FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139137. March 31, 2000]
ALFREDO
ARQUELADA, CRESENCIA EGOS, NELSON EGOS, SALVADOR EMPEYNADO, DANILO GIBE,
RICARDO FRILLES, ANTONIO LABOY, FELICISIMA LOGERO, BIENVENIDO LUMBANG, ADELIA
MENDOZA, WELKENIE PALOMAR, ISABEL TAYAWA, MARGARITO YU, JOHN and JANE DOES who
are claiming rights and interest to occupy the subject premises in issue, petitioners,
vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals ("CA"),
promulgated on 22 June 1999, in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 52343 which denied due
course to and dismissed the petition for review filed by petitioners herein.
The decision of the CA, in turn, upheld the decision of the Regional Trial
Court ("RTC"), Branch 32, Manila, in Civil Case No. 98-91511 which
affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court ("MTC"), Branch
15, Manila, ordering the ejectment of petitioners.
The factual and procedural antecedents of
this case are as follows:
Arquelada, et al. (the
"Petitioners") are the lessees of a fourteen-door apartment located
at No. 1708 M. Lazaro corner M. Hizon Streets, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Previously,
the said apartments, originally covered by TCT Nos. 44753 and 44754, were owned
by the spouses Ernesto Singson and Socorro Singson.[2] The spouses Singson and the
petitioners entered into a verbal contract of lease wherein the latter
undertook to pay a monthly rent on the apartments. During the effectivity of
the lease contract, the spouses Singson executed a real estate mortgage over
the said apartments as security for the loan they obtained from respondent
Philippine Veterans Bank (the "Bank"). In view of the failure of the
spouses Singson to pay their loan to the Bank, it instituted foreclosure
proceedings on the real estate mortgage. Eventually, title to the properties
owned by the spouses Singson, including the apartments, were transferred to the
name of the Bank under TCT Nos. 225493 and 225494.[3]
Despite the change in ownership over the
apartments, the Bank allowed the petitioners to continue staying in the
premises. Like the original arrangement with the spouses Singson, lease on a
month-to-month basis at a stipulated rent was agreed upon. In the meantime,
petitioners incurred arrearages in the payment of the rentals as follows:
|
DEFENDANTS |
PERIOD
COVERED |
AMOUNT |
|
Alfredo Arquelada |
May
97 to Jan. 98 |
|
|
Cresencia Egos |
Sept.96
(sic) to Jan.98 |
|
|
Nelson Egos |
Sept.97
(sic) to Jan.98 |
|
|
Salvador Empaynado |
Jul.97
(sic) to Jan. 98 |
|
|
Danilo Gibe |
Jul.97
(sic) to Jan. 98 |
|
|
Ricardo Frilles |
June95
(sic) to Jan. 98 |
|
|
Antonio Lahoy |
Jan.97to
(sic) Jan. 98 |
|
|
Felicisima Logero |
Sept.97to
(sic) Jan. 98 |
|
|
Bienvenido Lumbang |
Jul.97
(sic) to Jan. 98 |
|
|
Adelia Mendoza |
Jan.96
(sic) to Jan. 98 |
|
|
Welkenie Palomar |
June97
(sic) to Jan. 98 |
|
|
Isabel Tayawan |
Jul.97
(sic) to Jan. 98 |
|
|
Margarito Yu |
May
97 to Jan. 98 |
|
On 30 January 1998, the Bank sent to each
petitioner a Statement of Account indicating their respective outstanding back
rentals.[5] The Bank, likewise, made several demands to
petitioners, asking them to settle their debts.[6] However, the Bank's demands fell on deaf ears. Since
nothing happened, the Bank gave to each of the petitioners a Final Notice,
dated 8 February 1998, which was similarly worded except as to the amounts due
from each of them, which states:
"We are
reiterating our previous notice dated OCTOBER 9, 1997 for you to vacate
the Bank's property IMMEDIATELY and settle your rental arrearages
amounting to NINE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (9,680.00) as of February
28, 1998, otherwise we will be constrained to proceed with the filing of the
necessary legal actions to protect the interest of the Bank.
