FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130669. March 27, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON MITRA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Once again, a man’s bestiality is up for
judgment by the Court. The case at bar involves the traumatic experience of a
young girl robbed of her innocence by a man who admitted defeat in the face of
his lust. The appellant Wilson Mitra was convicted of the crime of rape
committed against the 14-year old provincial lass, Marites B. Eliang, and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 for moral damages and P50,000.00 for
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.[1] The Information charging the appellant of the said crime
reads:
Sppedsc
"That on or
about the 23rd day of May, 1996, in Barangay Bayaoas, municipality of
Urbiztondo, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force or intimidation,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with Marites B. Eliang against her will and consent, to her damage
and prejudice. Ca-lrsc
Contrary to
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code."[2]
When arraigned, the accused pleaded not
guilty of the crime charged.
The prosecution’s evidence shows that on May
23, 1996, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, Marites was cooking her family’s
supper in the kitchen of their house in Barangay Bayaoas, Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan.[3] Thereupon, the appellant knocked and borrowed a bolo
from her. Without fear nor hesitation as the appellant was her neighbor,
Marites told the appellant to just get the bolo at the back of the door.
Once in possession of the bolo, the appellant approached Marites, seized
her left wrist, pointed the bolo at her and threatened her not to shout
or else he would pierce her with the bolo.[4] Marites struggled to break free from the appellant’s
hold, but to no avail because the latter proved to be much stronger than her.[5] The appellant then forcibly brought Marites to their
bedroom where she was laid on a bed.[6] She continued to struggle, but was quelled by the appellant’s
reiteration of his threat that she would be pierced with the bolo if she
shouted.[7] The appellant then started kissing her on the lips
and embracing her.[8] Thereafter, the appellant removed her shirt, sando,
shorts, and panty, and likewise removed his shorts and brief.[9] He then straddled the victim and forced an
intercourse.[10] During the entire sexual assault, the appellant
pointed the bolo at Marites. He also covered Marites’ mouth with his
other hand to keep her from shouting.[11] Scc-alr
Having satisfied his lustful desires, the
appellant then ordered Marites to sit down and threatened her not to tell her
parents about the incident lest her whole family would be killed.[12] Marites then dressed herself up, and the appellant
also put on his clothes and left the Eliang residence. Calrs-pped
On June 26, 1996, approximately one month after
that fateful day in May, Marites mustered enough courage to tell her parents
about the May 23 incident because she learned that the appellant had already
left for Manila the previous day.[13] On June 27, 1996, Marites’ father, Manuel Eliang,
accompanied her to the Urbiztondo Police Station to report the rape incident.[14] The report was entered in the police blotter[15] by one SPO1 Teofilo Garcia. Thereafter, SPO1 Garcia
along with another police officer accompanied Marites and her father to the San
Carlos General Hospital in Pangasinan[16] where one Dr. Araceli Callao examined Marites and
subsequently issued a medical certificate dated June 27, 1996 with the
following findings: Sce-dp
"PERINEUM: No
sign of external injuries noted
HYMEN: With old
incomplete lacerations at 5, 6, & 8 o’clock positions
VAGINA: Admits 1
finger with ease
CERVIX: Soft,
close"[17]
Dr. Callao testified that the above findings
indicate that the victim may have experienced sexual intercourse at least a
month previous to the examination.[18]
After being physically examined, Marites
went back to the Urbiztondo Police Station and gave a sworn statement narrating
the incident of May 23, 1996.[19] Thereafter, on July 10, 1996, Marites filed a
criminal complaint against the appellant.[20]
The defense had a different story to tell.
The appellant testified that on May 23, 1996, from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., he
was in his house which was then under construction. He was with a carpenter
named Eddie, a certain Mama Pering, his wife, and his grandmother.[21] On that day, he also went back home to his
parents-in-law’s house where he was then staying and which was located next to
the Eliang residence.[22] The house of the appellant’s parents-in-law stood
between appellant’s house which was then being constructed and the Eliang residence.[23]
The appellant also testified that he had
known Marites for eight years and had treated her like a younger sister.[24] Marites, however, was very sweet to him and even
wrote to him a letter in June 1996 and also told him in person that she had
special feelings for him.[25] He returned the letter to Marites for fear that it
might cause a quarrel between his wife and himself.[26] Thereafter, he saw and even talked to Marites almost
everyday because she would watch television at the house of the appellant’s parents-in-law
where the appellant was staying. In one of their conversations, appellant told
Marites to treat him like an older brother.[27] Nonetheless, he claims that Marites remained sweet to
him, until one day, she cried professing her unrelenting love for him.[28] The appellant then tried to avoid Marites, but she
pursued him. Finally, on June 23, 1996, he told her that he and his family were
moving to Manila. The appellant’s family then stayed in Manila until the
appellant was offered a driving job in Batangas.[29] On August 16, 1996, the appellant learned of the
instant case when he was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued on
August 6, 1996.[30]
To corroborate the appellant’s story, the
defense presented 10-year old Corazon Lomboy, appellant’s niece-in-law who
lived with appellant in the house of his parents-in-law. Corazon testified that
Marites was a flirt.[31] She cited one instance when she saw Marites putting camote
into the mouth of the appellant[32] and another instance when Marites followed the appellant
inside the bathroom.[33] She also testified that Marites asked her to give
appellant her (Marites’) letter to him which said "I love you" at the
bottom.[34] Consistent with the testimony of the appellant,
Corazon further testified that Marites would watch television in the house of
appellant’s parents-in-law because there was no television and electricity in
Marites’ house.[35] Virginia Olieca, an employee of the sole electric
company supplying electricity to Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, confirmed that Manuel
Eliang, the father of Marites, was not a subscriber of electricity.[36]
A certain Zaldy Ramos was also presented as
a witness by the defense. Claiming to be a photographer by profession, he took
photographs of the residence of the Eliang’s and noted that the distance from
their house to an artesian well, which the defense claimed to be a public well,[37] was only about ten (10) meters,[38] as opposed to the testimony of Marites that the
distance was about one hundred (100) meters.
