THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1443. March 14,
2000]
EVAN B.
CALLEJA, complainant, vs. JUDGE RAFAEL P. SANTELICES, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2, Legaspi City, respondent. Maniksâ
R E S O L U T I O N
VITUG, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint, dated 03
December 1997, complainant Evan B. Calleja charged Judge Rafael B. Santelices
of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 2, with manifest partiality
and gross ignorance of the law relative to his actuations in Civil Case No.
9441 ("Mayon International Hotel, Inc. vs. Albay Electric Cooperative,
Inc., Edgardo San Pablo and Evan B. Calleja") for damages, with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary mandatory injunction; he averred
that -
"a. During
the hearing on October 17, 1997 the plaintiff made certain admissions which
conclusively prove that it (plaintiff) and its personnel are guilty of
electricity pilferage and were caught in the act of knowingly using or
receiving the benefit of pilfered electricity;
"b. During
the hearing on the preliminary mandatory injunction, defendant was able to
submit a computation of the differential billing in the amount of P1,454,381.50
as basis for fixing the bond but respondent ignored it and fixed the bond at P200,000.00
only;
"c.
Respondent issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction but refused to
comply with Section 9 of R.A. No. 7832 which directs the court issuing the
injunction to submit a report to the Supreme Court within (10) days from its
issuance;
"d. During
the hearing on November 12, 1997, the counsel for the defendant was about to
invoke a circular of the Supreme Court when respondent in gross and grave
disrespect to the Supreme Court, cut him short and said 'Never mind, let the
Supreme Court have that circular;' and
"e. During
the hearing on the same date, counsel for the defendants requested for a
postponement whereupon respondent ordered the defendants to reimburse the
transportation expenses and appearance fee of counsel for plaintiff."
Another administrative complaint, dated 25
February 1998, was filed by complainant, this time alleging that -
"a.
Respondent is partial to the plaintiff as a favor to the counsel of the
plaintiff, Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, who as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and
Chairman of the Presidential Judicial Re-Organization during President Marcos'
regime, had caused, processed and recommended the appointment of respondent in
the judiciary;
"b. Complaint
was not sent a Notice of Raffle as required by the Supreme Court Circular No.
20-95 dated September 12, 1995 and when he was told by somebody that a case
against him and his co-defendants has been filed and will be raffled at 2:00
p.m., he went to the sala of respondent at around 1:45 p.m. only to be told
that the raffle had been done already; Manikanä
"c. In an
order dated October 17, 1997 respondent set the case for pre-trial on November
12, 1997 inspite of the fact that the last pleading has not yet been filed or
the period to file it has not yet expired and no motion was ever filed by the
plaintiff to set the case for pre-trial as required by Section 1 of Rule 18 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
"d.
Respondent repeated the same mistake by issuing another Notice of Pre-Trial
dated December 18, 1997 stating in part 'The last pleading in this case having
been filed and issues being joined, the pre-trial conference is hereby set on
February 11, 1998 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning;'
"e.
Respondent distorted the records of Civil Case No. 9441 when he issued two (2) orders:
first, the order dated February 6, 1998 stating that the motion to inhibit
filed by Counsel for the defendants had already been denied in open court
during the hearing on December 10, 1997 and second, the order dated February
11, 1998 which resolved for the second time the said motion to inhibit and
reiterated that said motion was denied last December 10, when in fact
respondent did not make such a ruling during the hearing last December 10,
1997."
In his comment, dated 16 February 1998,
respondent Judge denied the allegations of complainant and countered that if
the plaintiff had indeed made admissions of pilferage of electricity, the
defendants could have easily moved for the dismissal of the complaint.
Respondent Judge asserted that the pilferage was merely "discovered"
and that the plaintiff was not "caught in the act" as so claimed by
complainant. With respect to the fixing of the bond, respondent argued that the
differential billings were only mentioned by the defendants but the witness
presented by the latter did not specify the amount involved. The bond of
P200,000.00 he fixed was, in any event, still subject to change once the amount
of the differential billings would have been determined. Respondent Judge
admitted his failure to report to the Court his issuance of an injunction but
maintained that his act was not deliberate. Respondent Judge conceded having
uttered the words ascribed to him but explained that he did not mean to offend
the Court by his utterance; nevertheless, he expressed his apologies. He did
direct, he said, the reimbursement of transportation expenses of plaintiff's
Makati-based counsel since the latter was not duly notified of defendants'
intention to ask for postponement.
