FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130769. March 13, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER GEGUIRA y OBIA,
JUANITO CARIÑO y NALDOZA and RICARDO PEÑAFLOR y SEVILLANA, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 98, dated 30 May 1997,
wherein accused-appellants were convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs
of their victim in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
On 12 October 1993, Christopher Geguira and
Juanito Carino were charged with the crime of murder before the aforementioned
RTC under Criminal Case No. Q-93-49688. The information reads:
The undersigned accuses CHRISTOPHER GEGUIRA
Y OBIA, and JUANITO CARINO Y NALDOZA, of the crime of MURDER, committed as
follows:
That on or about
the 5th day of October 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with other persons,
whose true names and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, with intent
to kill and without any justifiable cause, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, qualified by evident
premeditation, and treachery, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon
the person of one [P]ARMINDER SIGNH, by then and there stabbing him with a
bladed weapon on the chest and stricking (sic) his head with a bottle of
Ginebra San Miguel, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of [P]ARMINDER SIGNH.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Upon being arraigned on 23 November 1993,
Geguira and Carino, assisted by counsel de officio, Atty. Agustin Benzon
of the Public Attorney's Office, pleaded "not guilty" to the offense
charged.[2]
On 10 March 1994, the third
accused-appellant, Ricardo Peñaflor, was arrested by the police. Because of
this development, Assistant City Prosecutor Lydia A. Navarro filed, on 15 March
1994, a Motion to Admit Amended Information with the trial court wherein
Peñaflor was included as a co-accused.[3] On the same day, the trial court issued an order
admitting the amended information.[4] On 5 April 1994, Peñaflor, assisted likewise by
Atty. Agustin Benzon, was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the
offense charged.[5]
The first witness for the prosecution was
Surjit Singh, an Indian national who was the uncle of the victim.[6] This witness testified on four separate dates[7] since the trial court, as well as both counsels for
the prosecution and defense, found it difficult to understand his testimony due
to the fact that he primarily communicated via the Hindi language and knows
very little Filipino and English. This problem was compounded with the
difficulty of finding a competent interpreter. The first time he took the
witness stand, his direct testimony was discontinued because the Hindi
interpreter, who was only a high school graduate, was not translating the
witness's testimony properly.[8] However, on the following scheduled date for the
continuation of his direct testimony, the prosecution was already able to
obtain the services of a knowledgeable Hindi interpreter who had stayed in the
Philippines since 1978 and finished an English-taught master's in political
science degree from the Punjab University in India.[9]
Surjit Singh testified that he is engaged in
the buy and sell business.[10] In this line of work, he purchases shirts, pants and
towels which he then sells on installment, at a premium, to his clients in
their residences or places of work.[11] On 5 October 1993, his nephew, Parminder
Singh, accompanied him in collecting from six (6) of his clients in the area of
Congressional Ave. corner Abra St. in Quezon City.[12] The victim rode at the back of his motorcycle in
going to the said place.[13] His first stop between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock in the
afternoon was in a store where he was supposed to collect the payment of a
certain person named Bobby.[14] When they approached the store, he noticed that
there were five (5) to six (6) persons, among them the three
accused-appellants, having a drinking session in front of the store.[15] He frequently saw this group before, drinking in the
same store.[16] When the group saw them, they all stood up and
approached him and his nephew.[17] At this point in time, his nephew was walking behind
him.[18] He was then asked by the group to join them in their
drinking session.[19] He declined[20] and, instead, he offered to give them thirty pesos
to buy more drinks.[21] The group refused to accept the money, saying that
if he cannot drink, he should let his companion drink.[22] He said that his nephew was too young to have a
drink.[23] He then warned his nephew that something wrong might
happen because the group was drunk.[24] He told his nephew to run to save himself but the
latter did not heed his advice. His nephew instead urged him that he (Surjit
Singh) be the one to escape.[25] Sensing real danger, his nephew then pulled him back
to shield him, thus, exposing the victim directly in front of the group.[26] At this juncture, Cariño drew a knife while the
other two accused-appellants, Geguira and Peñaflor, held the arms of the
victim.[27] Cariño then plunged the bladed weapon into the
victim, piercing the left portion of his chest.[28] Cariño repeated the attack by stabbing the victim at
the left portion of his chest.[29] Peñaflor, on his part, hit the victim on the head
with a bottle.[30] Fearing for his life, Surjit Singh then ran towards
the nearby police station[31] located at the corner of Congressional Ave. and
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA).[32] Upon nearing the police station. The witness looked
back towards his nephew. He saw the victim running away from his attackers and
towards the police station.[33] However, after running for about forty (40) to fifty
(50) yards, the victim fell down.[34] The victim was only five (5) to ten (10) yards away
from the station when he collapsed.[35] When the lone police officer at the outpost stepped
out to investigate, the commotion was all over and the victim was already lying
unconscious on the ground.[36] Surjit Singh boarded his nephew on a passing jeepney
and brought him to the emergency room of the Quezon City General Hospital.[37] Unfortunately, the victim died a few hours later due
to the gravity of his wounds.[38] In the afternoon of 6 October 1993, the witness went
to the police station to report the death of the victim.[39] While in the station, he saw that Geguira was
already apprehended by the police.[40] He then executed a statement before the police.
