SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 110740.
August 9, 2001]
NDC-GUTHRIE PLANTATIONS, INC., NDC-GUTHRIE ESTATES, INC., and DAVID SUDHIR KUMAR DAS, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JESSIE OMAMALIN, EDWIN M. CRUZ, REMEDIOS CUBITA, LORENZO M. BETINOL, EULALIO E. EBAÑEZ, PEDRO A. LONGKAKIT, MERELYN D. JARA, NELSON B. BERNALES, DOMINADOR C. IOLATA, EDMUNDO S. INCHOCO, ROLITO S. COCAMAS, NEMESIO L. TAGAHANAN, JACQUELINE P. TEJADA, DANILO P. CUADRA and HERMES C. ARCEÑAS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari
seeking to annul the Resolution[1] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
Fifth Division, dated May 27, 1993 which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Labor Arbiter dated January 13, 1992 holding
petitioners NDC-Guthrie Plantations, Inc. (NGPI), NDC-Guthrie Estates, Inc.
(NGEI) and David Sudhir Kumar Das liable for unfair labor practice, illegal
dismissal and ordering them to reinstate private respondents to their former
positions or to pay them their separation pay plus backwages.
Petitioner companies are both
government-controlled corporations, 60% of their stocks being owned by the
National Development Corporation. They
were incorporated in the early 1980’s to develop, operate and maintain integrated
palm projects in Agusan del Sur.[3] Pursuant to their purpose clause, NGPI and NGEI hired
hundreds of farm workers to establish and maintain their respective plantations[4] as well as several supervisors to oversee and
superintend their workers. Petitioner
Kumar Das was the designated general manager of petitioner companies at the
time of the supposed illegal dismissal.
Sometime in 1989, NGPI discovered
that it was sustaining tremendous losses which threatened to further upset its
precarious financial condition. In 1987
alone it incurred a net loss of Eighty Six Million Three Hundred Eighteen
Thousand Five Hundred Eighty Pesos (P86,318,580.00) while in 1988 its net loss
amounted to Eighty Three Million Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand Nine Hundred
Thrity Pesos (P83,950,930.00). In a
desperate attempt to reverse its fortune and prevent its coffers from further
depletion, NGPI terminated the services of seventy- two (72) field
workers. Still, the company was
confronted with an audit report prepared by the Commission on Audit reflecting
losses of Sixty Four Million Three Hundred Fifteen Thousand One Hundred
Forty-Four Pesos (P64,315,144.000) and One Hundred Forty Three Million Nine
Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety-Three Pesos (P143,939,893.00)
for 1989 and 1990, respectively. Faced
with mounting losses, NGPI further terminated the employment of forty-nine (49)
field workers in February 1990, followed by another one hundred fifty-eight
(158) farm hands in September of that year.
NGEI was not spared from a similar
fate as it likewise fell into dire straits during the same period. Based on the 1990 Audit Report furnished
the company by the Commission on Audit, NGEI incurred a net loss of Forty Four
Million Seven Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Eight Pesos
(P44,797,868.00) for 1990. Previous financial statements of the company
indicated a trend of dwindling current assets. NGEI’s assets diminished from
Thirteen Million Forty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Seven Pesos
(P13,044,727.00) in 1987 to Seven Million Six Hundred Forty Five Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy-Three Pesos (P7,645,473.00) in 1988 to Five Million Eight
Hundred Sixty One Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Five Pesos (P5,861,285.00) in
1989 to Three Million Five Hundred Seventy Six Thousand Three Hundred Fifty-Two
Pesos (P3,576,352.00) in 1990.[5] Thus, it was compelled to take the same course of
action undertaken by NGPI and retrenched or laid off eighty-eight (88) farm
workers in December 1989, seven (7) field workers in February 1990 and
fifty-eight (58) farm helpers in September of that year.
With this as backdrop, several
employees of petitioner companies bonded together and formed the NDC-GUTHRIE
Staff Workers Union hereinafter called the Union. On October 7,1990, after it had been issued a Certificate of
Recognition by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), the Union
sent notice to NGPI and NGEI requesting that it be recognized as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all its member-employees. Petitioner companies jointly replied asking
that they be furnished proof confirming the Union’s claim that it represented
the majority of the employees covered by the proposed bargaining unit. In compliance with the request, petitioner
companies were provided with a copy of the minutes of the Union’s
organizational meeting as well as the minutes of the meeting when its proposed
collective bargaining agreement was ratified.
