SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129960.
August 28, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO CARIÑO @ “ORLANDO,” accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision[1] dated December 3, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court
of Candon, Ilocos Sur, Branch 23, finding appellant Pedro Cariño @ “Orlando”
guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Edmundo[2] Milan, the amount of P50,000.00 for loss of life, and
P67,805.00 for burial and funeral expenses.
Appellant was charged with murder
in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of September, 1992, in the municipality of Sta. Cruz, province of Ilocos Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, stab and hack one Edmundo Milan, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on different parts of his body, which wounds necessarily produced the death of said Edmundo Milan.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The appellant was arraigned on May
7, 1993 and with the assistance of counsel, pleaded “Not Guilty” to the crime
charged. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution anchored its case
mainly on the testimony of Rolando Lovinaria.
According to him, sometime in the evening of September 16, 1992, he and
his brother-in-law, Edmundo Milan, attended the wake of one Dominador Opinion
at Sevilla, Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur.[4] During the wake, a misunderstanding occurred between
Edmundo and appellant Pedro Cariño. The
misunderstanding was apparently caused when Edmundo touched the head of Pedro,[5] getting the ire of Pedro who then tried to get
Edmundo to go outside with him to engage in a boxing bout.[6] Rolando intervened and pacified both of them. Thinking that everything was settled,
Rolando and Edmundo stayed at the wake watching a card game. After ten minutes, the two of them got up to
go home. After a few moments, Rolando
noticed that Pedro was following them on the road and was going to attack
Edmundo.[7] Rolando turned to meet Pedro and embraced him. Rolando pleaded forgiveness for Edmundo’s
act. Said pleas fell on deaf ears.
Pedro, instead of relenting, pulled out a “Rambo” knife[8] and used it to break away from Rolando’s
embrace. Pedro then pursued Edmundo and
upon catching up with him, stabbed the latter twice at the back with the
“Rambo” knife.[9] Pedro then hacked Edmundo on the head. After Pedro had left, Rolando called for help
and brought Edmundo to the hospital where he was pronounced, “Dead on Arrival.”[10]
The prosecution then presented as
its second witness Dr. Hermenigildo[11] Somera, who had conducted the autopsy on the body of
Edmundo Milan. The doctor testified
that the victim suffered multiple wounds.
The first four wounds were all linear lacerations located on different
parts of the body. One was on the
parietal area of the scalp. Another
wound was 3 cm. along the horizontal plane at level of T4 along paravertebral
line, left and found at the back of the face of the victim. The third wound was five cms. along the
horizontal plane at level of L2-L3 along midscapular line, right. The fourth wound was about 3 cms.,
superficial and found in the middle of the right elbow. The victim also suffered “multiple
contusions, hematoma, as well as abrasions in the left peri-orbital RT”. The victim also had a black eye and a wound
on the lips which the witness said could have been caused by a fall or a direct
blow from another person. Finally, Dr.
Somera testified that the fatal wounds which caused the death of Edmundo were
the ones inflicted from behind.[12]
Brenda Milan, sister of the
victim, testified on the expenses which their family spent for the interment,
funeral and burial of Edmundo.[13]
The last two witnesses for the
prosecution were SPO4 Gregorio Biteng and Councilwoman Marietta Oliver. Their testimonies concerned the recovery of
the weapon used in the killing of Edmundo.
Oliver testified that the son of Pedro, Orlando Cariño, surrendered a
bladed weapon to her, which she then turned over to SPO4 Biteng.[14] Her testimony was corroborated by SPO4 Biteng.[15]
Appellant did not deny the killing
but pleaded self- defense. As lone
witness for the defense, he testified that at around 9:00 o’clock in the
evening of September 16, 1992, he was at the wake of one Dominador Opinion and
was playing a card game with Anacleto Anioan, Jr.. While he was playing, Edmundo, who was behind him, suddenly
slapped his ears and then left.
Appellant tried to regain his composure and “cool his feelings”,[16] then followed Edmundo to ask him why he was
slapped. He was first stopped by
Rolando Lovinaria but was allowed to go[17] after he told the latter that he was just going to
talk to Edmundo. Upon catching up with
Edmundo, appellant asked him, “Why did you do that to me, Brod?” to which
Edmundo replied, “Stupid.”[18] Thereafter, Edmundo pulled out a knife[19] from his left waist.