Thereafter, he went to the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office where he had the
statement sworn to.[41]
The second and last witness for the
prosecution was Dr. Ludovino Lagat, a medico-legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation.[42] He testified that he autopsied the cadaver of the
victim on 6 October 1993 at around 2:30 p.m. at Rey's Funeral Parlor.[43] He noted that the victim suffered two fatal stab
wounds[44] on the left portion of the chest, both of which
punctured the heart.[45] The entry point of one of the stab wounds measured
2.0 centimeters while the other measured 2.5 centimeters. He also noted that
the victim had an incise wound on his left wrist.[46] In this regard, he issued an autopsy report which
reads:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Pallor,
generalized.
Incision, 17.0
cms., anterior chest wall, left side, transverse; 2.0 cms., anterior axillary
line, 2.0 cms., left wrist, lateral.
STAB WOUND:
1. 2.0 cms.,
clean-cut edges, with a blunt superior and sharp inferior extremities, almost
horizontally oriented, located at the anterior chest wall, left side, 7.0 cms.,
from the anterior median line, directed backwards, upwards and laterally,
involving the soft tissues, cutting the cartilage of the 4th rib, and entering
the left thoracic cavity, perforating the pericardial sac and then to apex of
the heart, with a depth of 12.0 cms.
2. 2.5 cms.,
clean-cut edges, elliptical, with a blunt superior and sharp inferior
extremities, almost horizontally oriented, located at the anterior chest wall,
left side, 15.0 cms., from the anterior median line, directed backwards,
upwards and medially, involving the soft tissues, then entering the left
thoracic cavity, then perforating the left ventricle of the heart, with a depth
of 11.5 cms.
Visceral organs
pale
Stomach, 1/2
amount of liquid.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
STAB WOUNDS, CHEST.[47]
Based on the above findings, he concluded
that the assailant stood in front of the victim, at an arm's length distance,
when the stabs were delivered.[48] He also stated that the assailant used a sharp
bladed weapon on the victim.[49] However, he clarified that there might have been two
bladed weapons since the stab wounds measured differently in width.[50] He also stated that the first stab wound may have
already been sufficient to kill the victim thereby rendering the second stab
wound unnecessary.[51] With regard to the incise wound on the victim's left
wrist, he said that it might have been caused by the victim's attempt to parry
the thrusts of the assailant.[52] When questioned with regard to Surjit Singh's claim
that the victim was hit on the forehead with a bottle, he said that there was
no finding of any wound in the victim's forehead.[53]
After the prosecution rested its case, the
defense presented Rolando del Rosario as its first witness. He testified that
he lives at No. 50 Abra St., Bago-Bantay, Quezon City and works as an umbrella
repairman.[54] On 5 October 1993, between five and six o'
clock in the afternoon, he was near the scene of the crime since he was on his
way home.[55] However, he later on corrected himself and said that
he was on his way home at around 4:30 p.m.[56] While walking towards his home in Abra St., he
noticed, from a distance of 30 meters,[57] a commotion going on in the said street.[58] He then crossed Congressional Ave. and noticed an
Indian national, whom he later on identified as Surjit Singh, hurrying to cross
the said avenue.[59] He was familiar with the face of Surjit Singh since
he had seen him before in Abra St. collecting from the said Indian's clients.[60] After crossing Congressional Ave., Surjit Singh then
went to the aid of another Indian national who was already bloodied and
unconscious.[61] He followed Surjit Singh and was only an arm's
length away while the latter was assisting his fellow Indian.[62] Surjit Singh then ran towards the nearby police
station to seek help.[63] Thereafter, Surjit Singh carried the unconscious
Indian national towards a jeep.[64] On cross-examination, he admitted that one of the
accused-appellants, Cariño, was his neighbor whom he has known for a long time.[65] He also admitted that the mother of Carino went to
him and requested that he testify in behalf of her son.[66]
The defense then presented Asteria Cariño as
its second witness. She testified that she is the mother of accused-appellant
Cariño, lives in 54-C Abra St., Bago-Bantay, Quezon City and makes a living out
of repairing umbrellas.[67] On 5
October 1993, she was in their house together with her son.[68] She was
then washing umbrellas while her son slept for the most part of the day.[69] She noticed that her son slept in the morning, woke
up at lunch, slept again after taking the said meal and woke up in the evening
