FIRST DIVISION
[G.R.
No. 139849. December 5, 2001]
JOHN MANGIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Not only did petitioner John
Mangio breach the law when he committed estafa in the case at bar, he also
breached the trust reposed upon him by his former business partners, private
complainant spouses Reynaldo and Aurea Dillena. Indeed, he should be taught a lesson and penalized, for
dishonesty and unfaithfulness not only disrupt peace and order, but also deeply
undermine good human relations.
Petitioner Mangio filed this
petition for review on certiorari to reverse the respondent court's
Decision dated March 31, 1999 and Resolution dated August 25, 1999 affirming
the trial court's decision convicting him of estafa.
An information for estafa under
Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code was filed against petitioner
Mangio on January 4, 1994, viz:
"The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses John Mangio of the crime of estafa, penalized under the provisions of Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That in or about the month of January, 1991, in the municipality of Hagonoy, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from the complaining witness (sic) Reynaldo and Aurea Dillena an owner-type jeep bearing Plate No. CCS-121 with a total value of P40,000.00 with the express obligation to deliver the said jeep to Agnes Salvador as payment for an obligation, but the said accused once in possession of the said jeep and far from complying with his aforesaid obligation and inspite of repeated demands for such compliance, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with unfaithfulness, abuse of confidence and intent to gain, misapply, misappropriate and convert the said jeep to third person, to the damage and prejudice of the said Reynaldo and Aurea Dillena in the said amount of P40,000.00.
Contrary to law."[1]
The following facts spurred the
present controversy:
Petitioner Mangio and private
complainant Aurea Dillena used to be business partners. In October 1990, Aurea and her husband,
Reynaldo Dillena, approached the petitioner as they badly needed money because
of the losses they suffered in their fishpond business. The petitioner informed them that they could
ask help from his friend, Agnes Salvador, and accompanied the couple to the latter
so they could borrow money from her with the petitioner as guarantor. As Salvador did not have money at that time,
the Dillena couple went back to her on some other day and obtained a P50,000.00
loan. Salvador asked the Dillenas to
issue a check for P50,000.00 as evidence of the loan. The Dillenas obliged, but told Salvador that their checking
account was already closed. When the
loan fell due, Salvador asked the couple to make good their check. The couple failed to do so, and instead
asked Mangio to bring P10,500.00 to Salvador.
The payment was evidenced by a receipt.[2] Aurea, however, also
testified that Mangio subsequently came to the Dillenas' house and told her and
Reynaldo that Salvador refused to accept the P10,500.00 and demanded payment of
the entire P50,000.00. The couple told
Mangio that they would give Salvador whatever she needed other than cash. Mangio came back to their house after some
time and told them that their loan had increased to P64,000.00, and that
Salvador instructed him to get the couple's Toyota jeep as payment for the
loan. Mangio showed them a type-written
agreement, the "Dapat Malaman ng Lahat" dated January 19, 1991, viz:
"DAPAT MALAMAN NG LAHAT
KASULATAN NG KASUNDUAN
Na, ako si Reynaldo Boy Dillena, kasal kay Aurea Dillena, sapat na gulang, at kasalukuyang naninirahan sa Sto. Niño, Hagonoy, Bulacan ay may nakuhang pera kay Gng. Agnes M. Salvador kasal kay Rodolfo Salvador na taga Sta. Ana, Bulacan, Bulacan ng halagang ANIMNAPO AT APAT NA LIBONG PISO (P64,000.00) Perang Pilipino at ito ay aking babayaran sa ika-28 ng Pebrero 1991. At kung sakali at hindi ko maibalik o mabayaran ay aking ipananagot ang aking sasakyan na may mapagkakakilanlan ay ang sumusunod:
Make or Type ------ TOYOTA JEEP
Motor No. ---------- -2R- 1486112
Chassis or Serial No. --76-04206-C
Plate No. --------------CCS-121
Na, ang nasabing sasakyan ay nasa pag-iingat ni Gng. Agnes Salvador. At ibibigay ko sa kanya ang lahat ng aking karapatan bilang may-ari ng nasabing sasakyan.
At bilang patotoo ako ay lumalagda sa ibaba ng kasulatang ito ngayong ika-19 ng Enero, 1991.
(signed)
REYNALDO DILLENA
(May-ari ng Sasakyan)
Saksi:
(signed)
John Mangio"
In his own
handwriting, Reynaldo added at the bottom of the document that he signed it
with the understanding that Salvador would give back to him and his wife the
P50,000.00 check they issued as evidence of their loan. His note read:
"1/22/91
Katunayan lamang ito na ako ay lumagda sa ibaba ayon sa kasunduan na ibabalik ang aking tseke na may halagang P50,000.
