FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No.
126746. November 29, 2000]
ARTHUR TE, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a
petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of
the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971[1] and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178[2] and the
Resolution dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the
case are as follows:
Petitioner
Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites
on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the
marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth
to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her.[3]
On May 20, 1990,
while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner
contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).[4]
On the basis of
a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when
she learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging
petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City on August 9, 1990.[5] This case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.[6]
Meanwhile, on
July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the
annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was
forced to marry her. He alleged that
private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their
marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.[7]
On November 8,
1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation
of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts
of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite
their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already
married to private respondent. With
respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of
falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was
still single.[8]
After the prosecution
rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court
and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and
animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case.
The trial court
denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990
which stated that the same could not be granted because the prosecution had
sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused.[9] The RTC
also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis.[10]
Petitioner then
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C.
Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s
counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioner’s
[motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing of
the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate
guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in
a criminal case only “prima facie evidence” is sufficient for conviction of an
accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 23971.[11]
Petitioner also
filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the
administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending,
a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the
civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal
case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City.[12] When the
Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16, 1991,[13]
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari,
contending that the Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of
the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case
pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the
administrative case could render nugatory petitioner’s right against
self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making
an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not allow the
suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board despite the
pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the same
respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
26178.[14]
The two
petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the
same set of facts.
On 31 August
1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in
the consolidated petitions. The
appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to
petitioner’s failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial court judge
exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend
the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law.[15] The Court
of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed
by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive grounds to support the
same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the
existence of the elements of bigamy.[16]
Neither did the
appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order
denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case
on the ground of prejudicial question.
Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed since the
action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action
involved is a civil case.[17]
Petitioner
thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals but the same was denied.[18]
Hence,
petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
I
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.
III
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A
QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.[19]
The petition has
no merit.
While the
termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage
to private respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending
both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and
the administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s engineering license
before the PRC Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of
prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and
rules.[20]
A prejudicial
question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.[21] The
rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.[22]
The Court of
Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for
annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not
pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for
bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.
The outcome of
the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.[23] Petitioner’s
argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be
resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could
continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would
necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza[24] and
People vs. Aragon[25] cited by
petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of
a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40
of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.[26] In Landicho
vs. Relova,[27] we held
that:
Parties to a marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to
the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration
the presumption of marriage exists.[28]
It is clear from
the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question
which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for
bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage
was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.
Neither did the
filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the
administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves
a civil and a criminal case. We have
previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative
and the other is civil.[29]
Furthermore,
Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice
of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative
proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a
criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as
the administrative case:
The filing or pendency of a
criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another
judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same
facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall
neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with
the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without
awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.
It must also be
noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board
are not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by
petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is
also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his
obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and
for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage.[30] The
existence of these other charges justified the continuation of the proceedings
before the PRC Board.
Petitioner also
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial
of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the
prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and second
marriages beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him
and private respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not
properly identified and there was no showing that the requisites of a valid
marriage were complied with. He alleges
further that the original copy of the marriage contract between him and
Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was
adduced, and that there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by
him ever took place.[31]
We are not
persuaded. The grant or denial of a
demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and
its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse
of such discretion.[32] In this
case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two
grounds: first, the prosecution
established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and
second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify
the grant of the same. It has been held
that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari
the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has
not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[33] In view
of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against petitioner
exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense.[34]
The Court also
finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his
demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case
against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is
liable for the offense charged. As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the
demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the
sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or not a
full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case.[35] The RTC’s
observation that there was a prima facie case against petitioner only
meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its
proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless
petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion.[36] Said
declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of
petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely
because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that
petitioner may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve
the case based on the evidence adduced by both parties.
Lastly,
petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case
No. Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality
and bias against him in several instances.
First, when petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said
case, the judge said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though
the motion for reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested
that he had just recovered from an accident and was not physically fit for
trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and
required said counsel to produce a medical certificate to support his
statement. Third, when petitioner
manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge
characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile
attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances
justified the grant of his motion to inhibit.
We agree with
the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo
did not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the
case.[37] In People
of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,[38] this
Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons
for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the
rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not
enough. There should be clear and
convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.[39]
Furthermore,
since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among
those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge
Peralejo. Said provision of law states:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No
judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and
valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Thus, it was not
mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.
This Court does
not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion
to inhibit. The test for determining
the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a
fair and impartial trial.[40] The
instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality
against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and
impartial trial. As discussed earlier,
the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal
proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and
jurisprudence. Neither was there
anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit a
medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident which
rendered him unprepared for trial. Such
requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the
resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays,
in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly.[41]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] Arthur Te,
Petitioner, vs. Hon. Cesar C. Peralejo as Judge, RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 98 and People of the Philippines, Respondents.
[2] Arthur Te,
Petitioner, vs. Board of Civil Engineering, Professional Regulation
Commission and Liliana Choa Te, Respondents.
[3] Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated August 31, 1994, Rollo, p. 29.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Id., at 29-30.
[6] Records, Criminal
Case No. Q-90-14409, p.1.
[7] Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[8] Id., at 30.
[9] Records, Criminal
Case No. Q-90-14409, p. 37.
[10] Id., at 33.
[11] Id., at 6-10.
[12] These cases
were: (1) Arthur Te, vs. Liliana
Choa-Te, Civil Case No. 90-6265 for Annulment of Marriage, Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 106; and (2) People of the Philippines vs. Arthur Te,
Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 for Bigamy, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 98.
[13] Records, CA-G.R. SP
No. 26178, p. 15.
[14] Records, CA-G.R. SP
No. 26178, pp. 6-10.
[15] Decision of the Court
of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 33-34, 36.
[16] Id., at 35.
[17] Id., at 36.
[18] Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated October 18, 1996, Id., at 103.
[19] Petition, Id., at
18-24.
[20] Salonga vs.
Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438, 463 (1985).
[21] Librado vs.
Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303, 309-310 (1982).
[22] Carlos vs.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 25, 33 (1997) citing Tuanda vs.
Sandiganbayan, 249 SCRA 342
(1995).
[23] The elements of the
crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) the
offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved; (3) the offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4)
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity. (REYES, LUIS B. THE REVISED
PENAL CODE ANNOTATED, Vol. 2 , Thirteenth Edition, p. 828.)
[24] 95 Phil. 843 (1954).
[25] 100 Phil. 1033
(1957).
[26] Mercado vs.
Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000; Bobis vs. Bobis, G.R.
No. 138509, July 31, 2000; Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499, 501
(1986).
[27] 22 SCRA 731(1968).
[28] Id., at 734, citing 3 VIADA, PENAL CODE 275.
[29] Ocampo vs.
Buenaventura, 55 SCRA 267, 271 (1974).
[30] Records, CA-G.R. SP
No. 26178, pp. 18-19.
[31] Petition, Rollo,
pp. 21-23.
[32] People vs.
Mercado, 159 SCRA 453, 459 (1988).
[33] People vs.
Cruz, 144 SCRA 677, 681 (1986).
[34] Section 15, Rule 119,
Revised Rules of Court.
[35] Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, Rollo, pp.
35-36.
[36] People vs.
Nuque, 58 O.G. 8445; Salonga vs Cruz Pano, supra note 20 at 450.
[37] Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, Rollo, p.
33.
[38] 309 SCRA 705 (1999).
[39] Id., at 709-710.
[40] Associacion de
Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.,
88 SCRA 294.
[41] Rule 3.05, Canon 3,
Code of Judicial Conduct.