to watch television.[70] From October 5 to October 6, her son, who makes a
living from selling cigarettes at the corner of Project 7 and Corregidor St.,
did not and could not leave their house since it was raining hard for two (2)
consecutive days.[71] Her son only left their house on 7 October 1993 to watch
a movie when the heavy rains had already stopped.[72] To buttress her claim that it was raining hard from
5 to 6 October, she obtained a certification to this effect from the Philippine
Atmospheric Geophysical Astronomic Services Administration (PAGASA).[73] The authenticity of the PAGASA report was stipulated
upon by the counsels of both parties.[74] She only learned that her son had a criminal case
when she was informed that he was arrested on 7 October 1993.[75]
The third witness for the defense was Monica
Figuerroa. She testified that she is a neighbor of Cariño[76] and that she resides in No. 52 Abra Street,
Bago-Bantay, Quezon City.[77] On 5 October 1993, between four and five in the
afternoon, she was at the corner of Congressional Ave. and Abra St. selling
umbrellas.[78] While going about her business, she noticed that on
the opposite side of the street, less than 30 meters away from where she was,
someone was stabbed.[79] She saw only one person stab the victim and the said
assailant ran away and passed in front of her.[80] She characterized the person who was stabbed as an Indian
national.[81] When asked if the person who stabbed the victim was
any one among the accused, she answered in the negative.[82] After being stabbed, the victim ran towards the
police station nearby but he was unable to reach the same because he already
fell to the ground.[83] She then approached the fallen victim to join the
other onlookers.[84] Another Indian national then came along, hailed a
jeep and boarded the victim into the said vehicle.[85] The following day, she went to the house of the
Cariño's to relate to Asteria Cariño what she witnessed.[86] She noted that during her visit, accused-appellant
Cariño was in their house.[87] Upon being prodded on when she learned that she was
going to testify for the defense, she said that she was only informed of this
matter a few days prior to the scheduled hearing. She explained that prior to
her testimony, she was never requested by the mother of Cariño to testify in
her son's behalf.[88] However, during the latter part of her testimony,
she contradicted what she said and stated that she had been previously
requested by the Cariño's to testify but she initially refused since she was
afraid to do the same.[89]
The fourth witness for the defense was
accused-appellant Cariño. He testified that, prior to his detention, he used to
be a cigarette vendor plying his trade in that portion of EDSA near Project 7.[90] On 5 October 1993, he stayed in their
house for the whole day and did not sell cigarettes because there was a storm.[91] On the said day, he slept after taking his lunch and
was awakened by his brother at around 6:30 p.m.[92] The following day, 6 October 1993, he still
stayed at home since the storm was still raging.[93] He only left their house on 7 October to watch a
movie since the weather had already cleared.[94] While watching a movie in the theater of ShoeMart
West Ave., he was arrested by the police and informed that he was being accused
of killing an Indian national.[95] He was then brought to the Baler Police Station
where he was detained.[96] He stated that he does not know Parminder Singh and
that it was only while in detention that he first saw Surjit Singh.[97] Upon being asked with regard to the distance of his
house to the scene of the crime, he estimated the same to be less than a
kilometer.[98]
The fifth witness for the defense was Aurora
Prudencio, a fruit vendor who resides at Project 8, Quezon City.[99] She personally knows accused-appellant Cariño, whom
she calls John-john, while she only knows the other accused-appellants by face.[100] On 5 October 1993, she was selling fruits in front
of the bowling center which is located near the scene of the crime.[101] It was then raining very hard and the streets were
flooded.[102] In the afternoon of the said day, she witnessed the
stabbing of the victim.[103] She recounted that prior to the said incident, two
(2) Indian nationals arrived on board a motorcycle and stopped at the corner of
Congressional Ave. and Abra St.[104] She recognized one of the Indian nationals, Surjit
Singh, since he frequently went to the said place collecting payments from his
clients.[105] After the two Indian nationals dismounted from their
motorcycle, a commotion occurred and one of the Indians was stabbed.[106] When asked if the assailant was present in the
courtroom, she responded in the negative.[107]
The sixth witness for the defense was
accused-appellant Geguira. He testified that prior to his arrest, he sold