Hoping you will
give this matter your preferential attention." (Annexes "I"
to "I-10", Petition).[7]
For failure of petitioners to heed the final
notice, the Bank filed on 12 February 1998 a complaint for Unlawful Detainer
with the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 15, Manila. The complaint for
unlawful detainer was anchored on the ground of termination of the
month-to-month lease because the Bank needed the properties for its own use. In
their answer, petitioners argued that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the unlawful detainer case since the complaint was filed before the lapse of
the five-day period from the time of demand or notice to vacate as required in
Section 2, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
After trial, the MTC rendered judgment in
favor of the Bank in a Decision, dated 28 September 1998. The MTC held that
valid grounds for the ejectment of the petitioners existed, namely, the
non-payment of rentals for more than three (3) months and the expiration of the
verbal contract of lease. The dispositive portion of the decision of the MTC
sets forth the following:
WHEREFORE, in the
light of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants.
1.....Ordering all of the aforenamed defendants and
all those claiming right under them to vacate the premises they respectively
occupy, particularly the subject premises described in and covered by
plaintiff's Transfer Certificate of Title No. 225493 and 225494, of the
register of Deeds of Manila, and surrender peaceful possession thereof to the
plaintiff;
2.....Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff their
respective rental arrearages as of January 1998 as follows:
|
Alfredo
Arquelada.. . . . |
|
as well as the
rentals falling due every month thereafter at the rate of P1,210.00 a month for
each of the defendant beginning February 1998 up to and until each defendant
shall have finally vacated the premises as reasonable compensation for the use
and occupancy of the premises.
3. Ordering the
defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the amount of P20,000 as
attorney's fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The petitioners appealed the adverse
decision of the MTC to the RTC. The RTC handed down a Decision, promulgated on
23 February 1999, affirming in toto the decision of the MTC.[9] Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the RTC decision. The Bank, in turn, filed a motion for
execution of the RTC decision. In an Order, issued on 7 April 1999, the RTC
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and granted the Bank's motion
for execution.[10]
Undaunted by the series of defeats they
encountered before the trial courts, petitioners brought their case before the
CA. Initially, petitioners filed a special civil action on certiorari
under Rule 65 questioning the decision of the RTC. However, in a Resolution,
issued on 16 April 1999, the CA dismissed the petition for review of
petitioners on the ground that their recourse under Rule 65 was not the proper
remedy in the course of law.[11] Petitioners filed anew a petition for review with
the CA, this time under Rule 42, assailing the decision of the RTC. The CA,
thereafter, required the Bank to file its Comment on the petition.
The CA resolved the following issues in its
decision, to wit: (1) whether the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction
over the action of the respondent [the Bank] for unlawful detainer; (b) whether
the Regional Trial Court committed reversible error in issuing its Omnibus
Order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration and granting respondent's
motion for execution; (c) whether the petitioners are guilty of forum shopping.[12] On the first issue, the CA ruled that the MTC
acquired jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The appellate court
explained that under Section 2, Rule 70 a demand to vacate is required only if
the action is anchored either on the ground of non-payment of rentals or
violation of the conditions of the lease. Since the Bank's action for ejectment
was by reason of the expiration of the month-to-month lease, a demand to vacate
under the cited rule is not necessary. Thus, the CA held that the Bank had
every right to institute an action for unlawful detainer against petitioners
even before the lapse of the five-day period as provided for in Section 2, Rule
70. Anent the second issue, the CA opined that the RTC did not err in issuing
the questioned omnibus order which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and granted the Bank's motion for execution in view of the fact
that no amicable settlement could be reached between the parties. Lastly, the
CA ruled that petitioners were guilty of forum-shopping when they filed a
second petition for review under Rule 42 after their first petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 was dismissed by the appellate court. Thus, the CA decreed in
this wise:
IN THE LIGHT OF
ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED due course and is DISMISSED. With
costs against the Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Hence, the present recourse to this Court.