(signed)
Boy
Dillena"[3]
Mr. Dillena
signed the agreement. Mangio signed it
as a witness and also to attest to his receipt of the jeep. Reynaldo then surrendered the jeep to
Mangio, and the latter took it.
Sometime thereafter, Aurea was
surprised to learn that Salvador sued her for violation of B. P. Blg. 22
because their check for P50,000.00 was dishonored. When she asked Salvador about the payment and the jeep, the
latter told her that she did not receive anything. Based on the affidavit executed by petitioner Mangio[4] in November 1991 in
connection with that B.P. Blg. 22 case, it turned out that Mangio sold the jeep
for P20,000.00 and allegedly used the money to pay the interest of the
Dillenas' loan to Salvador and other expenses.
Counsel for the petitioner admits Mangio executed said affidavit. The Dillena spouses did not give authority
to Mangio to sell the jeep. From the
court hearings in the B.P. Blg. 22 case filed by Salvador against Aurea, as
shown by the transcript of stenographic notes therein, Aurea learned that
Salvador did not receive the P20,000.00 sale proceeds.[5] Aurea was convicted for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[6] The Dillenas demanded that
the petitioner return the jeep or the purchase price therefor, but the
petitioner did not do so.[7] When the Dillenas looked
for the jeep, they learned that Marcelino Rodriguez had bought it.[8] The latter attested in his
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" that he bought the Dillenas' jeep from Salvador
through the petitioner Mangio who was his "amain" and that the jeep
was transferred to Salvador in payment of a debt owed by the Dillenas to her.[9]
Aurea and her husband were
embarrassed by the B.P. Blg. 22 case as it was the first time she was
sued. They spent P15,000.00 for the
services of their lawyer and P700.00 appearance fee per hearing in the instant
case.
Reynaldo Dillena also took the
witness stand. He knows the petitioner
Mangio as he and his wife, Aurea Dillena, used to buy fingerlings from him for
their fishpond business. Sometime in
January 1991, petitioner Mangio brought a document entitled "Dapat Malaman
ng Lahat," regarding the petitioner's taking of his Toyota jeep from the
Dillena residence for delivery to Agnes Salvador as payment for Aurea's debt to
the latter. The document stipulated,
"Na, ang nasabing sasakyan ay nasa pag-iingat ni Gng. Agnes M. Salvador at
ibibigay ko sa kanya ang lahat ng aking karapatan bilang may-ari ng nasabing
sasakyan." Reynaldo signed the document because he trusted that Mangio
would deliver the jeep to Salvador. The
petitioner Mangio also signed the document as witness. Reynaldo did not, however, sign a Deed of
Sale covering the sale of the jeep to Salvador as he agreed to do so only upon
Mangio's return of the check his wife issued to Salvador. The Dillenas did not give authority to sell
the jeep to any person other than Salvador.
After Mangio took the jeep, Salvador got mad at Aurea and sued her for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. In the
proceedings for said case, Reynaldo learned from Salvador that Mangio sold the
jeep to another person and spent the proceeds of the sale. Aurea was convicted for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22.[10]
Marcelino Rodriguez took the
witness stand for the petitioner. He
knows the petitioner as they live in the same place in Bulacan and he
(petitioner) is the uncle of his wife.
Rodriguez had also known Agnes Salvador for ten years as they previously
had a money lending transaction. In the
latter part of 1992, Rodriguez purchased a Toyota jeep from Salvador for
P30,000.00. He paid her an initial
amount of P20,000.00 with the remaining balance of P10,000.00 to be paid upon
delivery of the Deed of Sale over the jeep.
Rodriguez took the jeep after making the initial payment in Salvador's
house in the presence of petitioner Mangio and his son Manny. He knew that Salvador was not the owner of
the jeep as the jeep's certificate of ownership showed that Mr. Boy (Reynaldo)
Dillena was its owner. Nonetheless, he
no longer required Salvador to issue a receipt as he had only paid partially. Moreover, Salvador showed him a contract
regarding the ownership of the jeep, entitled "Dapat Malaman ng
Lahat", executed between Reynaldo Dillena and Salvador which stipulated
that if by February 28, 1991, Reynaldo had not paid his debt to Salvador, the
jeep would serve as payment for the loan.