pineapples for a living at the corner of Abra St.[108] On 6 October 1993, he was arrested by the police in
his house at No. 3. Abra St., Bago Bantay, Quezon City.[109] He was then brought to the Munoz Police Station
where he was shown a list of names and asked if he knew any of those listed
therein.[110] He said he did not.[111] Thereafter, he was brought to the Baler Police
Station where he was then shown pictures of persons sought by the police.[112] He was asked if he knew any of them and, again, he
responded in the negative.[113] He was then told that he was being made accountable
for a killing incident and he was persuaded to stay in the precinct's prison
cell[114] where twelve other inmates were detained.[115] Surjit Singh then arrived and was led by the police
towards the detention cell.[116] Surjit Singh pointed towards five other inmates
inside the detention cell.[117] Thereafter, the police officer engaged Surjit Singh
in a conversation.[118] After their conversation, Surjit Singh then pointed
towards him, thereby implicating him as a suspect in the killing of Parminder
Singh.
The last and final witness for the defense
was accused-appellant Peñaflor. He testified that he was a construction helper
who worked in various projects.[119] During the months of September and October 1993, he
worked in a project in Malolos, Bulacan.[120] Thereafter in November, he worked in another project
in Marikina.[121] In February of 1994, he then worked in a project in
Project 6, Quezon City.[122] On 10 March 1994, he was arrested by the police in
his house in San Jose St., Project 8, Quezon City.[123] He was told by the police that he was going to be
brought to the precinct for an investigation with regard to a robbery that occurred
in their area on the same day.[124] Three days after his arrest, Surjit Singh arrived in
the precinct.[125] He was then instructed to stand and approach the
cell bars.[126] Thereafter, Surjit Singh and the police officer
left.[127] When asked if he knew his co-accused, he answered
no.[128]
In its Decision, dated 30 May 1997, the
trial court ruled out the existence of evident premeditation but appreciated
the qualifying circumstance of treachery and convicted the three
accused-appellants of the crime of murder. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the
Court hereby finds the accused Juanito Cariño y Naldoza, Christopher Geguira y
Obia and Ricardo Peñaflor y Sevellina all guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, as
principals of the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 148 of the
Revised Penal Code; there being no aggravating circumstances, nor mitigating
circumstance attendant thereto, hereby sentences each of the said accused to a
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with the accessories provided for by the law. The
three (3) accused are also directed to indemnity (sic) the heirs of [P]arminder
Singh in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, with each of them
paying one third (1/3) of the said sum to the heirs concerned.
SO ORDERED.[129]
Hence, the present appeal where
accused-appellants assign the lone error, namely, that the trial court erred in
convicting them of murder despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[130]
Accused-appellants argue that in convicting
them, the trial court relied primarily on the testimony of Surjit Singh which
was allegedly riddled with contradictions and inaccuracies; hence, their guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the said witness' testimony was
riddled with contradictions and inaccuracies.[131]
Accused-appellants point out that the first
time Surjit Singh took the witness stand on 5 April 1994, he said that the
victim actually partook of the drinks offered, that there were two persons who
wielded knives and that accused-appellants Cariño and Peñaflor stabbed the
victim. However, the succeeding times he took the witness stand, he changed his
testimony and stated that the victim did not accept the drink, that only one
person wielded a knife and that only Cariño stabbed the victim.
We do not agree. The flaws in Surjit Singh's
testimony are easily explained by the fact that the said witness primarily
spoke Hindi and knows very little Filipino and English. The contradictions in
his testimony are mostly with regard to the statements he made the first time
he took the witness stand and those made on the second, third and fourth times
he took the witness stand. As previously mentioned, the interpreter of the
trial court during the first time Surjit Singh testified was not competent
since the said interpreter is only a high school graduate and does not have a
good grasp of the English language. The parties and the court noticed that his
translations into English of what the witness said in Hindi were inaccurate.
