SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140229.
August 30, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HENRY
BALMOJA alias Ayat, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
HENRY BALMOJA alias Ayat was found guilty of rape by the RTC-Br. 272,
Marikina City, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay his victim
P50,000.00 for moral damages.[1] He now appeals his conviction.
The Decision of the court a quo
is anchored on the following factual findings:
on 24 July 1997, at the behest of her teacher, a certain Mrs. Cillo,
fourteen (14) year old Cynthia Lea Dapoc, private complainant, set out in
search for the house of an absentee student so she could deliver a notice
coming from her teacher. While trying
to locate the place, accused Henry Balmoja pointed Lea towards the direction of
Ma. Cristina Village. As she started to
proceed on her way, the accused
volunteered to accompany her but led her instead towards San Isidro
Village. While there, Balmoja persuaded
Lea to enter a vacant grassy area with a factory-like structure adjacent to it
alleging that a certain lieutenant was tracking him down on account of a
missing girl. Once in the grassy
portion, Balmoja locked her in an embrace and made her sit on his lap. As she struggled, he removed her shirt,
pants and panty, leaving her with only her sando on. Lea pleaded for Balmoja to stop but every
time she did the latter strangled her into silence. Her fear was further exacerbated by the sight of a pair of
long-nose pliers in the pocket of the accused. Balmoja then inserted his penis into her vagina. She cried in pain and begged him to
stop. It was over in a few
minutes. Seemingly satisfied, Balmoja
told Lea to dress up and told her not to tell anybody, otherwise he would "bomb" her house. Thereafter, she was released.
Despite her ordeal, Lea managed to
deliver the notice and to prepare herself for school. She did not reveal her tragic experience to
the attendant at the beauty parlor from whom she asked for directions; neither
did she tell her relatives at home, as she was ashamed, but decided to divulge
it to her teacher instead. In school,
Lea broke down before Mrs. Cillo who immediately summoned Lea's mother to the
Guidance Counselor’s Office where she was apprised of her daughter’s
misfortune.
Assisted by her mother, Mrs.
Cillo, and another personnel from her school, Lea went to the police station
where she filed a complaint against now accused Henry Balmoja whom she
described as her rapist. Subsequently,
Lea underwent medico-legal examination where it was discovered that she had two
(2) abrasions on the posterior aspect of her right forearm which could have
been caused by a hard, rough and sharp object, and fresh bleeding lacerations
on the hymen at 3 o’clock, 6 o’clock, and 8 o’clock positions that could have
been inflicted within twenty-four (24) hours.
The court a quo did not
give credence to Henry Balmoja’s claim that at the time of the incident he was
sleeping in his house in Tumana, Concepcion, Marikina City; that earlier at
6:30 in the morning he was awakened by his brother-in-law Sonny Dalusong to
deliver a swing in Cavite but that he opted to sleep it out instead as he had stayed
up late the night before as he watched a mahjong game; and that he woke up only
at 1:30 in the afternoon. The lower
court declared that the defense of alibi by the accused could not prosper over
the positive testimony of private complainant Cynthia Lea Dapoc that he was the
one who raped her.
Accused-appellant now contends
that the trial court erred in convicting him of rape when his guilt had not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He
argues that Lea’s claim that it was out of fear that she entered the vacant
grassy area does not deserve credence since, first, Lea admitted that she did
not believe his tale of a lieutenant looking for him in connection with a
missing woman; second, she did not know
the woman on the picture; and third, she had no reason to hide from the
"lieutenant."
Accused-appellant disputes further
the finding of force or intimidation by the lower court as there was no
physical evidence that Lea was strangled and the only physical injuries noted
on her body, apart from those in her genitalia, were the abrasions on the
posterior aspect of her right forearm.
He avers that it was hard to believe that the presence of a pair of
long-nose pliers in his pocket would instill fear in the victim sufficient
enough for her not to even put up a token resistance. He contends that Lea herself admitted that she did not shout nor
resist when he undressed her.
Accused-appellant likewise
contends that private complainant’s testimony is not credible as it was
inconsistent. He notes that during private
complainant’s direct testimony she stated that he laid her on the ground,
undressed her, placed himself on top of her, and tried to insert his penis into
her vagina. However, during
cross-examination, she narrated that accused-appellant did not tell her to lie
down but instead placed her on his lap, with her back against him, and while
accused-appellant held her, he undressed both of them.
