FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132518. March 28, 2000]
GAVINA
MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA MAGLUCOT, MELANIA
MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG, LADISLAO SALMA, petitioners, vs.
LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO
ALEJO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails
the Decision, dated 11 November 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
48816 which reversed and set aside the Decision, dated 13 December 1994, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental in an action
for recovery of possession and damages.
The core issue in this case is whether a
partition of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in 1952. Petitioners contend that
there was already a partition of said lot; hence, they are entitled to
exclusive possession and ownership of Lot No. 1639-D, which originally formed
part of Lot No. 1639 until its partition. Private respondents, upon the other
hand, claim that there was no partition; hence, they are co-owners of Lot No.
1639-D. Notably, this case presents a unique situation where there is an order
for partition but there is no showing that the sketch/subdivision plan was
submitted to the then Court of First Instance for its approval or that a decree
or order was registered in the Register of Deeds.
The antecedent facts of the case are as
follows:
Korte
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint
for recovery of possession and damages alleging, inter alia, that they
are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot was originally part of Lot No. 1639
which was covered by Original Certificate Title No. 6775 issued in the names of
Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot, Anselmo
Lara and Tomas Maglucot on 16 August 1927.[1] On 19 April 1952, Tomas Maglucot, one of the
registered owners and respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, filed a petition to
subdivide Lot No. 1639.[2] Consequently, on 13 May 1952, then CFI of Negros Oriental
issued an order[3] directing the parties to subdivide said lot into six
portions as follows: Rtcspped
a) Hermogenes Olis
- lot 1639-A
b) Pascual Olis -
lot 1639-B
c) Bartolome
Maglucot - lot 1639-C
d) Roberto
(Alberto) - lot 1639-D
Maglucot
e) Anselmo Lara -
lot 1639-E
f) Tomas Maglucot
- lot 1639-F.[4]
Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented
a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot). Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo,
both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969,
respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said respondents built houses
on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental amount of P100.00 per
annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot,
petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however, said
respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot.
Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo. Sdaadsc
After trial, the lower court rendered
judgment in favor of petitioners. The RTC found the existence of tax
declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Olis (purported owners
of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639-B, respectively)[5] as indubitable proof that there was a subdivision of
Lot No. 1639. It likewise found that Tomas Maglucot, respondents’
predecessor-in-interest, took active part in the partition as it was he, in
fact, who commenced the action for partition.[6] The court a quo cited Article 1431 of the
Civil Code which states that "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be
denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon." Applying said
provision of law, it held that while there was no court order showing that Lot
No. 1639 was partitioned, its absence could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or
respondents as his successors-in-interest, to deny the existence of an approved
partition against the other co-owners who claim that there was one.[7] Said court, likewise, ruled that the tax declarations[8] over the houses of respondents, expressly stating
that the same are constructed on the lots of Roberto Maglucot, constitute a
conclusive admission by them of the ownership of the subject lot by the latter.[9]
The dispositive portion of the lower court’s
decision reads as follows: Missdaa
WHEREFORE, on the
basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs against the defendants ordering the latter:
1. To demolish
their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the premises thereof and deliver the possession
of the same to Plaintiffs; Slxmis
2. To jointly and
solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees;
3. To each pay
plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year from 1993 for actual damages
representing the amount of unpaid rentals up to the time they actually vacate
the premises in question; Sclaw
4. To pay the
costs.[10]
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of
the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations
relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence of partition.[11] The CA likewise found that the prescribed procedure
under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court was not followed. It thus declared that
there was no partition of Lot No. 1639. Slxsc
Petitioners filed this petition for review
on certiorari alleging that the CA committed the following reversible
errors:
I
IN VIOLATING THE
LAW ON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION PLAINTIFFS HAVING POSSESSED LOT 1639-D SINCE
1946;
II
IN VIOLATING THE
LAW ON ESTOPPEL; THE FACT OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS AND OFFER TO BUY BY THE
DEFENDANTS IS ADMISSION THAT THE AREA IN LOT 1639-D, HAD LONG BEEN ADJUDICATED
TO PLAINTIFFS;
III
IN DECLARING THAT
THERE WAS NO PRIOR PARTITION, CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AND
AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, OF WHICH IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD CHANGE
THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE;
IV
IN DECLARING THAT
THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE UNDER THE PREMISES; THIS WOULD ONLY
SHOW THAT THE RECORD OF THE CASE WAS NOT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED, AND THE LAW WAS
NOT PROPERLY STUDIED; ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE AT BENCH THAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL
PARTITION HAPPENED DURING THE REGIME OF THE OLD RULES OF PROCEDURE;[12]
Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was
mutually partitioned and physically subdivided among the co-owners and that
majority of them participated in the actual execution of the subdivision.