Since the documents submitted did
not constitute proof of majority representation, petitioner companies denied
recognition of the Union. Consequently,
the Union filed a petition for a certification election among all employees
covered by the proposed bargaining unit.[6]
Meanwhile, on January 16, 1991,
petitioner companies notified the DOLE of their financial condition and their
decision to retrench employees numbering about one hundred and twenty (120).[7] Subsequently, on January 21, 1991 petitioner
companies sent notices to seventeen (17) of their office and supervisory
employees advising them that in view of the companies’ financial problems, they
would be retrenched from their employment effective February 28, 1991. Believing that their dismissal was resorted
to because of their union activities and hence, in violation of their rights to
self-organization and to collective bargaining, the said seventeen (17)
employees who were laid off filed with the Labor Arbiter’s Office a complaint
for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against petitioner companies
and petitioner Kumar Das.
As petitioners failed to attend
any of the scheduled conferences and hearings before Labor Arbiter Irving A.
Petilla thereby rendering all efforts towards conciliation in vain, the Labor
Arbiter issued an order directing the parties to submit their respective
position papers.
In their position paper, private
respondents averred that prior to their dismissal from their employment they
had been pleading with petitioner companies for a salary increase. However, petitioner companies rejected their
demand and even removed certain privileges to which they had been previously
entitled such as the use of the companies’ clubhouses. Perturbed by the apparent arrogance of the
management of petitioner companies, private respondents decided to form a union in the belief that
it would increase their bargaining power.
Their decision proved calamitous as petitioner companies called
attention to their financial woes and got back at them by dismissing them
purportedly by reason of retrenchment.
Petitioners, on the other hand,
denied the claim of illegal dismissal and asserted that it was their
prerogative to lay off their employees to prevent or forestall further
losses. They countered that their
financial obligations had eaten up most of their capital outlay resulting in
unabated losses from 1987 to 1990, thus constraining them to adopt and
implement retrenchment programs. The petitioner companies presented financial
statements prepared by the Commission on Audit showing tremendous losses for
four (4) consecutive years, i.e., from 1987 to 1990. They further claimed that the retrenchment of private respondents
was done in good faith as it was based on a number of criteria, namely,
seniority, service record and performance.
One of the complainants, Paul V.
Martinet, was dropped from the complaint after it was found that he had
accepted his separation pay from NGPI and executed a deed of quitclaim
releasing the latter from liability.
Accordingly, his complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
On January 13, 1992, Labor Arbiter
Petilla rendered judgment ordering the reinstatement of private respondents,
with full backwages, on the ground that petitioner companies failed to
substantiate their supposed losses incurred from 1987 to 1990 which led to the
retrenchment of employees. The Labor
Arbiter pointed out in his Decision that petitioners’ alleged losses
were merely conjured as “a convenient excuse to get rid of herein complainants
who displayed more determination, motivation, zeal and enthusiasm in going
through with their union x x x. It constitutes nothing less than an unfair
labor practice.”[8]
Aggrieved, petitioner companies
appealed to the NLRC. Pending appeal,
complainants Joel F. Fortich, Merelyn D. Jara and Edwin M. Cruz entered into an
amicable settlement with petitioner companies thereby extinguishing whatever
claim they had against the latter. On
the basis of the aforementioned settlement, petitioners moved for the dismissal
of the complaint insofar as Fortich, Jara and Cruz were concerned.
On 27 May 1993, the NLRC dismissed
the appeal and held:
We are subsequently in accord with the findings and conclusions of
the Labor Arbiter below. Appellants
miserably failed to establish the grave abuse of discretion and/or serious
errors allegedly committed by the Labor Arbiter a quo when he rendered
the decision in question. The records
of the case plausibly show that the assailed decision was amply supported by
relevant and material evidence.[9]
The NLRC
expressed the view that the decision of petitioner companies to lay off private
respondents was calculated to douse the embers of unionism among the
workers. The NLRC, however, granted the
Motion to Dismiss filed by complainants Fortich, Jara and Cruz.[10]
Inasmuch as their motion for
reconsideration was denied by the NLRC, petitioners filed with this Court the
instant petition for certiorari. The
veracity of their claim of financial distress and the validity of private
respondents’ dismissal, as a consequence of their distressful financial condition,
are the basic issues which they submitted for the Court’s consideration.
Instead of commenting on the
petition, the Solicitor General filed his Manifestation and Motion which
gave credence to petitioner companies’ plea of financial distress and supported
the retrenchment of employees. In recommending
the granting of the petition, the Solicitor General remarked that “had the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC studied more carefully the financial statements
offered in evidence by petitioner companies, they would have found that the two
companies were losing.”[11]
On the other hand the NLRC, in its
Comment, strongly opposed the
granting of the petition and
averred that the mass layoff could not be justified by losses suffered
by petitioner companies inasmuch as there were no proof presented in
support thereof. The NLRC further
argued that assuming arguendo that petitioner companies were
suffering losses, there
was no showing that they observed fair and reasonable standards in
effecting retrenchment nor was there
proof that they adopted cost reduction measures before resorting to
retrenchment.[12]
In the meantime, by authority of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, petitioner companies were merged, with
NGPI as the surviving corporation.