Complainant, in his reply, asseverated that
respondent Judge had shown partiality to plaintiff's counsel, Atty. Manuel
Lazaro, who was instrumental in the appointment of said respondent to the
judiciary. He insisted that the plaintiff was caught in flagrante delicto, that
respondent erred in fixing the amount of bond, and that there was nothing that
could justify his order directing the reimbursement of transportation expenses
to counsel for the plaintiff.
Following a further exchange of pleadings,
the case was referred by the Court to the Office of the Court Administrator
("OCA") for evaluation, report and recommendation. In due time, OCA
came out with its findings. The Court, on 14 April 1999, required the parties
to manifest whether or not they were submitting the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings on record to which the parties responded in the
affirmative.
The Court quotes below the pertinent
portions of the evaluation, report and recommendation of OCA; thus: Oldmisâ o
"The issues
of whether or not the plaintiff made admissions as to its liability and whether
or not, the plaintiff was caught in flagrante delicto are still subjudice. The
trial of the merits of Civil Case No. 9441 before the Regional Trial Court is
still going on and besides the question posed by these issues are judicial in character
as these go to the assessment by respondent of the evidence of the parties. In
such a case, the remedy of complainant are those found in the Rules of Court
and not an administrative case.
"As to the
alleged error of respondent in fixing the bond at P200,000.00 this has already
been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal by the Supreme Court of the
petition filed by the defendants and docketed as G.R. No. 131290 questioning
the said order of respondent.
"Respondent
admitted that when he issued the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, he
failed to report the same within ten (10) days from its issuance as a required
by R.A. 7832, Section 9. Respondent's omission constitutes gross inefficiency.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 9441 (Annex ‘A’ of the complaint) clearly
indicates the applicable law, that is Republic Act No. 7832. This law consists
of merely seventeen (17) sections and it would not have required too much time
and effort on the part of the respondent to peruse its provisions and acquaint
himself with its contents. It even appears that respondent came to know of the
requirement of Section 9 of R.A. No. 7832 only from this administrative
complaint. Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a
judge should maintain professional competence. In this regard, the Supreme
Court has consistently ruled that judges should be conversant with the law
(Lopes vs. Fernandez, 99 SCRA 603, 611), he should be fully acquainted with the
statutes and procedural rules (Librarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48, 56)
"Likewise,
respondent admitted that he uttered this statement ‘Never mind, let the Supreme
Court have that circular.’ This is in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 Code of
Judicial Conduct which provides that a judge should so behave at all times as
to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. A remark such
as that uttered by the respondent, although he might not have meant any
disrespect, tends to create in the minds of those who heard it the impression
that the authority of the Supreme Court can be ignored by the lower courts. A
judge should be prudent and more circumspect in his utterances, remembering
that his conduct in and outside the courtroom is under constant observation.
(Legaspi vs. Garrete, 242 SCRA 679,686)
"The question
of validity and propriety of the order of respondent judge directing the
defendants to reimburse the transportation expense and appearance fee of
counsel for plaintiff, has been raised in G.R. No. 132540, and has yet to be
resolved by the Supreme Court. Hence, the matter is still subjudice.
"As to the
charge that respondent is partial in favor of Mayon International Hotel, this
has been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of G.R. No. 133368.
"We also find
baseless the charge that respondent failed to comply with the provision of Rule
58, Section 4 (c) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that when
an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order is included in a complaint, the case shall be raffled only after notice
to and in the presence of the adverse party. Complainant raised this issue in
his pleading entitled ‘Administrative Complaints' which we considered as a
supplement to his original complaint. On page two (2) thereof, he states that
'the herein complainant was not sent the required Notice of Raffle...'
