THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1484 (A).
March 17, 2000]
JOSELITO
RALLOS, JOSEFINA RALLOS VALLAR, SIMON RALLOS representing his deceased father
CARLOS RALLOS, TERESITA RALLOS YAP, and JOSELITO RALLOS, complainants,
vs. Judge IRENEO LEE GAKO JR., RTC, Branch 5, Cebu City, respondent. Jurismis
[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1484. March 17,
2000]
Executive
Secretary RONALDO B. ZAMORA, complainant, vs. Judge IRENEO LEE
GAKO JR., RTC, Branch 5, Cebu City, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Partiality and dishonesty have no room in
the administration of justice, for they contradict its very essence. Indeed,
like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure, but must also be beyond
suspicion.
The
Case
Two administrative cases were filed against
Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5.
Filed by Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, the first is a Letter-Complaint
charging him with ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority. Allegedly,
respondent ordered the release of 25,000 sacks of imported rice to the
claimants, notwithstanding the pendency of seizure and forfeiture proceedings
before the Bureau of Customs.
The second was an Administrative Complaint
filed by Joselito Rallos, Simon Rallos, Josefina Rallos Vallar and Teresita
Rallos Yap. They assailed the respondent’s Order dated March 15, 1999, which
had falsely stated that complainants, who were petitioners in Special
Proceedings Case No. 1576-R entitled "Intestate Estate of Simeon Rallos,"
were present during the hearing on the said date.
After respondent filed his separate Comments
to these two Complaints, the Court, in its September 1, 1999 Resolution,
docketed the two cases as administrative matters and referred them to Deputy
Court Adminstrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada for investigation, report and
recommendation.
After conducting hearings, the investigator
submitted his findings and recommendations to this Court in a Memorandum dated
January 4, 2000.
The
Facts
The antecedent facts in the first case, as
summarized by the investigator,[1] are as follows:
"On December
8, 1998, the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of the
Bureau of Customs (BOC), the Philippine Coast Guard, and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) at the Port of Cebu withheld, for investigation, an
estimated 25,000 sacks of rice marked as ‘Snowman’ on board the vessel, M/V
Alberto. The sacks of rice allegedly came from Palawan to be unloaded in Cebu.
Likewise seized on the same date were nine cargo trucks to be used for carrying
the subject sacks of rice. Jjjuris
"The EIIB
then wrote to the Bureau of Customs, Cebu, stating that upon further
verification, no proper voyage clearance to sail from Palawan to Cebu was
issued to the vessel, M/V Alberto. The EIIB then requested that a warrant of
seizure and detention be issued over the rice shipment.
"On December
9, 1998, the Bureau of Customs issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention
against: a) the vessel M/V Alberto used in the illegal transport of imported
staple rice; b) the imported staple rice consisting of 25,000 sacks, more or
less, with the ‘Snowman’ brand; and c) nine (9) motor-vehicle trucks used and
utilized in the illegal transport of the rice. The warrant was also directed to
the owner of the M/V Alberto, ANMA Philippine Shipping Corporation, and the
consignee of the rice shipment, Mark Montelibano.
"Thereafter,
the claimants Mark Montelibano and Elson Ogario, on December 10, 1998, filed a
complaint for injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ
of preliminary injunction. The case, entitled ‘Elson Ogario and Mark
Montelibano vs. Bureau of Customs, EIIB, Philippine Navy, Maritime Command,
Philippine National Police, Philippine Coast Guard and All Enforcement
Agencies’ was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 23077 and assigned to Branch 5,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which is the sala of respondent judge. The
complaint alleged that the acts of defendants in intercepting the subject sacks
of rice [were] unlawful, illegal and merely based on suspicion. Thus,
plaintiffs prayed for the quashal of the warrant of seizure and detention
(dated December 9, 1998) issued by the Collector of Customs, and for the
release of the goods.
