6/21/00 11:16:37 PM
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122142. May 17, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.: HTML
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Manila,
finding accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties, and to indemnify
the heirs of the victims Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta in the amount of
P50,000.00 each and to pay the sum of P4,000.00 representing the amount of
money stolen.
The information alleged ¾
That on or about
August 11, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating with one, whose true name, identity and present
whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, to wit: the said accused take, rob and carry
away the amount of P4,000.00 cash belonging to Antonio Cabrera against his
will, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P4,000.00
Philippine Currency; that on the occasion thereof and by reason of the
aforesaid robbery, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, attacked, assaulted and used personal violence upon the person
of NENA BERJUEGA and REMEDIOS HITTA, by stabbing them to death, thereby
inflicting upon the said victims mortal stab wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of their death thereafter.
Contrary to law.
Only accused-appellant had been apprehended.
His co-accused Ronnie Liwanag has been at large. When arraigned,
accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses,
namely, Pat. Benjamin Ines, Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, and Atty. Bienvenido De los
Reyes. Pat. Ines of the Western Police District investigated the robbery with
homicide. The gist of his testimony is to the following effect:
Accused-appellant was a delivery boy
employed by Angie Cabosas whose business was selling chickens to customers.
Cabosas’s business was located in Blumentritt Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. CODES
In the morning of August 11, 1989,
accused-appellant was asked to deliver dressed chickens to Emma Cabrera, a
regular customer at Room 4-D Gatlin Building, 1344 C.M. Recto Avenue in Sta.
Cruz, Manila. At about 10:20 a.m., accused-appellant came back and turned over
to his employer the amount of P2,000.00. Pat. Ines testified that after
receiving report of the killing, he and Pfc. Ricardo Sibal went to see Angie
Cabosas from which they learned that the latter has received a call from Emma
Cabrera informing Angie that her house had been robbed and her two maids
killed. They were told that accused-appellant had gone to Pangasinan allegedly
to attend the burial of his grandfather. Pat. Ines said he and P/Lt. Villamor
Valdez, Pfc. Sibal, Pfc. Edmundo Cabal and Pat. Renato Gutierrez went to
Rosales, Pangasinan but failed to find accused-appellant. They were told by the
sister of accused-appellant, Merly Asuncion, that accused-appellant had gone to
La Union. According to Pat. Ines, accused-appellant confided to his sister that
he had allegedly done something wrong in Manila.
Pat. Ines identified two sworn statements,
both executed on August 11, 1989, one of which, he said, had been executed by
Helen N. Moral, a househelp of Emma Cabrera, and the other by Angie C. De los
Reyes. In her statement marked Exhibit I, Moral said that upon arriving in the
house at about 12:20 p.m. that day, she and her employer’s nephew, Carlos
Emerson, found the bodies of the victims sprawled on the floor. She told Pat.
Ines that accused-appellant used to deliver pork and dressed chicken to their
place.
On the other hand, in her sworn statement
given on August 14, 1989 and marked as Exhibit L, Anita C. De los Reyes stated
that on August 11, 1989, she had seen accused-appellant and Ronnie Liwanag,
their hands covered with blood, coming out of the Gatlin Building on C.M. Recto
Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila.[2]
Pat. Ines testified that on March 3, 1990,
he and his group received information from Pat. Alfredo Que of the Urdaneta
Police Station that accused-appellant was in Cataban, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
Accordingly, they went to the place indicated and the next day, March 4, 1990,
they were able to apprehend accused-appellant whom they brought to Manila. Pat.
Ines said accused-appellant was positively identified by Anita De los Reyes as
one of those whom she saw running down the stairs of the Gatlin Building on
C.M. Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila with blood in his hands.[3]
Pat. Ines testified that on that same day,
March 4, 1990, accused-appellant gave a confession (Exh. O) in writing with the
assistance of counsel, Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, in which he admitted
participation in the killing of Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta. Pat. Ines
himself executed an affidavit (Exh. P) stating the circumstances of
accused-appellant’s arrest. He said accused-appellant refused to sign the
booking and information sheet.[4] yacats
Accused-appellant’s extrajudicial confession
was presented in evidence as Exhibit O.[5] In it, accused-appellant said he started working for
Angie Cabosas in the latter’s business on Blumentritt Street, Manila three or
four months before the incident. Cabosas and accused-appellant’s sister Merly
Asuncion, had been neighbors in Rosales, Pangasinan. Accused-appellant’s work
was to deliver dressed chicken. Emma Cabrera was a regular customer to whom he
made deliveries in the morning. On August 10, 1989, his fellow employee, Ronnie
Liwanag, proposed that they rob Emma in order to be able to go to La Union to
visit his family. On August 11, 1989, after learning that only two helpers were
then at the residence of Emma Cabrera, accused-appellant and Ronnie decided to
pull the heist. Ronnie covered the mouth of one Nena Berjuega to prevent her
from shouting but, as she tried to run away, Ronnie stabbed and killed her.
