THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131925. March 9, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DARIO CABANAS CUAL,
and DARIO MARANAN VILLOCENO, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In an information[1] dated February 28, 1994, accused-appellants Dario
Cabanas Cual and Dario Maranan Villoceno were charged with the crime of murder
before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 20. The
information reads as follows:
"That on or
about February 26, 1994 at more or less 9:00 o’clock in the evening, near NHA,
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named two (2) accused, with deliberate intent to
kill, evident premeditation and treachery, conspiring, confederating and,
mutually helping with one another, armed with a sharp bolo, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and wound one Ramil
Macasalhig Sabturani by then and ther suddenly and abruptly hacking and
stabbing said victim with the use of accused’s said bolo, which directly caused
said victim’s instantaneous death at the scene of the crime due to ‘shock due
to hemorrhage due to multiple hacking wounds’, to the great damage and
prejudice to the injured party, his aggrieved family as well.
Accused’s
commission of the above felony was attended by the aggravating circumstance of
superior strength.
Contrary to
Article 248 in relation to Article 14, Revised Penal Code."
Upon arraignment, the two accused-appellants
pleaded not guilty and thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To establish conviction, the prosecution
anchored its case on the testimonies of four witnesses, namely: Leodivico
Caayao, Amy Sabturani, Dr. Jerry Abroguena, and SPO1 Vicente Apag.
The first witness, Leodivico Caayao, a
twenty-year old trisikad driver, testified that on February 26, 1994 at around
9:00 in the evening, he was sitting in his trisikad watching the television
inside a store in Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City when he noticed a commotion
taking place nearby.[2] He turned to see what the commotion was about and
saw accused-appellant Dario Villoceno and the victim, Ramil Sabturani,
grappling for the possession of a steel pipe. The two were two (2) arms length
away from him.[3]
While the two were grappling for the
possession of the steel pipe, he saw accused-appellant Dario Cual arrive at the
scene and hack Ramil Sabturani with a bolo.[4] Thereafter, Sabturani ran towards his trisikad and
attempted to drive it. Ramil Sabturani wasonly able to make a turn on the
trisikad before he was caught by Cual. Cual then repeatedly hacked Sabturani
with the bolo while the latter was inside the trisikad.[5] He heard the victim plead for mercy and say
"that is enough because it was only a little trouble and you pity
me."[6] He then saw Cual slam the victim inside the trisikad
and thereafter Cual walked away. At the time when Cual was hacking the victim
inside the trisikad, he was about four meters away from the incident.[7] When he left the scene of the crime to talk with his
employer, Ramil Sabturani was still breathing.
On cross-examination, he stated that he was
not able to see how the commotion started as he only turned his attention to
the incident while Dario Villoceno and Ramil Sabturani were already grappling
for the possession of the steel pipe.[8] He likewise recalled seeing something at the tip of
the steel pipe although he was not sure whether it was a pointed object.
Amy Sabturani, the widow of the victim, for
her part, recalled that on the night of February 26, 1994, at around 9:00 p.m.,
her late husband asked permission from her to buy cigarettes.[9] After a while, a certain Julie Sison informed her
that her husband was ganged up upon and so she went outside to check up on her
husband. She was shocked to see her husband lying face down with a number of
wounds on his back. It was her brother-in-law who brought her husband to the
hospital as she was still in shock.[10]
She disclosed that her late husband was
employed with G&P Builders at the time of his death with a weekly average
income of P2,500.00.[11] On account of her husband’s death, she testified
that she incurred twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000,00) for the casket, the
vigil, and other incidental expenses.[12] When asked whether her grief could be reduced to
monetary terms by way of damages, she decided to leave the same to the
discretion of the court. As to the motive behind the killing, she opined that
it must have been work-related and that the accused-appellants pretended to be
plumbers. Thus, they were able to take over the contract which was supposed to
be for her husband.[13]
On cross-examination, she admitted that she
did not actually see how the incident happened. She likewise stated that the
receipts for the expenses she incurred were in the possession of her
brother-in-law.[14]
Dr. Jerry Abroguena, the physician who
conducted the post-mortem examination of the victim, testified that the victim
suffered a total of twenty-one hacking and stab wounds on different parts of
his body. He opined that the instrument probably used in the hacking and
stabbing of the victim was a sharp-bladed weapon like a bolo.[15] He explained that all the wounds sustained by the
victim contributed to his demise and that not one of the wounds, taken alone,
will cause the death of the victim. In this regard, he pointed out that the
cause of death of the victim was shock due to hemorrhage due to multiple hack
wounds.[16] He further noted that the wounds on the back of the
victim could have been inflicted while he was lying down or in the prone
position.[17]
On cross-examination, he speculated that
there was probably a struggle between the victim and his assailant as there was
a wound on his left hand. He also stated that there were instances when the
victim was facing the assailant due to the presence of wounds at his front.[18]
The last witness for the prosecution, SPO1
Vicente Apag, testified that on the evening of February 26, 1994 at about 9:00
p.m., he was on duty at the Carmen Police Precinct when he received a report
that someone was killed in Balulang, Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City.[19] Upon receipt of the report, several policemen left
the precinct to investigate the matter and when they returned, they brought
with them accused-appellant Dario Cual so that the incident could be blottered.
Afterwards, accused-appellant Cual was brought to the Maharlika Rehabilitation
Center.[20] With respect to accused-appellant Dario Villoceno,
he stated that he was brought to the precinct later that night. He also
identified the bolo which was allegedly used in the killing of Ramil Sabturani
and which was turned over to him by the apprehending officer.
On cross-examination, he stated that he was
not the one who went to investigate the incident in Balulang, Cagayan de Oro
City and that he based his report only on the testimony of those who responded
to the call and on the testimony of witness Caayao.[21] He further testified that he did not investigate the
accused Dario Villoceno when he came in and he just asked the apprehending
officer if Villoceno had anything to do with the killing. He stated that he
could not remember whether accused-appellant Villoceno had injuries when he was
brought to the precinct but he recalled the said accused telling him the
following morning that he had some contusions and bruises.[22] When asked whether he knew whether accused-appellant
Cual was pursued or whether he surrendered, he stated that he was only told
that the accused was apprehended. He was not told whether the said accused
voluntarily surrendered or whether the latter was pursued by the apprehending
officers.[23]
The defense, for its part, introduced the
testimonies of the two accused-appellants to support their contention that they
were innocent of the crime charged against them.
Accused-appellant Dario Villoceno first
narrated the events which led to the killing incident. He testified that two
days before the incident or on February 24, 1994, at around 4:00 in the
afternoon, the victim Ramil Sabturani approached him and challenged him to
fight while he was eating his snack near the house which he was working on in
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City.[24] He admitted that he and the victim often worked
together as sub-contractors. He surmised that the reason the victim was angry
with him was because the project engineer had given him a task that was
originally assigned to the victim but which had been delayed.[25] He did not accept the challenge and instead he
simply stepped back, which prompted the victim to throw stones at him. He was
able to evade the attack and afterwards, he ran towards the house he was
working on while he saw the victim run towards the house of a certain Julie
Sison. He surmised that the victim was looking for a weapon at this time as he
heard somebody shout "do not do that." When the victim emerged from
the house, he again threw stones at accused-appellant and his companion, the
other accused Dario Cual.[26] They then retaliated by also throwing stones at the
victim but they were not able to hit him. Afterwards, the victim went home but
he returned soon thereafter brandishing two knives. The victim commenced
hurling stones at them but again they were not hit. They then ran away from the
victim but not before seeing the victim being disarmed by the guard of the NHA
Subdivision.[27] They then went back to the house where they were
staying in.
On that same day, at around 9:00 in the
evening, Ramil Sabturani, his wife and a certain Rey Ligan threw stones at
their house and shouted at them to go down. Instead of confronting the victim, accused-appellants
decided to hide inside their house. Eventually, the group of the victim stopped
their stone-throwing as the accused-appellants did not retaliate or answer back
at them[28]. They were not able to report the incident to the
police the following day as the victim and Rey Ligan were waiting for them.
They were only able to report the incident and to have the same blottered at
around 10:00 a.m. of February 26, 1994. They were then told that they should
clear things up with the Barangay Captain of Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City but
they were unable to do so as it was a Saturday and the offices were closed.[29]
Later that day, at around 8:00 in the
evening, he, together with Dario Cual, decided to work overtime at their place
of work. However, when they were about fifteen (15) meters away from their
place of work, Ramil Sabturani and Rey Ligan ran after them. Ramil Sabturani
was armed with a lead pipe. They ran away from their pursuers but eventually,
Ramil Sabturani was able to catch up with him. Ramil Sabturani then proceeded
to hit him with the lead pipe. He recounted that he was hit on left shoulder,
right arm, forehead, and left jaw and that he fell down after being hit. Once
he fell down, his companion, accused-appellant Dario Cual, approached and helped
him by hacking Ramil Sabturani with a bolo. He explained that Dario Cual
brought a bolo with him as they were going to use it in rendering overtime work
at the house they were building.[30] He was not able to clearly see what happened to
Ramil Sabturani afterwards as he immediately proceeded home after he stood up.
The accused Cual also followed him to his house a while later but afterwards,
Cual told his wife that he was going to surrender. Cual then immediately left
the house.
A policeman later arrived at his house and
brought him to the police station where he and Cual were both investigated.
Initially only Cual was brought to the Maharlika Center as the arresting
officer stated that he had nothing to do with the incident. However, upon the
prodding of a certain Engineer Eleno Dingue, the cousin of the victim, he was
likewise detained.[31]
On cross-examination, accused-appellant
Villoceno explained that the bolo Cual was carrying was to be used for forming
the wood for mixing the cement. At that time only Cual was carrying a bolo, as
the work they were doing did not require a good finish.[32] He likewise testified that it was the victim who
carried a lead pipe while his companion did not carry anything. Consequently,
it was the victim who beat him up with the lead pipe. He did not know what the
latter’s companion was doing while this was happening. He likewise stated that
the accused Cual helped him by hacking Ramil Sabturani with the bolo he was
carrying. He further stated that once the attention of Ramil Sabturani was on
Dario Cual, he stood up slowly and left while the two were still fighting.[33] Before leaving the scene, he stated that he saw the
victim ride a trisikad and attempt to bump Dario Cual.
The other accused, Dario Cual, corroborated
the testimony of Dario Villoceno as to the events that led to the killing
incident including the challenge made by the victim to his co-accused and the
stone-throwing incidents. As to the reason for these confrontations, he stated
that Villoceno and the victim had a previous quarrel regarding a certain
plumbing job which was given to Villoceno by the project engineer.[34]
Dario Cual had a different version as to the
events which happened on February 26, 1994. He testified that on that date at
around 8:00 in the evening, he and Villoceno decided to render some overtime
work. On their way to work, they saw the victim and Rey Ligan run towards them.
They tried to run away but Villoceno was caught by Ramil Sabturani and beaten
with a lead pipe.[35] After he saw Villoceno being hit with the lead pipe,
he approached the two and told Ramil Sabturani to stop what he was doing.
Thereafter, Ramil Sabturani faced him and tried to stab him with the lead pipe
which had a knife at the other end. The victim kept on trying to stab him while
he kept on moving backward. When his back was against the wall, he hacked the
victim on the head with the bolo he was carrying.[36] Afterwards, the victim ran towards a parked trisikad
and rode on it. The victim then attempted to run over him but he was only hit
by the steering wheel of the vehicle. Thereafter, he hacked the victim again
although, he could not remember the exact number of times he was able to hit
the victim.[37] He denied that he pursued the victim when the latter
ran to the trisikad and he maintains that he stood his ground and that it was
the victim who went to him.[38]
After the incident, he walked towards his
house where he met his wife who was already crying because of the incident.
When they reached their house, he talked with his wife and told her he was
going to surrender.[39] He was not able to reach the police station as he
met the policemen on the way to the precinct at Balongis. When the policemen
got off their vehicle, he gave them his bolo and he told them that he was going
to surrender.[40]
On 25 September 1996, the court a quo
rendered its questioned decision the dispositive portion of which states:
"In view of
the foregoing observations and deliberate perception of this court, this court
is morally convinced that the guilt of the two (2) accused was duly established
and proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt over the crime charged in
the information and as such the accused DARIO CUAL is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA for not being a
heinous crime. The other accused DARIO VILLOCENO is likewise found guilty of
the crime herein charged as an accomplice and he is hereby sentenced to the
penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL which is the next lower in degree to that of
reclusion perpetua under Art. 52 in relation to Art. 27 of the Revised Penal
Code in consummated felonies.
Both accused are
further condemned, jointly and severally, to pay to the heirs of the victim the
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for the death of Ramil M.
Sabturani and the further sum of P100,000.00 for actual and moral
damages plus costs.
SO ORDERED."[41]
The trial court was of the impression that
the prosecution’s version of the events and witnesses was more credible than
those of the defense. It struck down appellant’s tale of self-defense
particularly of the contention of the defense that the victim was the aggressor
and that he was armed with a lead pipe.[42] Moreover, the court stated that the presence of
twenty-one (21) stab wounds could not have been inflicted without the
conspiracy and mutual participation of the two accused-appellants.
The Court held that the killing was
qualified to murder in this wise:
"The several
stab wounds received by the victim which is beyond the normal impulse of a
person who is attacked has rendered the victim so helpless and unable to defend
himself from the superior strength abusively applied by the accused Dario Cual
thus qualifying the present case to the crime of Murder punishable and defined
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
Both accused never
denied that the cause of the death of the victim was the twenty-one (21) stab
wounds inflicted by Dario Cual on the person of Ramil Sabturani during the
incident. Evidence was clearly shown that Dario Cual suddenly stabbed the
victim with a bolo with such tenacity and persistence that the presence of
twenty-one (21) stab wounds amounts to abuse of superior strength thereby
employing means to weaken the defense of the victim who was then unarmed."[43]
With respect to accused-appellant Dario
Villoceno, the court was convinced that he was an accomplice to the murder as
his act of grappling with the victim for the possession of a lead pipe gave
accused-appellant Dario Cual the "necessary inspiration and impetus in
consummating the act of murder."[44]
In this appeal accused-appellants raise the
following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO
ERRONEOUSLY CONVICTED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF MURDER
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD CLEARLY DISCLOSE THAT THE
CRIME COMMITTED WAS ONLY HOMICIDE.
II.
THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED IN QUALIFYING THE KILLING TO MURDER ON THE BASIS OF THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH CONSIDERING THAT THE
SAME WAS NEVER ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
III.
THE COURT A QUO
ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER,
INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AND LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG IN FAVOR
OF THE ACCUSED DARIO CUAL.
IV.
ACCUSED-APPELLANT
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONVICTED AS AN ACCOMPLICE BUT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED.[45]
We will first take up the liability of
accused-appellant Dario Cual.
A cursory analysis of the arguments offered
by accused-appellant Cual in his appellant’s brief shows that he is praying,
not for his acquittal, but that he be convicted only of homicide and thus be
made to suffer a reduced penalty corresponding thereto. Accused-appellant Cual
admits that he killed the victim and the force he used in doing so was
excessive. However, accused-appellant argues that the evidence on record cannot
sustain the conclusion that murder had indeed been committed considering that
no qualifying circumstance was established by the prosecution to qualify the
killing to murder.
There is merit in accused-appellant’s plea.
In order to qualify the killing to murder,
the prosecution must prove that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. Moreover, the prosecution is necessarily limited by the allegations
in the complaint as to the qualifying circumstances that attended the killing
of Ramil Sabturani, namely evident premeditation, treachery, and abuse of
superior strength.[46]
To arrive at a conviction, the prosecution
principally relied on the testimony of the alleged eyewitness, Leodico Caayao
who testified as follows:
Q: And while you were watching TV, can you
recall if there was any unusual incident that happened that evening?
A: There was.
Q: And tell the court what was that unusual
incident?
A: There were two persons grappling for the
possession of the steel pipe.
Q: And how far were these two persons from
you whom you said was grappling for the possession of the steel pipe?
A: About two arms length.
Q: And did you recognize these two persons
whom you said was grappling for the possession of the steel pipe?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who were these two persons?
A: Ramil and Dario Villoceno.
X X X
Q: When you saw Ramil Sabturani and Dario
Villoceno grappling for the possession of the steel pipe, what happened next?
A: Another person arrived?
Q: And who was this person that arrived?
A: Dario Cual.
X X X
Q: What happened when Dario Cual arrived at
the scene?
A: He hacked Ramil.
Q: What weapon did you see was used by Dario
Cual in hacking Ramil?
A: A bolo.
Q: Did you see what part of the body of Ramil
Sabturani was hacked by Dario Cual?
A: I did not see anymore.
Q: What happened after Ramil Sabturani was
hacked by Dario Cual with a bolo?
A: Ramil was able to run to my trisikad.
Q: And when Ramil reached your trisikad, what
did he do?
A: He attempted to drive my trisikad.
Q: Was he able to drive away your trisikad?
A: He was able to only make a turn.
Q: Why was he able to make only a turn of
your trisikad?
A: Because he was then chased upon and
caught.
Q: Caught by whom?
A: Dario Cual.
Q: What happened when Dario Cual caught
Ramil?
A: He then hacked successively Ramil
Sabturani.
Q: Using the same bolo?
A: Yes, the same bolo.
Q: Where was Ramil hacked by Dario Cual,
inside your trisikad?
A: Inside.
X X X
Q: Did you hear anything coming from Dario
Cual or from Ramil Sabturani while he was being hacked by Dario Cual?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you hear and from whom did you
hear?
A: I heard Ramil asking for pity or mercy.
Q: What exactly were the words uttered by Ramil
Sabturani pleading for mercy from Dario Cual?
A: And he said, that is enough because that
was only a little trouble and you pity me.
Q: Did you hear if Dario Cual also replied
for a plea of mercy from Ramil Sabturani?
A: None.[47]
From the above narration, it is clear that
evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. For evident premeditation to
aggravate a crime, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime
itself, of the following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time, between determination and
execution, to allow himself to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[48] As shown above, however, the prosecution failed to prove any element of
this qualifying circumstance as their only eyewitness merely testified on the
actual commission of the crime. Where there is no showing as to how and when
the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried
out, evident premeditation cannot be considered to exist.[49]
We likewise find that no treachery attended
the killing. The requisites for appreciating alevosia in the commission
of a crime are: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself; and (2) appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods or forms of the attack employed by him.[50]
In the instant case, although
accused-appellant Dario Cual initially attacked the victim while the latter was
grappling for the possession of a lead pipe, this circumstance by itself does
not amount to treachery. For one, it cannot be said that the victim was not
given any opportunity to defend himself. As narrated by Leodivico Caayao, the
victim was able to defend himself after the initial assault made by Cual as he
even managed to run away – without success however, - before Cual hacked him to
death. Moreover, there was absolutely no evidence produced by the prosecution which
show that accused-appellants consciously and deliberately employed this
specific form of attack which would especially and directly ensure its
commission without impunity.[51] The decision by accused-appeallant Cual to attack
the victim could have been a product of impulsiveness or a spur of the moment
decision provoked by the struggle of the victim with his friend, accused
Villoceno. Hence, it was unlikely that he deliberated on the means to carry out
his decision.[52]
To summarize, the presence of treachery in
the case at bench has not been proven as fully and convincingly as the crime
itself. The doubt must, therefore, be resolved in favor of the appellant.[53]
With respect to the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength, we likewise find that it is not attendant under
the circumstances. In order to appreciate this qualifying circumstance, there
must be evidence introduced that the two accused-appellants were physically
stronger that the victim and that they abused such superiority by taking advantage
of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense.[54] In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to
introduce any evidence as to the relative physical strength of the parties
involved. In fact, the lone eyewitness to the incident, Leodivico Caayao, was
non-committal on this aspect:
"Atty. Merlas
(to the witness)
Q: And this Sabtorani, you can recall is
builded. Is it not?
A: Tall and slim. I could not tell correctly
as to his height.
Q: When you say taller, between this accused
Villoceno and the deceased Sabturani, who is taller?
A: Sabturani was taller.
Q: And, in fact, he was also bigger than the
accused?
A: I did not see clearly because he was
seated."[55]
Moreover, the testimony of the eyewitness
shows that at no point did the two accused-appellants attack the victim
simultaneously as it was only accused Cual who deliberately attacked the
latter. And even assuming that accused-appellant Cual was stronger than the
victim, abuse of superior strength still cannot be appreciated as there is no
showing that accused-appellant deliberately intended to take advantage of such
superiority.
In sum, the prosecution failed to prove any
of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information. As such,
accused-appellant can only be convicted of the crime of homicide.
Accused-appellants next argue that the trial
court should have appreciated in favor of accused Cual, the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender, incomplete self-defense and lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong.
We agree with the accused-appellants that
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been
appreciated. As we have previously held, the following requisites must be
proven for voluntary surrender to be considered: (1) the offender had not actually
been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority;
and (3) the surrender was voluntary. On this point, accused-appellant testified
as follows:
"Q: Now after the incident, can you tell us
where did you proceed after that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: After the incident I walked towards home
and then before reaching the house I met my wife who was already crying so I
brought her home. But before we reached the house the wife of Ramil Sabturani
(i.e. the victim), Amy Sabturani, quarreled with my wife.
Q: Now, were you able to finally reach your
house?
A: Yes, sir. When we reached home, I talked
with my wife and then I told her since we cannot do anything and it already
happened, you just wait and stay here because I am going to surrender.
Q: Before whom?
A: I wasn’t able to reach the police station
but I met the policemen at Balongis.
Q: So, what did you do when you saw the
policemen?
A: When they saw me they then alighted from
their vehicle and then I gave then the bolo and told then that I am going to
surrender."[56]
From this narration, it is evident that
accused Cual’s surrender satisfied the above-mentioned requisites. He had not
been arrested as the police were, in fact, still looking for him to verify his
participation in the crime. Upon seeing the policemen, he immediately gave them
his weapon and told them that he was surrendering. Finally, his surrender was
through his own volition as he was on his way to the precinct when he was met
by the police.
The Solicitor-General, in his Appellee’s
Brief, disputes accused Cual’s statement that he voluntarily surrendered by
stating that it was only upon the arrival of the policemen at his house that he
was forced to go out of his house to surrender.[57] However, we have examined the records carefully and
we find no evidence to this effect. In fact, the policeman who actually
arrested accused-appellant Cual was supposed to be called to the witness stand
but due to his failure to appear, despite summons, the prosecution dispensed
with his evidence. Verily, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
should properly be appreciated as the prosecution failed to dispute the same.[58]
The Court does not, however, agree to the
argument of accused-appellant Cual that he should also benefit from the mitigating
circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The sheer number of
wounds, twenty-one in all, inflicted by the accused-appellant Cual on the body
of the victim brings forth in bold relief the intention of the accused to snuff
out the life of the deceased, and definitely negates any pretense of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong.[59]
The Court cannot likewise appreciate the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. Under Article 69
of the Revised Penal Code[60], in order to avail of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense, accused-appellant must prove the
existence of a majority of the requisites for self-defense, namely: (1)
unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.[61]
On this point, accused-appellant admits that
the numerous hack and stab wounds found on the victim negates complete
self-defense. However, they argue that accused-appellant Dario Cual should
still be given the benefit of the said privileged mitigating circumstance
considering that the defense was able to prove aggression on the part of the
victim and the lack of provocation on the part of the defendant.
We do not agree.
Under prevailing law and jurisprudence,
there can be no defense, complete or incomplete unless the victim committed an
unlawful aggression against the person defending.[62] The testimony of witness Leodivico Caayao
effectively negated any pretense that there was aggression on the part of the
victim as against accused Cual. The witness, who had no motive to fabricate his
testimony, clearly stated that the victim was locked in a struggle with accused
Dario Villoceno when accused Cual approached the victim and hacked him with the
bolo. After the initial assault made by Cual, the victim immediately ran from
Dario Cual to go to a parked trisikad where he was immediately pursued by Cual.[63] At no instance did the witness see the victim attack
or hit accused Cual. Thus, as proven by the prosecution, there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim Ramil Sabturani.
Moreover, even assuming that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, such unlawful aggression had
already ceased when the victim ran away from accused Cual to a parked trisikad.
At this point, there was no longer any reason for accused-appellant Dario Cual
to pursue the victim and inflict more injuries. Once the unlawful aggression
had ceased with the victim’s attempt to escape, accused-appellant Dario Cual
was no longer justified in pursuing the victim and inflicting the fatal wounds.
In sum, accused-appellant Dario Cual should
only be convicted of the crime of homicide with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. Applying the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law[64], accused-appellant Dario Cual should be sentenced to
an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor
as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum.
We shall now look into the participation of
accused-appellant Dario Villoceno in the crime. As stated previously, the lower
court convicted Dario Villoceno as an accomplice to the crime. It reasoned that
Villoceno deliberately grappled with the victim for the possession of a steel
pipe and thus gave accused Cual the necessary impetus and inspiration to
consummate the deed.[65]
Under current jurisprudence, in order that a
person may be considered an accomplice, the following requisites must concur:
(1) community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he
cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with
the intention of supplying material and moral aid in the execution of the crime
in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts and
those attributed to the person charged as an accomplice.[66]
The cooperation that the law punishes is the
assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist without the previous
cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore
required in order to be liable as an accomplice, that the accused must unite
with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation.[67]
In the case at bench, there is nothing in
the records which show that accused-appellant Villoceno knew that accused Cual
was going to hack Ramil Sabturani. Neither was it shown that accused-appellant
Villoceno concurred in the criminal design of his co-accused.
The only involvement of accused-appellant
Cual in the incident was when he was engaged in a struggle with the victim just
before Villoceno made his initial attack on the victim. This circumstance does
not by itself show his unity with the criminal design of Villoceno. On this
point, we are inclined to believe his testimony that the struggle was not
deliberate on his part and that, in fact, it was the victim who initiated the
struggle. The victim, who had just been deprived of a job opportunity by
accused-appellant Cual, surely had more reason to feel aggrieved and thus
engage accused-appellant Cual to a fight.
The fact that accused-appellant Cual
immediately disengaged from his struggle with the victim after Villoceno’s
attack is yet another indication that he is innocent of the charge against him.
Verily, if he had indeed conspired with Villoceno, he would have continued to
hold the victim and prevent him from escaping until he expired from Villoceno’s
attack.
The prosecution having failed to establish
that there was community of design between accused Villoceno and Cual, the
former cannot be held liable as accomplice to the homicide. Accused-appellant
Dario Villoceno should therefore be acquitted of the charges against him.
The last issue to be resolved is the whether
the heirs of the victim Ramil Sabturani are entitled to the damages awarded by
the trial court, namely P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P100,000.00
as actual and moral damages.[68]
We affirm the award of P50,000.00 to
the heirs of Ramil Sabturani as this is in accord with current jurisprudence.[69] However, we note that the trial court erred in
awarding to the heirs of the victim the lump sum of P100,000.00 as
actual and moral damages. These are separate in nature and require separate
determination.
With respect to actual damages, according to
Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, one is entitled to adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Moreover,
only expenses supported by receipts and which appears to have actually been
expended in connection with the death of the victim should be allowed for
actual damages.[70] In the case at bench, the wife of the victim testified that she spent
the amount of P25,000.00 on account of the death of her husband.[71] However, she failed to produce any receipt to
support these expenses as these were allegedly with her brother.[72] Thus, we cannot take these expenses into
consideration, as these are unsupported by any documentary evidence.
However, the heirs are entitled to damages
for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased Ramil Sabturani. The fact that
the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support its claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery
of said damages.[73] The testimony of the victim’s wife, Amy Sabturani,
as to the earning capacity of her husband sufficiently establishes the basis
for making such an award. It was established that Ramil Sabturani was 24 years
old at the time of his death in 1994. His average weekly income was P2,500.00.[74] Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table of Mortality
that has been consistently adopted by the Court[75], the loss of his earning capacity is to be calculated as follows:
Award for = 2/3 [80-age at time of death]x[gross
annual income–80%(GAI)]
Lost earnings
= 2/3 [80-24] x [P130,000.00
– 80%(P130,000.00)]
= (37.3333) x (P26,000.00)
=P970,666.65
Finally, the heirs of the victim are
likewise entitled to moral damages considering that the wife of the deceased
asked for it and testified that she experienced moral suffering. An award of P50,000.00
is sufficient to compensate the heirs of the victim for the injuries to their
feelings.[76]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the judgment
appealed from. As MODIFIED, the accused-appellant DARIO CUAL is found guilty of
the crime of homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised
Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay
the heirs of Ramil Sabturani the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the latter’s death, the sum of P970,666.65 as compensation for lost
earnings and the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Accused-appellant Dario Villoceno is hereby
ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 10.
[2] T.S.N. October 13, 1994, pp. 7-8.
[3] Ibid, p. 8.
[4] Ibid, pp. 10-11.
[5] Ibid, pp. 11-12.
[6] Ibid, p. 13.
[7] Ibid, p. 14.
[8] Ibid, pp. 18-19.
[9] T.S.N., February 20, 1995, p. 8.
[10] Ibid., pp. 9-11.
[11] Ibid. p. 12.
[12] Ibid, p. 13.
[13] Ibid. p. 14.
[14] Ibid. p. 17.
[15] T.S.N., April 11, 1995, p. 25.
[16] Ibid., pp. 23-26.
[17] Ibid, p. 33.
[18] Ibid., pp. 37-38.
[19] Ibid., pp. 42-43.
[20] Ibid. p. 43.
[21] Ibid. p. 51.
[22] Ibid., pp. 51-52.
[23] Ibid. p. 55.
[24] T.S.N., May 3, 1995, p. 19.
[25] Ibid. , pp. 20-21.
[26] Ibid. p. 24.
[27] Ibid., pp. 25-26.
[28] Ibid., pp. 28-29.
[29] Ibid., pp. 30-31.
[30] Ibid. pp, 34-35.
[31] Ibid., pp. 36-37.
[32] T.S.N., June 28, 1995, pp. 9-11.
[33] Ibid., pp. 19-21.
[34] T.S.N., June 19, 1995, pp. 9-12.
[35] Ibid, pp. 19-21.
[36] Ibid., pp. 21-22.
[37] Ibid., pp. 22-23.
[38] Ibid., p. 24.
[39] Ibid., p. 25.
[40] Ibid., pp. 25-26.
[41] Rollo, p.28.
[42] Rollo, p. 27.
[43] Rollo, pp. 27-28.
[44] Rollo, p. 28.
[45] Rollo, pp. 82-83.
[46] Rollo, p. 10.
[47] T.S.N., October 13, 1994, pp. 7-13.
[48] People vs. Sumalpong, 286 SCRA 464.
[49] People vs. Sambulan, 289 SCRA 500.
[50] People vs. Reyes, 287 SCRA 229.
[51] People vs. Chua, 297 SCRA 227.
[52] People vs. Galapin, 293 SCRA 474.
[53] People vs. Balabare, 264 SCRA 350.
[54] People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil. 385; People vs. Diokno, 63 Phil. 601; People vs. Maloloyon, 189 SCRA 250; People vs. Balano, 272 SCRA 782.
[55] T.S.N., October 13, 1994, p. 20.
[56] T.S.N., June 29, 1995, pp. 24-46.
[57] Rollo, p. 134.
[58] People vs. Malabago, 265 SCRA 198.
[59] People vs. Brana, 30 SCRA 307.
[60] Revised Penal Code, Article 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. – A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
[61] Article 11, Revised Penal Code.
[62] People vs. Agravante, 236 SCRA 300; People vs. Bautista, 254 SCRA 621.
[63] T.S.N. October 13, 1994, pp. 11-12.
[64] Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225.
[65] Rollo, p. 43.
[66] People vs. Villanueva, 270 SCRA 456.
[67] People vs. Jorge, 231 SCRA 693.
[68] Rollo, p. 28.
[69] People vs. Verde, G.R. No. 119077, February 10, 1999.
[70] David vs. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 727.
[71] T.S.N. February 20, 1995, p. 13.
[72] Ibid., p. 17.
[73] People vs. Verde, 302 SCRA 690.
[74] T.S.N., February 20, 1995, p. 12.
[75] People vs. Dizon, G.R. No. 129893, December 10, 1999.
[76] People vs. Verde, supra.