On 29 July 1999, petitioners filed an Urgent
Motion to resolve Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction asking the Court to restrain the MTC from
executing its Order, dated 22 July 1999, issuing a Writ of Execution on the
unlawful detainer case and commanding the Sheriff to enforce the same.[14] The Court, in a Resolution, adopted on 4 August
1999, issued a Status Quo Order enjoining both the MTC and the RTC from
implementing any writ of execution against petitioners.
Thereafter, Messers. Mark Purisima and
Heinrich Suson (the "Movants") filed on 6 August 1999 a Motion for
Substitution asking the Court to allow them to prosecute the case in lieu of
the Bank since they have already purchased the apartments from the latter.[15] In a Resolution, dated 18 August 1999, the Court
noted their motion. Subsequently, the movants were allowed by the Court to file
their Comment which was submitted on 13 September 1999.[16]
The issues of prime concern in the case at
bar are as follows:
1) whether the MTC
acquired jurisdiction over the case for unlawful detainer; and,
2) whether a valid
ground exist for the ejectment of petitioners.
The Court resolves
both issues in the affirmative.
Petitioners contend that in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 70, a prior demand to vacate is a jurisdictional requisite in
an unlawful detainer action involving a month-to-month lease. Moreover, they
allege that before a complaint for ejectment may be filed with the MTC, the
lapse of the five-day day period from the time of giving the demand, as
provided for in the aforecited rule, must, likewise, be observed. According to
petitioners, when the Bank filed the ejectment suit on 12 February 1998, barely
four days after it gave the final notice of termination on 8 February 1998, the
five-day moratorium had not yet expired. Thus, in view of the premature filing
of the case, the MTC did not thereby acquire jurisdiction over the unlawful
detainer action filed by the Bank.
The Court is not persuaded. Petitioners
failed to see the import of Section 2, Rule 70, which provides:
Sec. 2. Lessor
to proceed against lessee only after demand. - Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall
be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the
lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of
such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on
the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply
therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the
case of buildings.
As contemplated in Section 2, the demand
required is the demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and
not merely a demand to vacate. Consequently, both demands - either to pay rent
or adhere to the terms of the lease and vacate are necessary to make the lessee
a deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed.[17] It is the lessor's demand for the lessee to vacate
the premises and the tenant's refusal to do so which makes unlawful the
withholding of the possession.[18] Such refusal violates the lessor's right of
possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer.[19] However, prior to the institution of such action, a
demand from the lessor to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and
to vacate the premises is required under the aforequoted rule. Thus, mere
failure to pay the rents due or violation of the terms of the lease does not
automatically render a person's possession unlawful. Furthermore, the giving of
such demands must be alleged in the complaint, otherwise the MTC cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the case.[20] Nonetheless, it is clear from the above rule that
prior demands to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and vacate
apply only to cases where the grounds relied upon are non-payment of rentals or
violation of the conditions of the lease, as the case may be.[21] Hence, a notice to vacate is needed only when the
action is due to the lessee's failure to pay rent or to comply with the terms
of the lease.[22] Consequently, the waiting period of five (5) days
from the giving of the notice or demand to vacate, necessarily, applies only if
the alleged grounds in the complaint are the non-payment of rents due or
non-compliance with the conditions of the lease.
As found by the MTC, RTC and the CA, the
case for unlawful detainer filed by the Bank was anchored on the expiration of
the contract of lease. Thus, if, as the CA held, the action for unlawful
detainer was based on the expiration of the contract of lease, a demand to
vacate was not necessary for judicial action after the expiration of the terms
of the lease.[23] There being no need for any demand or notice, there
was likewise no necessity to wait for five (5) days upon notice or demand
before an action for unlawful detainer may be filed. Moreover, when the ground
asserted is the expiration of the term of lease, any notice given merely serves
to negate any inference that the lessor has agreed to extend the period of the
lease.[24] In view of this, petitioners' contention that the
MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case must fail.
