EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137001.
December 5, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAYETANO
MOSENDE y MORATA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
On the evening of 22 March 1998,
Leticia Zabala Sapupo was alone with her two sleeping children at her residence
in Wawa III, Rosario, Cavite. Her
husband, a barangay tanod, had left the house to conduct a night patrol
in the neighborhood. She would, now and
then, look through the window opening to see if he was already back. At about 10:00 p.m., peeping out, she saw
Cayetano “Tano” Mosende, leaning on the fence, just arms away from where
she stood. He was wearing the same
clothes when she saw him drinking at the store earlier that afternoon. The vicinity was sufficiently illuminated
from neighboring houses and a nearby construction site. Mosende was unaware of being watched because
she by then had the lights in the house turned off. "Tano” was known in the neighborhood of closely-knit
urban dwellers as being a habitual drunkard and troublemaker when
inebriated. Leticia saw Mosende walk
towards the mango tree where Enrique Sefriuto, popularly called by neighbors as
“Andrew,” was lying face up on a nearby bench.
Moments later, Andrew stood up and walked some distance away to
urinate. Mosende also rose, entered the
yard and positioned himself behind Andrew while the latter was relieving himself. When Andrew faced “Tano,” the latter,
without warning, stabbed the unsuspecting victim twice at the left portion of
the abdomen. The wounded Andrew yelled,
“Inay, may tama ako, sinaksak ako ni `Tano!'”
Leticia Sapupo was a few meters
away from the two men. Recovering from
the shock, Leticia sprung to call for help.
She recounted that immediately after stabbing Andrew, “Tano” ran
towards his house, which was just two arms length from the residence of the
victim. Relatives immediately brought
him to the Grace Hospital in Rosario, Cavite, but the young man had expired
upon arrival at the hospital grounds.
He was only twenty-nine years old.
Barangay officials arrested Mosende.
Jenny Sefriuto, the mother of the
deceased, was in her house in Boracay, Wawa III, Rosario, Cavite, with her two
sons and a daughter when she heard Andrew shout, “Inay, sinaksak po ako ni
`Tano!'" Jenny rushed out and
saw her bloodied son. Jenny said that
Andrew and Mosende must have had some kind of misunderstanding because, days
prior to the incident, Mosende had come to their house to ask forgiveness from
her son. Jenny Sefriuto, however, had
no idea of the nature of their misunderstanding.
Joseph Sefriuto, a brother of the
victim, was inside the house when he heard his brother yell that he was stabbed
by Mosende. When Joseph opened the
door, he was completely aghast. He
beheld the wounded Enrique who kept pointing at the nearby house of Mosende.
Henry de la Cruz, the victim's
brother-in-law, assisted Joseph Sefriuto in bringing Andrew to the
hospital. Although quite weakened,
Andrew was still alive when he was brought by tricycle to the hospital. Enroute to the hospital, he began to utter that
it was “Tano” who had stabbed him.
On 17 June 1998, an Information
was filed against Cayetano Mosende charging him with the killing of Enrique
(Andrew) Sefriuto.
"That on or about the 22nd day of March 1998, at
Sitio Boracay, Barangay Wawa III, Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to kill, being then armed with a fan knife (balisong), and
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab the person of Enrique (Andrew)
Sefriuto, inflicting upon the said victim stab wounds on the left thigh,
thereby causing his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the legal
heirs of said victim."[1]
The accused, Cayetano Mosende y
Morata, denied any involvement in the crime.
He testified that on the evening of 22 March 1998, he went to the house
of his sister in Little Baguio, Wawa III, so that he and his brother-in-law
could go out fishing. When he arrived,
his brother-in-law begged off. With the
unexpected change in plans, the accused decided to stay for a while. It was already 11:00 in the evening when he
made his homeward trek. At midnight, he
was taken aback when a barangay came to take him to the municipal hall to
account for the death of Enrique Sefriuto.
Parenthetically, when the trial
court asked the accused about the apparent incongruence between his testimony
and the earlier defense theory of self-defense, previously manifested by
counsel, no explanation was proffered.
On 07 December 1998, the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite, giving credence to the case for the prosecution,
convicted the accused of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the
extreme penalty of death -
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this
court hereby finds the accused Cayetano Mosende y Morata guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, as charged in the Information,
qualified by treachery and aggravated by evident premeditation and
intoxication, and accordingly hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme
penalty of death, and is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Enrique
(Andrew) Sefriuto the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity."[2]
In this automatic review of his
case, appellant ascribes error to the trial court in giving more weight to the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses than that of his own.
Regrettably, the records of the
case fail to indicate anything of substance that can warrant a reversal of the
judgment of conviction. Appellant,
however, is correct in seeking a modification of his death sentence.
Neither the defense of denial nor
the tender of alibi can prevail over the strong evidence presented by
the prosecution. Surely, his acquittal
cannot be made to rest solely on a self-serving testimony. Appellant claims to have been in the house
of his sister in Wawa III on the night in question but the residence of
appellant's sister is not that distant away from the place of the
incident. In order that alibi
can prosper an accused must be able to show that it would not have been
possible for him to be physically present at the place of the crime or its
vicinity at the time of its commission.[3] The defense has miserably failed to make its point in
this respect.
