FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138781.
December 3, 2001]
FELIX PASCUAL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and VICTOR SOLIS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41542, which
affirmed in toto the judgment of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 1529. In its decision, the DARAB reversed the Provincial Adjudicator’s
ruling in DARAB Case No. 374-Bul. ‘92, by recognizing respondent as the lawful
tenant of the agricultural lots belonging to petitioner and ordering the latter
to surrender possession of said lots to respondent.
The two parcels of land subject of
this controversy are situated in Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan, designated as
Lot Nos. 1923 and 2025, both of Cad-350.
The lots are registered in the name of petitioner Felix B. Pascual under
Original Certificate of Title Nos. 1051(M) and 4364 (M), respectively.[1] Lot No. 1923, which measures 7,423 square meters was
classified as rice land under Tax Declaration No. 11383. Lot No. 2025, on the other hand, consisting
of 27,456 square meters, was divided into two portions; one consisting of
10,000 square meters classified as rice land, and the other containing an area
of 17,456 square meters, of cogon land, as reflected in Tax Declaration No.
12734.[2]
On March 5, 1992, petitioner
brought an action for “Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction” against respondent Victor Solis, before the DARAB
Region III, in Malolos, Bulacan.[3] Petitioner alleged that sometime during the third
week of January 1991, respondent tried to enter into possession and cultivate
the above-described agricultural lots, thus disrupting petitioner’s peaceful
possession and personal cultivation of the same.
Petitioner claimed that he has
been working on the agricultural lots with the aid of his immediate farm
household and has been occupying the lots for 52 years. To buttress his claim,
petitioner presented a certification issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) of Norzagaray, Bulacan, confirming petitioner’s status as
owner-cultivator and declaring the landholdings to be untenanted.[4]
Additionally, petitioner submitted
a certification issued by the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC)
Chairman of Poblacion, Norzagaray, to the effect that petitioner is in actual
possession of the lots in the concept of owner-cultivator and that respondent
forcibly entered into the lots in order to establish himself as tenant thereof.[5] Petitioner, thus, prayed that respondent be
permanently enjoined from intruding into and disturbing petitioner’s possession
and cultivation of the properties in question.
In his answer to the complaint,
respondent averred that he is a lawful tenant of the lots owned by petitioner
and has been in possession of the disputed properties since 1960 up to the
present. He has regularly performed all his obligations and duties as lessee,
particularly the payment of rentals, and cultivated the agricultural lots. As a legitimate tenant, respondent insisted
that he enjoyed security of tenure and cannot be ejected from the land he is
tilling except upon authority of the court and for causes provided by law.[6]
To substantiate his assertion,
respondent presented two agricultural leasehold contracts allegedly concluded
between him and petitioner. The first agreement was constituted over a farm lot
measuring 7,423 square meters and identified through Tax Declaration No. 11383
(first lot). The second contract was for a 1.3-hectare piece of land covered by
OCT No. P-2780 (second lot).[7]
Respondent also submitted two
Certificates of Agricultural Leasehold (CAL) covering the same lots specified
in the leasehold contracts. CAL No.
03-02-13-004-023 (or CAL 023) was issued for the first lot, while CAL No.
03-02-13-004-022 (or CAL 022) pertained to the second lot. Both certificates
were awarded by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and recorded with the former
Ministry of Agrarian Reform on January 25, 1984.[8]
Petitioner countered in his reply
that respondent’s tenancy status over the first lot was extinguished when
respondent deliberately failed to pay the agreed lease rentals for the years
1987, 1988 and 1989. Respondent subsequently abandoned the lot without notice
in 1990. This fact was attested to by one Simeon Bartolome in a sworn
statement.[9]
Petitioner also said that
respondent abandoned the first lot because he moved to Manila to work as a
professional jeepney driver plying the Divisoria-Pier route. This was affirmed
by a certain Matias Santos in another affidavit attached to petitioner’s reply.[10]
With regard to the second lot,
petitioner stated that respondent voluntarily surrendered its possession on
December 5, 1985, upon payment to him of disturbance compensation in the amount
of P18,000.00.[11] Consequently, petitioner was able to sell this second
lot to the spouses Jose Bernardo and Rosa B. Payumo, as evidenced by a “Kasulatan
ng Bilihang Tuluyan (Venta Absoluta)” dated December 11, 1985.[12]
Petitioner added that in view of
the sale of the second lot, the issue of respondent’s status as lessee thereof
should be addressed to the new owners. Hence, petitioner maintained that
respondent’s tenancy status over the second lot must be excluded from the
present dispute, and that the complaint should be limited to the first lot.[13]
Pursuant to an order issued by the
Provincial Adjudicator on May 6, 1992, DARAB Legal Officer Homer M. Abraham,
Jr. conducted an ocular inspection of Lot Nos. 1923 and 2025. A second ocular
inspection was conducted on September 14, 1992 since it appeared that
respondent was not duly notified of the prior inspection.