Nonetheless, petitioners argue that the
ground relied upon by the Bank, the expiration of the lease, is not a valid
ground for ejectment under B.P. 25, the old rental law. According to
petitioners, the original verbal lease agreement between petitioners and the
spouses Singson had no definite period although the rents were paid on a
monthly basis. This arrangement was continued when the Bank took over the
properties. Petitioners, thus, allege that while the expiration of the period
of lease is provided for in paragraph (f), Section 5 of B.P. 25, the lease
referred therein is the lease with a specific period of time and if there was
no agreed length of time for the period of lease, as in the present case, the
ground relied upon by the Bank in ejecting the petitioners cannot be invoked.
Furthermore, petitioners maintain that since the grounds stated in Section 5,
B.P. 25 is exclusive, citing Rivera v. Florendo,[25] then the
ground relied upon by the Bank is unavailing.
The Court disagrees with the contentions of
petitioners.
Initially, the Court would like to point out
that petitioners' counsel not only failed to keep himself abreast of the latest
jurisprudence on lease but also tried to mislead the Court by citing a law,
B.P. 25, which has long been repealed. This clear case of ignorance of the law
on the part of petitioners' counsel cannot escape the Court's attention. As a
lawyer, it is his duty to keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of
the Court on the issues and legal problems confronting his client. Indeed,
being aware of the existing jurisprudence and the latest law applicable to his
client's case would enable him to fully advance his client's cause. Moreover, a
lawyer owes his client the responsibility to study his case well by taking note
of the latest applicable laws and jurisprudence which may aid him in defending
his client. Failure to do so shows that a lawyer is remiss in his duty towards
his client. In the case at bar, the Court notes that petitioners' counsel
neglected to study the prevailing jurisprudence on lease and the applicable law
on the matter. Thus, the Court takes this opportunity to warn petitioners'
counsel not to commit the same mistake again.
The prevailing law regulating the lease of
residential units is B.P. Blg. 877,[26] which replaced B.P. Blg. 25, the old rent control
law. B.P Blg. 25[27] was approved on 10 April 1979 and took effect
immediately. It remained in force for the next five years. After the expiration
of the five-year term, the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 25 was further extended by
Presidential Decree No. 1912[28] and B.P. Blg. 867, for eight (8) months and six (6)
months, respectively.[29] After the the period of extension of B.P. Blg. 25
ended on 30 June 1985, B.P. Blg. 877 was enacted on 1 July 1985. Initially, the
effectivity of B.P. Blg. 877 was up to 31 December 1987 only. However, just
like its predecessor, the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 877 was extended up to 31
December 1989 by Republic Act No. 6643.[30] Subsequently, the legislature passed Republic Act
No. 6628[31] and Republic Act No. 7644[32] which both extended the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 877
for another three (3) years. Finally, Republic Act No. 8437[33] gave another extension to the rent control period in
B.P. Blg. 877 from 1 January 1998 up to 31 December 2001. Hence, presently,
the controlling rental law for certain residential units is still B.P. Blg.
877.
When the case was filed on 12 February 1998,
the existing rental law was B.P. Blg. 877. Since B.P. Blg. 877 was the law at
the time the ejectment case arose, it must be applied to the present case and
not B.P. Blg. 25, as petitioners insist. B.P. Blg. 25 has long been repealed at
the time of the institution of the present action.
Under B.P. 877 the grounds for judicial
ejectment are as follows:
Section 5. Grounds
for Judicial Ejectment. - Ejectment shall be allowed on the following
grounds:
(a) Assignment of
lease or subleasing of residential units in whole or in part, including the
acceptance of boarders or bedspacers, without the written consent of the
owner/lessor.
(b) Arrears in
payment of rent for a total of three (3) months: Provided, that in case
of refusal by the lessor to accept payment of the rental agreed upon, the
lessee may either deposit, by way of consignation, the amount in court, or with
the city or municipal treasurer, as the case may be, or in a bank in the name
of and with notice to the lessor, within one month after the refusal of the
lessor to accept payment.
