SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 141702-03. August 2, 2001]
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MARTHA Z. SINGSON, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari
seeks to set aside the 20 September 1999 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals declaring respondent Martha
Z. Singson illegally dismissed by petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd., and
thus should be reinstated with full back wages and awarded moral as well as
exemplary damages.
This petition traces its origin to
two (2) petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 initially filed with the Supreme
Court: Martha Z. Singson v. National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., SP Case No.
52104, and Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. National Labor Relations Commission
and Martha Z. Singson, SP Case No. 52105, which were consolidated[2] and referred[3] to the Court of Appeals in consonance with the St.
Martin Funeral Homes doctrine.
Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd.
(CATHAY), is an international airline company engaged in providing
international flight services while Martha Z. Singson was a cabin attendant of
CATHAY hired in the Philippines on 24 September 1990 with home base in
Hongkong.
On 26 August 1991 Singson was
scheduled on a five (5)-day flight to London but was unable to take the flights
as she was feeling fatigued and exhausted from her transfer to a new apartment
with her husband. On 29 August 1991 she
visited the company doctor, Dr. Emer Fahy, who examined and diagnosed her to be
suffering from a moderately severe asthma attack. She was advised to take a Ventolin nebulizer and increase the
medication she was currently taking, an oral Prednisone (steroid). Dr Fahy thereafter conveyed to Dr. John G.
Fowler, Principal Medical Officer, her findings regarding Singson’s medical
condition as a result of which she was evaluated as unfit for flying due to her
medical condition.
On 3 September 1991 Singson again
visited Dr. Fahy during which time the latter declared her condition to have
vastly improved. However, later that
day, Cabin Crew Manager Robert J. Nipperess informed Singson that CATHAY had
decided to retire her on medical grounds effective immediately based on the
recommendation of Dr. Fowler and Dr. Fahy.
Martha Z. Singson was surprised
with the suddenness of the notification but nonetheless acknowledged it. Later, she met with Nipperess and inquired
of possible employment that entailed only ground duties within the company. She was advised to meet with certain
personnel who knew of the employment requirements in other departments in the
company, and to await a possible offer from the company.
On 20 December 1991 Singson filed
before the Labor Arbiter a complaint against CATHAY for illegal dismissal, with
prayer for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Efforts on initial settlement having failed,
trial followed.
Robert J. Nipperress and Dr. John
G. Fowler appeared as witnesses for CATHAY.
Nipperess confirmed that the decision to retire respondent was made upon
the recommendation of Dr. Fowler. In
turn, Dr. Fowler testified that the affliction of respondent with asthma
rendered her unfit to fly as it posed aviation risks, i.e., asthma disabled her
from properly performing her cabin crew functions, specifically her air safety
functions.
On the other hand, Singson
presented herself and Dr. Benjamin Lazo, a doctor in the country specializing
in internal medicine and pulmonary diseases.
She denied being afflicted with asthma at any point in her life, while
Dr. Lazo confirmed the same declaring that at the time of his examination of
Singson he found her to be of normal condition.
On the basis of the evidence
presented before him, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu Jr. declared CATHAY
liable for illegal dismissal and ordered the airline to pay Singson
HK$531,150.80 representing full back wages and privileges, HK$54,137.70 for
undisputed benefits due her, HK$100,000.00 as actual damages, HK$500.00 as
moral damages, HK$500.00 as exemplary damages, and HK$168,528.85 as attorney’s
fees. Furthermore, CATHAY was ordered
to reinstate Singson to her former position as airline stewardess without loss
of seniority rights, benefits and privileges.
On 19 March 1993 CATHAY appealed
the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the National Labor Relations
Commission. On 29 December 1994 the
NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declared valid Singson’s
dismissal from service.[4] Relying on the testimony of Dr. Fowler and the
affidavit and medical records submitted by Dr. Fahy, admitted as
newly-discovered evidence, the NLRC found Singson to be indeed afflicted with
asthma that rendered her unfit to fly and perform cabin crew functions. Consequently, the NLRC withdrew the back
wages, moral and exemplary damages awarded to Singson for lack of factual or
legal basis. It however ordered CATHAY
to retain her services as ground stewardess, with salaries and benefits, noting
that she had been reinstated therein since 12 March 1993. In turn, Singson was granted the option to
continue her employment with CATHAY.