Thereafter, on Nov. 5, 1992, the
Provincial Adjudicator granted petitioner’s prayer for a restraining order/writ
of preliminary injunction.
In due course, the Provincial
Adjudicator rendered judgment on May 3, 1993 and disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Felix Pascual and against defendant Victor Solis:
1. Maintaining plaintiff in peaceful possession over the subject landholdings;
2. Making the restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction permanent.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The Provincial Adjudicator ruled
that respondent was not a tenant of the disputed lots, despite the existence of
the leasehold agreements and Certificates of Agricultural Leasehold. The evidence adduced by the parties clearly
indicated that respondent was not in possession of the lots and did not
personally cultivate the landholdings, much less, share the proceeds of the
harvest with petitioner.
Respondent appealed to the DARAB,
which reversed the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator. The DARAB held that
the contracts and certificates are the best evidence of a tenancy relation and
that, without a final court judgment dispossessing respondent on grounds
authorized by law, respondent could not be ejected from the land. The DARAB ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and a new one entered:
1. Declaring Defendant-Appellant Victor Solis as a legitimate tenant and is entitled to security of tenure;
2. Ordering Plaintiff-Appellee Felix Pascual to transfer and turn-over the possession of the disputed property to herein Defendant-Appellant; and
3. The Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby revoked.
SO ORDERED.[15]
As mentioned earlier, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB in toto.[16] Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.[17] Hence, the instant petition on the basic issue of
whether or not respondent was a tenant of the lands belonging to petitioner
and, consequently, entitled to security of tenure.
Initially, the question regarding
respondent’s tenancy status is factual in nature which is not proper in a
petition for review, where only questions of law may be entertained. However,
after a careful examination of the evidence on record, there appears a compelling
reason to modify the factual findings below, since it appears that the
appellate court and the DARAB failed to take into account certain important
considerations extant in the records.[18]
It appears that Lot Nos. 1923 and
2025 are registered in petitioner’s name under OCT Nos. 1051 (M) and 4364 (M),
respectively. Lot No. 1923 is covered
by Tax Declaration No. 11383 and is obviously the same lot described in the
first tenancy agreement between petitioner and respondent, for which CAL 023
was issued. Thus, with respect to this
lot, there can be no question that a tenancy relation was established between
petitioner and respondent. Petitioner
admitted the existence of the leasehold contract and CAL 023 over Lot No. 1923,
which are the best evidence to show that a leasehold relation has been
established between petitioner and respondent. Thus, the real issue over Lot
No. 1923 is whether respondent may be ejected from this lot.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 3844,[19] provides that once the leasehold relation is established,
as in the case of Lot No. 1923, the agricultural lessee cannot be ejected from
the land unless authorized by the court for causes provided by law. Under Section 37 of the same Act,[20] the burden of proving lawful cause for ejecting the
lessee falls on the lessor/landowner.
It is thus petitioner’s duty to prove that there were grounds for
ejecting respondent from Lot No. 1923.
Petitioner failed to discharge this burden.
Petitioner alleged that respondent
ceased to be a tenant of Lot No. 1923 because he failed to pay the lease
rentals for three consecutive years, and eventually abandoned the lot to work
in Manila as a jeepney driver. The
DARAB and the Court of Appeals found these allegations not supported by competent
evidence. We agree.
The only evidence offered by
petitioner to prove the non-payment of rentals is the affidavit of Simeon
Bartolome, where the latter declared:
5. Na naibalita sa akin ni
G. Felix Pascual na simula noong taong 1987 hanggang sa taong 1989, si Victor
Solis ay hindi na nagbibigay ng buwis sa saka, at noong taong 1990 ay tuluyang
iniwan o inabandona ni Victor Solis and nasabing saka. x x x.[21]
As can be gleaned from the
affidavit, Mr. Bartolome did not have personal knowledge of the fact that
respondent failed to pay the agreed rentals, but merely based his statement on
information given to him by petitioner himself.