Further, the co-owners accepted their designated shares in 1946 as averred by
Tomas Maglucot in his petition for partition.[13] Petitioners opine that in 1952, Tomas Maglucot
himself initiated a court proceeding for a formal subdivision of Lot No. 1639.
In said petition, he averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs of Pascual
Olis were not agreeable to the partition.[14] Petitioners further contend that respondents admitted
in their tax declarations covering their respective houses that they are
"constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot."[15] Simply put, petitioners vigorously assert that
respondents are estopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view
of the mutual agreement in 1946, judicial confirmation in 1952, and
respondents’ acquiescence because they themselves exclusively exercised
ownership over Lot No. 1639-A beginning 1952 up to the present.[16]
For their part, respondents posit three
points in support of their position. First, they emphasize that petitioners
failed to show that the interested parties were apprised or notified of the
tentative subdivision contained in the sketch and that the CFI subsequently
confirmed the same.[17] Second, they point to the fact that petitioners were
unable to show any court approval of any partition.[18] Third, they maintain that Lot No. 1639 remain
undivided since to date, OCT No. 6275 is still an existing and perfectly valid
title, containing no annotation of any encumbrance or partition whatsoever.[19]
After a careful consideration of the
pleadings filed by the parties and the evidence on record, we find that the
petition is meritorious. As stated earlier, the core issue in this case is
whether there was a valid partition in 1952. Scslx
Preliminarily, this Court recognizes that
"the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court
of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing
errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the
following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings
of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record."[20] This case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in
that the findings of facts of the CA are in conflict with that of the RTC, are
mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
and are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on
record. For these reasons, we shall consider the evidence on record to
determine whether indeed there was partition. Slx
In this jurisdiction, an action for
partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for partition which
determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is
proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted
by the parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be.[21] The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit
is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact
exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase
may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition
either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment that a
co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an
accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate
in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able
to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance,
and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case – i.e.,
either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed – the
order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. The
second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to
agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition
shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition
of the accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have
been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by
the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and
profits of the real estate in question. Such an order is, to be sure, final and
appealable.[22]
The present rule on the question of finality
and appealability of a decision or order decreeing partition is that it is
final and appealable.[23] The order of partition is a final determination of
the co-ownership over Lot No. 1639 by the parties and the propriety of the
partition thereof. Hence, if the present rule were applied, the order not
having been appealed or questioned by any of the parties to the case, it has
become final and executory and cannot now be disturbed. Mesm
The true test to ascertain whether or not an
order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it
is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is
interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the
case.[24] An order for partition is final and not interlocutory
and, hence, appealable because it decides the rights of the parties upon the
issue submitted.[25]
However, this Court notes that the order of
partition was issued when the ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso,[26] which held that the order of partition is
interlocutory, was controlling. In addition, the reports of the commissioners
not having been confirmed by the trial court are not binding.[27] In this case, both the order of partition and the
unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties
do not object to the interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they
have assented thereto, they cannot thereafter question the decree,[28] especially, where, by reason of their conduct,
considerable expense has been incurred in the execution of the commission.[29] Respondents in this case have occupied their
respective lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot
after acquiescing to the order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to
question the binding effect thereof.
This case is to be distinguished from the
order in the action for partition in Arcenas vs. Cinco.[30] In that case, the order was clearly interlocutory
since it required the parties " to submit the corresponding deed of
partition to the Court for its approval." Here, the order appointed two
commissioners and directed them merely to approve the sketch plan already
existing and tentatively followed by the parties. Calrky
Under the present rule, the proceedings of
the commissioners without being confirmed by the court are not binding upon the
parties.[31] However, this rule does not apply in case where the
parties themselves actualized the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision
plan. The purpose of court approval is to give effect to the sketch/subdivision
plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court
order for partition by actually occupying specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in
1952 and continue to do so until the present until this case was filed,
clearly, the purpose of the court approval has been met. This statement is not
to be taken to mean that confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed
with but only that the parties herein are estopped from raising this question
by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly non-binding
sketch/subdivision plan. Kycalr
The records of the case show that sometime
in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639.[32] By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners
occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639.[33] It was only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide
Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and
heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate
certificates of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties
in this case by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest
occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan.
Such possession remained so until this case arose, or about forty (40) years
later.
