THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221. March 16,
2000]
JOSEFINA M.
VILLANUEVA, complainant, vs. JUDGE BENJAMIN E. ALMAZAN, respondent. Sce-dp
D E C I S I O N
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is an administrative case instituted
by Josefina M. Villanueva against Judge Benjamin E. Almazan for gross ignorance
of the law, abuse of discretion, partiality and gross misconduct.
The verified letter-complaint[1] filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
averred that the acts of Judge Benjamin E. Almazan complained of were committed
as follows:
On October 9, 1997, the complainant filed
with the Municipal Trial Court of Santo Tomas, La Union, presided over by
respondent Judge, two (2) Complaints for Grave Oral Defamation against one
Teresita Nabayan, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3097 and 3098, respectively.
On the same day, the respondent Judge,
conducted a "preliminary examination", after which he issued the
following Order downgrading the crimes charged to simple slander, to wit:
"The Court
conducted the necessary preliminary examination to determine the existence of
probable cause by asking searching questions to the witnesses for the
prosecution. In the course of investigation, the Court is convinced that the
offense committed by the accused was just simple slander.
In view of the
findings of the Court in the two (2) entitled cases, the accused is hereby
ordered to submit her counter-affidavit including that of her witness/es well
as exhibits or evidence/s if there be any within ten (10) days from receipt of
this order. Failure on her part to comply with his order, she is barred to
present evidence during the trial of this case." Ed-psc
On the November 21, 1997, the complainant
presented a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration, contending that the
aforesaid action of respondent judge does not accord with the Rules of Court
under which the judge has no authority to downgrade subject accusation from
grave oral defamation to simple slander. In due time, the motion for
reconsideration[2] was denied for failure of the private prosecutor[3] to get the conformity thereto of the public
prosecutor.[4]
On January 20, 1998, the day before the
scheduled arraignment and pre-trial in the said cases, complainant asked for
the inhibition of Judge Benjamin E. Almazan from the said cases on the ground
that the latter used to be a law partner of the defense counsel. Said request
or motion for inhibition, which was denied, infuriated the respondent Judge who
then subjected her (Complainant) to verbal abuse. When asked why he downgraded
the charge to that of simple slander, respondent Judge explained to the
complainant that he did so "because your answers were wrong".
On January 21, 1998, accused Teresita
Nabayan was arraigned in the absence of the public prosecutor, who did not receive
any calendar of cases for that day.
The same complaint sought to have Clerk of
Court Violeta R. Villanueva investigated for blatant partiality and influence
peddling, alleging that the latter discussed the cases during mahjong sessions
where she entertained some litigants. Also, she (Violeta R. Villanueva) refused
to officially receive the pleading of the herein complainant so as not to mess
up the records, and was only forced to receive the same when she got a dressing
down from the lawyer of complainant.
Respondent Judge and respondent Violeta R.
Villanueva submitted their Comments, dated December 24, 1998, which the Office
of the Court Administrator received on January 18, 1999.
Explaining his aforementioned action
complained of, respondent Judge contended that he conducted a preliminary
examination of the complainant and her two (2) eye witnesses, and thereafter,
arrived at the conclusion that the acts allegedly committed were not grave oral
defamation, as averred in the complaint, such that he issued his questioned
Order to the effect that the accused in subject cases should be charged with
simple slander only. Ed-p
Respondent Judge theorized that his trouble
with the complainant started when he denied her motion in subject criminal
cases to amend the Complaint so as to reflect the correct dates of commission
of the crimes charged, and the complainant was incensed by the failure of the
court to grant her motion, and by the adverse effect on complainant’s position
of the action thus taken by respondent judge in the said cases when she
requested him to inhibit therefrom. Respondent Judge maintained that the denial
of the motion for reconsideration of complainant was proper because amendment
of the complaint could only be made with conformity of the public prosecutor
who intervened to prosecute the said cases.
Respondent Clerk of Court Violeta R.
Villanueva denied the allegations of the complaint, branding the same baseless,
motivated by ill will and a mere harassment, considering that she has no power
to influence or interfere with the issuance of the orders, decisions, or
actuations of respondent judge. She brushed aside as blatant lies the
allegation that she attends mahjong sessions during office hours and entertains
thereat litigants who need her services. That she discussed cases during such
sessions is a mere speculation, since the complainant could not have gotten
such information as she spent most of her time in Manila.
As regards the accusation that she was
taking sides, this respondent maintained that the same is a fabrication by the
complainant who wanted to impose her will upon the court.
On July 27, 1999, there was received from
the Court Administrator[5] the report finding respondent judge administratively
liable and recommending that he be fined Five Thousand (P5,000.00)
Pesos, with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
The same report recommended the dismissal of
the complaint against Violeta R. Villanueva for insufficiency of evidence.[6] Mis-edp
In response to the Resolution of the Court
dated August 23, 1999, respondent Judge manifested in a letter, dated September
20, 1999, that he was submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings and
records.
The principal issues for resolution here concern
the propriety of the preliminary investigation conducted by respondent judge,
and the arraignment of the accused in subject criminal cases. Corollarily, the
downgrading of the said cases, and denial of complainant's motion to inhibit
respondent judge from trying the same cases are denounced.
After a thorough examination of the report
and the records on hand, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of the
Court Administrator.
The root of the controversy is the
unfamiliarity of respondent judge with the rules applicable in cases requiring
preliminary investigation.
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
reads:
SECTION 1. Definition.
-- reliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.[7]
Section 9, of the same Rules provides:
SEC 9. Cases
not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. -Mis-oedp
xxx.....xxx.....xxx
(b) Where filed
directly with the Municipal Trial Court. -- If the complaint or information
is filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure provided for in
Section 3(a) of this Rule shall likewise be observed. If the judge finds no
sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the
complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of arrest after
personally examining in writing an under oath the complainant and his witnesses
in the form of searching questions and answers.
Contrary to the clear mandate of the
aforestated rules, the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation
culminating in the lowering of the charge to simple slander. The original
charge for grave oral defamation is punishable[8] by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, while simple slander is punishable by arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. Thus, the original charges were
cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and did not require a preliminary
investigation. The proper action the respondent judge could have taken under
the premises was to dismiss the complaint if found to be without any basis for
further proceedings or if warranted, to issue a warrant of arrest for the
respondent, and after arrest, to hold him for trial. It is decisively clear
that in conducting the preliminary investigation under attack, the respondent
judge exceeded his authority under the pertinent rules.
In his Comment, respondent judge was careful
to refer to his challenged action as a preliminary examination. Be that as it
may, when he concluded that the proper charge should be simple slander, after
examining the complainant and her witnesses in subject criminal cases,
respondent Judge, in effect, conducted a preliminary investigation. Not only
was such preliminary investigation defective; it was a patent error because no
preliminary investigation is required for criminal cases cognizable by
Municipal Trial Courts. It is only required for those cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court.[9] Consequently, the respondent judge was devoid of
jurisdiction or authority to reduce the charge to simple slander. Ed-pm-is
Furthermore, in Bagunas vs. Fabillar,[10] the Court reiterated that under the new rules of
procedure, preliminary investigation has only one stage, viz.:
"(u)nder the
old rules, the preliminary investigation conducted by a municipal judge had two
stages: (1) the preliminary examination stage during which the
investigating judge determines whether there is reasonable ground to believe
that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof,
so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial; and
(2) the preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or information is
read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the substance of the
evidence adduced against him, after which he is allowed to present evidence in
his favor if he so desires. Presidential Decree 911, upon which the present
rule is based, removed the preliminary examination stage and integrated it into
the preliminary investigation proper. Now, the proceedings consist only of one
stage." (Underscoring supplied)
In the present cases, the respondent judge
showed his ignorance not only of the scope of his authority to conduct
preliminary investigation[11] but also of the procedure to follow in conducting a
preliminary investigation. Where, as in this case, the law involved is simple
and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly
in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no less.[12]
Equally erroneous was the action of
respondent judge in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused in subject
criminal cases without the participation of a government prosecutor. The Court
need not belabor the point that as the officer in charge of prosecuting
criminal cases for the government, rudiments of due process require that the
public prosecutor must be afforded an opportunity to intervene in all stages of
the proceedings. Here, it cannot be denied that the public prosecutor assigned
to handle Criminal Cases Nos. 3097 and 3098 was not notified by respondent
judge of the scheduled trial of said cases. That the public prosecutor in the
said criminal cases had an arrangement with the respondent Judge as early as
June 1997 - that trial of cases requiring his appearance be transferred from
the previous Tuesday schedule to Wednesdays, did not excuse the failure of the
latter to notify the former of the scheduled trial on January 21, 1998 (a
Wednesday) in subject criminal cases. Jjs-c
Concerning the refusal of respondent judge
to inhibit from the cases in question, the Court is not convinced of the need
therefor. In this connection, the Court Administrator observed that the
complainant wrote respondent judge, asking him to inhibit from subject criminal
cases, but a formal motion therefor was necessary so that the alleged grounds
thereof could be ventilated properly.[13]
As a matter of fact, the request or motion
for inhibition was taken up during the scheduled arraignment of the accused on
November 12, 1997, when the private prosecutor asked the respondent Judge to
inhibit himself from subject cases. Acting thereupon, respondent judge ordered
the lawyer to file the corresponding motion within five (5) days from receipt
of the Order; and in the meantime, he suspended the arraignment of the accused.
However, the private prosecutor did not file the required motion for inhibition,
an omission which was interpreted as abandonment of the stance of the
complainant to inhibit the respondent Judge from hearing subject cases.[14]
WHEREFORE, Judge Benjamin E. Almazan is hereby found GUILTY of
gross ignorance of the law and is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Let copy of this
Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent Judge.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] Dated January 26, 1998. On February 9, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator received a verified complaint containing the same allegations as that in the sworn letter-complaint.
[2] Order dated December 23, 1997,
[3] Atty. Lazaro C. Gayo.
[4] Efren Basconcillo.
[5] Alfredo L. Benipayo.
[6] On August 23, 1999, this Court issued a resolution
which reads: Considering the memorandum of the Office of the Court
Adminsitrator on the complaint charging respondents with gross ignorance of
law, abuse of discretion, gross partiality and gross misconduct relative to
Criminal Case Nos. 3097-98, entitled "People vs. Teresita
Nabayan," the Court Resolved to adopt its recommendation: (a) to REDOCKET
this case as an administrative matter; and (b) to DISMISS the charges against
respondent Clerk of Court for insufficiency of evidence.
The Court further resolved to require respondent Judge to MANIFEST to the Court whether he is submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings and the records of the case, within (10) days from Notice.
[7] In Cojuangco vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government et al. (190 SCRA 226, 243), this Court held that such a preliminary investigation is required for offenses cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan in accordance with section 1, Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal procedure and Section 10, P.D. No. 1386.
[8] The Revised Penal Code, art. 358. Slander. -- Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of s serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
[9] Del Rosario, Jr. vs. Bartolome, 270 SCRA 645, 649.
[10] 289 SCRA 383, 394.
[11] SEC. 2, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Court.
[12] Cortes vs. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423, 458.
[13] Report of the Court Administrator, p. 3.
[14] Ibid.