Furthermore, the defense theory
would be no match against the unwavering identification made by eyewitness[4] Leticia Sapupo who, in her testimony, was positive
and unyielding when she pointed to appellant as being the person who killed
Enrique Sefriuto -
"Q. Can you tell us what was that unusual incident?
"A. When I peeped through the window, I saw this `Tano' leaning on the fence or wall of our neighbor, I was just one arm length away from him, sir.
"Q. Do you know the complete name of this `Tano?'
"A. Cayetano Mosende, sir.
"Q. What was he doing at that time?
"A. He was just leaning there, sir, but I saw on the part of his body (witness pointing to her left waist), that he had a knife with him which was still folded, sir.
"Q. After you saw him with the knife, what happened next when you saw him holding the knife?
"A. After a while I saw him walking towards the mango tree, sir.
"Q. Considering that it is already 10:30 in the evening, how were you able to see him?
"A. The place was lighted because there was a light in our neighbor’s place that illuminated the place and at the other side of the fence there were people doing some construction work at the subdivision, and the spotlight of the place was focused on the other side, sir.
"Q. Then, what happened next after that?
"A. After a while, I saw this Andrew lying face up on the bench near the fence, sir.
"Q. At that time you saw this Andrew lying on the bench, where was `Tano,' then?
"A. He was still there seated along the mango tree, sir.
"Q. How far was this mango tree from where this Andrew was lying?
"A. Maybe about four arms length away, sir.
"Q. After that, what happened?
"A. Then I saw this Andrew stand up and he went outside of their kitchen, sir.
"Q. After that, what happened next?
"A. He was urinating sir.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q. While this Andrew was urinating, what happened next?
"A. I saw Cayetano stand up, sir.
"Q. After he stood up, what happened?
"A. He was going towards the fence then he went inside [the fence], sir.
"Q. Inside of where?
"A. Inside the fence, sir.
"Q. Whose place?
"A. Andrew’s house, sir.
"Q. After this `Tano' entered the gate, what happened?
"A. When `Tano' faced Andrew, `Tano' stabbed Andrew, sir.
"Q. How many times?
"A. Two times, sir.
"Q. After this `Tano' stabbed Andrew, what happened next?
"A. I heard Andrew shout, `Inay, may tama ako, sinaksak ako ni `Tano!'
"Q. If this `Tano' or Cayetano Mosende is in court, will you be able to point to him?
"A. He is there, sir. (Witness pointed to the accused who identified himself as Cayetano Mosende).
"Q. After `Tano' stabbed this Andrew, what happened next?
"A. He went out going
towards their house because the house of that person whom he stabbed is just
two arms length away from their house, sir."[5]
The eyewitness account of Leticia
Zabala Sapupo, against whom no ill-motive against appellant could be intimated,
was bolstered by the testimony of the victim's mother Jenny Sefriuto, his
brother Joseph Sefriuto and his brother-in-law Henry de la Cruz. The additional three witnesses, in brief,
testified:
Testimony of Jenny Sefriuto –
"Q. While you were in your house on same date and time, can you recall of any unusual incident that happened?
"A. Yes, Sir, there was.
"Q. And, what was that?
"A. It was a shout, Sir.
"Q. Can you tell us who made the shout?
"A. Andrew, Sir.
"Q. What was the exact words?
"A. He shouted the words, `Inay, inay, sinaksak po ako ni Tano!'
"Q. Do you know to whom your son was referring, to this Tano?
"A. Yes, Sir.
"Q. Can you tell us the full name of this Tano?
"A. Cayetano Mosende,
Sir."[6]
Testimony of Joseph Sefriuto –
"Q. What exactly were the words of your brother?
"A. I asked him what happened and then he pointed to the house of Cayetano Mosende and uttered the words, `Sinaksak ako niyan.'
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q. What did your brother say?
"A. I was stabbed by `Tano.' (Sinaksak ako ni `Tano')"[7]
"A. I loaded him in the
tricycle. While we were already inside
the tricycle, and I was holding unto him, and the tricycle started to move,
that was the time your Honor, when he said, `Sinaksak ako ni `Tano.'"[8]
Testimony of Henry de la Cruz
"Q After you heard the shout of your mother-in-law, what happened next?
"A I saw my brother-in-law being carried by a certain Joseph, Sir, and when I saw them, I also carried my brother-in-law and brought him to the hospital.
"Q How did you bring him to the hospital?
"A I was holding him, Sir, and I loaded him in a tricycle.
"Q Can you tell us the condition of your brother-in-law at that time?
"A He was still alive, Sir.
"Q While you were bringing him to the hospital, was there any conversation that transpired between you and your brother-in-law?
"A He just said that he was stabbed by Tano, Sir.
"Q Do you know this Tano whom your brother-in-law is referring to?
"A Yes, Sir.
"Q Why do you know him?