Moreover, accused-appellant
observes that the conduct of private complainant immediately after the incident
was not the natural reaction of a woman who had just been sexually abused
since she still looked for the address of the absentee student on
the notice and even asked
directions from a parlor
attendant. He also finds it
unbelievable that private complainant did not immediately inform any member of
her family considering that she went home and could immediately phone her
mother.
Accused-appellant thus maintains
his innocence and avers that the trial court should not have been hasty in
ruling out his defense of alibi.
Contrary to the trial court’s finding, he contends that his home was not
a fifteen (15) minute walk from the locus criminis but a fifteen (15) or
twenty (20) minute ride away which makes it physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed had he been
awake.
We find the arguments
unmeritorious. Prior to its amendment,[2] Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code (RPC)
provides that rape is committed when the malefactor has carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when the woman is
deprived of reason or is otherwise rendered unconscious; or (c) when the woman
is under twelve (12) years of age, even when neither of the preceding
circumstances is present. What is
vital is that the act of copulation be proven under any of the conditions
enumerated.
Here, Lea was unwavering in her
narration that accused-appellant was the one who sexually abused her by
employing deceit, intimidation and force upon her. Accused-appellant lured
her into a trap by promising her
that he would accompany her to the address indicated on the notice and
later tried to deceive her into believing that a lieutenant was about to
apprehend him. Lea admitted being
skeptical of Balmoja’s tale but she likewise declared that every time she tried
to leave, Balmoja would prevent her by holding on to her hands and letting her
sit down.[3]
On cross-examination, she
acknowledged that they were near the exit, where on one side was a grassy area
full of branches while on the other side was a narrow pathway which rendered
escape possible, but she was held back by accused-appellant who locked her arms
in an embrace and pushed her down on the ground.[4] Indeed, as accused-appellant asserted, private
complainant Lea did not shout, but not for want of trying. She pleaded for him to spare her but he
strangled her.[5] Lea was further held immobile by the sight of the
pliers of accused-appellant which she feared would be used against her if she
continued struggling.[6] Contrary therefore to accused-appellant's assertion,
it was more than token resistance that was exhibited by Lea but foresight and
prudence in the midst of adversity.
We likewise find that private
complainant was able to adequately establish the act of rape as she was
consistent in her narration. The
statements she uttered should be viewed in the context in which they were
expressed and not compartmentalized.
Thus, when Lea stated that accused-appellant laid her on the ground,
undressed her, placed himself on top of her, and tried to insert his penis into her vagina, it was in answer
to the question of how the felon raped
her.[7] However, private complainant’s statement that she was
not lying down but was instead on top of accused-appellant with her back
against him while he undressed her and himself was made in answer to the query
on why she was not able to put up any resistance against the advances of
accused-appellant and escape his clutches.[8] In this declaration private complainant was therefore
not referring to the execution of the rape itself as she clarified that it
happened only after accused-appellant had undressed her. Thus -
ATTY. VALEZA: After he undressed you, what happened
next?
A: He laid on top of me and he was trying to…?
Q: What do you mean by "ano?"
A: He tried to insert his
penis into my vagina?[9]
All other considerations and
alleged factual discrepancies fade in the light of this averment. For a discrepancy to serve as basis for acquittal,
such must refer to significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the
accused. An inconsistency, which has
nothing to do with the elements of the crime, cannot be a ground to reverse a
conviction.[10] Thus, any inconsistency with regard
to private
complainant Lea’s position relative to accused-appellant Balmoja is
inconsequential as the material fact that the latter inserted his penis into
her vagina has been established.
Although the extent of penile
penetration was not expounded upon, private complainant’s cry of pain and
entreaty that accused-appellant cease from his actions[11]11 Id., p. 24.11 show that a certain degree of penetration was
achieved sufficient to conclude that consummated rape was committed. This was confirmed by the medico-legal
report which declared that private complainant's hymen had fresh bleeding
lacerations at 3 o’clock, 6 o’clock, and 8 o’clock positions that could have
been inflicted within twenty-four (24) hours as of the time of the examination.[12]
Accused-appellant begs the
question when he requires additional evidence of physical injury. In rape cases, it is the victim's lacerated
hymen that is more conclusive than any physical injury. People v. Alimon[13] is in point. There
the accused capitalized on the absence of physical injuries on the body of the
victim as well as on the alleged uncertainty of penile penetration since it was
claimed that he placed himself on top of the victim although did not succeed in
fully inserting his penis into her organ.