Ronnie then gave the knife to accused-appellant who stabbed the younger maid
Remedios Hitta from which she died. Thereafter, the two proceeded to
Blumentritt Street and divided the money Ronnie had taken from the house of
Emma Cabrera. From Blumentritt Street, Ronnie went to La Union, while
accused-appellant proceeded to Pangasinan. The extrajudicial confession is in
Tagalog and signed by accused-appellant in the presence of Atty. De los Reyes.
The prosecution next presented Atty.
Bienvenido De los Reyes, a PC Captain of the WPD Headquarters, U.N. Avenue,
Manila. He said that on March 4, 1990, he happened to be at Station 7 of the
WPD, representing a client accused of illegal recruitment. He was asked by Lt.
Generoso Javier of the WPD Homicide Section to assist accused-executing an
extrajudicial confession. According to Atty. De los Reyes, he apprised
accused-appellant of his constitutional rights, explaining to him that any
statement made by him could be used against him in court, but accused-appellant
said he was willing to give a statement as in fact he did, confessing to the
commission of the crime of robbery with homicide.[6]
The other prosecution witness was Dr.
Marcial G. Cenido, medico-legal officer who conducted autopsies on August 11,
1989 on the victims, Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta. After proper
identification (Exh. D) by the victim’s employer, Antonio Cabrera, Dr. Cenido
prepared a postmortem report (Exh. A) that Nena Berjuega suffered 16 stab
wounds from which she died. olanski
Dr. Cenido testified that the victim
sustained 16 stab wounds which affected her vital organs, specifically the
right and left lungs and the heart, causing her death. Six of these wounds were
fatal so that she could not survive despite immediate medical attention. He
concluded that the assailant and the victim could be facing each other when
wounds nos. 1, 3 and 5 (Exhs. B-1, B-2, and B-4, respectively) were inflicted
and that the assailant may have been on the left lateral side of the victim
when he inflicted wound no. 8 (Exh. B-5) and at the victim’s back when
assailant inflicted wound no. 16 (Exh. B-6). He said that there could be one or
more assailant who inflicted these wounds by using a single bladed weapon.[7]
Dr. Cenido likewise prepared a postmortem
report (Exh. F) that Remedios Hitta suffered 12 stab wounds from which she
died.
Dr. Cenido testified that the victim
sustained 12 stab wounds with seven fatal ones that caused her death. The fatal
wounds damaged her left and right lungs and the heart that she would not
survive despite immediate medical attention. He observed that in wounds nos. 1,
2 and 3 (Exhs. G-1, G-2, and G-3, respectively), the assailant and the victim
could be facing each other, while in wounds nos. 4, 9 and 11 (Exhs. G-4, G-6,
and G-7, respectively), the assailant could have been at the back of the
victim. He said that there could be one or more assailant who inflicted these
wounds using a single bladed weapon.[8]
Dr. Cenido prepared the certificates of
death of the victims, Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta (Exhs. C and H). He
stated that the weapon used on both victims could have been the same and that
both victims sustained multiple stab wounds.[9]
With the testimonies of Pat. Ines, Atty. De los
Reyes, and Dr. Cenido and the extrajudicial confession (Exh. O), as well as the
sworn statements of Helen Moral (Exh. I) and Anita De los Reyes (Exh. L), the
prosecution rested its case.
The defense presented, as its sole witness,
accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla. Accused-appellant testified that he had
worked for Angie Cabosas in Blumentritt Street for four (4) months before the
incident in this case. Angie was a neighbor of his sister, Merly Asuncion, in
Pangasinan. Angie’s business was selling dressed chickens. Accused-appellant
said that at about 9:00 a.m. on August 11, 1989, he delivered dressed chickens
to Emma Cabrera’s residence on C.M. Recto Avenue. He came back from his errand
at around 10:20 a.m. and remitted the amount of P2,000.00 which had been paid
to him. He denied participation in the commission of the crime and claimed that
he was arrested without a warrant in Pangasinan. He claimed that, after being
informed of the charges against him, he was beaten up and detained for a week
and made to execute an extrajudicial confession. He denied having known or seen
Atty. De los Reyes before and stated that he did not understand the contents of
the extrajudicial confession which he signed because he does not know how to
read.[10]
On August 31, 1995, the trial court rendered
its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this
Court finds accused JIMMY OBRERO Y CORLA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and punishable under Article 294(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law. He is
further condemned to pay the heirs of the victims, Remedios Hitta and Nena
Berjuega the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS each as civil indemnity
for their death and the additional sum of P4,000.00 as the amount of money
taken, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
His immediate
transfer to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa is hereby ordered.