Upon seeing the knife, appellant boxed Edmundo, hitting him in the
face. Then they grappled for possession
of the knife. After he got possession of the knife, appellant brandished it to
repel the attacks of Edmundo. Since
Edmundo did not stop his aggressive advances, appellant stabbed him with the
knife. He then threw the knife and
proceeded to the house of Sgt. Servando Manzano to surrender himself. [20]
On December 3, 1996, the trial
court promulgated its decision, disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused, Pedro Cariño, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of MURDER and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is further ordered to pay to the heirs of Edmundo Milan the amount of P50,000.00 for loss of life and also, the amount of P67,805.00 as funeral and burial expenses.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Aggrieved, appellant appealed
seasonably. In his brief, he assigns
two errors for our consideration.
1. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ROLANDO LOVINARIA WHO WAS AN INTERESTED WITNESS BEING THE BROTHER-IN-LAW OF THE VICTIM EDMUNDO MILAN.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF EDMUNDO MILAN WAS ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY.
Appellant contends that aside from
being related to the victim and thus a biased witness, Rolando Lovinaria as the
lone eyewitness for the prosecution gave statements which are contrary to human
experience. Appellant, however,
mentions only one example in his brief, the allegation that Edmundo Milan
walked normally even after appellant was already struggling to free himself
from Rolando’s embrace. According to
appellant, this is unbelievable because the normal reaction of a person who had
noticed that someone was following him would be to walk fast.[22]
As for the second assigned error,
appellant argues that there can be no treachery in this case as the victim was
not unaware of appellant’s intent since there was a heated argument between
them, preceding the attack. The fact
that there was already an existing hostility between the parties prior to the
attack should presumably give the victim an opportunity to defend himself.[23]
On the first assigned error, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counters that mere relationship between
the victim to a witness does not necessarily impair the latter’s credibility,
especially if, as in this case, there was no improper motive attributed to the
witness which could have impelled him to commit perjury.[24]
However, regarding the second
assigned error, the OSG agrees that treachery was not sufficiently established
in this case. The OSG recommended that
the appellant be found guilty of homicide, instead of murder.[25]
The issues we find in this case
are: (1) whether the testimony of
prosecution witness Rolando Lovinaria deserves credence; (2) whether
self-defense was proved by appellant; and (3) whether treachery qualified the
killing of Edmundo Milan to murder.
The first issue raised by
appellant is one of credibility. In
criminal cases, when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate
courts as a rule will not disturb the findings of the trial court considering
that the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.[26] Hence, the assessment of witnesses’ credibility lies
within the trial court’s province and expertise.[27] There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, as
when the trial court has neglected to consider significant facts and
circumstances of material importance which could lead to a different result.
Here there is no showing that
Rolando Lovinaria was impelled by any improper motive to testify in court
falsely. Without showing any reason or
motive for a prosecution witness to perjure his testimony, the presumption is
that no such improper motive exists, and his testimony is worthy of full faith
and credit.[28]
Rolando’s relationship with the
victim, in our view, does not taint his testimony. In fact, it tends to strengthen his credibility as the interest
of the victim’s kinsmen is to secure the conviction of the guilty. This natural inclination deters them from
implicating persons other than the real culprits.[29]
Appellant’s allegation that
Rolando gave statements contrary to human experience is not supported by the
records. We find his testimony candid,
straightforward and credible. There is
nothing unbelievable in his statement that Edmundo Milan simply walked even
after Pedro broke free from Rolando’s embrace.
That the victim just walked away, however, bears scant relevance and
materiality to the offense charged.
What appears highly pertinent are the facts proved by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) it was appellant who followed the victim; (2)
despite Rolando’s intercession, appellant persisted in pursuing and engaging
the victim in a fight; and (3) appellant admitted stabbing the victim dead.
While appellant claims
self-defense, we find that the requisites therefor have not been
established. That the victim was guilty
of unlawful aggression[30] is unproved.
The claim of appellant that Edmundo had suddenly pulled out a knife is
not corroborated. That appellant
managed to wrestle away from the victim the knife he used to stab Edmundo is
patently self-serving. The ownership of
the “Rambo” knife was not established at all.
What has been established is that appellant followed the victim outside
the place of the wake, after the latter decided to go home. Appellant persisted and confronted the victim
even after witness Rolando Lovinaria had pleaded for appellant’s forgiveness
and embraced appellant to prevent him from pursuing further the victim. Appellant’s action showed his own
belligerence. Yet it is axiomatic that
he who claims self-defense bears the burden of proving that the killing was
preceded by unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.[31] Here we find, instead, appellant’s action highly
bellicose. While appellant insists that
he stabbed the victim only once, not counting his first swinging attack of
which he was not certain whether he had hit the victim. But according to the results of the autopsy
performed by Dr. Somera, the victim’s body bore at least four wounds aside from
contusions and abrasions on the face. Also, according to Dr. Somera’s
testimony, several of the victim’s wounds were inflicted from behind. We are, therefore, unable to accept
appellant’s plea of self-defense for utter lack of merit.