However, on the second, third and fourth times that Surjit Singh testified, the
interpreter was already changed to one who is knowledgeable in the English
language. As pointed out by the Solicitor General:
The discrepancies
can readily be explained. It must be remembered that Surjit Singh as an Indian
national who spoke very little English. In fact, his testimony had to be
interpreted into English from its original Hindi. During the course of Surjit's
testimony on April 5, 1994, the parties and the court noticed that Nirmal Singh,
the interpreter, was not accurately translating the same. The defense counsel
objected to the translation being made by Nirmal Singh pointing out the fact
that he could hardly decipher what the interpreter had been saying "for
almost an hour." The parties thus agreed to discontinue the hearing until
such time that an official interpreter from the Indian embassy could be
produced.[132]
In fact, the interpretation of Nirmal Singh
was so unreliable that the prosecution had to repeat most of the questions
propounded to Surjit Singh all over again the second time he took the witness
stand.
Accused-appellants also call our attention
to the fact that the testimony of Surjit Singh contradicted the autopsy report
of another witness, Dr. Ludovino Lagat, the medico-legal officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation. They assert that Surjit Singh's testimony is
not credible because the second time he took the witness stand, he said that
Peñaflor hit the victim with a bottle in the forehead but, later on, he
recanted and said that it was actually Geguira who hit the victim. These
contradictions, according to accused-appellants, are worsened by the fact that
the autopsy report does not mention that the victim had bruises or contusions
on the forehead.
We are not persuaded. That either Peñaflor
or Geguira took hold of a bottle and struck the victim with it is not difficult
to believe. The overpowering fright instilled in the witness' mind by the
startling events must have affected his ability to observe what he saw in minutest
details. Whether it was one or the other who struck the victim with a bottle
does not affect the witness' credibility. It is also possible that the mark of
the bottle on the victim's head was not discernible or the blow could have hit
another part of the victim's body but the witness mistakenly thought that the
impact was on the head. The inconsistencies pointed out by accused-appellants
refer only to minor details which cannot affect the credibility of the witness
and the reliability of his other statements. In the case of People vs.
Resagaya,[133] we said:
That there are
inconsistencies, even improbabilities, in the testimony of a witness,
especially on minor details or collateral matters is a common phenomenon. That
the accounts of witnesses regarding the same occurrence are contradictory on
certain details is not unusual. There is no perfect or omniscient witness
because there is no person with perfect faculties or senses. An adroit
cross-examiner may trap a witness into making statements contradicting his
testimony on direct examination. By intensive cross-examination on points not
anticipated by a witness and his lawyer, a witness may be inveigled into making
statements that do not dovetail with the testimonies of other witnesses on the
same points.
Yet, if it appears
that the witness has not willfully perverted the truth, as may be gleaned from
the tenor of his testimony and as concluded by the trial judge from his
demeanor and behavior on the witness stand, his credibility on material points
may be accepted.
"If witnesses
should agree as to every detail of a transaction which occupied a considerable
space of time, and should undertake to tell all that occurred in precisely the
same order, each giving the same incidents as the others in precisely the same
words, that fact would be of itself a suspicious circumstance" (Rumsey,
J., Matter of Seagrist, 1 N. Y. App. Div., 615, 617, 37 N. Y. Supp. 496, 497,
cited in 6 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 141).[134]
Accused-appellants also make much of the
alleged inconsistencies between the statements made by Surjit Singh in his
affidavit before the police and those he made while he was on the witness
stand. They contend that while Surjit Singh stated before the police that
Peñaflor was the one who drew a knife, he testified in court that it was Cariño
who did it. Again, this inconsistency can easily be explained by Surjit Singh's
inability to communicate his statements properly due to language barrier.
Moreover, affidavits are not entirely reliable evidence in court due to the
inaccuracies that may have occurred in the formulation of the same.[135] In the Resagaya case,[136] we extensively discussed why affidavits are not that
dependable:
Much importance
cannot be attached to that discrepancy because, as has been truthfully
observed, the infirmity of affidavit evidence is a matter of judicial
experience. Since, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant
himself, but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's
statements, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent
particularly under the circumstances of hurry and impatience. (People vs.
Mariquina, 84 Phil. 39, 42).
An affidavit,
"being taken ex parte, is almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion, and sometimes from want of
suggestion and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to
recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of
the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all
that belongs to the subject." (People vs. Alcantara, L-26867, June 30,
1970, 33 SCRA 812, 820).