SO ORDERED. haideem
Hence, this instant appeal.
Accused-appellant assails the validity of this extrajudicial confession which
forms the basis of his conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide. He
claims that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted him in executing his confession,
was not the counsel of his own choice. That was the reason, he said, he refused
to sign the booking and information sheet. He said he signed the extrajudicial
confession five times as a sign that it was involuntarily executed by him.
Art. III, §12 of the Constitution provides
in pertinent parts:
(1)......Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2)......No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3)......Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
There are two kinds of involuntary or
coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) those which
are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence,
threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of §12, and (2) those
which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject
of paragraph 1 of the same §12.
Accused-appellant claims that his confession
was obtained by force and threat. Aside from this bare assertion, he has shown
no proof of the use of force and violence on him. He did not seek medical
treatment nor even a physical examination. His allegation that the fact that he
was made to sign the confession five times is proof that he refused to sign it.
To begin with, what accused-appellant claims
he was made to sign five times is not the same confession (Exh. O) but
different parts thereof. He signed his name on page 1 to acknowledge that he
had been given the Miranda warnings. (Exh. O-3) Then, he signed again as proof
that after being given the Miranda warnings he agreed to give a statement.
(Exh. O-6) Next, he signed again his name at the end of page 2 to authenticate that
page as part of his confession. (Exh. O-7) Fourth, he signed the third page at
the end of his confession. (Exh. O-10) Fifth, he signed his name again on the
third page in which the jurat appears. (unmarked, [p. 3] of Exh. O)
We discern no sign that the confession was
involuntarily executed from the fact that it was signed by accused-appellant
five times.
kirsten
Nor can it be inferred that the confession
was involuntarily executed from the fact that accused-appellant refused to sign
the booking and information sheet. For if he were simply forced to execute the
extrajudicial confession and sign it for five times, there is no reason the
police was not able to make him sign the said sheet as well. The inference
rather was that no force was used to make accused-appellant execute the
confession, otherwise, he could also have been forced to sign the booking and
information sheet.
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed
voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarant’s
consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be
sustained.
Moreover, the confession contains details
that only the perpetrator of the crime could have given. No one except
accused-appellant could have stated that it was he who killed the younger maid
of Emma Cabrera (Remedios Hitta), that he committed the crime together with his
townmate, Ronnie Liwanag, and that he used the same weapon given to him by
Ronnie after the latter had stabbed and killed the other helper (Nena
Berjuega), details which are consistent with the medico-legal findings that the
wounds sustained by the two victims were possibly caused by one and the same
bladed weapon. It has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be
inferred from its being replete with details which could possibly be supplied
only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said
of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied.[11] When the details narrated in an extrajudicial
confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not
take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the
extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence
exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is
admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a
confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which
dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession.[12] barth
But what renders the confession of
accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that accused-appellant was not given
the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled
statement, such as it is called in the United States from which Art. III,
§12(1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an
unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the
atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand
of counsel.
Now, under the first paragraph of this
provision, it is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be
given the following warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right to remain
silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used
against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that
if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.[13]
In the case at bar, the prosecution
presented Pat. Ines and Atty. De los Reyes to establish that the
above-enumerated requisites were fully satisfied when accused-appellant
executed his extrajudicial confession. Pat. Benjamin Ines testified:[14]
Q......What happened during the investigation of the
accused?
A......He consented to give a written statement to
me, sir.
Q......Now, when accused Jimmy Obrero consented to
give statement, Patrolman, was he assisted by counsel?
A......Yes, sir, we provided him with a lawyer.
Q......And who was that lawyer that was provided by
you?
A......Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, sir.
Q......And who personally took down the statement of
the accused?
A......I was the one who personally took the
statement of accused Obrero. Jksm
Q......Do you know what was the gist of that
statement that was given to you, what was it all about?
A......It’s all about the admission of Jimmy Obrero,
the gruesome slaying of two househelps.
. . . .
Q......Before having taken down the admission of
Jimmy Obrero, what investigative steps did you undertake relative to his
constitutional right, patrolman?
A......I informed Jimmy Obrero of his constitutional
right to remain silent, to have an attorney; that everything that he will say
will be used for or against him. He, however, consented to proceed with the
written statement.
