FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124110. April 20, 2001]
UNITED AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his minor son MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN,
J.:
On March 1, 1989, private
respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from petitioner United Airlines,
through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila, three (3) “Visit the U.S.A.”
tickets for himself, his wife and his minor son Mychal for the following
routes:
(a) San Francisco to Washington (15 April 1989);
(b) Washington to Chicago (25 April 1989);
(c) Chicago to Los Angeles (29 April 1989);
(d) Los Angeles to San
Francisco (01 May 1989 for petitioner’s wife and 05 May 1989 for petitioner and
his son).[1]
All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines.[2]
The Fontanillas proceeded
to the United States as planned, where they used the first coupon from San
Francisco to Washington. On April 24,
1989, Aniceto Fontanilla bought two (2) additional coupons each for himself,
his wife and his son from petitioner at its office in Washington Dulles
Airport. After paying the penalty for
rewriting their tickets, the Fontanillas were issued tickets with corresponding
boarding passes with the words “CHECK-IN REQUIRED,” for United Airlines Flight
No. 1108, set to leave from Los Angeles to San Francisco at 10:30 a.m. on May
5, 1989.[3]
The cause of the
non-boarding of the Fontanillas on United Airlines Flight No. 1108 makes up the
bone of contention of this controversy.
Private respondents'
version is as follows:
Aniceto Fontanilla and
his son Mychal claim that on May 5, 1989, upon their arrival at the Los Angeles
Airport for their flight, they proceeded to United Airlines counter where they
were attended by an employee wearing a nameplate bearing the name “LINDA.”
Linda examined their tickets, punched something into her computer and then told
them that boarding would be in fifteen minutes.[4]
When the flight was
called, the Fontanillas proceeded to the plane. To their surprise, the stewardess at the gate did not allow them
to board the plane, as they had no assigned seat numbers. They were then directed to go back to the
“check-in” counter where Linda subsequently informed them that the flight had
been overbooked and asked them to wait.[5]
The Fontanillas tried to
explain to Linda the special circumstances of their visit. However, Linda told them in arrogant manner,
“So what, I can not do anything about it.”[6]
Subsequently, three other
passengers with Caucasian features were graciously allowed to board, after the
Fontanillas were told that the flight had been overbooked.[7]
The plane then took off
with the Fontanillas’ baggage in tow, leaving them behind.[8]
The Fontanillas then
complained to Linda, who in turn gave them an ugly stare and rudely uttered,
“It’s not my fault. It’s the fault of
the company. Just sit down and wait.”[9] When Mr. Fontanilla reminded Linda of the
inconvenience being caused to them, she bluntly retorted, “Who do you think
you are? You lousy Flips are good for
nothing beggars. You always ask for
American aid.” After which she remarked “Don’t worry about your
baggage. Anyway there is nothing in
there. What are you doing here
anyway? I will report you to
immigration. You Filipinos should go
home.”[10] Such rude statements were made in front of
other people in the airport causing the Fontanillas to suffer shame,
humiliation and embarrassment. The
chastening situation even caused the younger Fontanilla to break into tears.[11]
After some time, Linda,
without any explanation, offered the Fontanillas $50.00 each. She simply said “Take it or leave it.”
This, the Fontanillas declined.[12]
The Fontanillas then
proceeded to the United Airlines customer service counter to plead their
case. The male employee at the counter
reacted by shouting that he was ready for it and left without saying anything.[13]
The Fontanillas were not
booked on the next flight, which departed for San Francisco at 11:00 a.m. It was only at 12:00 noon that they were
able to leave Los Angeles on United Airlines Flight No. 803.
Petitioner United
Airlines has a different version of what occurred at the Los Angeles Airport on
May 5, 1989.
According to United
Airlines, the Fontanillas did not initially go to the check-in counter to get
their seat assignments for UA Flight 1108.