At the time of the jeep's sale to Rodriguez, it had been more than one
year from February 28, 1991. He thus
presumed that the jeep was already owned by Salvador. Rodriguez never paid the balance of P10,000.00 as Salvador failed
to deliver to him the Deed of Sale because the "real owner did not sign
the Deed of Sale." Rodriguez offered that he return the jeep and Salvador
return the P20,000.00, but Salvador told him that she had already spent the
money. Sometime thereafter, Reynaldo
and his wife went to see Rodriguez asking him to testify that he purchased the
jeep from Salvador in a case filed by the latter against Aurea. He did not have any document to prove that
he purchased the jeep from Salvador or from the Dillenas.[11]
The petitioner took the witness
stand. He knows Reynaldo Dillena as he
transacted business with him. He also
knows Agnes Salvador because he lived in her apartment sometime in October 1990
for five months. About that time, the
Dillena spouses went to Mangio to buy fingerlings for P200,000.00. Having spent their money to buy another
fishpond, the Dillenas were not able to pay petitioner Mangio. This enraged petitioner's son and the
barangay captain of Bulacan, Bulacan.
Reynaldo thus asked the petitioner to borrow money for him even at a 10%
interest. The petitioner then
introduced Reynaldo to Agnes Salvador for the latter to help the spouses
financially. With the petitioner as
"guarantor" of the loan, Salvador agreed to lend Reynaldo
P150,000.00. Of this amount, Dillena
paid P100,000.00 to the petitioner's son, Emmanuel Mangio, and P20,000.00 to
the petitioner, and kept P30,000.00 for himself. Reynaldo was able to pay back Salvador P100,000.00 and for the
remaining P50,000.00, he issued a check in her favor. The check bounced. The
loan increased to P80,000.00 because of the interest, and Reynaldo was able to
pay P10,000.00 for the interest. The
petitioner told Salvador not to file a complaint against Reynaldo and that he
would talk to him for the payment of the loan.
In January 1991, the petitioner talked to Reynaldo and the latter told
him that he would pay Salvador even if the loan increased to P100,000.00 and
would give his owner-type jeep as collateral.
Salvador prepared a document enitled "Dapat Malaman ng Lahat"
dated January 19, 1991, regarding the payment arrangement. Reynaldo signed the document and the
petitioner also signed as witness. The
jeep was delivered to Salvador's house and was parked there. Subsequently, Salvador asked Reynaldo to
take back the jeep. Reynaldo then
talked to the petitioner and told him that he (Reynaldo) would just sell the
jeep and apply the proceeds thereof to the payment of his loan to
Salvador. Upon learning this, Salvador
asked the petitioner to get the jeep's certificate of registration from
Reynaldo so she could sell the jeep.
Salvador found a buyer, Marcelino Rodriguez, and agreed to sell it for
P30,000.00, P20,000.00 to be paid initially and the remaining P10,000.00 to be
paid upon transfer of registration to Rodriguez. Rodriguez paid P20,000.00 to Salvador in her house at Sta. Ana,
Bulacan, Bulacan in the presence of the petitioner and his son, then took the
jeep. The balance of P10,000.00 was
never paid as the registration was not transferred to Rodriguez. Petitioner denied the Dillenas' allegation
that he sold the jeep and received the proceeds of the sale. Salvador then filed a case for B.P. Blg. 22
against Reynaldo in relation to the loan, and the latter was convicted. He also filed a collection suit against the
Dillenas for payment of bangus fry and fingerlings and the case was
decided in his favor.[12]
Manuel Mangio, son of the
petitioner, also testified. He knows
the Dillena spouses because they had been buying fingerlings from him since
1989. In September 1990, they bought
P100,000.00 worth of fingerlings from him.
Their agreement was that payment would be made outright in cash, but the
couple failed to pay right away, causing Manuel to get mad at them. It took more than one month for the couple
to pay. Manuel also knows Agnes
Salvador as she is his kumadre.
In October 1991, he accompanied his kumpadre, Marcelino
Rodriguez, to Salvador's house to look at Reynaldo Dillena's jeep which
Salvador was selling. According to
Salvador, the jeep was mortgaged to her.