"We have too
much experience of the great infirmity of affidavit evidence. When the witness
is illiterate and ignorant, the language presented to the court is not his; it
is, and must be, the language of the person who prepares the affidavit; and it
may be, and too often is, the expression of that person's erroneous inference
as to the meaning of the language used by the witness himself; and however
carefully the affidavit may be read over to the witness, he may not understand
what is said in language so different from that which he is accustomed to use.
Having expressed his meaning in his own language, and finding it translated by
a person on whom he relies, into language not his own, and which he does not
perfectly understand, he is too apt to acquiesce; and testimony not intended by
him is brought before the court as his." (2 Moore on Facts, sec. 952, p. 1105;
People vs. Timbang, 74 Phil. 295, 299).[137]
Accused-appellants also contend that Surjit
Singh's testimony that there were five (5) to six (6) persons drinking outside
the store cannot be true since there was a storm on that day as shown by the
certification of PAGASA. Suffice it to state that, even assuming arguendo that
there was indeed a heavy downpour on that day, the bad weather condition did
not necessarily negate the possibility that persons were having a drink outside
the store as the rain at that particular time could have stopped. Simply put,
this line of argument is non sequitur. Moreover, even the defense's own
witness, Aurora Prudencio, testified that there were people drinking in the
store when the commotion occurred.[138]
We now come to accused-appellants' defense
of alibi. Cariño claims that he could not have possibly killed Parminder Singh
since he stayed in their house and did not leave the same from 5 October until
6 October 1993. He explains that bad weather prevented him from leaving their house
for two consecutive days. On the other hand, Peñaflor asserts that he was in
Malolos, Bulacan working as a construction helper at that time the incident
took place. He further avers that his inclusion in the information was due to
the fact that he was mistakenly identified by Surjit Singh upon instigation of
a police officer in the precinct where he was detained.
Time and again, the Court has declared that
alibi is an inherently weak defense.[139] Unless an accused can prove that he was in another
place where it would be physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time it was committed, the positive identification made by
a witness will prevail over his defense of alibi.[140] In the present case, it was not physically
impossible for accused-appellants to be at the scene of the crime. With regard
to Cariño, his house is only less than a kilometer away from the scene of the
crime. On the other hand, Geguira did not show adequate proof, except for his
own testimony, that he was indeed in Malolos, Bulacan at the time the incident
took place. Moreover, it is not physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. The said area is
relatively near the North Luzon Expressway which is the route taken by those
coming from the central and northern Luzon provinces like Bulacan.
We cannot, likewise, give credence to
Geguira and Peñaflor's defense that they were mistakenly identified by Surjit
Singh. He was only an arm's length from where his nephew was assaulted. Geguira
and Peñaflor have not shown any improper motive on the part of Surjit Singh to
lie and impute to them such a grave felony, unless the same really took place.
By lying, he would only allow the real malefactor who killed his nephew to go
scot-free Human experience tells us that a person, in the absence of a showing
of any ill-motive, would not impute a grave crime upon another unless the same
is true.[141] In the
case of People vs.
Antud,[142] we said:
The Court finds no
reason to depart from the foregoing rule. Appellant was positively identified
by eyewitnesses who were just at arm's length from the victim. No dubious or
evil motive whatsoever has been proved which would cause or impel them to
falsely testify against appellant. It is much a matter of judicial acceptance
that witnesses would not falsely impute to an accused a serious criminal
offense if it is not the untarnished truth.[143]
Also, as testified upon by Surjit Singh and
corroborated by defense witnesses Rolando del Rosario and Aurora Prudencio,
Surjit Singh was a frequent visitor in the area where the crime was committed.
As such, the declaration of Surjit Singh that he had frequently seen
accused-appellants drinking in the same store prior to the incident is
believable. All these circumstances negate the possibility that Geguira and
Peñaflor were mistakenly identified by the eyewitness.
The testimony of Surjit Singh, standing
alone, clearly point to accused-appellants' guilt. The testimonies of the
defense witnesses were not able to overcome the positive identification of
accused-appellants by Surjit Singh. On the other hand, the credibility of the
witnesses for the defense is highly questionable. They are biased and not
disinterested witnesses. Rolando del Rosario and Monica Figuerroa are neighbors
of Cariño and Peñaflor. Asteria Cariño is the mother of Christopher Cariño.
Aurora Prudencio personally knows Cariño and lives in the same area as Geguira
in Prject 8, Quezon City.