They instead proceeded to join the queue boarding the aircraft without
first securing their seat assignments as required in their ticket and boarding
passes. Having no seat assignments, the
stewardess at the door of the plane instructed them to go to the check-in
counter. When the Fontanillas proceeded to the check-in counter, Linda Allen,
the United Airlines Customer Representative at the counter informed them that
the flight was overbooked. She booked
them on the next available flight and offered them denied boarding
compensation. Allen vehemently denies
uttering the derogatory and racist words attributed to her by the Fontanillas.[14]
The incident prompted the
Fontanillas to file Civil Case No. 89-4268 for damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. After trial on
the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing the complaint. The counterclaim is likewise dismissed as it
appears that plaintiffs were not actuated by legal malice when they filed the
instant complaint.[15]
On appeal, the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of the Fontanillas.
The appellate court found that there was an admission on the part of
United Airlines that the Fontanillas did in fact observe the check-in
requirement. It ruled further that even
assuming there was a failure to observe the check-in requirement, United
Airlines failed to comply with the procedure laid down in cases where a
passenger is denied boarding. The
appellate court likewise gave credence to the claim of Aniceto Fontanilla that
the employees of United Airlines were discourteous and arbitrary and, worse,
discriminatory. In light of such
treatment, the Fontanillas were entitled to moral damages. The dispositive portion of the decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals dated 29 September 1995, states as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment appealed herefrom is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is entered ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiff-appellant the following:
a) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
b) P200,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) P50, 000.00 as attorney’s fees.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Petitioner United
Airlines now comes to this Court raising the following assignment of errors:
I
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT WAS WRONG IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE ALLEGED ADMISSION THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT OBSERVED THE CHECK-IN REQUIREMENT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S FAILURE TO CHECK-IN WILL NOT DEFEAT HIS CLAIMS BECAUSE THE DENIED BOARDING RULES WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH.
III
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES OF P200, 000.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P200,000.
V
RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S
FEES OF P50, 000.[17]
On the first issue raised
by the petitioner, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled that when Rule 9,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court,[18] there was an implied admission in
petitioner's answer in the allegations in the complaint that private respondent
and his son observed the “check-in requirement at the Los Angeles Airport.”
Thus:
A perusal of the above
pleadings filed before the trial court disclosed that there exists a blatant
admission on the part of the defendant-appellee that the plaintiffs-appellants
indeed observed the “check-in” requirement at the Los Angeles Airport on May 5,
1989. In view of defendant-appellee’s
admission of plaintiffs-appellants’ material averment in the complaint, We find
no reason why the trial court should rule against such admission.[19]
We disagree with the
above conclusion reached by respondent Court of Appeals. Paragraph 7 of private respondents'
complaint states:
7. On May 5, 1989 at 9:45 a.m., plaintiff and his son checked in at
defendant’s designated counter at the airport in Los Angeles for their
scheduled flight to San Francisco on defendant’s Flight No. 1108.[20]
Responding to the above
allegations, petitioner averred in paragraph 4 of its answer, thus:
4. Admits the allegation set forth in paragraph 7 of the complaint
except to deny that plaintiff and his son checked in at 9:45 a.m., for lack of
knowledge or information at this point in time as to the truth thereof.[21]
The rule authorizing an
answer that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a
denial, does not apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted
is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant's knowledge that his averment
of ignorance must be palpably untrue.[22] Whether or not private respondents checked
in at petitioner's designated counter at the airport at 9:45 a.m. on May 5,
1989 must necessarily be within petitioner's knowledge.
While there was no
specific denial as to the fact of compliance with the “check-in” requirement by
private respondents, petitioner presented evidence to support its contention
that there indeed was no compliance.
Private respondents then
are said to have waived the rule on admission.
It not only presented evidence to support its contention that there was
compliance with the check-in requirement, it even allowed petitioner to present
rebuttal evidence. In the case of Yu
Chuck vs. "Kong Li Po," we ruled that:
The object of the rule is to relieve a party of the trouble and expense in proving in the first instance an alleged fact, the existence or non-existence of which is necessarily within the knowledge of the adverse party, and of the necessity (to his opponent’s case) of establishing which such adverse party is notified by his opponent’s pleadings.