Rodriguez asked Manuel to check if the jeep was in good condition, and
when told that it was, Rodriguez paid Salvador P20,000.00 in Salvador's
residence. Rodriguez and Manuel then
took the jeep. When Manuel was
confronted with his father's affidavit stating that he (the petitioner) sold
the jeep, Manuel testified that he was not aware of this.[13]
The trial court convicted the petitioner, viz:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused
JUANITO MANGIO,[14] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of estafa as defined and penalized under Art. 315, par. (b) of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2
years 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision
mayor as maximum and to pay the private complainant the sum of P40,000.00, the
value of the goods misappropriated."[15]
He appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the trial court's decision in toto on March 31,
1999. He filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied on August 29, 1999. Hence, this petition for review with the following assignment of
errors:
“I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE LAW WHEN IT TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION TESTIMONIES OF AGNES SALVADOR GIVEN IN ANOTHER CASE, WHERE PETITIONER WAS NOT AFFORDED THE CHANCE TO CROSS-EXAMINE HER.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PENALTY WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW.”
Petitioner faults the decision of
the appellate court for having appreciated Exhibit "G" which is page
31 of the transcript of stenographic notes of Agnes Salvador's testimony in
another case, Crim Case. No. 413-M-94 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 78 for violation of B. P.
Blg. 22. Salvador filed said
case against Aurea Dillena in relation to the check the latter issued for her
P50,000.00 loan from Salvador in 1990.
Exhibit "G" shows that Salvador testified that she did not
receive the P20,000.00 proceeds of the sale of the Dillenas' owner-type
jeep. According to petitioner, the
appellate court erred in admitting said testimony as he did not have the
opportunity to cross-examine Salvador who was not presented in the trial of the
instant case, and thus claims that he was denied due process. Petitioner asserts that Salvador's testimony
did not satisfy the requisites for admissibility under Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz:
"Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.- The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him."
Without
said testimony of Salvador, petitioner contends that respondent's cause is left
without a leg to stand on as there is no other evidence to support respondent's
allegation that Salvador did not receive the Dillena spouses' owner-type jeep
or the proceeds of its sale.
The Solicitor General, on the
other hand, argues that it is too late in the day for petitioner to raise
denial of due process in relation to Rule 130, Sec. 47 as grounds for objecting
to the admissibility of Exhibit "G".
In petitioner's Comment on the Prosecution's Offer of Documentary
Exhibits dated February 14, 1996, petitioner objected to Exhibit "G"
only for being immaterial and self-serving, and not on due process grounds or
for failure to satisfy the requisites under Sec. 47, Rule 130. The Solicitor General contends, viz:
". . . it is a rule of universal application that objection is
deemed limited to the ground or grounds specified and does not cover others not
specified. In other words, where the
grounds for objection are specified, every other ground which is not
particularly stated, is to be considered abandoned or waived, and cannot be
relied upon in appeal (Essentials on Evidence by Apostol, 1991 Edition, p.
457). In Tan Machan v. De la
Trinidad, et al. (3 Phil. 648 (1904), this Honorable Court ruled that in examining
the question as to whether the ruling of the court below on an objection to
evidence was correct or not, the appellate court will not consider any other
ground of objection than that raised in the court below. Hence, at the proceedings a quo, the defense
objected to Exhibit "G" for being allegedly immaterial and
self-serving. At this stage, therefore,
petitioner is barred by law from raising any other grounds, such as deprivation
of his right to due process and the right to cross-examine Agnes Salvador,
which are already considered abandoned or waived."[16]
We agree with the Solicitor
General. In Sermonia v. Court of
Appeals,[17] we ruled that as the ground
raised for objecting to the evidence presented was violation of the rule on
privileged communication, the petitioner was considered to have waived his
right to make an objection on the ground of the evidence being hearsay. In People v. Competente,[18] we also ruled that the
failure of the accused to object to hearsay evidence constitutes a waiver of the
right to cross-examine the actual witness to the occurrence, thereby rendering
the evidence admissible.
We have carefully reviewed the
evidence on record and find that petitioner Mangio is guilty of estafa under
Art. 315, par. 1(b),viz:
"Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx
(b) By appropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property;
xxx"
Petitioner Mangio himself admitted
that he received the subject jeep from the Dillena spouses for him to deliver
it to Agnes Salvador as collateral for the outstanding debt of the Dillenas to
Salvador.[19] The Dillena spouses trusted
him to take the jeep to Salvador as he was the one who facilitated the
Dillenas' loan from Salvador and even stood as "guarantor" of the
loan. In the affidavit which he admits
to have executed in connection with the criminal case for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 filed by Salvador against Aurea Dillena, he stated that when he brought
the jeep to Salvador, the latter refused to accept it because it was
dilapidated and she opined that it could not even fetch a P30,000.00 purchase
price. Petitioner thus drove the jeep
and parked it in his residence.