The lessee shall
thereafter deposit the rental within ten days of every current month. Failure
to deposit rentals for three months shall constitute a ground for ejectment. If
an ejectment case is already pending, the court upon proper motion may order
the lessee or any person or persons claiming under him to immediately vacate
the leased premises without prejudice to the continuation of the ejectment
proceedings. At any time, the lessor may, upon authority of the court, withdraw
the rentals deposited.
The lessor, upon
authority of the court in case of consignation and upon joint affidavit by him
and the lessee to be submitted to the city or municipal treasurer and to the
bank where deposit was made, shall be allowed to withdraw the deposits.
(c) Legitimate
need of owner/lessor to reposses his property for his own use or for the use of
any immediate member of his family as a residential unit, such owner or
immediate member not being the owner of any other available residential unit
within the same city of municipality: Provided, however, That the
lease for a definite period has expired: Provided, further, That the
lessor has given the lessee formal notice three (3) months in advance of the
lessor's intention to repossess the property: and Provided, finally, That
the owner/lessor is prohibited from leasing the residential unit or allowing its
use by a third party for at least one year.
(d) Absolute
ownership by the lessee of another dwelling unit in the same city or
municipality which he may lawfully use as his residence: Provided, That
the lessee shall have been formally notified by the lessor of the intended
ejectment three months in advance.
(e) Need of the
lessor to make necessary repairs of the leased premises which is the subject of
an existing order of condemnation by appropriate authorities concerned in order
to make the said premises safe and habitable: Provided, That after said
repair, the lessee ejected shall have the first preference to lease the same
premises: Provided, however, That the new rental shall be reasonably
commensurate with the expenses incurred for the repair of the said residential
unit: and Provided, finally, That if the residential is condemned or
completely demolished, the lease of the new building will no longer be subject
to the provisions of this Act.
(f) Expiration
of the period of the lease contract.[34] No lessor
or his successor-in-interest shall be entitled to eject the lessee upon the
ground that the leased premises has been sold or mortgaged to a third person
regardless of whether the lease or mortgage is registered or not.
It is noteworthy that the expiration of the
period of the contract of lease is one of the grounds for judicial ejectment
under Section 5(f) of B.P. Blg. 877. Nevertheless, petitioners argue that the
ground of expiration of contract applies only to leases with specific periods
such as written contracts of lease which specifically provides for the time
when the lease contract shall end. To buttress their allegation, petitioners
cite Section 5(f) of B.P. Blg. 25 which states as one of the grounds for
judicial ejectment the "expiration of the period of a written lease
contract." Since the oral contract of lease in the present case does not
provide for a definite duration of the term of the lease, petitioners insist
that the Bank cannot rely upon the expiration of the contract of lease as a
ground to eject them. The Court cannot sustain the reasoning of petitioners.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, the
ground of expiration of the lease contract does not apply merely to contracts
with specific duration such as written contracts of lease. Petitioners'
reliance on Section 5(f) of the original rental law, B.P. Blg. 25, is
misplaced. Section 5(f) of B.P. Blg. 877, the prevailing rent control law, now
says "expiration of the period of lease contract," thus removing any
distinction between a written and oral contract of lease.[35] As such, regardless of the nature of the lease,
whether it is verbal or written, the termination of contract based on the
expiration of the same may be availed of by the lessor in ejecting the lessee.
Hence, there is no merit in petitioners' contention that the above ground does
not apply to the oral month-to-month lease in the instant case.
The question now is, has the verbal contract
of lease between petitioners and the Bank expired in order to call for the
ejectment of the latter from the premises in question? The Court rules in the
affirmative.
It is admitted that no specific period for
the duration of the lease was agreed upon between the parties. Nonetheless,
payment of the stipulated rents were made on a monthly basis and, as such, the
period of lease is considered to be from month to month in accordance with
Article 1687[36] of the Civil Code. Moreover, a lease from
month-to-month is considered to be one with a definite period which expires at
the end of each month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor.[37]
On 9 October 1997, the Bank already demanded
from petitioners that they vacate the apartments and settle their accounts for
it is terminating the contract of lease. Petitioners do not deny this fact.