Q......Now, Patrolman, did you indicate his constitutional
rights that you stated in this written statement of Jimmy Obrero?
A......Yes, sir, I put it on the statement which he
voluntarily gave.
Q......And will you please tell us which part of the
statement of Jimmy Obrero is it indicated, the consent which he gave after
having pointed out to him his constitutional right?
A......This portion sir, this "sagot-opo"
and then it was further affirmed by his signature over his typewritten name,
sir.
For his part, Atty. De los Reyes testified:[15]
Q:......Were you able to confront the suspect at that
time, herein accused? Chief
A:......Yes, sir, I told him for the purpose of
investigation -- custodial investigation I can render my services to him and
afterwards avail the services of another lawyer and I told him his rights under
the law, sir.
Q:......What was the reply of Jimmy Obrero, the
accused, in this case at that time you confronted Jimmy Obrero?
A:......He is willing at that time and [voluntarily]
gave his affirmation that he wanted to secure my services, sir.
. . . .
Q......After having manifested that he will retain
your services as counsel for the investigation, Atty. De los Reyes, what
happened next?
A......I told him the rights under the Constitution,
the right to remain silent, the right to secure lawyer, the right not to give
statement, the right not to be placed in any identification procedure in a
police line up, and I told him that all the evidences he might give will be
utilized against him in the court with respect to the case -- and despite of that,
he said he wanted to give his statement to the police in my presence.
Q......Was he able to give statement to the police?
A......Yes, sir. I was there inside the room with the
client and observing fairly [when he] gave statement voluntarily.
Q......Was that statement taken down into writing?
A......In a question and answer form, sir.
Indeed, the waiver signed by
accused-appellant reads:
MGA KARAPATAN AYON SA ATING BINAGONG SALIGANG BATAS:
Ikaw, JIMMY OBRERO
y CORLA, ay aking isasailalim sa pagsisiyasat sa salang Pagnanakaw na may
kasamang Pagpatay, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan ayon sa
ating Binagong Saligang Batas:
1. Karapatan mo
ang manahimik at huwag sagutin ang mga itatanong ko sa iyo;
2. Karapatan mo
ang kumuha ng isang abogado na iyong sariling pili na maaaring makatulong sa
iyo sa imbistigasyon na ito at kung hindi ka makakakuha ng iyong abogado ay
bibigyan ka namin ng isa na walang bayad para makatulong sa iyo; Esm
3. Karapatan mo
rin na malaman na ang lahat ng iyong sasabihin dito sa iyong salaysay ay
maaaring gamiting katibayan o ebidensya laban o pabor sa iyo o sa kanino mang
tao sa alinmang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas.
Ngayon na
naipaalam ko na sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan, nais mo pa bang magbigay ng
iyong malaya at kusang loob na salaysay?
SAGOT : (ni Jimmy
Obrero y Corla)Opo.
TANONG: Kung
ganoon ay sabihin mo ulit ang iyong pangalan at lagdaan mo ito sa ibabaw ng
iyong pangalan na ipipirma o imamakinilya ko?
(Sgd.) JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA
There was thus only a perfunctory reading of
the Miranda rights to accused-appellant without any effort to find out from him
whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or
he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings,
in several decisions[16] of this Court, has been found to be merely
ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect.
Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the
police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these
questions considering that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary
school. Indeed, as stated in People v. Januario:[17]
Ideally,
therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation
(if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused
(himself), or by the latter’s relative or person authorized by him to engage an
attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person
authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police,
whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed
independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between
lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.[18] Esmsc
Moreover, Art. III, §12(1) requires that
counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and
independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who,
though presumably competent, cannot be considered an "independent
counsel" as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station
commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. On this point,
he testified as follows:
Q......Now, whenever there is a crime committed
wherein the member of police to which you belong or working but could not solve
the crime and then you were designated as counsel to extend legal assistance to
a suspect who is under a custodial investigation and in that conference with
the suspect you may have inquired confidential information, what would you do,
will you keep it to yourself or you must have to divulge that to your
co-policeman because you know that?
A......If I am the lawyer, then all the
testimonies and declaration is my preferential right, I can divulge it even to
my fellow officer.
Q......Now, by the way, do you have authority to
practice the law profession, did you get approval or permit from the civil --
A......Previously, when I was at the JAGO, we are
authorized verbally [as long as] it will not hamper our time, we will not work
our time during the police duty, ma’am.
Q......According to you, you were extending legal
assistance to your client who was charged of illegal recruitment, do you not
consider that conflict of duty because no less than your organization was the
one investigating that? Esmmis
A......I am extending my legal assistance to the
client I am handling the case because if it is true that he committed the crime
then I will back out, if I found suspicion and there is no proof at all, I go
to the litigation.