"The Bureau
of Customs filed a motion to dismiss on December 11, 1998, alleging that the
trial court ha[d] no jurisdiction over the complaint. x x x justice
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"The Bureau
of Customs also pointed out that the appropriate seizure proceeding was already
instituted on December 9, 1998, by virtue of the issuance of the warrant of
seizure and detention. This had the effect of depriving the trial court of
jurisdiction over the matter.
"On December
28, 1998, a hearing was held by respondent judge on both the motion to dismiss
of the Bureau of Customs and the complainants’ application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The parties presented evidence in support of their
respective positions.
"In a
Resolution dated January 11, 1999, the respondent judge denied the Bureau of
Custom’s motion to dismiss and granted complainants’ prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"In the
subject resolution, the respondent judge also ruled that the Bureau of Customs
ha[d] no jurisdiction because the goods involved [were] neither imported nor
smuggled and were apprehended outside the customs zone. As further basis, it
was ruled that plaintiff was able to present a certification issued by the
National Food Authority that the subject rice came from Palawan. Defendants, on
the other hand, submitted no evidence that the subject bags of rice were
imported or smuggled. The issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention
being arbitrary and without probable cause, it did not divest the trial court
of its jurisdiction. Jksmä â Ó
"The Bureau
of Customs filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was subsequently denied
in the trial court’s Order dated January 25, 1999. In this resolution,
respondent judge ordered the defendants to release the 25,000 sacks of rice
without delay, the dispositive portion of which reads:
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"The Bureau
of Customs, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51051,
assailing the Resolutions dated January 11 and 25, 1999 of the respondent
judge.
"In the
meantime, on April 5, 1999, the District Collector of Customs of Cebu City
rendered a Decision in the seizure proceedings (Cebu Seizure Identification
Case No. 17-98) declaring the 25,000 sacks of ‘Snowman’ rice as smuggled and
ordering their forfeiture.
"On April 15,
1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision[2] denying the petition for certiorari field by the
Bureau of Customs and affirmed the questioned Resolutions dated January 11 and
25, 1999 issued [by] respondent judge.
"In view of
the Court of Appeals decision, respondent judge issued another Resolution dated
April 26, 1999 reiterating the release of the 25,000 sacks of rice, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"A petition
for review was then filed by the Bureau of Customs before the Supreme Court
questioning the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Upon application, a Temporary
Restraining Order was subsequently issued by the Supreme Court on May 17, 1999,
‘enjoining the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 5, Cebu City or any of his representatives and
the respondents from enforcing or causing to be enforced the questioned
Resolution dated 11 January 1999, the Order dated 25 January 1999, and the
Resolution dated 26 April 1999, as well as all subsequent orders issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-23077 entitled
Elson Ogario and Mark Montelibano vs. Bureau of Customs, et. al.’
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"Respondent
judge was required to comment on the administrative complaint. Lexjuris
1...........In his Comment dated July 21, 1999 (Exh. 8), the
judge in essence, sought to justify the issuance of the questioned orders on
the following propositions:
a...........The Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the
Bureau of Customs of the Port of Cebu on December 9, 1998 was based merely on a
suspicion and not anchored on probable cause. Hence, the issuance of the
Warrant was not valid and, therefore, of no legal effect.
b...........That the Bureau of Customs [of the Port of] Cebu x x
x abused its authority or function in seizing the '25 thousand bags of rice' on
the basis of a suspicion that they were smuggled goods or illegally imported.
The issuance of the Warrant of Seizure and Detention was arbitrary.
c...........That the Regional Trial Court Judge in the exercise
of his jurisdiction, can issue an injunction to stop or prevent a purported
enforcement of a criminal law which is not in accordance with an orderly
administration of justice, and also to stop and prevent the Bureau of Customs
from using the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and arbitrary
manner."[3]
In the second case, Deputy Court
Administrator Ponferrada summarized the facts as follows:
"On July 29,
1998, complainants, who are the legitimate children and compulsory heirs of the
late Simeon Rallos, filed a motion to remove and/or replace [the] administrator
of the estate[,] Atty. Juan T. Borromeo. In an Order dated February 10, 1999,
respondent judge did not categorically rule on the motion, and instead
scheduled a hearing on March 17, 1999. x x x
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"Atty.