Since a demand or notice had already been given to petitioners on 9 October
1997, at the end of that month the contract is deemed to have expired already.
When petitioners opted to stay after the expiration of the lease contract they
had become unlawful occupants of the place. In view of petitioners' refusal to
vacate, the Bank issued a final notice of termination of the lease on 8
February 1998. Although no immediate action was taken by the Bank from the time
petitioners were asked to vacate, such inaction cannot be construed as granting
a renewal of the lease contract since the 8 February 1998 notice precisely
negated any inference that the lessor agreed to extend the period of lease.[38] Since the lease contract had already been
terminated, the Bank could lawfully ask for petitioners' eviction from the
premises.
Moreover, the month-to-month contract has
also expired by virtue of petitioners' failure to pay the monthly rentals.
Petitioners do not deny that they have accrued back rentals, which up to now
remain outstanding, during the course of their stay in the apartments. A lease
on a month-to-month basis provides for a definite period and may be terminated
at the end of any month, hence, by the failure of the lessees to pay the rents
due for a particular month the lease contract is deemed terminated as of the
end of that month.[39] Applying this principle, the lease contract in the
instant case was deemed terminated at the end of the month when the
petitioners, as lessees, failed to pay the rents due.
However, petitioners submit that their
failure to pay cannot be attributed to them since it was the Bank who allegedly
failed to send its representatives to collect the rents from them. The Court is
not convinced. Even assuming that their contention is correct, it fails to
persuade the Court because petitioners were not left without a remedy in case
of the Bank's failure to collect or its refusal to accept the payment of rents.
It is well-settled that the failure of the owners/lessors to collect, or their
refusal to accept the rentals are not valid defenses.[40] Article
1256 of the Civil Code provides that "if the creditor to whom tender of
payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall
be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum
due." Thus, what petitioners should have done was to consign their rents
either to the court or to another bank with notice to respondent Bank if,
indeed, the latter failed to collect or refused to accept the rents. However,
petitioners failed to do so and they only have themselves to blame.
As a last ditch effort to maintain their
occupancy of the apartments, petitioners invoke the second sentence of Article
1687, to wit: "x x x However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no
period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the
lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. x x x"
Thus, in the alternative, petitioners ask this Court to fix and extend their
contract of lease with the Bank.
The power of the court to extend the term of
a lease under the second sentence of Article 1687 of the Civil Code is
potestative, or more precisely, discretionary.[41] As such, the Court is not bound to extend it, and
its exercise depends upon the circumstances surrounding the case.[42] However, it may grant a longer term where equities
come to play.[43] In Divino v. Marcos,[44] in
granting the extension of the contract of lease, the Court considered the
length of time that petitioners therein have stayed in the premises, the fact
that petitioner already made substantial or additional improvements in the
property and the difficulty of looking for another place wherein petitioner
could transfer. The same guidelines may also be applied in the present case.
The Court, thus, exercises its prerogative
under the second sentence of Article 1687 to fix the term of the contract of
lease between petitioners and the Bank. In this case, the Court deems that an
extension of the contract of lease for another six (6) months from the finality
of this decision is enough to enable the petitioners to vacate the premises and
look for a new place to reside. Petitioners are likewise ordered to settle
their pending accounts with the Bank and to continue paying the stipulated rent
until the extended term of the contract expires as set forth herein.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1.....Ordering the extension of the contract of lease
between petitioners and the Bank for another six (6) months from the finality
of this decision. Upon the expiration of the extended contract of lease
petitioners and those claiming under them are ordered to vacate the premises;
2.....Ordering petitioners to settle their pending
accounts with the Bank by paying the accrued rentals, including those that fell
due during the pendency of the case, as well as the monthly rents that will
thereafter fall due during the period of the extension of the contract of
lease, based on the agreed amount;
3.....In all other respects, the petition is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno,
Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 40-49.
[2] Rollo, pp. 74-75.