Likewise, the sworn statement of
Matias Santos is inconclusive to prove that respondent had indeed abandoned the
lot to work as a jeepney driver.
Respondent explained that he drove a passenger jeepney in between the
planting and harvesting seasons, considering that the landholding is rain-fed
and planted to palay only once a year.
This explanation is not inconsistent with Mr. Santos’ sworn declaration
that respondent has been driving a jeepney in Manila since 1982.
As regards Lot No. 2025, there is
nothing on record which shows that petitioner and respondent entered into any
lease agreement or that a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold was issued in
respondent’s favor. The second contract
and CAL 022, which respondent presented, referred to a 1.3-hectare farmland
covered by OCT No. P-2780. Meanwhile,
Lot No. 2025 is a 2.7456-hectare lot registered under OCT No. 4364 (M). It is therefore evident that Lot No. 2025 is
not the same landholding over which respondent claims to be a tenant under the
second contract and CAL 022.
Consequently, the appellate court
and the DARAB erred in rendering judgment on the assumption that these lots are
one and the same. To repeat, the second contract and CAL 022 do not pertain to
Lot No. 2025. Hence, respondent cannot
be declared a tenant of Lot No. 2025.
No lease agreement or certificate was adduced to prove that Lot No. 2025
is the same lot described in the second contract and CAL 022.
Furthermore, there is an apparent
absence of the essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship
between the parties over Lot No. 2025.
For this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is
consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.[22]
The findings of the Provincial
Adjudicator and the ocular inspection indicate that respondent did not
personally cultivate the riceland portion of Lot No. 2025 or share its harvest
proceeds with petitioner. Petitioner
did not consent to a leasehold arrangement with respondent over Lot No. 2025,
as shown by petitioner’s filing of complaint below to enjoin respondent from
encroaching and planting thereon.
Accordingly, respondent is not a de jure tenant of Lot No. 2025,
thus, he is not entitled to security of tenure relative to this lot.
As to the 1.3-hectare land subject
of the second contract and CAL No. 022, petitioner contends that this lot was
already sold to the spouses Payumo in 1985.
Therefore, the issue of respondent’s tenancy status over the 1.3-hectare
agricultural lot covered by the second contract and CAL 022 is not proper for
disposition in this case. Petitioner is no longer the owner of this lot and
will not, thus, be benefited or prejudiced by any declaration made herein,
recognizing respondent as its bona fide tenant. The claim of tenancy over this lot should be directed against the
new owners/vendees, who are subrogees to the rights and obligations of the
agricultural lessor/vendor.[23]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
PARTLY GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41542 is MODIFIED. Respondent is declared a lawful tenant of
Lot No. 1923, and petitioner is ORDERED to maintain respondent in
peaceful possession and cultivation thereof.
On the other hand, respondent is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
entering into, encroaching or cultivating Lot No. 2025.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 39
& 41.
[2] Id., at 40
& 42.
[3] Id., at
33-37.
[4] Id., at 43.
[5] Id., at 44.
[6] Id., at
46-49.
[7] Id., at 53-55.
[8] Id., at 54
& 56.
[9] Record, p. 49.
[10] Id., at 50.
[11] Id., at 51.
[12] Id., at 48.
[13] Id., at 54.
[14] Supra, note 1
at 68.
[15] Id., at
77-78.
[16] Id., at 8-11.
[17] Id., at 18.
[18] See Gelos v.
Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 608, 610 (1992), citing Talavera v. Court of Appeals,
182 SCRA 778 (1990).
[19] Sec. 7. Tenure of
Agricultural Leasehold Relation. – The agricultural leasehold relation once
established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue
working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding
and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes
herein provided.
[20] Sec. 37. Burden of Proof. – The burden of
proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of an
agricultural lessee shall rest upon the agricultural lessor.
[21] Supra, note 9
at 49.
[22] See Bautista v.
Araneta, G.R. No. 135829, February 22, 2000.
[23] R.A. No. 3844, Sec.
10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished By Expiration of
Period, etc. – The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall
not be extinguished be mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold
contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers
the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof
shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor.