SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1544. March 15,
2000]
Acting
Solicitor General ROMEO DE LA CRUZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE
CARLITO A. EISMA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Zamboanga City, respondent. francis
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint filed by then Acting
Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz against Judge Carlito A. Eisma, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 13, Zamboanga City for gross ignorance of the law and
manifest bias in favor of a party in a case.
The facts are as follows:
In a decision, dated December 8, 1954, the
then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga gave judgment in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines for the expropriation of 280,885 square meters of
land which now form part of the Zamboanga International Airport. Its decision
was subsequently affirmed by this Court in Republic v. Garcellano.[1]
It appears, however, that on February 17,
1996, Juanito Ledesma, Arsenio Nuevo, and Aida Ledesma-Nuevo, alleged heirs of
Juan Ledesma, one of the defendants in the said expropriation case, forcibly
entered the property by destroying the perimeter fence of the airport and
thereafter caused a concrete wall to be built separating the property from the
rest of the airport. Ledesma, Nuevo, and Ledesma-Nuevo acted on the basis of an
allegedly reconstituted title in their names. marie
This prompted the government to file a
complaint for forcible entry against Ledesma, Nuevo, and Ledesma-Nuevo. The
case was filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Zamboanga City, which, however,
dismissed the same in its decision dated December 19, 1996. On appeal, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Zamboanga City, reversed the decision. As
Ledesma, Nuevo, and Ledesma-Nuevo did not appeal, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 17, Zamboanga City became final.
It appears, however, that Ledesma-Nuevo had
filed in the meantime a complaint for accion publiciana, which was
raffled and assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Zamboanga City,
presided by respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma. The government moved to dismiss
the case invoking res judicata, prematurity, and estoppel, but Judge
Eisma did not resolve the motion. Instead, he issued a temporary restraining
order, dated November 18, 1997, directing the Metropolitan Trial Court to cease
and desist from enforcing the decision in the forcible entry case. Later, he
issued a writ of preliminary injunction, dated December 16, 1997, which reads
in part:
novero
In the case at
bar, it is undisputed that by virtue of the Decision in Civil Case No. 357 for
Eminent Domain by the then Court of First Instance, herein defendant ATO has
been in possession of the property in question. However, it is also undisputed
that plaintiffs are likewise in possession of the property. While it may be
admitted that plaintiffs’ physical possession came later than the ATO, because
of which the latter filed the ejectment case but surprisingly against only
three (3) of herein plaintiffs, it must likewise be admitted that the former
have the legal title to the property. Granting, for the sake of argument, that
no compensation has yet been made for the property so expropriated, defendant
ATO’s possession thereof since 1954 did not in any way vest in it the naked
ownership over the property. As the Court appropriately stated in the Decision
now sought to be enjoined, defendant ATO is only a de facto owner of the
property. On the basis of the assumption, it is not at all difficult to hold,
as logic and justice dictate, that plaintiffs have a clear and substantial right
over the property. To outrightly deny the injunctive relief sought without
giving plaintiffs their day in court is to cause them injustice and irreparable
injury should this Court later find out they are entitled to the reliefs sought
for in the complaint. Upon the other hand, the Government stands to lose
nothing by merely preserving the status quo ante. More than anything else,
justice will be better served. nigel
Admittedly, the
decision in the ejectment case had already become final, hence, executory. However,
that it is the ministerial duty of the court to order execution of final and
executory judgments admits of certain exception. Quoting Lipana vs. Development
Bank of Rizal, 154 SCRA 257, the Supreme Court, in Cruz vs. Leabros, 244 SCRA
194, reiterated that "the rule that once a decision become final and
executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution,
admits of certain exceptions as in the cases of special and exceptional nature
where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the
suspension of its execution" (Vecine vs. Geronimo, 59 O.G. 579);
"whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice" (Pascual
vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 164); or "when certain facts and circumstances transpired
after the judgment become final which could render the execution of the
judgment unjust" (Cabrias vs. Adil, 135 SCRA 354).
In the present
case, the stay of execution is warranted by the facts that plaintiffs claim
they are legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To
execute the judgment by ejecting plaintiffs pending determination of their
claim would certainly result in injustice, considering that plaintiff Aida
Nuevo has already spent much for the relocation of squatters. Moreover, to
reiterate, the plaintiffs claim they have not yet been compensated for the land
expropriated. Certainly, the Government should not sacrifice justice and the
citizen’s rights in the altar of technicality. Otherwise, the courts are
duty-bound to protect. ella
WHEREFORE, on the
basis of the foregoing, plaintiffs’ prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is hereby GRANTED upon their posting of a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00 executed to herein defendants to the effect that
the former will pay defendant all damages that it may sustain by reason of the
injunction should this Court finally decide they are not entitled thereto.
On certiorari by the government, the
Court of Appeals on January 2, 1999 set aside the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by Judge Eisma. It held:
The decision of
the RTC-Branch 17 of Zamboanga City reversing the dismissal of the forcible
entry case in the decision of the City Trial Court of Zamboanga and ruling in
favor of the Republic has become final and executory, no appeal having been
taken therefrom. To iterate the principal issue: Can a final and executory
appellate decision of a regional trial court in an ejectment case be restrained
in a separate action for accion publiciana filed before another branch
of the regional trial court?
