncorroborated. His bare and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over the positive identification of the two (2) principal witnesses of the prosecution.[19] There was no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witnesses were moved  by improper motive to testify against the appellant. Hence, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit. The rule is settled that factual findings of the trial court are accorded great respect since the trial court is in a much better position than an appellate court to properly evaluate the evidence and observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying.[20] The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and there is no reason to depart therefrom.

As found by the trial court and this Court, appellant Damitan went to the barrio hall and suddenly stabbed victim Cahapon from behind. He was clearly identified by prosecution witnesses Sumin-ao and Junine who were very near the victim. Appellant was likewise not a stranger to the two (2)  prosecution witnesses. Sumin-ao knew appellant as a  member of the same Manobo tribe of which Sumin-ao is the datu chieftain.[21] Appellant was also a neighbor of prosecution witness Junine whose house is about thirty-five (35) meters from the house of appellant.[22] Junine saw appellant coming from the latter’s house and walking towards the barrio hall.[23] Appellant, without  uttering a word, suddenly stabbed victim Cahapon  at the right portion of his breast. The first strike came from behind while victim Cahapon was facing the horse and fixing the rope.  Then, appellant stabbed victim Cahapon for the second time while the latter was lying down.

Self-defense as a justifying circumstance must satisfy the following requirements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the person defending himself.[24] The absence of unlawful aggression negates the existence of self-defense.[25] Here, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. To constitute aggression, the person attacked must face a real threat to his life and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not imaginary.[26] The victim was facing the horse and fixing its rope when appellant attacked him. Indeed, there was no real danger to appellant’s life  or  personal  safety.

It is difficult to believe appellant’s claim that there was a scuffle between him and the victim Cahapon after Cahapon had boxed appellant while the latter was going down the “ladder”. There were no bruises, contusions or marks on the bodies of either of them.

Moreover, the presence of two (2) fatal stab wounds on the breast of victim Cahapon negates self-defense. The  victim was stabbed by appellant not once but twice. The first hit the right breast of the victim while he was facing the horse and fixing its rope, unaware of the deadly attack from behind. The second stab wound was inflicted while the victim was already lying down and completely defenseless.  The nature, location and number of wounds inflicted by the accused on the victim belie and negate the claim of self-defense.  It is a recognized principle that the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim are important indicia to disprove a plea of self-defense.[27]

On the second assigned error, appellant argues that the mere fact  the victim was hit at the back is not enough to constitute treachery. Appellant insists that it was the victim Cahapon who provoked him when Cahapon challenged him to go down from his house. Appellant contends that if ever he is found guilty, he should only be liable for the crime of Homicide and not Murder.

We are not persuaded.

The position and manner of the attack on the victim Cahapon  clearly indicate the presence of treachery. Appellant arrived at the barrio hall and, without a word of warning, suddenly stabbed Cahapon twice. Cahapon was then fixing the rope of the horse of his grandson and facing the horse when appellant stabbed him from behind. Thereafter, while the victim was already lying down, appellant stabbed him for the second time. 

True, the stab wounds were frontal, i.e., at the right portion of the breast. However, the evidence clearly established that appellant stabbed Cahapon from behind. Witness Sumin-ao testified as follows:

“Q    Now at what point in time wherein he was stabbed by Elmer Damitan while fixing the rope of the horse or before that time?

A      He was stabbed while he was fixing the rope of the horse.

Q      So when he was fixing the rope therefore, he was facing the horse?

A      Yes, ma’am.

Q      And then this Elmer Damitan from where did he come wherein he stabbed Leon Cahapon?

A      From his house.

Q      To the place where Leon Cahapon was stabbed how far is the house of Elmer Damitan?

A      More or less fifteen (15) meters.

Q      So that, therefore, Datu Sumin-ao, when Leon Cahapon was stabbed by Elmer Damitan his back was facing Elmer Damitan?

A      Yes, ma’am.

Q      Now how about you how far were you from Leon Cahapon when he was stabbed by Elmer Damitan?

A      More or less one (1) meter.

Q      Now were you facing each other? 

A      We were side by side.

Q      Now how many times did Elmer Damitan stab Leon Cahapon?

A      Twice.

Q      Now the first stab of Elmer Damitan was Leon Cahapon hit?

A      Yes, ma’am

Q      Where was he hit?

A      Here. (Witness, pointing to his right breast).

Q      How about the second hit where was he hit?

A      On the lower portion of the first hit.

