SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133323. March 9, 2000]
ALBERTO
AUSTRIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. Mis-edp
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari,
seeking to set aside (1) the decision dated August 13, 1997, of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 16889, affirming with
modification the March 21, 1994, judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
43, of San Fernando, Pampanga, in Criminal Case No. 5784, which convicted the
petitioner of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries, and
(2) the resolution of said respondent court dated March 25, 1998 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The original Information dated August 27, 1990,
charging petitioner Alberto Austria and his co-accused was amended as to
correctly state the name of co-accused Rolando M. Flores, which was
Rolando Torres in the original Information. Consequently, the Amended
Information reads:
"AMENDED
INFORMATION
The undersigned
Provincial Prosecutor and Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuse ALBERTO
AUSTRIA y PENAFLOR and ROLANDO M. FLORES of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence resulting in Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries, committed as
follows:
That on or about
the 9th day of July 1989, in barangay Cabetican, municipality of Bacolor,
province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Alberto Austria y Peñaflor, being then the
driver and person-in-charge of a Ford Fiera Crew Cab bearing Plate No. DEB 558
UV Pil. '88 and registered under the name of Geronimo Noceda, without due
regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations, without taking the necessary
precaution to avoid accident to persons and by giving said vehicle a speed far
greater than is allowed by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfullly and
feloniously drive, manage and operate said vehicle in a careless, reckless and
imprudent manner, causing as a result of his carelessness, recklessness and
imprudence to bump and hit a cargo trailer truck bearing Plate No. CES 518
which was improperly and carelessly parked along the right shoulder of the road
by accused Rolando M. Flores, driver of said cargo trailer truck,
thereby causing fatal injuries upon Virginia Lapid Vda. de Diwa, occupant of
said Ford Fiera Crew Cab, which directly caused her death shortly thereafter,
and inflicted physical injuries upon the following occupants of said Ford Fiera
Crew Cab, to Wit: Sdjad
Armin Q. Manalansan
- which required and did require medical attendance for a period of more than
thirty (30) days and incapacitated and did incapacitate said victim from
performing her customary labor for the same period of time;
Mylene S. Gigante -
which required and did require medical attendance for a period o five (5) to
seven (7) days and incapacitated and did incapacitate from performing her
customary labor for the same period of time;
Luzviminda S. Diwa
- which required and did require medical attendance for less than two (2) weeks
and incapacitated and did incapacitate her from performing her customary labor
for the same period of time;
Mark S. Diwa -
which required and did require medical attendance for an unknown duration an
incapacitated and did incapacitate him from performing his customary labor for
the same period of time.
All contrary to
law."[1]
The facts of the case as summarized by the
respondent court are as follows:
"On July 9,
1989 at around 7:00 P.M. along the Olongapo-Gapan Road in the vicinity of
barangay Cabetican, Bacolor, Pampanga, the appellant was driving his Ford Fiera
with ten (10) passengers. They came from the Manila International Airport bound
to Dinalupihan, Bataan.
One of the
vehicle’s tire suddenly hit a stone lying in the road, while thus cruising,
which caused the appellant to lose control and collide with the rear of an
improperly parked cargo truck trailer driven by accused Rolando M. Flores. As a
result of the collision, five (5) passengers suffered varying degrees of
injuries."[2]
While trial ensued, accused truck driver
Rolando M. Flores remained at-large.
On March 21, 1994, the trial court
promulgated its decision, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE,
the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt hereby sentences him
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, ten (10) months and
twenty (20) days of Prision Correccional, as maximum.
The accused is
likewise ordered to: Jjjuris
1) Pay the heirs of
Virginia Lapid Vda. de Diwa the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity;
2) P6,320.00 as
and for actual expenses incurred by Luzviminda Diwa, representing medical and
funeral expenses; and
3) Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED."
Subsequently, on June 10, 1994, the court
modified its decision after the accused filed his motion for reconsideration
dated April 4, 1994. The modified judgment reads:
"WHEREFORE,
the Decision promulgated on March 21, 1994 is hereby modified as follows:
The Court, finding
accuse Alberto Austria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries (Art. 365 in relation to Art.
263 (3), Revised Penal Code), hereby sentences the said accused to suffer a[n]
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of one (1) month and one (1) day to four
(4) months of arresto mayor.
The said accused
is likewise ordered to indemnify Luzviminda Diwa the amount of P1,345.75; Mark
Diwa the amount of P4,716.31; and Mylene Gigante the amount of P6,199.62 as and
for actual damages incurred.
No pronouncement
as to the civil liability of the accused to private complainant Armin
Manalansan considering that the latter filed a separate civil action against
accused Alberto Austria before the Regional Trial Court of Bataan (TSN., p. 7,
February 18, 1992).