Borromeo, on March 10, 1999, filed a motion to defer [the] hearing set for
March 17, 1999. He scheduled the hearing of the motion on March 15, 1999 at
2:30 p.m. On the said hearing date, Atty. Borromeo appeared but complainants
and counsel were not present. Respondent judge then issued the subject order
(dated March 15, 1999) stating: Jlexj
‘When this case
was called for hearing, only the administrator and his counsel appeared. The
oppositors and their counsel [were] also around.
‘The administrator
and his counsel called the attention of the court that their Supplemental
Inventory, including the opposition thereto, ha[d] not been resolved yet and
the favorable resolution of the court is very important for them so they can
move further for the settlement of the estate.
‘WHEREFORE, the
Supplemental Inventory, including the opposition thereto, is considered
submitted for the resolution of the court.
‘The administrator
and his counsel are notified of this order in open court, including the
oppositors and their counsel.
‘SO ORDERED.’
"On the other
hand, on March 17, 1999, complainants and their counsel, Atty. Expedito
Bugarin, Jr. went to Branch 5 to attend the hearing, only to be informed that
the case was not calendared. Upon further inquiry from the staff of respondent
judge, they learned that [the] hearing of the case was conducted on March 15,
1999. They obtained a copy of the Order of March 15, 1999 of respondent judge
which stated that 'oppositors (referring to the complainants) and their counsel
are also around', and this was also stated in the transcript of records.
"The
complainants, on the basis of the Order dated March 15, 1999, filed the instant
administrative complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator. Respondent
judge was required to comment on the complaint.
"In his
Comment, respondent judge admitted that the inclusion of the sentence 'the
oppositors and their counsel [were] also around' was mere error on his part. He
points out that the sentence is inconsistent with the first sentence ‘only the
administrator appeared.’ Courtx
"Nevertheless,
he admits his error and states that it was not done intentionally, but was due
to mental lapse and fatigue, considering that he heard numerous cases on said
date. He further alleged that complainants filed the instant administrative
complaint because he did not act on their motion to remove and/or replace the
administrator; that he could have rectified his error if only the complainants
informed him of the same; that 'there was no malice on his part since he does
not know personally the oppositors and the administrator; and that he is not a
personal friend to their counsel; that the subject order pertains only to the
submission of the supplemental inventory and the opposition thereto for
resolution of the court, so no damage or prejudice was done to the herein
complainants; that he has not even resolved the said incident because he is
still reading the voluminous court records.’ Respondent judge also stated that
he already voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the case."
Investigator’s
Recommendation
In his Memorandum, Deputy Court
Administrator Ponferrada recommended that respondent be suspended for six
months without pay for the first case and fined in the amount of P5,000
for the second.
In justifying the penalty for the first
case, the investigator ratiocinated as follows:
"Well-settled
is the rule that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the property subject
of the warrant of seizure and detention issued by the Bureau of Customs. In the
case of Mison vs. Natividad,[4] the Honorable Supreme Court held that:
'The court a quo
has no jurisdiction over the res subject of the warrant of seizure and
detention. The respondent judge, therefore, acted arbitrarily and despotically
in issuing the temporary restraining order, granting the writ of preliminary
injunction and denying the motion to dismiss, thereby removing the res from the
control of the Collector of Customs and depriving him of his exclusive original
jurisdiction over the controversy. Respondent judge exercised a power he never
had and encroached upon the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Collector of
Customs. By express provision of law, amply supported by well-settled
jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure
and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his
exercise thereof or stifle or put it to naught.