We answer in the
negative.
marinella
. . . .
Moreover, what is
sought to be enjoined in Civil Case No. 1198 (4673) by the respondent RTC is
the decision in Civil Case No. 4991 (503) of RTC-Branch 17, Zamboanga City, a
co-equal court. No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the
power to grant relief sought by injunction. (PDCP Development Bank v. Vestil,
264 SCRA 467 (1996)). Thus, the issuance by respondent judge of the writ of
preliminary injunction is a clear act of interference with the judgment of
RTC-Branch 17, Zamboanga City.
In the present case, Acting Solicitor
General Romeo C. de la Cruz alleged: (1) that judge Eisma exceeded his
authority in enjoining the implementation of the decision in the forcible entry
case of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Zamboanga City, which is a sala of
co-equal jurisdiction; (2) that even assuming that he has the authority to
issue the temporary restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction
directing the Metropolitan Trial Court to cease and desist from enforcing the
said decision, he overlooked the rule that except under certain well-defined
circumstances, which do not obtain in the instant case, a decision in a
forcible entry case is immediately executory; and (3) that Judge Eisma
disregarded the rules on res judicata and forum-shopping in not
dismissing the complaint for accion publiciana filed by Ledesma-Nuevo. alonzo
In his comment, dated April 21, 1998, Judge
Eisma alleged: (1) that the government did not pay just compensation for the
subject property; (2) that the said property is not being used for the purpose
for which the same was expropriated; (3) that the plaintiffs in the case for accion
publiciana are in possession of the property and the title to the same is
in their names; and (4) res judicata cannot be invoked for the dismissal
of the complaint for accion publiciana because parties are impleaded in
the latter case as plaintiffs who were not defendants in the forcible entry
case.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
in a report dated January 31, 2000, recommends that Judge Eisma be held guilty
of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority and that he be fined
in the amount of P10,000.00 with a warning that the commission of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. We find
the recommendation well taken. brando
First. Pertinent to this case is our ruling in Trinidad v. Cabrera,[2] where the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 32,
Quezon City gave judgment for plaintiffs and ordered defendants ejected from
the premises. On appeal, the Regional Trail Court affirmed the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. The Court of Appeals and this Court denied the
petitions for review successively filed by defendants. After entry of judgment,
the Metropolitan Trial Court issued a writ of execution. However, defendants
filed an injunctive suit in the Regional Trial Court, which then issued an injunction.
Plaintiffs thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with this Court.
In granting the petition, we reiterated the well-settled rule that the Regional
Trial Court cannot impede the execution of the decision of a higher court.
The principle that a court cannot prevent
the implementation of a decision of a higher court can also be applied with
respect to salas of co-equal jurisdiction. In the instant case, Judge Eisma, as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Zamboanga City issued at
first a temporary restraining order and later a writ of preliminary injunction
directing the Metropolitan Trial Court to cease and desist from implementing
the decision of Branch 17 of the same court. Although the temporary restraining
order and the writ of preliminary injunction were directed at the Metropolitan
Trial Court, the same had the ultimate effect of preventing the execution of
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Zamboanga City, a court of
equal rank and jurisdiction. Judge Eisma thus exceeded his authority. micks
Second. Under Rule 70, §1 of the Rules of Court, a judgment becomes executory
if no appeal is perfected within the reglementary period. Since Ledesma, Nuevo,
and Ledesma-Nuevo, defendants in the ejectment case, did not appeal from the
decision, dated May 22, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Zamboanga
City, the same, therefore, became executory.
It is true that, as an exception to this
general rule, execution may be stayed where the implementation of the judgment
would lead to injustice in view of a change in the situation of the parties. In
his order dated December 16, 1997, Judge Eisma justified the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction on the ground that the government did not pay just
compensation for the property; the property was not being used for the purpose
for which the same was expropriated; the plaintiffs in the case for accion
publiciana were in possession of the property and the titles to the same
were in their names; and the case brought by them was not barred by the
principle of res judicata because certain parties are impleaded therein
as plaintiffs who were not defendants in the forcible entry case. However, the
defendants in the ejectment case should have opposed the issuance of a writ of
execution by the Metropolitan Trial Court on these grounds, instead of asking
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Zamboanga City to issue a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction. nigella
With respect to complainant’s allegation
that Judge Eisma disregarded the rules on res judicata and
forum-shopping in not dismissing the complaint for accion publiciana, we
hold that this issue should be properly raised in a judicial proceeding and not
in an administrative case. If indeed Judge Eisma has not resolved the motion to
dismiss filed by the government on these grounds, the remedy is a special civil
action for mandamus to compel him to rule on the same.
In line with our ruling in PDCP Development
Bank v. Vestil,[3] in which a judge was fined of P5,000.00 for
interfering with the execution of an order of a court of co-equal jurisdiction,
the same penalty should be imposed on Judge Eisma.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 13, Zamboanga City, is found guilty of gross ignorance of
the law and abuse of authority and is hereby fined in the amount of P5,000.00
with warning that a commission of the same or similar act in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED. Scä
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing,
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.