Likewise, in pages 9 and 13 of the petition in G.R. No. 133368, it was alleged
therein that Notice of Raffle was not sent to San Pablo and Calleja. It should
be remembered that there are three (3) defendants in Civil Case No. 9441, Albay
Electric Cooperative, Inc., Edgardo San Pablo and Evan Calleja, the latter two
being impleaded as officers of the corporation. Interestingly, complainant did
not categorically allege, either in this complaint or in the petition in G.R.
No. 133368, that no notice of raffle was sent to Albay Electric Cooperative,
Inc. In the absence of such an allegation, respondent can not be held liable
for violating Rule 58, Section 4(c), for if such notice was sent to the
corporation, then there would have been substantial compliance with the rule. Ncmâ
"The charge
that respondent violated Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure when he set Civil Case No. 9441 for pre-trial must be dismissed for
being subjudice. This is one of the issues complainant raised in G.R. No.
132540 which has yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court.
"Finally, the
charge that respondent distorted the records in Civil Case No. 9441 must also
be dismissed for being moot and academic. The legality and propriety of the
orders dated February 6 and 11, 1998 which allegedly distorted the records of
Civil Case No. 9441 was raised by complainant in G.R. No. 133368 and has
already been rejected by the Supreme Court."
The OCA recommended that the case be
re-docketed as an administrative matter, and that respondent Judge be (a) FINED
in the amount of P10,000.00 for gross inefficiency and disrespect to the
Supreme Court, (b) REPRIMANDED for violating Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of
Judicial Ethics, and (c) REMINDED that a repetition of the same offenses will
be dealt with most severely. The OCA recommended the dismissal of the rest of
the charges.
The Court accepts and adopts the foregoing
evaluation, report and recommendation of the OCA.
Although the Court has said that an
administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy for an act of a judge
where a judicial remedy exists and is available,[1] respondent Judge, nonetheless, cannot totally escape
from administrative sanction. He has admitted his failure to submit a report on
his issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction required by Section
9 of Republic Act No.7832. This law provides:
"SEC. 9.
Restriction on the Issuance of Restraining Orders or Writs of Injunction. - No
writ of injunction or restraining order shall be issued by any court against
any private electric utility or rural electric cooperative exercising the right
and authority to disconnect electric service as provided in this Act, unless
there is prima facie evidence that the disconnection was made with
evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority.
"If,
notwithstanding the provisions of this section, a court issues an injunction or
restraining order, such injunction or restraining order shall be effective only
upon the filing of a bond with the court which shall be in the form of cash
bond or cashier's check equivalent to 'differential billing,' penalties and
other charges, or to the total value of the subject matter of the action;
Provided, however, That such injunction or restraining order shall
automatically be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the
public utility of a counterbond similar in form and amount as that above
required: Provided, finally, That whenever such injunction is granted the
court issuing it shall, within ten (10) days from its issuance, submit a report
to the Supreme Court setting forth in detail the grounds or reasons for its
order."[2]
Observance of the law, which he is bound to
know and sworn to uphold, is required of every judge.[3] The mandate of Republic Act No. 7832 is certainly
not ambiguous, and no justifiable reason has been advanced by respondent to
excuse his failure to comply therewith. All that respondent could say for his inaction
is that his nonfeasance has not been deliberate. The Court considers this
explanation to be unsatisfactory.
Relative to the utterance made by respondent
in open court (when his attention was called to a circular issued by this
Court), viz: "Never mind, let the Supreme Court have that
circular," he not only has unwarrantably undermined the authority of this
Court but also has seriously demeaned the entire judiciary and his own
profession. Being himself a ranking official charged with the delicate task of
dispensing justice, it should have behooved him to be constantly cautious in
his words and deeds to help earn the proper respect of the public. The Supreme
Court certainly expects no less from him. NcmmisÓ
Given the possibility, if not likelihood,
that respondent has had no real intention to do harm, the Court deems it
appropriate to reduce the recommended fine from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.
WHEREFORE, for inefficiency and lack of circumspection, Judge
Rafael P. Santelices is imposed a FINE in the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00)
Pesos. A repetition of the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt
with most severely.
SO ORDERED.
Melo,
(Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and
Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Scncä m