"A Because he is a
resident of the place, Sir."[9]
While it was not adequately shown
that the statements testified to were said by the victim with knowledge of his
impending death that would qualify the utterances to be dying declarations, the
statements, nevertheless, could be taken as being part of res gestae.
Utterances are considered part of res
gestae when made immediately after a startling occurrence. The admission of such utterances are based
on the well-founded belief that words spoken instinctively at the time of a
specific transaction or event, without the opportunity for the speaker to
effectively concoct a fabricated version of the startling event, can only be
but credible.
In finding treachery, the court a
quo held that the stealth with which accused-appellant followed his victim,
his act of positioning himself behind the latter and the swiftness with which
he stabbed him were circumstances that could only amount to treachery.
The Court agrees. Treachery is present when the offender
employs means, methods or forms in the execution of an offense which tend to
directly and specially ensure its accomplishment without risk arising from the
challenge that the offended party might make.[10] Where the attack is so sudden and unanticipated that
the victim finds himself with hardly any chance to defend himself or to evade
the aggression, treachery must be held to exist.
In this case, it would appear that
appellant, upon seeing Enrique Sefriuto rise and proceed to the fence to
urinate, himself stood up and followed surreptitiously. Appellant then proceeded to quietly position
himself behind his intended victim while the latter, still half-awake from
sleep, relieved himself. Suddenly and
without any warning, appellant repeatedly stabbed the unsuspecting victim.
In imposing upon appellant the
penalty of death, the trial court considered the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and intoxication.
In essence, evident premeditation
refers to the deliberate planning of an act before its execution. It takes into account the cool thought and
reflection upon a resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment before the actual execution of the
criminal act.[11] Evident premeditation requires an appreciable time as
the offender so determines to commit the crime; an act manifestly indicating
that the culprit has clung to his resolve, and an adequate duration between
such determination and execution in order to allow his conscience to overcome
his resolve.
The various accounts given by the
witnesses, however, would fail to indicate pertinent facts that could establish
evident premeditation. While the mother
of the victim, Jenny Sefriuto intimated a standing feud between appellant and
her son, she herself testified, however, that, days before, Mosende had
repaired to their house to ask forgiveness from Enrique who forthwith forgave
his would-be assailant. In any event,
the fact alone that appellant could have nursed a grudge or resentment against
his victim would not be enough to constitute proof of evident premeditation.[12] The eyewitness account of Leticia Sapupo itself only
related to details immediately before and during the commission of the crime.
The court a quo, in
considering the aggravating circumstance of intoxication, gave much weight to
the testimony that appellant was so identified as a habitual drunkard. While Leticia Sapupo testified to having
seen Mosende drinking an alcoholic beverage at a store earlier the afternoon of
the incident, nothing would show that he was in any state of intoxication or in
drunken condition when the dastardly deed was being committed.
The crime of murder is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"ART. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
"1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
"2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
"3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
"4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
“5. With evident premeditation.
"6. With cruelty, by
deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging
or scoffing at his person or corpse. (As
amended by Sec. 6, RA No. 7659.)
Treachery
qualified the killing to murder but, there being no other aggravating
circumstance shown, the penalty that can only be imposed is reclusion
perpetua.
The civil indemnity decreed by the
trial court accords with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, moral damages and exemplary damages must be held to
be due. Article 2219(1) of the Civil
Code ordains that moral damages may be recovered in a criminal offense
resulting in physical injuries. In its
generic sense, "physical injuries" includes death. Moral damages compensate for the mental
anguish, serious anxiety and moral shock suffered by the victim and his family
as being a proximate result of the wrongful act. An award requires no proof of pecuniary loss.[13] The presence of the aggravating circumstance of
treachery[14] likewise warrants, under Article 2230 of the Civil
Code, the payment of exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite
finding Cayetano Mosende y Morata guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the sentence imposed upon him
is hereby reduced from death to reclusion perpetua. The award of P50,000.00 civil indemnity to
the heirs of the victim Enrique Sefriuto is reiterated; in addition, P50,000.00
moral damages and P20,000.00 exemplary damages are also ordered to be paid by
appellant to the heirs of the victim.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo,
Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Ynares-Santiago,
De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Buena, J., on official leave.
[1] Records, p. 1.
[2] Rollo, p. 24.
[3] People vs. Balisoro,
307 SCRA 48.
[4] People vs. Banela,
301 SCRA 84; People vs. Hillado, 307 SCRA 535.
[5] TSN, 28 July 1998,
pp. 4-6.
[6] TSN, 28 July 1998,
pp. 41-42.
[7] TSN, 04 August 1998,
pp. 5-17.
[8] TSN, 18 August 1998,
pp. 13-14.
[9] TSN, 18 August 1998,
p. 5.
[10] People vs.
Velaga, Jr., 199 SCRA 518.
[11] People vs.
Durante, 53 Phil 363.
[12] People vs.
Lacao, 60 SCRA 89.
[13] People vs.
Bantillo, G.R. No. 117949, 23 October 2000.
[14] People vs. Catubig,
G.R. No. 137842, 23 August 2001.