ATTY. ALISUAG:
That is all, Your
Honor.[19]
The trial court, agreeing with him, ruled:
As shown in
Exhibit "O", accused consented to giving his extrajudicial confession
after he was informed of rights under custodial investigation, by affixing his
signature thereto (Exhibit "O-3"). And absent any showing that the
assisting lawyer, though a station commander but of another police station, was
remiss in his duty as a lawyer, this Court holds that the proceedings were regularly
conducted. In fact, he testified that he first asked the accused if he is
accepting his legal services (TSN, March 5, 1991, p. 4); that he informed the
accused of his Miranda rights and despite the warning, he decided to give his
confession just the same; that he was at all time present when the accused was
being interrogated with the accused giving his answers voluntarily (Ibid, p.
4); that he read to the accused the questions and answers before he signed his
extrajudicial confession (Ibid, p. 8). Clearly shown was the fact that Atty. De
los Reyes was equal to his duties as a lawyer than a member of the police
force, when he lend his assistance to the accused during his in-custody
interrogation.[20]
This is error. As observed in People v.
Bandula,[21] the
independent counsel required by Art. III, §12(1) cannot be a special counsel,
public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police
whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case, Atty. De los
Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD, was part of the police
force who could not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted
accused-appellant in the investigation, his claim to the contrary
notwithstanding. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the
protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation.[22] Esmso
For these reasons, we hold that
accused-appellant’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.
Without the extrajudicial confession, the
conviction of accused-appellant cannot stand. The prosecution tried to
introduce circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant’s guilt consisting of
the sworn statements (Exhs. I and L) of Helen Moral, the househelp who said
accused-appellant used to deliver dressed chickens to the Cabrera residence,
and Anita de los Reyes who said that on March 11, 1989 she was passing in front
of the Gatlin Building where the killing took place when she saw
accused-appellant running down the stairs with blood in his hands. These
statements are likewise inadmissible for being hearsay. Consequently, there is
no identification of accused-appellant.
And while there is evidence of homicide
consisting of the corpus delicti, there is no evidence of the robbery
except the confession (Exh. O) of accused-appellant which, as already stated,
is inadmissible. It does not matter that accused-appellant failed to object to
the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of
objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof which rested on the prosecution.
We cannot thus affirm the conviction of accused-appellant because of the
procedural irregularities committed during custodial investigation and the
trial of the case. It may be that by this decision a guilty person is set free
because the prosecution stumbled, but we are committed to the principle that it
is far better to acquit several guilty persons than to convict one single
innocent person.
WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 90-82187 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Manila, convicting accused-appellant Jimmy
Obrero y Corla of the crime of robbery with homicide is REVERSED and
accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed
to forthwith cause the release of accused-appellant unless the latter is being
lawfully held for another cause and to inform the Court accordingly within ten
(10) days from notice.
SO ORDERED. MENDOZA, J
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
De Leon, Jr., J., on leave.
[1] Per Judge Rosmari D. Carandang.
[2] TSN (Pat. Benjamin Ines), pp. 2-4, Feb. 6, 1991; pp. 1-4, Feb. 26, 1991.
[3] Id., pp. 5-6, Feb. 26, 1991.
[4] Id., pp. 7-10.
[5] RTC Records, pp. 179-181.
[6] TSN (Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes), pp. 2-10, March 5, 1991.
[7] TSN, pp. 2-6, Aug. 29, 1990.
[8] Id., pp. 7-9.
[9] Id., pp. 10-12.
[10] TSN, pp. 2-5, Dec. 8, 1993; pp. 3-22, March 2, 1994.
[11] People v. Villanueva, 266 SCRA 356 (1997)
[12] People v. Elizaga, 23 SCRA 449 (1968)
[13] People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 (1981); Cf. People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 (1980); People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289 (1986)
[14] TSN, pp. 6-7, Feb. 26, 1991.
[15] TSN, pp. 3-4, March 5, 1991.
[16] People v. Santos, 283 SCRA 443 (1997); People v. Binamira, 277 SCRA 232 (1997); People v. Basay, 219 SCRA 404 (1993)
[17] 267 SCRA 608, 632 (1997)
[18] Citing People v. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626, 638 (1995)
[19] TSN (Atty. Bienvenido delos Reyes), p. 9, March 5, 1991 (emphasis added)
[20] Rollo, p. 21.
[21] 232 SCRA 566 (1994)
[22] People v. Matos-Viduya, 189 SCRA 403 (1990)