However, we agree with the OSG’s
recommendation that appellant be held liable only for homicide, not
murder. In this case, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was not conclusively established. For treachery to exist, the following
requisites must be met: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not
in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted
the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.[32] The facts show that Edmundo was placed on guard
concerning a possible assault by Pedro.
First, there was a heated argument between them at the place of the
wake. Second, Edmundo was not unaware
that he and Rolando were followed outside by appellant, who did not adopt any
means to conceal himself or hide his intention of confronting Edmundo. Third, the abrasions and contusions on Edmundo’s
face show that Edmundo was able to put up a fight before he was fatally
stabbed. These circumstances negate the
existence of treachery in the commission of the offense.
Absent treachery as a qualifying
circumstance, appellant can only be convicted of homicide.[33] Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty on appellant is
imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum with all the accessory penalties provided by law.[34]
For funeral and burial expenses,
the award of P67,805.00 ought to be reduced. The records reveal that in this
connection, the prosecution was able to present a receipt[35] for P9,000.00, a certification[36] for P7,000.00 and P25,805.00, or a total of
P41,805.00 only. Pursuant to current jurisprudence,[37] we can only award what has been duly proved in this
case, by documentary evidence. The
award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is also in accord with prevailing
jurisprudence.[38] Lastly, pursuant to the ruling in People vs. Uldarico
Panado,[39] the amount of
P50,000.00 should also be awarded to the heirs of Edmundo Milan as moral
damages for the brutal slaying of the victim.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Candon, Ilocos Sur, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant PEDRO CARIÑO is found guilty of HOMICIDE and sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P41,805.00 as
actual damages; P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp.
17-25.
[2] Sometimes referred
to as “Edmund” in the records.
[3] Id. at 9.
[4] TSN, June 3, 1993,
pp. 5-6.
[5] Id. at 6.
[6] Id. at 7.
[7] Id. at 9.
[8] About 1 ft. long,
per TSN, June 3, 1993, p. 10.
[9] Id. at 10-12.
[10] Id. at 13-14.
[11] Also spelled as
“Herminigildo.”
[12] TSN, Sept. 14, 1993,
pp. 5-9; See also Exh. “B”, Records, p. 2.
[13] TSN, March 4, 1994,
pp. 6-10.
[14] TSN, May 12, 1994,
pp. 5-7.
[15] Id. at 3-4.
[16] TSN, October 16,
1995, p. 7.
[17] Upon
cross-examination, appellant testified that he struggled to break free from
Rolando’s hold, Id. at 18.
[18] Id. at 6-9.
[19] About 6 to 7 inches,
Id. at 9.
[20] Id.
at 9-11.
[21] Rollo, pp.
24-25.
[22] Rollo, p. 37.
[23] Id. at 40.
[24] Id. at 72.
[25] Id. at 73-76.
[26] People vs. Mendoza,
GR. No. 128890. 332 SCRA 485, 494 (2000).
[27] People vs. Tanoy, GR
No. 115692, 332 SCRA 12, 17 (2000).
[28] People vs.
Acaya, G.R. No. 108381, 327 SCRA 269 (2000).
[29] People vs. Dimailig,
G.R. No. 120170, 332 SCRA 340, 350 (2000), citing People vs. Quilang, G.R. Nos.
123265-66, August 12, 1999, 312 SCRA 314.
[30] People vs. Saragina,
G.R. No. 128281, 332 SCRA 219, 225 (2000).
[31] See Reyes, L.B., The
Revised Penal Code, Book One, 12th
Edition, pp. 150-151; Also, People vs. Cotas, G.R. No. 132043, 332 SCRA
627, 635 (2000).
[32] Reyes, supra,
pp. 409 - 410.
[33] Article 249, Revised
Penal Code.
[34] People vs. Mangahas,
G.R. No. 118777, 311 SCRA 385, 406 (1999).
[35] Exhibit C-1,
Records, p. 63.
[36] Exhibit C-2,
Records, p. 64.
[37] Art. 2199, Civil
Code; People vs. Uldarico Panado, et.al., G.R. No. 133439, December 26, 2000;
People vs. Avillana, G.R. No. 119621, 332 SCRA 19 (2000); People vs. Guillermo,
G.R. No. 113787, 302 SCRA 257 (1999).
[38] People vs.
Silvestre, G.R. No. 125573, 307 SCRA 68, 90-91 (1999); People vs.
Saragina, supra, p. 240.
[39] G.R. No. 133439,
December 26, 2000.