"The Office
of the Court Administrator also issued Circular 68-94 dated November 3, 1994,
which reiterated the provisions of Circular No. 13-93. Esä m
"The
aforesaid circulars were again reiterated in Administrative Circular No. 07-99
dated June 25, 1999 issued by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide informing judges
of the lower courts to exercise utmost caution, prudence, and judiciousness in
the issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary
injunctions to avoid any suspicion that its issuance or grant was for
considerations other than the strict merits of the case. x x x"[5]
In the second case, respondent judge was
found guilty of grave abuse of authority. The investigator explained:
"Based on the
evidence presented during the investigation, respondent judge appeared to be
biased and prejudiced against the complainants, as shown by the following:
"a).....On July 29, 1998, complainants filed a Motion to
Remove and /or Replace Administrator. The respondent judge required the
administrator to file a comment or opposition within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the Order. Complainant's counsel was also required to file [a] reply
thereto, after which the incident [would be deemed] submitted for resolution.
In his Order dated
February 10, 1999 respondent judge did not categorically rule on complainant's
motion while the Order stated that the "relationship between the heirs and
the administrator can no longer see eye to eye with each other, then it's about
time for the Administrator to give [way] so as not to further delay the
distribution of the estate." The respondent judge chose to give priority
to the administrator's compensation, and thus deferred a categorical ruling on
the motion. However, it may be stated that the matter of compensation can be
pursued by the administrator as a claim against the estate, and satisfaction
thereto is not a pre-condition to the administrator's removal as such. The
reason given by the respondent judge has no basis in law. It appears as a ploy
to delay further the ruling on the petition of the heirs to change the
administrator. With this actuation, the respondent exposed his bias in favor of
the administrator. He became a true picture of what a judge ought not to be.
"b).....The administrator, on March 10, 1999, filed a Motion
to Defer the hearing of March 17, 1999 and set the hearing on March 15, 1999.
In the Order of respondent judge dated March 15, 1999, there was no
pronouncement on whether the hearing on March 17, 1999 was cancelled. Instead
it discussed the issue of the inventory of the properties of complainants by
the administrator. Esâ msc
As to the Motion
to Defer the hearing of March 17, 1999, respondent judge should have observed
the procedure laid down under Rule 15 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that "[e]very written motion required to be heard and the notice
of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing,
unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice." And
the "good cause" required was not even stated when the respondent
judge advanced the hearing to March 15 1999, instead of March 17, 1999 as
originally scheduled. The only visible reason why it was transferred earlier to
March 15, 1996 [was] because it appear[ed] as the date suggested by the
administrator.
"The
respondent judge evidently, did not consider the rights of the heirs of the
late Simeon Rallos, who appear[ed] persistent in seeking x x x the removal of
the administrator. With the confusion occasioned by such a blunder committed by
the respondent even on a simple motion to transfer hearing, it creates an
impression that it was done deliberately to stall the possible removal of the
administrator upon petition by the heirs of a deceased person. Such unwelcome
act coming as it does from the judge certainly erodes the confidence and
integrity of the judiciary.
"Another
[point] to be observed is that the hearing must specify the time and date which
must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. This was
not followed by the administrator. Complainants' copy of the motion was sent by
registered mail on March 10, 1999, and it was not received by the complainants
in time for the March 15, 1999 hearing. In spite of this, respondent judge
heard the case on March 15, 1999 even without the presence of complainants and
their counsel, and despite the lack of proof that the latter were notified of
the hearing on that day. Worse, he made it appear in his Order that the
complainants in this administrative matter were present. When in truth they
were not.
"C......Based on the testimony of Atty. Nollara, Ms. Estella
was transferred to another Branch after she testified against respondent judge.
This [was] clearly an act of retaliation against Ms. Estella for her
"unfavorable" testimony.
"The evidence
show[s] that the "March 15, 1999 Order" [was] not a "mere
oversight" as respondent judge would like to make it appear. The court
stenographer testified that she had already prepared a draft of the order
stating that the complainants and their counsel were not around, but respondent
judge modified this and made it appear that complainants and their counsel were
present.
EsmmÓ is
"Moreover, it
was not proper for respondent judge to push through with the March 15, 1999,
hearing being requested by the administrator, since there was no proof that
complainants were notified of the requested change in the hearing date. At the
least, respondent judge should have heard the case on March 17, 1999.