The plaintiff may, of course, waive the rule and that is what must
be considered to have done (sic) by introducing evidence as to the execution of
the document and failing to object to the defendant’s evidence in refutation;
all this evidence is now competent and the case must be decided thereupon.[23]
The determination of the
other issues raised is dependent on whether or not there was a breach of
contract in bad faith on the part of the petitioner in not allowing the
Fontanillas to board United Airlines Flight 1108.
It must be remembered
that the general rule in civil cases is that the party having the burden of
proof of an essential fact must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon.[24] Although the evidence adduced by the
plaintiff is stronger than that presented by the defendant, a judgment cannot
be entered in favor of the former, if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain
his cause of action. The plaintiff must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendant’s.[25] Proceeding from this, and considering the
contradictory findings of facts by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals, the question before this Court is whether or not private respondents
were able to prove with adequate evidence his allegations of breach of contract
in bad faith.
We rule in the negative.
Time and again, the Court
has pronounced that appellate courts should not, unless for strong and cogent
reasons, reverse the findings of facts of trial courts. This is so because trial judges are in a
better position to examine real evidence and at a vantage point to observe the
actuation and the demeanor of the witnesses.[26] While not the sole indicator of the
credibility of a witness, it is of such weight that it has been said to be the
touchstone of credibility.[27]
Aniceto Fontanilla’s
assertion that upon arrival at the airport at 9:45 a.m., he immediately
proceeded to the check-in counter, and that Linda Allen punched in something
into the computer is specious and not supported by the evidence on record. In support of their allegations, private
respondents submitted a copy of the boarding pass. Explicitly printed on the boarding pass are the words “Check-In
Required.” Curiously, the said pass did not indicate any seat number. If indeed the Fontanillas checked in at the
designated time as they claimed, why then were they not assigned seat
numbers? Absent any showing that Linda
was so motivated, we do not buy into private respondents' claim that Linda
intentionally deceived him, and made him the laughing stock among the
passengers.[28] Hence, as correctly observed by the trial
court:
Plaintiffs fail to realize that their failure to check in, as
expressly required in their boarding passes, is the very reason why they were
not given their respective seat numbers, which resulted in their being denied
boarding.[29]
Neither do we agree with
the conclusion reached by the appellate court that private respondents' failure
to comply with the check-in requirement will not defeat his claim as the denied
boarding rules were not complied with.
Notably, the appellate court relied on the Code of Federal Regulation
Part on Oversales, which states:
250.6 Exceptions to eligibility for denied boarding compensation.
A passenger denied board involuntarily from an oversold flight shall not be eligible for denied board compensation if:
(a) The passenger does not comply with the carrier’s contract of carriage or tariff provisions regarding ticketing, reconfirmation, check-in, and acceptability for transformation.
The appellate court,
however, erred in applying the laws of the United States as, in the case at
bar, Philippine law is the applicable law.
Although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United
States, the tickets were purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were
“rewritten” in Washington, D.C.
However, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of
carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.
In the case of Zalamea
vs. Court of Appeals,[30] this Court applied the doctrine of lex
loci contractus. According to the
doctrine, as a general rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or
entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and
interpretation. This has been said to
be the rule even though the place where the contract was made is different from
the place where it is to be performed, and particularly so, if the place of the
making and the place of performance are the same. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the
airline ticket was issued, when the passengers are residents and nationals of
the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline.
The law of the forum on
the subject matter is Economic Regulations No. 7 as amended by Boarding
Priority and Denied Boarding Compensation of the Civil Aeronautics Board, which
provides that the check-in requirement be complied with before a passenger may
claim against a carrier for being denied boarding:
SEC. 5. Amount of Denied Boarding Compensation – Subject to the exceptions provided hereinafter under Section 6, carriers shall pay to passengers holding confirmed reserved space and who have presented themselves at the proper place and time and fully complied with the carrier’s check-in and reconfirmation procedures and who are acceptable for carriage under the Carrier’s tariffs but who have been denied boarding for lack of space, a compensation at the rate of: xx
Private respondents' narration
that they were subjected to harsh and derogatory remarks seems
incredulous. However, this Court will
not attempt to surmise what really happened.