Q      Now when this Leon Cahapon, Datu Sumin-ao, was stabbed by Elmer Damitan you said that his back was facing Elmer Damitan and then why is it that he was stabbed in front of his breast or chest?

A      Because the strike of Elmer came from behind towards the front of Leon.”[28]

Verily, the manner of attack by appellant was sudden and unexpected leaving the victim Cahapon defenseless. By positioning himself at the back of the victim and suddenly stabbing the latter from behind, appellant employed means and methods which tended directly and specially to insure the execution of the crime, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make.[29] And by stabbing the victim a second time when the victim was already lying down, appellant employed means to insure or afford impunity.

Treachery qualified the killing of Cahapon to murder and pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, the penalty for the crime of Murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating circumstance, the trial court was correct in sentencing appellant Damitan to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

On the third assigned error, appellant contends that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been appreciated by the trial court. He argues that after the stabbing incident, he went to the military detachment at BUSCO to voluntarily surrender.

We agree that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is present in this case. Appellant immediately surrendered himself to the authorities and this fact is not disputed by the prosecution. However, since the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed upon appellant is an indivisible penalty,[30] the same  shall be applied regardless of any mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 63 of the  Revised Penal Code.[31]

Finally, an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of the Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether it is made the subject of an assignment of error or not.[32] In finding appellant Damitan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, the trial court properly awarded the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The rule is settled that civil indemnity ex delicto can be awarded forthwith to the heirs of the victim by proof alone of such fact of death.[33] The trial court was likewise correct in not awarding actual damages there being no proof presented to justify such an award, except the bare testimony of the victim's widow that she spent P27,000.00 as burial expenses.[34] However, we find the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages proper considering that the victim’s  heir suffered grief.  Thus, in line with prevailing jurisprudence,[35] the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is granted to the heirs of the victim Leon Cahapon, Sr.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Elmer Damitan y Mantawel is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Leon Cahapon, Sr. the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.


[1] People vs. Vallador, 257 SCRA 515, 524.

[2] Penned by Judge Vivencio P. Estrada.

[3] Record of Criminal Case No. 8965-98, p. 14.

[4] Order of 14 July 1998, Ibid, p. 22.

[5] TSN, 17 May 1999, pp. 3-5.

[6] Ibid, pp. 6-7.

[7] Ibid, pp. 8-9 & 13-14.

[8] Ibid, pp. 9-11.

[9] Ibid, p. 11.

[10] Ibid, p. 12 .

[11] Ibid, pp. 25-26.

[12] Ibid, pp. 27-28.

[13] Ibid, pp. 38-39.

[14] Exhibit “A”, Record of Criminal Case No. 2370, p. 5; TSN, 17 May 1999, pp. 2-3.

[15] TSN, 22 June 1999, pp. 2-3.

[16] Ibid, pp. 2-9.

[17] Ibid, p. 10.

[18] People vs. Bitoon, Sr., 309 SCRA 209; People vs. Santillana, 308 SCRA 104.

[19] People vs. Gailo, 316 SCRA 733.

[20] People vs. Grefalde, 298 SCRA 337; People vs. Aquino, 284 SCRA 369.

[21] TSN, 17 May 1999, p. 5.

[22] Ibid, p. 27.

[23] Ibid, p. 33.

[24] People vs. Emberga, 319 SCRA 304; People vs. Patalinghug, 318 SCRA 116; Article 11 (1) of the  Revised Penal Code provides: “Justifying circumstances.- The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1.  Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

     First. Unlawful aggression.

     Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

     Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.”

[25] People vs. Bautista, 312 SCRA 475.

[26] People vs. Langres, 316 SCRA 769.

[27] People vs. Bitoon, Sr., 309 SCRA 209; People vs. Unarce, 270 SCRA 756.

[28] TSN, 17 May 1999, pp. 8-10.

[29] Par. 16, Article 14, Revised Penal Code.

[30] People vs. Quitlong, 292 SCRA 360.

[31] People vs. Mengote, 305 SCRA 380;    ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. –

In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless  of   any  mitigating  nor  aggravating   circumstances   that   may   have  attended   the commission of the deed. x x x.

[32] People vs. Juachon, 319 SCRA 761; People vs. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 687.

[33] People vs. Basco, 318 SCRA 615; People vs. Borreros, 306 SCRA 680.

[34] People vs. Robles, Jr., 305 SCRA 273; People vs. Rosario, 246 SCRA 658.

[35] People vs. Tanzon, 320 SCRA 762; People vs. Recones, 310 SCRA 809.