Accordingly, the entire assets and liabilities of NGEI were transferred
to and absorbed by NGPI.[13]
After an assiduous evaluation of
the record, we are convinced that there truly existed a persistent and
irreversible financial instability in petitioner companies, thus amply
justifying their resort to drastic cuts in personnel. We cannot share the posture adopted by the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC rejecting petitioners’ defense of financial distress. On the contrary, it is more logical to
conclude from the evidence on record that petitioner companies had indeed been
deeply troubled by a continuing downtrend in their financial resources and had
been struggling to keep their businesses afloat. From the evidence presented by NGPI, in 1987 alone it sustained a
net loss of Eighty Six Million Three Hundred Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred
Eighty Pesos (P86,318,580.00), followed by Eighty Three Million Nine Hundred
Fifty Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Pesos (P83,950,930.00) in 1988, Sixty Four
Million Three Hundred Fifteen Thousand One Hundred Forty-Four Pesos (P64,315,144.00)
in 1989 and One Hundred Forty Three Million Nine Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand
Eight Hundred Ninety-Three Pesos (P143,939,893.00) in 1990. On the other hand, NGEI reported an alarming
constriction in its current assets from Thirteen Million Forty Four Thousand
Seven Hundred Twenty-Seven Pesos (P13,044,727.00) in 1987 to a measly Three
Million Five Hundred Seventy Six Thousand Three Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos
(P3,576,352.00) in 1990; while its net loss for 1990 was Forty Four Million
Seven Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Eight Pesos
(P44,797,868.00). Proof was also presented supporting petitioners’ claim that
even prior to the dismissal of private respondents, hundreds of farm workers of
petitioner companies had already been retrenched to save on much needed
capital.
In the context of the submitted
financial statements prepared by the Commission on Audit itemizing and
explaining the losses suffered by petitioner companies, the Court is unable to
understand the rationale behind the NLRC’s challenged judgment. These financial documents duly audited by
the Commission on Audit constitute the normal and reliable method of proof of
the profit and loss performance of a government-controlled corporation.[14] The Court cannot also conceive how the Labor Arbiter,
despite these financial statements, was able to opine that “the financial
statements submitted by respondents failed to show losses incurred in business
operation deducted from gains.”
As the retrenchment programs
undertaken by petitioner companies were purely business decisions properly
within the reasonable exercise of management prerogative, the NLRC has been
denied the authority to delve into their wisdom and soundness.[15] Indeed, management cannot be denied recourses to
retrenchment if it can successfully prove the existence of the following
factors: (a) substantial losses which are not merely de minimis in
extent; (b) imminence of such
substantial losses; (c) retrenchment would effectively prevent the expected
additional losses; and, (d) alleged losses and expected losses must be proven
by sufficient and convincing evidence.[16] As these guidelines were faithfully observed by
petitioner companies, the respondent NLRC’s opinion in the case at bar is thus
shown, upon analysis, to be nothing but rhetoric of hyperbolic character,
finding no justification whatever in the facts, or in law or logic.[17] Accordingly, NLRC’s subject resolution will have to
be rejected for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.
However, notwithstanding the
propriety of the retrenchment programs, petitioner companies are not excused
from complying with the required written notice to the affected employees and
the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month before the intended
date of termination.[18] In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner
companies informed both the retrenched employees and DOLE of the impending
retrenchment. The requirement of law
mandating the giving of notices was intended not only to enable the employees
to look for other employment and therefore ease the impact of the loss of their
jobs and the corresponding income,[19] but, more importantly, to give the DOLE the
opportunity to ascertain the verity of the alleged authorized cause of
termination.[20]
Accordingly, inasmuch as private
respondents’ separation from service was both substantively and procedurally
just, petitioner companies should only be held liable for separation pay at the
rate of one month for every year of service and the proportionate 13th month
pay.[21]
At this point, we take notice of
the 9 July 1991 Order[22] issued by
Labor Arbiter Petilla which, in our view, was rendered in grave abuse of
discretion. The facts surrounding the
issuance of the said order are as follows:
It appears that by reason of the nature of their work, each of the
private respondents was allowed to avail of petitioner companies’ loan policy
intended exclusively for the purchase of motorcycles. Under that policy, the company would advance the purchase price
of the motorcycle to be paid back by the employee through monthly deductions
from his salary with the company retaining the ownership of the motorcycle
until it was fully paid for. All the
private respondents availed of petitioner companies’ motorcycle loan policy.
After they had been dismissed from
their employment private respondents, fearing that their motorcycles would be
taken, sought a temporary restraining order from the Labor Arbiter to stop
petitioner companies from seizing their motorcycles pending the final
resolution of their complaints for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Petilla responded favorably and immediately issued
a restraining order forbidding petitioners from disturbing private respondents
in their possession of the said motorcycles.