[3] Id., at 78.
[4] CA Decision, Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[5] Id., at 41.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Id.
[8] Rollo, pp. 82-83.
[9] CA Decision, Rollo, p. 43.
[10] Id., at 44.
[11] Id., at 45.
[12] Id., at 46.
[13] Id., at 49.
[14] Rollo, pp. 74-76.
[15] Id., at 96-105.
[16] Id., at 106-113.
[17] REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, p. 770, citing Zobel v. Abreu, 78 Phil. 343.
[18] Dio v. Concepcion, 296 SCRA 579 (1998), citing Casilan v. Tomasi, 10 SCRA 261 (1964)
[19] Ibid.
[20] Casilan v. Tomasi, 10 SCRA 261 (1964)
[21] Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672 (1946); Santos v. Vivas, 96 Phil. 538 (1955)
[22] Labastida v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 663, 669 (1998)
[23] Dizon v. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 289 (1999); Heirs of Manuel T. Suico v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 445 (1997)
[24] Id., at 671 citing Racaza v. Susana Realty, 18 SCRA 1172 (1966)
[25] 143 SCRA 278 (1986)
[26] AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE STABILIZATION AND REGULATION OF, RENTALS OF CERTAIN RESIDENTIAL UNITS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. This law was enacted on 12 June 1985 and took effect immediately upon its approval.
[27] AN ACT REGULATING RENTALS OF DWELLING UNITS OR OF LAND ON WHICH ANOTHER’S DWELLING IS LOCATED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
[28] EXTENDING THE EFFECTIVITY OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 25 BY EIGHT MONTHS UP TO 31 DECEMBER 1984, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
[29] AN ACT FURTHER EXTENDING THE EFFECTIVITY OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 25 TO JUNE 30 1985.
[30] AN ACT EXTENDING THE EFFECTIVITY OF BATAS PAMBANSA PAMBANSA BILANG 877, ENTITLED "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE STABILIZATION AND REGULATION OF RENTALS OF CERTAIN RESIDENTIAL UNITS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," FOR ANOTHER TWO YEARS.
[31] AN ACT EXTENDING THE EFFECTIVITY OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 877 ENTITLED "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE STABILIZATION AND REGULATION OF RENTALS OF CERTAIN RESIDENTIAL UNITS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," FOR ANOTHER THREE YEARS. AMENDING THEREBY SECTION ONE OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED SIXTY-SIX HUNDRED AND FORTY-THREE.
[32] AN ACT FURTHER EXTENDING THE RENT CONTROL PERIOD FOR CERTAIN RESIDENTIAL UNITS, AMENDING THEREBY BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 877, ENTITLED "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE STABILIZATION AND REGULATION OF RENTALS OF CERTAIN RESIDENTIAL UNITS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," AS AMENDED. The Act extended the effectivity period of B.P. Blg. 877 for another three (3) years from 1 January 1990 up to 31 December 1992.
[33] AN ACT FURTHER EXTENDING THE RENT CONTROL PERIOD FOR CERTAIN RESIDENTIAL UNITS AMENDING THEREBY BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 877 ENTITLED: "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE STABILIZATION AND REGULATION OF RENTALS OF CERTAIN RESIDENTIAL UNITS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, AS AMENDED."
[34] Emphasis supplied.
[35] De Vera v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 397 (1996); Dionio v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 47 SCRA 243 (1987)
[36] Article 1687, Civil Code:
If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month.
[37] Patermo v. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA 771, 778 (1997) citing Chua v. CA, 242 SCRA 744 (1995)
[38] Labastida v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22, at 671.
[39] Lesaca v. Cuevas, 125 SCRA 385 (1983)
[40] Velez v. Avelino, 127 SCRA 603, 608 (1984)
[41] Heirs of Manuel T. Suico v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 444, 458 (1997)
[42] Ibid.
[43] Id., citing Acasio v. Corporation de los PP. Dominicos de Filipinas, 100 Phil 523 (1956)
[44] 4 SCRA 187 (1962)