From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned
that the CFI took notice of the tentative subdivision plan by oral partition of
the parties therein. Further, it appears that said court was aware that the
parties therein actually took possession of the portions in accordance with the
sketch/subdivision plan. With this factual backdrop, said court ordered the
partition and appointed two (2) commissioners to approve the tentative
sketch/subdivision plan. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the
parties therein, having occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in
accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan, were aware that it was that same
sketch/subdivision plan which would be considered by the commissioners for
approval. There is no showing that respondents by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest raised any objections. On the contrary, the records
show that the parties continued their possession of the specific portions of
Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision plan. Kyle
It has been previously held that a co-owner,
who, though not a party to a partition accepts the partition allotted to him,
and holds and conveys the same in severalty, will not be subsequently permitted
to avoid partition.[34] It follows that a party to a partition is also barred
from avoiding partition when he has received and held a portion of the
subdivided land especially in this case where respondents have enjoyed
ownership rights over their share for a long time.
Parties to a partition proceeding, who
elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the portion
allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to another
party.[35] A person cannot claim both under and against the same
instrument.[36] In other words, they accepted the lands awarded them
by its provisions, and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it
in part. They must accept all or none.[37] Parties who had received the property assigned to
them are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity of any part of it.[38] Here, respondents, by themselves and/or through their
predecessors-in-interest, already occupied of the lots in accordance with the
sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot
now be heard to question the possession and ownership of the other co-owners
who took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in accordance with the sketch
plan. Exsm
In technical estoppel, the party to be
estopped must knowingly have acted so as to mislead his adversary, and the
adversary must have placed reliance on the action and acted as he would
otherwise not have done. Some authorities, however, hold that what is
tantamount to estoppel may arise without this reliance on the part of the
adversary, and this is called, ratification or election by acceptance of
benefits, which arises when a party, knowing that he is not bound by a
defective proceeding, and is free to repudiate it if he will, upon knowledge,
and while under no disability, chooses to adopt such defective proceeding as
his own.[39] Ratification means that one under no disability
voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective
proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this
voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was
theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making
the ratification.[40]
The records show that respondents were
paying rent for the use of a portion of Lot No. 1639-D. Had they been of the
belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot No. 1639 they would not have
paid rent. Respondents attempted to counter this point by presenting an
uncorroborated testimony of their sole witness to the effect that the amount so
paid to Roberto Maglucot and, subsequently, to Ruperta Salma were for the
payment of real property taxes. We are not persuaded. It is quite improbable
that the parties would be unaware of the difference in their treatment of their
transactions for so long a time. Moreover, no evidence was ever presented to
show that a tax declaration for the entire Lot No. 1639 has ever been made.
Replete in the records are tax declarations for specific portions of Lot 1639.
It is inconceivable that respondents would not be aware of this. With due
diligence on their part, they could have easily verified this fact. This they
did not do for a period spanning more than four decades.
The payment of rentals by respondents reveal
that they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of respondents over Lot No.
1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner. One who
possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he
believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.[41] Since the possession of respondents were found to be
that of lessors of petitioners, it goes without saying that the latter were in
possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of an owner from 1952 up to the
time the present action was commenced. Msesm
Partition may be inferred from circumstances
sufficiently strong to support the presumption.[42] Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of
partition may be presumed.[43] It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession
and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years,
and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an
actual partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate court,
which had been lost and were not recorded.[44] And where a tract of land
held in common has been subdivided into lots, and one of the lots has long been
known and called by the name of one of the tenants in common, and there is no
evidence of any subsequent claim of a tenancy in common, it may fairly be
inferred that there has been a partition and that such lot was set off to him
whose name it bears.[45]
Respondents insist that the absence of any
annotation in the certificate of title showing any partition of Lot No. 1639
and that OCT No. 6725 has not been canceled clearly indicate that no partition
took place. The logic of this argument is that unless partition is shown in the
title of the subject property, there can be no valid partition or that the
annotation in the title is the sole evidence of partition. Esmso
Again, we are not persuaded. The purpose of
registration is to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given
transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, but the non-registration of the deed
evidencing such transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations
thereunder.[46] As originally conceived, registration is merely a
species of notice. The act of registering a document is never necessary in
order to give it legal effect as between the parties.[47] Requirements for the recording of the instruments are
designed to prevent frauds and to permit and require the public to act with the
presumption that recorded instruments exist and are genuine.[48]
It must be noted that there was a prior oral
partition in 1946. Although the oral agreement was merely tentative, the facts
subsequent thereto all point to the confirmation of said oral partition. By
virtue of that agreement, the parties took possession of specific portions of
the subject lot. The action for partition was instituted because some of the
co-owners refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of the original title.