Petitioner companies moved for reconsideration but their motion was
denied.
The 1990 Rules of Procedure of the
National Labor Relations Commission grant labor arbiters with the power to
issue preliminary injunction or restraining order “as an incident to cases
pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the
pendency of the cases but excluding labor disputes involving strike or
lock-out.”[23] The said Rules, however, limit the exercise of the
power over labor disputes only, which
as defined, refer to “any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions
of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, arranging the terms and conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.”[24]
In the present case, petitioners’
supposed attempt to seize the said motorcycles from the private respondents is
not a labor, but a civil, dispute. The
issue, inasmuch as it
relates directly to the enforcement of the loan agreement,
between petitioners and private respondents, involves debtor-creditor relations
founded on a contract and does not in any way concern employer-employee
relations. As such, it should be enforced
through a separate civil
action in the
regular courts and not before the Labor Arbiter.
Since the seizure of the
motorcycles is unrelated to any labor dispute under which an injunction may be
issued by a labor arbiter, it was plain grave abuse of discretion for Labor
Arbiter Petilla to have issued a writ of injunction restraining the petitioner
companies from seizing the motorcycles subject of the loan agreement between
petitioner companies and private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolution issued on May 27, 1993 by respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) is MODIFIED by ordering petitioner NDC-GUTHRIE
Plantations,Inc., as the surviving corporation of the original petitioner
companies, to pay private respondents separation pay equivalent to one month
pay for every year of service and their proportionate 13th month
pay. For this purpose, this case is
REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for computation of the separation pay and
the proportionate 13th month pay due to the private respondents.
The writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Labor Arbiter a quo is hereby ordered dissolved.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Commissioner
Leon G. Gonzaga, Jr., and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Musib M. Buat
and Commissioner Oscar N. Abella in NLRC CA No. M-000770-92, Rollo, pp.
568-580.
[2] Penned by Labor
Arbiter Irving A. Petilla in NLRC Case No. SRAB 10-01-00012-91 TO
10-01-00028-91.
[3] While NGPI was
incorporated in 1980, NGEI was issued its certificate of incorporation in 1983.
[4] NGPI’s farm is
located in Maligaya, Rosario, Agusan del Sur while NGEI’s plantations is in San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
[5] Rollo, pp.
509-525.
[6] Docketed as MED-ARB
Rox Case No. R1000-9012-RU-037 before the DOLE, Regional Office No. X, Cagayan
de Oro City; Original Records, Vol. I, p. 13.
[7] Rollo, p.
201.
[8] Original Records,
Vol. I, pp. 564-577.
[9] Rollo, pp.
568-580.
[10] Rollo, pp.
568-580.
[11] Rollo, p.
626. Id., pp. 646-652.
[12] Id., pp.
646-652.
[13] Rollo, p.
526.
[14] Dela Salle
University v. Dela Salle University Employees Union, 330 SCRA 363, 383 [2000];
Asian Alcohol Corporation v. NLRC, 305 SCRA 416, 430 [1999]; Caltex
Refinery Employees Association (CREA) v. Brillantes, 279 SCRA 218, 231
[1997]; Saballa v. NLRC, 260 SCRA 697, 709 [1996]; Revidad v.
NLRC, 245 SCRA 356,367 [1995]; Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of
Free Workers, 189 SCRA 179, 190 [1990].
[15] In the present case,
private respondents were the last ones to be hired by petitioner companies.
[16] Bogo-Medellin
Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc. v. NLRC, 296 SCRA 108,122 [1998];
Somerville Stainless Steel Corporation v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 420, 434 [1998];
Banana Growers Collective at Puyod Farms v. NLRC, 276 SCRA 544, 556 [1997];
Uichico v. NLRC, 273 SCRA 35, 43 [1997].
[17] La Salette of
Santiago, Inc. v. NLRC, 195 SCRA 80, 92 [1991].
[18] Article
283 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides:
ART. 283. Closure
of establishment and reduction of personnel. - The employer may also
terminate the employment of any employee due to xxx retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the
Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended
date thereof. xxx
[19] Coca-Cola Bottlers
(Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC, 194 SCRA 592, 599 [1991].
[20] Serrano v.
NLRC, 331 SCRA 331, 340 [2000].
[21] Article 283 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines further reads: x x x In case of retrenchment to
prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment
or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the
separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half
(1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall
be considered one (1) whole year.
[22] Original Records,
Vol. I, pp. 510-515.
[23] Sec. 1, Rule XI,
1990 NLRC Rules of Procedure.
[24] Article 212(l),
Labor Code of the Philippines.