Subsequently, upon alleged instructions of Reynaldo Dillena, he sold the
same for P20,000.00 to Marcelino Rodriguez and allegedly turned over the
proceeds to Salvador in payment of the interest of the Dillenas' loan and other
expenses. We hold that petitioner
Mangio has not adequately shown evidence to support his claim that the Dillenas
authorized him to sell the subject jeep, especially in light of the spouses'
denial of such grant of authority and the document entitled "Dapat Malaman
ng Lahat" which states that the jeep was supposed to be delivered to
Salvador and not sold to any other person.
In the course of the trial of the B.P. Blg. 22 case filed by Salvador
against Aurea, the latter learned that Salvador did not receive the subject
jeep. Aurea thus repeatedly demanded
from petitioner that he return the jeep to the Dillenas or at least turn over to
them the proceeds of its sale.[20] As petitioner failed to
return the jeep or give the proceeds of the sale to them, Aurea and her husband
filed the instant case.
The above circumstances satisfy
the elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b), viz:
"(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender."[21]
To
"convert" and "misappropriate" connote acts of using or
disposing of another's property as if it were one's own or devoting it to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon. Misappropriation for one's own use includes, not only conversion to
one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of
another without right,[22] as in the case at bar when
petitioner sold the Dillenas' jeep to Rodriguez without the authority of the
Dillena spouses.
Anent the penalty imposed by the
trial court, the petitioner contends that although the information stated that
the subject jeep was worth P40,000.00, there is a dearth of evidence with
respect to said value of the jeep.
Hence, according to him, should he be found guilty, the penalty imposed
should be the lowest provided in par. 4 of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code
which is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods. Additionally, he contends that even if the
P20,000.00 proceeds of the sale be considered as the amount misappropriated,
the imposable penalty, under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, which is six months and one
day to four years and two months as minimum, and five years, five months and
eleven days as maximum.[23]
We disagree. While the information states that the value
of the jeep was P40,000.00, there is no proof of such amount. However, petitioner Mangio himself admitted
that the jeep was sold for P30,000.00, the initial payment of P20,000.00 having
been made and the balance of P10,000.00 to be paid upon execution of the Deed
of Sale covering the subject jeep.
Marcelino Rodriguez, the buyer of the jeep, corroborated this testimony
of Mangio. We are of the view that the
P30,000.00 purchase price of the jeep is a fair value upon which the penalty
should be based. Par. 1 of Art. 315
provides for the following penalty:
"Art. 315 Swindling (estafa).- Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be."
As the
amount involved in the instant case, i.e., P30,000.00, exceeds
P22,000.00, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period of prision
mayor in its minimum period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court was correct in
imposing the penalty of two years, four months, and one day of prision
correccional as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as
maximum. The amount of P40,000.00 which
the trial court ordered the petitioner to pay is reduced to P30,000.00 as only
this amount is supported by the evidence on record.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the impugned decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that the petitioner is ordered to pay the private complainants P30,000.00 as
actual damages. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] Original Records, p.
1.
[2] Original Records, p.
185; Exhibit A.
[3] Original Records, p.
186.
[4] Original Records,
pp. 191-192; Exhibit F.
[5] TSN, Aurea Dillena,
November 21, 1994, p. 16.
[6] Original Records,
pp. 226-232; Exhibit H.
[7] TSN, Aurea Dillena,
November 21, 1994, pp. 1-17.
[8] Id., February
24, 1995, pp. 1-9.
[9] Original Records, p.
236; Exhibit 1.
[10] TSN, Reynaldo
Dillena, July 17, 1995, pp. 3-9; also October 9, 1995, pp. 3-8.
[11] TSN, Marcelino
Rodriguez, April 22, 1996, pp. 3-8.
[12] TSN, Juanito Mangio,
August 7, 1996, pp. 2-8; also August 26, 1996, p. 2; Exhibit 3, Original
Records, pp. 238-239.
[13] TSN, Manuel Mangio,
October 14, 1996, pp. 2-5.
[14] Should be John
Mangio as stated in the information.
[15] Rollo, pp.
61-62.
[16] Rollo, pp.
96-97; Comment, pp. 4-5.
[17] 233 SCRA 146 (1994).
[18] 207 SCRA 591 (1992),
citing People v. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440 (1979).
[19] TSN, John Mangio,
August 26, 1996, p. 2.
[20] TSN, Aurea Dillena,
November 21, 1994, p. 17.
[21] Barrameda v. Court
of Appeals, 313 SCRA 477 (1999), citing Fontanilla v. People, 258 SCRA 460 and
Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 202.
[22] Lim v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 271 SCRA 12 (1997).
[23] Rollo, pp.
43-44; Petition, pp. 6-7.