In 1952, an order for partition was issued by the cadastral court. There is no
evidence that there has been any change in the possession of the parties. The
only significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of partition in
1952 is that respondents rented portions of Lot No. 1639-D. It would be safe to
conclude, therefore, that the oral partition as well as the order of partition
in 1952 were the bases for the finding of actual partition among the parties.
The legal consequences of the order of partition in 1952 having been discussed
separately, we now deal with oral partition in 1946. Given that the oral
partition was initially tentative, the actual possession of specific portions of
Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition and the continuation of such
possession for a very long period indicate the permanency and ratification of
such oral partition. The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled.
In Espina vs. Abaya,[49] we declared that an oral partition is valid. In Hernandez
vs. Andal,[50] reiterated in Tan vs. Lim,[51] this Court has ruled, thus:
On general
principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity
have enforce oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed. Esmmis
Regardless of
whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at
law, equity will proper cases where the parol partition has actually been
consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of
ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize
and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder.
Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral
partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of
ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity
will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance
with the possession in severalty.
In numerous cases
it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained on the ground
of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to
parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty
was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of
equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for
the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to
hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition
may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in
and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts
of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of
the partition.
A number of cases
have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that
a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation
of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in
fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would
have regard to enforce such partition agreed to by the parties. Esmsc
Two more points have constrained this Court
to rule against respondents. First, respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and
Constancio Alejo offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot. Second, the tax
declarations contain statements that the houses of respondents were built on
the land owned by Roberto Maglucot. Esm
On the first point, petitioners presented
Aida Maglucot who testified that after respondents were informed that
petitioners were going to use Lot No. 1639-D belonging to Roberto Maglucot,
respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo went to the house of
said witness and offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot.[52] Aida Maglucot further testified that they refused the
offer because they also intend to use the lot for a residential purpose.[53] This testimony of Aida Maglucot is unrebutted by
respondents, and the CA did not touch upon this finding of fact. Hence, the
offer to buy has been established by the unrebutted evidence of the
petitioners. Why would they give such offer if they claim to be at least a
co-owner of the said lot? In effect, respondents impliedly admit the title of
the petitioners and that they are not co-owners, much less the sole owners, of
Lot No. 1639-D. Chief
On the second point, the existence of Tax
Declaration No. 04-557 in the names of Constancio Alejo and Godofreda Maglucot,[54] Tax Declaration No. 04-87-13 in the names of Leopoldo
Maglucot and Regina Barot,[55] Tax Declaration No. 04-593 in the names of Severo
Maglucot and Samni Posida[56] showing that the houses of the above-mentioned
persons are constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot[57] constitute incontrovertible evidence of admission by
the same persons of the ownership of the land by Roberto Maglucot. Tax
Declarations are public documents. Unless their veracity is directly attacked,
the contents therein are presumed to be true and accurate.[58] The lone testimony of Severo Maglucot that Roberto
Maglucot was only made to appear as owner of the land in their respective
declarations because he was the administrator of Lot No. 1639 is uncorroborated
and not supported by any other evidence. Jksm
No injustice is dealt upon respondents
because they are entitled to occupy a portion of Lot No. 1639, particularly Lot
No. 1639-A, in their capacity as heirs of Tomas Maglucot, one of the original
co-owners of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan of said lot
showing the partition into six portions.[59]
Finally, this Court takes notice of the
language utilized by counsel for petitioners in their petition for review on certiorari.
Thrice in the petition, counsel for petitioners made reference to the
researcher of the CA. First, he alluded to the lack of scrutiny of the records
and lack of study of the law "by the researcher."[60] Second, he cited the researcher of the CA as having
"sweepingly stated without reference to the record"[61] that "[w]e have scanned the records on hand and
found no evidence of any partition." Finally, counsel for petitioners
assailed the CA decision, stating that "this will only show that there was
no proper study of the case by the researcher."[62]
Any court when it renders a decision does so
as an arm of the justice system and as an institution apart from the persons
that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by the courts and not the persons or
personnel that may participate therein by virtue of their office. It is highly
improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners to berate the researcher in
his appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of the elementary rules
of the legal profession regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper
language in its pleadings and admonished for his improper references to the
researcher of the CA in his petition. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the courts.[63]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED The decision of the Court
of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
REINSTATED.
 h Y
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno,
Pardo, and Ynares-Santaigo, JJ., concur.
[1] Exhibit "J," Records, p. 89.
[2] Exhibits "A-4," "A-4-a" to
"A-4-c" and "B," Records, pp. 48-50.
[3] Exhibit "A," id.. at 45-47.
[4] Rollo, p. 24.
[5] Exhibits "K" and "L," Records,
pp. 90-91.
[6] RTC Decision, 13 December 1994, p. 10; Rollo,
p. 42.
[7] Ibid..
[8] Exhibits "G" to "I," Records,
pp.87-88.
[9] See note 5 at 9, Rollo, p. 41.
[10] Id., at 12-13; Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[11] CA Decision, pp. 6-7, Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[12] Petition, p. 4; Rollo,. p. 8.
[13] Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 6; Rollo, p.
61.
[14] Ibid..
[15] Id. at 10; Rollo, p. 65.
[16] Id. at 12; Rollo, p. 67.
[17] Memorandum for Respondents, p. 2; Rollo. p.
79.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Id. at 3,6; Rollo. pp. 81, 83.
[20] Sta. Maria vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 351
(1998); Medina vs. Asistio, 191 SCRA 218, 223-224 (1990).
[21] See Sections 2 and 6, Rule 69, Rules of Court. See
also Herrera, Comments on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as Amended, 768-770
(1997).
[22] Municipality of Biñan vs. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576
(1989).
[23] See Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, 71 SCRA 295 (1976)
reiterated in Valdez vs. Bagaso, 82 SCRA 22 (1978); Lagunzad vs. Gonzales,
92 SCRA 476 (1979); Garbo vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 616 (1984);
Fabrica vs. Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 250 (1986).
[24] Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[25] Id., at 9; See also Valdez vs. Bagaso,
supra.; Fabrica, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[26] G.R. No. 48102, May 27, 1942.
[27] RULE OF COURT, Rule 69, Sec. 2, par. 1 and Sec. 6.
[28] Godwin v. Banks, 43 A. 863, 89 Md. 679.
[29] Corbett vs. Fleming, 119 N.Y.S. 543, 134 App.
Div. 544.
[30] 74 SCRA 118 (1976).
[31] Notably, the provision applied by the Cadastral Court
in its Order of Partition in 1952 was section 22 of the Cadastral Act. (The
Cadastral Court was actually referring to section 19 of the law.) A perusal of
this provision would show that the appointed commissioners are empowered to
make partition such part and proportion of the lands as the court shall order.
Significantly, in contrast to the procedure under the Rules of Court, there is
no requirement of confirmation of the report of the commissioners by the
Cadastral Court. It is not, however, necessary to make any declaration on this
matter since whatever rule may have been applicable, the defendants are now
estoppped from raising this question.
[32] Exhibit B for petitioners, Rollo, p. 51.
[33] Exhibit A-4; Rollo p. 49.
[34] Hampshire County Trust Co. of North Hampton, Mass.,
et al. v. Stevenson et al., 150 N.E. 726 citing Freeman, Cotenancy
and Partition p. 710, Section 535.
[35] Jeffries vs. Hignite et al., 206 Ky.
50, 266 S.W. 901.
[36] Christen et al. vs. Christen et al.,
184 Ky. 822, 213 S.W. 189.
[37] Clarke et al. vs. Charles et al., 55
Neb 202, May 19, 1898.
[38] Torres vs. Encarnacion, 89 Phil. 678
(1951).
[39] Hampshire County Trust Co. of North Hampton, Mass., et
al. v. Stevenson et al., 150 N.E. 726.
[40] Ibid.
[41] A.M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Civil Code of the Philippines, 245 (Vol. II, 1995).
[42] Hunt vs. Rabitoay, 125 Mich. 137, 84 NW 59.
[43] Hepburn & Dundas vs. Auld, 9 US
262, 3 L Ed. 96.
[44] Hunt vs. Rabitoay, 125 Mich. 137, 84 NW 59.
[45] Jackson ex dem. Williams vs. Millr (NY)
6 Wend. 228.
[46] Casica vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-9590,
April 30, 1957.
[47] Pena, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 9 (1994
Revised Ed., 1997 Reprint).
[48] See 26 C.J. 313.
[49] 196 SCRA 313 (1991).
[50] 78 Phil. 196, 203 (1974).
[51] 296 SCRA 455 (1998).
[52] T.S.N. p. 5, August 18, 1994.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Exhibit "G" , Records, p. 87.
[55] Exhibit "H", Id., at 88.
[56] Exhibit "I", Id. at 89.
[57] Exhibits "G-1," "H-1" and
"I-1", Id. at 87-88.
[58] Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (m), (q), (y) and
(ff).
[59] Exhibits "B" and "B-1", Rollo,
p. 5.
[60] Rollo, p. 9.
[61] Id., at 10.
[62] Id.. at 16.
[63] Rule 11.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.