With regard to the allegation of conspiracy,
this is established by the evidence on record. Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.[144] The existence of conspiracy does not require that an
appreciable length of time elapse from the moment that there has been an
agreement up to the time of the actual occurrence.[145] It exists if, at the time of the commission of the
felony, the accused were of the same purpose and united in its execution.[146] Direct proof of the previous agreement of the
accused to commit the crime is not necessary.[147] Proof of the conspiracy may be inferred from the
proven conduct of the accused, at the time of the commission of the felony,
disclosing a common understanding among them for the perpetration of the
offense.[148]
In the present case, the testimony of the
prosecution's sole eyewitness, Surjit Singh, clearly established that
conspiracy existed among accused-appellants in the commission of the offense.
Accused-appellants' coordinated manner of attacking the victim shows their
common purpose and interest in executing their unlawful objective. The act of
Geguira and Peñaflor in holding the victim's hands while Cariño stabbed their
prey with his bladed weapon proves the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy
having been established, the act of one is the act of all.
Finally, as their last stance,
accused-appellants contend that, assuming arguendo, there is enough
evidence to hold them accountable for the death of Parminder Singh, the trial
court still erred in convicting them of the crime of murder since treachery
cannot be appreciated against them. Accused-appellants contend that, as shown
by the evidence, the means of killing the victim was not deliberately adopted;[149] the victim was forewarned by Surjit Singh of the
possibility of an impending attack; and, more importantly, the victim was able
to put up a defense.[150]
We agree. A thorough evaluation of the
evidence on record reveals that treachery was not present in the killing of the
victim. This conclusion is also shared by the OSG. In this regard the OSG aptly
observed:
Treachery exists
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the (sic) person[s],
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. To appreciate treachery, two
conditions must be present, to wit: (1) the employment of means of execution
that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate;
and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
While the attack
may have been sudden, there is no showing that the means of execution was
consciously adopted as the stabbing appears to have been done at the spur of
the moment. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous.
"To establish
treachery, the evidence must show that the accused made some preparation to
kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to
make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself."
Evidence shows
that the meeting between the appellant and the victim was casual and the attack
done impulsively. Appellants initially accosted the victim and his uncle to get
them to join them in their drinking spree. Perhaps rebuffed and insulted,
appellant Cariño pulled out a knife. Seeing this, the victim who was standing
behind his uncle, pushed the latter behind him and faced the appellants. The
victim was thus forewarned of the impending attack and chose to protect his
uncle by putting himself between appellant and his uncle instead of retreating
to save himself.
"There is no
treachery where the victim was forewarned of the grave danger that existed and
he was afforded a chance to involve himself in the peril yet, instead of
retreating, chose to come to the aid of his brother without any weapon to
defend himself."
Moreover, the
presence of a wound on the victim's left wrist shows that the victim was able
to put up a defense, a circumstance negating treachery.[151]
The qualifying circumstance of treachery
having been ruled out in the commission of the felony, the crime for
which accused-appellants should be made accountable must be modified from
murder to homicide.
Based on our finding that homicide and not
murder was committed, the penalty imposed upon accused-appellants should
correspondingly be lowered to reclusion temporal. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty should be reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum term is anywhere within the range of prision mayor, or from 6
years and 1 day to twelve (12) years, and the maximum within the range of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, or from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17
years and 4 months.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision appealed
from is MODIFIED and accused-appellants are hereby found GUILTY of the crime of
HOMICIDE, and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor medium, as minimum and to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. The trial court's imposition of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
[1] Records, p. 1.
[2] Id., p. 17.
[3] Id., at p. 46.
[4] Id., at 51.
[5] Id., at 51.
[6] TSN dated 5 April 1994, p. 3.
[7] 5 April 1994, 29 June 1994 30 June 1994 and 30 August
1994.
[8] TSN dated 5 April 1994, pp. 25-30.
[9] TSN dated 29 June 1994, pp. 5-8.
[10] TSN dated 5 April 1994, p. 41.
[11] Id., at 42.
[12] TSN dated 29 June 1994, pp. 12, 42-43.
[13] Id., at 52.
[14] Id., at 43.
[15] Id., at 13.
[16] TSN dated 30 August 1994, p. 8.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Id., at 14.
[19] Id., at 15.
[20] Id.
[21] Id., at 15.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] Id., at 35.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] TSN dated 29 June 1994, pp. 17-18.
[28] TSN dated 30 August 1994, p. 15.
[29] Id., at 16.
[30] TSN dated 29 June 1994, pp. 17-18.
[31] TSN dated 30 August 1994, p. 18.
[32] Id., at 19.
[33] TSN dated 30 August 1994, p. 16.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Id., at 17.
[36] Id., at 24.
[37] TSN dated 29 June 1994, p. 20.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Id., at 20.
[40] Id.
[41] Id., at 22.
[42] TSN dated 25 October 1994, p. 6.
[43] Id., at 7, 9.
[44] Id., at 29.
[45] Id., at 12.
[46] Id.
[47] Exhibit "E."
[48] Id., at 13.
[49] Id.
[50] Id., at 30.
[51] Id., at 32-33.
[52] Id., at 26-27.
[53] Id., at 34-35.
[54] TSN dated 5 January 1995, p. 3.
[55] Id.
[56] Id., at 7-8.
[57] Id., at 14.
[58] Id., at 3.
[59] Id., at 4.
[60] Id.
[61] Id., at 5.
[62] Id.
[63] Id.
[64] Id., at 6.
[65] Id., at 7.
[66] Id., at 9.
[67] TSN dated 2 March 1995, pp. 4-5.
[68] Id., at 5.
[69] Id., at 6.
[70] Id., at 6-7.
[71] Id.. at 8, 11.
[72] Id., at 11.
[73] Id., at 16-18.
[74] Id., at 43-44.
[75] Id., at 12.
[76] TSN dated 8 February 1995, p. 8.
[77] Id., at 2.
[78] Id., at 3.
[79] Id., at 4.
[80] Id.
[81] Id., at 5.
[82] Id.
[83] Id., at 6.
[84] Id., at 25-26.
[85] Id., at 6-7.
[86] Id., at 26.
[87] Id., at 27.
[88] Id., at 8.
[89] Id., at 31.
[90] TSN dated 15 June 1995, p. 3.
[91] Id., at 8.
[92] Id.
[93] Id., at 9.
[94] Id., at 9-10.
[95] Id., at 4.
[96] Id., at 7.
[97] Id., at 21.
[98] Id., at 18-19.
[99] TSN dated 28 June 1995, p. 2.
[100] Id., at 5.
[101] Id., at 3.
[102] Id., at 10-11
[103] Id., at 3.
[104] Id., at 4.
[105] Id.
[106] Id.
[107] Id.
[108] TSN dated 29 June 1995, p. 3.
[109] Ibid
[110] Id., at 3-4.
[111] Id., at 4.
[112] Id.
[113] Id.
[114] Id., at 5.
[115] Id., at 6.
[116] Id., at 5-6.
[117] Id., at 6.
[118] Id., at 6-7.
[119] TSN dated 12 July 1995, p. 3.
[120] Id., at 6-7.
[121] Id., at 5.
[122] Id., at 4.
[123] Id., at 7.
[124] Id., at 17.
[125] Id., at 11.
[126] Id., at 11-12.
[127] Id., at 13.
[128] Id., at 14-15.
[129] Decision, Records, pp. 205-206.
[130] Brief for Accused Appellants, Rollo, p. 70.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Appellant’s Brief, Rollo, p. 117.
[133] 54 SCRA 350 (1973).
[134] Id., at 360.
[135] Naval vs. Panday, 275 SCRA 654, 686 (1997);
Salumpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764, 772 (1997).
[136] Supra.
[137] Id., at 358-359.
[138] TSN dated 28 June 1995, p. 12.
[139] People vs. Magbanua, G.R. No. 128888, 3
December 1999; People vs. Platilla, G.R. No. 126123, 9 March 1999.
[140] People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA 1995, 330-331
(1995); People vs. Corpuz, 240 SCRA 203, 210-211 (1995).
[141] People v. Serdan, 213 SCRA 329, 337 (1992).
[142] People vs. Antud, 215 SCRA 190 (1992).
[143] Id., at 198-199.
[144] Article VIII, 2nd Paragraph, REVISED PENAL CODE.
[145] People vs. Sequiño, 264 SCRA 79, 102 (1996).
[146] People vs. Galapin, 293 SCRA 474, 490 (1998);
People vs. Felix, 297 SCRA 12, 25 (1998).
[147] People vs. Tabag, 268 SCRA 115, 127 (1997).
[148] People vs. Villalonez, 298 SCRA 567, 582
(1998).
[149] Id., at 75.
[150] Id., at 73-77.
[151] Appellee’s Brief, Rollo, pp. 122-124.