"The acts of
respondent judge are therefore, contrary to the Code of Judicial Conduct which
states:
"Canon 1 - a
judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. A judge
should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. A judge
should administer justice with impartiality and without delay."
The
Court’s Ruling
The first case should be held in abeyance,
pending the resolution by this Court of the Petition for Review assailing the
Orders that are the very subject of this administrative case. In the second
case, we believe that the fine recommended by the investigator should be
increased.
The First Case
Pending before us via a Petition for Review
on Certiorari[6] is the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
respondent judge’s Orders dated January 11, 1999, and January 25, 1999 – the
same Orders that are the subjects of the present Complaint for gross ignorance
of the law. In view of the present peculiar circumstances, the disposition of
this administrative case should be held in abeyance. We must, however,
emphasize that this action is motivated solely by considerations of the
smooth and orderly disposition of the cases, for a decision on the merits of
the Complaint herein would preempt the disposition of the Petition for Review.
In so ruling, we are not in any way implying
that an administrative case cannot proceed independently of the main one.[7] In light of the facts of the present case, though,
the Petition for Review constitutes a prejudicial question to the resolution of
the Complaint of Secretary Zamora.
The Second Case Esmsoâ
Complainants attribute partiality to the
respondent judge based on three points. First, he failed to resolve
complainants’ Motion to remove the administrator. Second, he arbitrarily
changed the date of hearing from March 17, 1999 to March 15, 1999 without
properly notifying the complainants. Worse, he made it appear in his March 15,
1999 Order that they and their counsel were present. Third, he
retaliated against Daisy Estella, the stenographer who had testified unfavorably
against him.
On the first point, considering that the
case had been pending before the trial court for a long time,[8] it was improper for the judge not to resolve the
complainants’ Motion to remove or replace the administrator.[9] Moreover, the reason he proffered was wrong. The
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) was correct in pointing out that the
compensation of the administrator was not a precondition for his removal.[10] Indeed, the complainants’ Motion raised several
legal grounds, but these were ignored by the respondent.[11]
However, by itself, this lapse was merely an
error of judgment and does not merit disciplinary action against the respondent
judge. Not every error or mistake he has committed in the performance of his
duties would render him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith
or with deliberate intent to do an injustice.[12]
As to the second point, we must clarify at
the outset that complainants are not questioning the resetting of the scheduled
March 17, 1999 hearing to March 15, 1999.[13] What they are stressing, and rightly so, is the
apparent dishonesty of respondent judge in making it appear that they were
present during the March 15, 1999 hearing. We are not convinced by his claim
that his Order was merely a harmless error caused by mental fatigue. The phrase
"[t]he oppositors and their counsel [were] also around" refers to a
substantial matter that cannot be overlooked, considering that it is
inconsistent with the first sentence of the questioned Order. Notably, the last
sentence was also edited by respondent judge to make it appear consistent with
the statement that the complainants were present.
Finally, regarding the third point, we agree
with the OCA’s conclusion that the transfer of Daisy Estella from the sala of
respondent judge was prompted by her unfavorable testimony against the latter.
Indeed, the branch clerk of court[14] also testified that the judge scolded Estella after
she testified, and that her testimony was the reason for her transfer.
These three points, taken together,
paint a picture of bias or partiality that calls for disciplinary sanction.
Worse, respondent manifested dishonesty when he altered his Order and made it
appear that the complainants were present during a hearing that they had not in
fact attended.