SO ORDERED."[3]
Defendant Austria timely appealed his
conviction before the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modifications the
lower court's decision. The appellate court's decision disposed as follows: Jurismis
"WHEREFORE,
foregoing considered, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification that:
1) a straight penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor for the
imprisonment of the accused is imposed; and 2) the award in favor of Mylene
Gigante of P6,199.62 is deleted.
SO ORDERED."[4]
Petitioner now comes before the Court
assigning the following errors:
1. THE RESPONDONT
COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE;
2. THE RESPONDENT
COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER NEGLIGENT ;
3. THE RESPONDENT
COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS;
4. IF THE
PETITIONER IS INDEED GUILTY OF SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE, THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
IMPOSING A PENALTY OF ARRESTO MAYOR, INSTEAD OF DESTIERRO.
Petitioner faults respondent court for its
failure to appreciate and give credence to his testimony that when the accident
occurred, the petitioner was driving along the Olongapo-Gapan road on the lane
properly belonging to him and driving at a moderate speed.[5] Petitioner cites the case of Phoenix Construction,
Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353 (1987),
which he alleges, contains a set of almost identical facts. Further, he claims
that the other driver's negligence in parking his vehicle caused the collision.[6] He asserts that the truck driver, Rolando Flores,
negligently parked his trailer truck with the rear end protruding onto road,
without any warning device. This being so, he should not be held responsible
for Flores' negligence.[7]Lexjuris
Worth noting, the first and second assigned
errors are factual in nature. As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court, and we will not normally
disturb such factual findings unless the findings of the court are palpably
unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on
misapprehension of facts.[8] We find no palpable factual error that would warrant
a reversal of the appellate courts’ factual determination in this wise:
"In his
direct examination, the appellant admitted that he saw the trailer at a
distance of about six ( 6) meters but at the same time stated that the distance
of the focus of the vehicle's headlight in dim position was twenty (20) meters.
These inconsistent statements, taken together with his claim on
cross-examination that he saw the trailer only when he bumped it, only show
that he was driving much faster than thirty (30) kilometers per hour. Assuming
that he was driving his vehicle at that speed of thirty (30) kilometers per
hour, appellant would have not lost control of the vehicle after it hit the
stone before the collision. Under these circumstances, the appellant did not
exercise the necessary precaution required of him. He was negligent."[9]
While we note similarities of the factual
milieu of Phoenix to that of the present case, we are unable to agree
with petitioner that the truck driver should be held solely liable while the
petitioner should be exempted from liability. In Phoenix, we ruled that
the driver of the improperly parked vehicle was liable and the driver of the
colliding car contributorily liable. We agree with the respondent court in its
observation on the petitioner’s culpability: "That he had no opportunity to
avoid the collision is of his own making and [this] should not relieve him of
liability."[10] Patently, the negligence of the petitioner as driver
of the Ford Fiera is the immediate and proximate cause of the collision.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that
there is no basis for the award of damages since the medical certificates and
receipts presented did not directly reveal the relation of these documents to
the accident. Petitioner's argument is flawed. The materiality of these
documents is amply supported by evidence on record, and we are constrained to
adhere to these factual holding of the appellate court, thus:
"The award of
liability by the trial court to Luzviminda Diwa and Mark Diwa was justified
because the expenses for hospitalization and treatments were incurred as a
direct result of the collision caused by the appellant's negligence. The fact
that the doctors did not testify on the medical certificates is of no moment.
Appellant's counsel admitted their due execution and genuiness (sic) during the
trial."[11]Jlexj
Anent the last issue, petitioner prays for
the modification of the penalty. He avers that respondent court erred when it
found the petitioner guilty of simple negligence and imposed a straight penalty
of One (1) month and One (1) day of arresto mayor, invoking the second
paragraph of Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to the sixth
paragraph of the same article. He submits that the correct and proper penalty
to be imposed against him should be destierro.
It is not quite accurate, however, for the
petitioner to state that the respondent court found him guilty of simple
negligence. The assailed decision reveals that the respondent court AFFIRMED
the findings of the trial court convicting the accused beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Serious Physical Injuries.
The respondent court only MODIFIED the trial court's decision by imposing the
straight penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor and
deleted the award in favor of Mylene Gigante in he amount of P6,199.62.[12]
We find nothing objectionable legally in the
imposition of a straight penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto
mayor by the respondent court against the petitioner. The penalty imposed
is well within the limits fixed by law and within the sound discretion of the
respondent court as well. As Article 365 pertinently provides:
"Art. 365. Imprudence
and negligence. - Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any
act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less
grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the
penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
x x xCourt
In the imposition
of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in article sixty-four." (Revised Penal
Code)
Since the determination of the minimum and
maximum periods of the penalty as provided by law is left entirely to the
discretion of the respondent court, its exercise of that discretion will not be
disturbed on appeal, unless there is a clear abuse.[13] And finding no such clear abuse in this case, we are
constrained to sustain the judgment of respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Supreme