Thereafter, both parties filed
their respective motions for reconsideration[5] before the NLRC which on 31 August 1995 were denied
for lack of merit. Petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65 were subsequently filed by both parties before the
Supreme Court which, after consolidation, were referred to the Court of Appeals
for resolution.[6]
Meanwhile, pursuant to the
decision of the NLRC, Singson was reinstated as cabin stewardess with ground
duties on 12 March 1993 pending the resolution of the petitions.
On 20 September 1999 the Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the
Labor Arbiter declaring Singson to have been illegally terminated. The appellate court anchored its judgment on
the following findings: First,
Dr. Fowler’s opinion about Singson’s medical condition was based on the
personal examination of Dr. Fahy, and not his own. The appellate court held that a personal and prolonged
examination of a patient was necessary and crucial before he or she could be
properly diagnosed as afflicted with asthma,[7] and thus Dr. Fowler’s expert opinion was unreliable
and mere hearsay. Second,
CATHAY disregarded Sec. 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code[8] which requires a certification by a competent public health authority when
disease is the reason for an employee’s separation from service, since it
relied merely on the diagnosis of its company doctors, Dr. Fowler and Dr. Fahy. Third, the NLRC erroneously
relied on the affidavit executed by Dr. Fahy since she was not personally
presented as a witness to identify and testify on its contents. Fourth, respondent passed the medical
examination required of prospective flight cabin attendants, the International
Labor Organization’s Occupational Health and Safety in Civil Aviation
examination, prior to her employment and found to be fit for flight-related
service. Fifth, CATHAY
failed to adequately prove the health standards required in aviation,
particularly the non-qualification of flight attendants afflicted with asthma
to flight-related service.[9]
Consequently, the appellate court
awarded respondent full back wages with reinstatement, as well as moral exemplary
damages, while deleting the award of actual damages reasoning that no undue
damage inured to her since her husband nonetheless remained in Hongkong
managing two (2) corporations. The
appellate court however declared the option given to respondent to continue her
employment as a ground stewardess with CATHAY to have been erroneously issued
and consequently nullified the same.
CATHAY now argues that the Court
of Appeals should have confined its inquiry to issues of want or excess of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion and not into the factual findings of
the NLRC since the petition before it was made under Rule 65.
This Court is not persuaded. CATHAY’s petition for certiorari filed
before the Court of Appeals assailed specifically the judgment of the NLRC
granting respondent the choice to continue her employment with CATHAY as ground
stewardess as, in fact, she had been reinstated as such since 12 March
1993. On the other hand, respondent’s
petition attacked the NLRC decision declaring her dismissal valid and
nullifying the award of damages in her favor on the basis of Dr. Fowler’s
testimony and not Dr. Lazo’s.
Consequently, it was inevitable for the Court of Appeals to examine the
evidence anew to determine whether the factual findings of the NLRC were
supported by the evidence presented and the conclusions derived therefrom
accurately ascertained. As pointed out
by the appellate court, this became even more essential in view of the fact
that there was a conflict of decision between the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC. We thus find no error in the
appellate court’s evaluation of the evidence despite the pleadings being
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
CATHAY next argues that the Court
of Appeals erred in not admitting as evidence the affidavit of Dr. Fahy. We agree.
The appellate court may have overlooked the principle in labor cases
that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not always
controlling.[10] It is not necessary that affidavits and other
documents presented conform to the technical rules of evidence as the Court
maintains a liberal stance regarding procedural deficiencies in labor case.[11] Section 3, Rule V, of the New Rules of procedure
of the NLRC specifically allows parties to submit position papers accompanied
by all supporting documents including affidavits of their respective witnesses
which take the place of their testimonies.[12] Thus, the fact that Dr. Fahy was not presented as
witness to identify and testify on the contents of her affidavit was not a fatal
procedural flaw that affected the admissibility of her affidavit as evidence.
The non-presentation of Dr. Fahy
during the trial was duly explained – she was no longer connected with CATHAY
and had transferred residence to Ireland.
It is for this same reason that we find no error in the NLRC’s admission
of Dr. Fahy’s written medical notes as newly-discovered evidence. Moreover, the submission of additional
evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by the New Rule of Procedure of
the NLRC, such submissions not being prejudicial to the party for the
latter could submit counter-evidence.[13]
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we
find Singson to have been illegally dismissed from the service. Granting without admitting that indeed
respondent was suffering from asthma, this alone would not be valid ground for
CATHAY to dismiss her summarily.
Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code requires a certification by a competent public health authority
that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured
within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment.
In the instant case, no
certification by competent public health authority was presented by
CATHAY. It dismissed Singson based only
on the recommendation of its company doctors who concluded that she was
afflicted with asthma. It did not
likewise show proof that Singson’s asthma could not be cured in six (6) months
even with proper medical treatment. On
the contrary, when Singson returned to the company clinic on 3 September 1991
or five (5) days after her initial examination on 29 August 1991, Dr. Fahy
diagnosed her condition to have vastly improved.
CATHAY could not take refuge in
Clause 22 of the Conditions of Service it entered into with
Singson. Although a certification by a
competent public health authority is not required, still CATHAY is obliged to
follow several steps under the Conditions of Service before terminating
its employee. The pertinent part of
Clause 22 thereof provides –
Clause 22. Sick Leave. – xxxx In case of serious illness the Company will grant sick leave with full pay for the first three months and with 2/3 of pay for the fourth month. Consideration will be given to granting the cabin crew further sick leave, either with pay or off pay up to a further two months, or retiring the cabin crew on medical ground xxxx
Thus, even on the assumption that
asthma is a serious illness, this again would not excuse CATHAY from ignoring
procedure specified in its employment contract with Singson. Under the contract, Cathay must first allow
Singson to take a leave of absence and not to terminate her services right
there and then. It is only after the
employee has enjoyed four (4) months of sick leave that the option to retire
the employee based on medical ground arises.
In the instant case, Singson went to the company clinic on 29 August
1991. On 3 September 1991 she returned
to the company clinic only to be told that “effective immediately” she was
dismissed on medical grounds.
We agree with the Court of Appeals
in its award of moral and exemplary damages to respondent. CATHAY summarily dismissed Singson from the
service based only on the recommendation of its medical officers, in effect,
failing to observe the provision of the Labor Code which requires a
certification by a competent public health authority. Notably, the decision to dismiss Singson was reached after a
single examination only. CATHAY’s
medical officers recommended Singson’s dismissal even after having diagnosed
her condition to have vastly improved.
It did not make even a token offer for Singson to take a leave of
absence as what it provided in its Contract of Service. CATHAY is presumed to know the law and the
stipulation in its Contract of Service with Singson.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20
September 1999 declaring the dismissal of respondent Martha Z. Singson by
petitioner CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD. as illegal and ordering her
reinstatement to her former or an equivalent position without loss of seniority
rights, with full back wages and benefits, and to pay her HK$500.00 as moral
damages, HK$500.00 as exemplary damages plus ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award as attorney’s fees, is AFFIRMED. The amounts received by respondent representing her six (6)
months retirement gratuity and one (1) month pay in lieu of notice should be
DEDUCTED from respondent’s computed back wages, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, (Acting Chairman),
Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J., abroad on official business.
[1] Decision penned by
Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., concurred in by Associate Justices Hector
L. Hofileña and Omar U. Amin, Fifteenth Division.
[2] SC Resolution dated
29 May 1996.
[3] SC Resolution dated
25 January 1999.
[4] Decision penned by
Commissioner Rogelio I. Rayala and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Raul
T. Aquino and Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay, Second Division.
[5] Records, pp.
310-324.
[6] Id., p. 440,
SC Resolution dated 25 January 1999.
[7] Rollo, p. 18,
citing Labor Arbiter’s Decision referring to par. 16 of the affidavit of Dr.
Benjamin Lazo, witness for respondent Martha Z. Singson.
[8] SEC. 8. Disease as a
ground for dismissal. – Where the employee suffers from a disease and his
continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to
the health of his-co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment
unless there is a certification by competent public health authority that the
disease is of such nature or at a such stage it cannot be cured within a period
of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the
employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a
leave. The employer shall reinstate
such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his
normal health. (Book VI, Labor Code
Omnibus Implementing Rules).
[9] Rollo, pp.
12-26.
[10] Canete v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 130425, 30 September 1999; Salonga v. NLRC, G.R. No.
118120, 23 February 1996, 254 SCRA 11, citing Cagampan v. NLRC, G.R.
Nos. 85122-24, 28 March 1991, 195 SCRA 533; Panlilio v. NLRC, G.R. No.
117459, 17 October 1997.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] NFD International
Manning Agents v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116629, 16 January 1998, 284 SCRA 239.