Respondent judge violated Canon 1[15] and Rule 1.02,[16] as well as Canon 2[17] and Rule 2.01[18] of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Thus, he must be
sanctioned.[19] In this connection, we have said:
"Well-known
is the judicial norm that ‘judges should not only be impartial but should also
appear impartial.’ Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled
to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other
elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the
ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not
only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner
free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
"This
reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional
trial court judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial
front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the
people’s sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should remain ‘free
from any appearance of impropriety’ and ‘should be beyond reproach.’"[20] (Footnotes omitted) ExÓ sm
A review of past Decisions shows a wide
range of penalty for cases of similar nature. These penalties include mere
reprimand,[21] withholding of salary,[22] fine,[23] suspension,[24] and even dismissal.[25] This court feels that the P5,000 fine
recommended by the OCA is inadequate, considering the dishonesty displayed by
respondent. Under the circumstances, we believe that a fine in the amount of P10,000
is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr. GUILTY
of grave abuse of authority and partiality aggravated by dishonesty for which
he is ordered to PAY a FINE of P10,000. He is sternly
warned that a commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely. The Complaint filed by Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora is hereby
held in abeyance.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. 6/5/00 3:12 PM
[1] Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada.
[2] Penned by J. Artemio G. Tuquero (now justice secretary), with the concurrence of JJ Eubulo G. Verzola (Division chairman) and Mariano M. Umali (member)
[3] Memorandum submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada dated January 4, 2000, pp. 2-7.
[4] 213 SCRA 734 (1992)
[5] Memorandum submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada dated January 4, 2000, pp. 7-13.
[6] The case is entitled "The Bureau of Customs (BOC) et. al. v. Elson Ogario and Mark Montelibano" (GR No. 138081) pending before the Second Division. Per Resolution dated May 17, 1999, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining, inter alia, the respondent judge herein from enforcing or causing to be enforced the questioned Resolution dated January 11, 1999; the Order dated January 25, 1999; as well as all subsequent orders related to Civil Case No. CEB-223077, Elson Ogario and Mark Montelibano v. Bureau of Customs et. al."
[7] See Gatchalian Promotions v. Naldoza, AC No. 4017, September 29, 1999.
[8] Respondent judge admittedly declared that the case has been pending for 43 years.
[9] The aforementioned Order dated February 10, 1999
states in part:
"The court will not also relieve the incumbent Adminstrator without first asking him to submit his claim of compensation which is honestly due him."
[10] The law that governs this matter is Section 2, Rule 82
of the Rules of Court, which provides:
"SEC. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. -- If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign. x x x." (See De Parreño v. Aranzanso, 116 SCRA 157, August 30, 1982)
[11] See Kalaw v. IAC, 213 SCRA 289, September 2, 1992.
[12] See Cagatin v. Demecillo, 304 SCRA 369, March 10, 1999.
[13] Complainants’ letter dated May 20, 1999, states: Mseä sm
"6......While we are not objecting to the cancellation of the March 17, 1999 hearing as a consequence of the March 15, 1999 hearing, in spite of the absence of prior notice from the court, what we are complaining about is the questionable and seemingly dishonest actuations of Judge Gako in making it appear in his Order dated March 15, 1999 that we and our counsel were present and were notified of said order in open court, when in truth and in fact we were not even there x x x"
[14] Atty. Manuel G. Nollora.
[15] "A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary."
[16] "A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay."
[17] "A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities."
[18] "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
[19] See Prudential Bank v. Castro, 142 SCRA 223, June 5, 1986.
[20] Macasasa v. Imbing, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1470, pp. 21-22, August 16, 1999, per Kapunan, J.
[21] See Ardosa v. Gal-lang, 284 SCRA 58, January 8, 1998; Tabao v. Butalid, 262 SCRA 559, September 30, 1996.
[22] See Santos v. De Gracia, 119 SCRA 189, December 15, 1982.
[23] See Espiritu v. Jovellanos, 280 SCRA 579, October16, 1997; Sandoval v. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611, August 22, 1996; Benjamin Sr. v. Alaba, 261 SCRA 429, September 5, 1996; Vda. de Coronel v. Danan, 225 SCRA 212, August 9, 1993.
[24] See Fernandez v. Imbing, 260 SCRA 586, August 21, 1996; Abundo v. Manio, AM No. RTJ-98-1416, August 6, 1999.
[25] See Meris v. Ofilada, 293 SCRA 606, August 5, 1998.