The Court however found the victim's healed lacerations to be consistent
with her claim that she was raped, and adjudged the accused guilty of the
crime. It held that the absence of any
external sign or physical injury on the body of the victim did not negate the
commission of the crime of rape. So we
hold in this case.
Private complainant’s subsequent
demeanor is not contrary to the natural reaction of a woman who had just been
defiled. It is evident that she was in
shock and in denial of the horror to which she had been subjected and opted to
do something methodical and mechanical - deliver the notice, take a
bath, prepare for school. Victims have
been known to react differently to trauma and tragedy but this does not affect
their credibility. Certain however with
private complainant was the person to whom she was to reveal her sad fate -
teacher Mrs. Cillo. As explained by
Lea, she was ashamed to tell anyone else and knew it was only Mrs. Cillo who
would understand her. Thus she waited
to get to school to see her. This too
is not a point against private complainant as naturally people disclose vital
information only to those whom they trust and who would sympathize with them.
The burden of proof to establish
the crime lies with the prosecution and this it was able to dispense
satisfactorily. The defense of alibi
and denial of accused-appellant is weak compared to the mountain of evidence
presented by the prosecution as to the guilt and culpability of
accused-appellant. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of
accused-appellant by private complainant.[14] Other than defense witness Vilma Santos’ claim that
she saw Balmoja sleeping on a wooden bed, no other witness was presented by the
defense - not the niece of Balmoja whom Vilma Santos spoke to outside of the
house of Balmoja,[15] nor Darling and Dennis who passed by and beckoned to Vilma Santos.[16] Other than his assertion that he was asleep at
the time of the
incident, accused-appellant did not present any evidence showing that his
presence at the locus criminis was impossible. Pitted against the volume of evidence presented by the
prosecution the defense of alibi and denial of accused-appellant therefore
falls as it has nothing to anchor on.
WHEREFORE, the 18 February 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Br. 272, Marikina City, declaring accused-appellant Henry Balmoja
alias Ayat guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
complainant P50,000.00 as moral damages, is AFFIRMED. In addition,
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, accused-appellant is also ordered to
pay the complaining witness P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Decision penned by
Judge Reuben P. De la Cruz, RTC-Br. 272, Marikina City.
[2] Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) was amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as “The
Anti-Rape Law of 1997.” Under the new
law, the definition of the crime of rape was expanded, reclassified as a crime
against persons, and incorporated into Title Eight under Chapter Three of the
RPC as Articles 266-A, 266-B, 266-C and 266-D.
[3] TSN, 27 July
1998, p. 41.
[4] Id., pp.
42-44.
[5] Id., p. 21.
[6] Id., pp. 21-22.
[7] ATTY.
VALEZA: You said you were raped, how
did that person rape you?
WITNESS: He undressed me, he laid on top of me, he
kissed me on my lips and on my breast. (TSN, 27 July 1998, pp. 12-13.)
[8] ATTY.
LARRACAS: So in other words, you want
to tell us that you did not put any resistance to defend yourself against the
man?
A: Because he always held my two (2) hands so I could not move.
Q: You can kick him if you want?
A: Yes, but I was sitting on the ground.
Q: When the man asked you to lie down, what was he doing at that time?
A: He did not tell me to lie down. He laid me on top of him while he was holding my hands he was undressing himself and he undressed me.
Q: While you were lying on top of him?
A: I was lying on top of him with my back against him
Q: So you mean to tell us that you were lying on top of him so if you want at that time to run away or stand up, you can easily do so because you were lying only on top of him and not under him?
A: Because he was
holding my hands so I cannot move.
(TSN, 27 July 1998, pp. 44-45).
[9] Id., pp.
22-23.
[10] People v. Antonio,
G.R. No. 128149, 24 July 2000, citing People v. Bato, G.R. No. 134939, 16
February 2000 and People v. Sancha, G.R. Nos. 131818-19, 3 February 2000.
[11] People v. Antonio,
G.R. No. 128149, 24 July 2000, citing People v. Bato, G.R. No. 134939, 16
February 2000 and People v. Sancha, G.R. Nos. 131818-19, 3 February 2000.
[12] TSN, 24 March 1998,
p. 17.
[13] G.R. No. 87758, 28 June
1996, 257 SCRA 658.
[14] People v. Batidor
alias “Tora,” G.R. No. 126027, 18 February 1999.
[15] TSN, 24 November 1998, p. 10.
[16] Id., pp.
15-16.