Suffice to say, private respondent was not able to prove his cause of
action, for as the trial court correctly observed:
xxx plaintiffs claim to have been discriminated against and
insulted in the presence of several people.
Unfortunately, plaintiffs limited their evidence to the testimony [of]
Aniceto Fontanilla, without any corroboration by the people who saw or heard
the discriminatory remarks and insults; while such limited testimony could
possibly be true, it does not enable the Court to reach the conclusion that
plaintiffs have, by a preponderance of evidence, proven that they are entitled
to P1,650,000.00 damages from defendant.[31]
As to the award of moral
and exemplary damages, we find error in the award of such by the Court of
Appeals. For the plaintiff to be
entitled to an award of moral damages arising from a breach of contract of
carriage, the carrier must have acted with fraud or bad faith. The appellate court predicated its award on
our pronouncement in the case of Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals, supra,
where we stated:
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, where passengers with confirmed booking were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to moral damages. (Emphasis supplied.)
However, the Court’s
ruling in said case should be read in consonance with existing laws,
particularly, Economic Regulations No. 7, as amended, of the Civil Aeronautics
Board:
Sec 3. Scope. – This regulation shall apply to every Philippine and
foreign air carrier with respect to its operation of flights or portions of
flights originating from or terminating at, or serving a point within the
territory of the Republic of the Philippines insofar as it denies boarding to a
passenger on a flight, or portion of a flight inside or outside the
Philippines, for which he holds confirmed reserved space. Furthermore, this Regulation is designed to
cover only honest mistakes on the part of the carriers and excludes deliberate
and willful acts of non-accommodation. Provided,
however, that overbooking not exceeding 10% of the seating capacity of the
aircraft shall not be considered as a deliberate and willful act of
non-accommodation.
What this Court considers
as bad faith is the willful and deliberate overbooking on the part of the
airline carrier. The above-mentioned
law clearly states that when the overbooking does not exceed ten percent (10%),
it is not considered as deliberate and therefore does not amount to bad
faith. While there may have been
overbooking in this case, private respondents were not able to prove that the
overbooking on United Airlines Flight 1108 exceeded ten percent.
As earlier stated, the
Court is of the opinion that the private respondents were not able to prove
that they were subjected to coarse and harsh treatment by the ground crew of
United Airlines. Neither were they able
to show that there was bad faith on part of the carrier airline. Hence, the
award of moral and exemplary damages by the Court of Appeals is improper. Corollarily, the award of attorney's fees
is, likewise, denied for lack of any legal and factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 37044 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City in Civil Case No. 89-4268 dated April 8, 1991 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.
(Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on sick leave.
[1] Records, p. 35.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Id.
[4] Records, pp. 35-36.
[5] Id., at 36.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Records, p. 37.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Id.
[13] Id., at 39.
[14] Id., at
119-204.
[15] CA Decision, Rollo,
pp. 7-25.
[16] Rollo, p. 25
[17] Id., at 37.
[18] Section 1.
Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. – Material Averment in the
complaint, other than those as to the amount of damage, shall be deemed
admitted when not specifically admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury are deemed not denied
specifically when not denied specifically under oath.
[19] Rollo, p. 75.
[20] CA Rollo, p.
2.
[21] Id., at 14.
[22] Warner Barnes and
Co. Ltd. vs. Reyes, 103 Phil 662 (1958); PNB vs. Utility
Assurance and Surety Co., Inc., 177
SCRA 210 (1989).
[23] 46 Phil 608, 613.
[24] Ricardo J.
Francisco, THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES, EVIDENCE, Volume VII,
Part II, 1997, citing I Moore on Facts 54.
[25] Nolan vs.
Jalandoni, 23 Phil 292.
[26] Matuguina Integrated
Wood Products, Inc. vs. CA, 263 SCRA 490 (1996) citing Bael vs. IAC,
169 SCRA 617 (1989).
[27] Connor vs.
Connor, 77 A. 2d 697.
[28] Records, p. 39.
[29] CA Rollo, p.
40.
[30] 228 SCRA 23 (1993).
[31] CA Rollo, p.
41.