The trial court sustained the prosecution’s
version of the rape incident. It found that the appellant intimidated Marites
with bodily injury using the bolo he borrowed from the latter and
sexually abused her in her house on May 23, 1996. It thus convicted the
appellant of the crime of rape and imposed upon him the penalty above-stated.
Hence, this appeal by the accused with the following assignment of errors: Ed-psc
"I. The trial
court erred in disregarding certain facts of substance and value which if
considered would affect the result of the case.
II. The trial
court erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the fact that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Ed-p
III. The trial
court erred in awarding exemplary and moral damages. "
The law applicable to the present case is
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, which states that:
"Art. 335. When
and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force
or intimidation; Mis-edp
x x x
The crime of rape
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime
of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon . . . the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death."
In reviewing the present case, the Court
adheres to the well-settled rule that the trial judge is best suited to assess
the probity and trustworthiness of witnesses because he has the opportunity to
observe directly their behavior and manner of testifying.[39] As eloquently stated by the Court in People v.
Agbayani:[40]
"The trial
judge is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, since he
personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying.[41] He had before him the essential aids to determine
whether a witness was telling the truth or lying. Truth does not always stalk
boldly forth naked; she often hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the
mind’s eye of the judge who tried the case. To him appears the furtive glance,
the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or flippant or
sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack
of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage
and mien." Mis-oedp
In the first assignment of error, in
relation to the second one, the defense attempts to place the present case
under the mantle of the exception to the above doctrine. That is, the rule does
not apply when the trial court has plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.[42]
Among the substantial facts claimed by the
defense to have been overlooked by the trial court was the lack of tenacious
resistance on the part of the complaining witness during the entire sexual
assault. In the absence of such resistance, the appellant suggests that no rape
can be inferred.[43] This claim, however, is not borne out by the records
of the case. In fact, several parts of Marites’ testimony manifest that she
persistently offered resistance but was quelled by the strength and threats of
the appellant. She testified to wit: Ed-pm-is
"Q. When he
lay (sic) you on the bed, what did you do?
A. I was
struggling to be freed but he was stronger than me, and aside from that he told
me that if I will shout he will prick me with the bolo, sir. He was pointing to
me the bolo sir.[44]
x x x
Q. While doing
that act to you, what did you do?
A. I was
struggling but he was stronger than me sir, and his other hand was covering my mouth
while the other hand was holding the bolo pointed at me, sir.[45]
x x x
Q. And so it is
not true Madam Witness that you struggled? Jjs-c
A. I struggled
hard and in the process of my struggle, he again threatened me that if I
continue to do so he would going to (sic) stab me with the bolo he was holding
and so out of fear I lost my strength."[46]
Besides, even assuming arguendo that
the defense is correct that Marites did not show resistance towards her
molester, it is well-settled that "physical resistance need not be
established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the
latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s advances because of
fear for her life and personal safety."[47] It is sufficient that the intimidation produces fear
in the mind of the victim that if she did not submit to the bestial demands of
the accused, something far worse would befall her at the time she was being
molested. As pronounced by the Court, "(i)f resistance would nevertheless
be futile because of intimidation, then offering none at all does not mean
consent to the assault so as to make the victim’s submission to the sexual act
voluntary."[48] In several rape cases, the Court has held that
threatening the victim with bodily injury while holding a knife or a bolo
constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring a woman to submission to the
lustful desires of the molester.[49] The appellant’s threat of bodily injury to Marites
while holding the bolo he borrowed from her sufficed to intimidate
Marites into submission to appellant’s bestial act. As a corollary, it is not
necessary for a finding of rape that the victim should have marks of physical
violence on her body[50] as in the present case.[51] Likewise, contrary to the appellant’s insinuation, it
is not beyond the realm of possibilities that the appellant was holding the bolo
during the entire sexual congress, similar to the finding of the Court in
the recently decided case of People of the Philippines v. Flores, G.R.
No. 123599, December 13, 1999. Sc-jj
To bolster its claim that Marites was not
raped because the prosecution failed to show Marites’ resistance towards her
molester, the defense would have the Court believe that Marites was a flirt and
that it was in fact Marites who had amorous intentions towards the appellant.
This claim, however, does not lend support to the theory of the defense and
deserves minimal attention because even if such flirtatiousness were pushed to
the extreme, the Court has not just once held that even prostitutes can be
victims of rape.[52] Besides, if the defense’s purpose for this claim is
to suggest consent on Marites’ part, this position is incongruent with and does
not strengthen the appellant’s defense of alibi. S-jcj
The defense also observed that the testimony
of Marites was fraught with inconsistencies. For instance, during the
preliminary investigation, Marites stated that the appellant stopped inserting
his penis into her vagina when he noticed that her parents were about to
arrive; while on cross-examination, she testified that she did not know why the
appellant stopped his despicable act.[53] Another inconsistency pointed out by the defense is
that in Marites’ sworn statement dated June 27, 1996,[54] she narrated that the appellant carried her into the
bedroom; while on cross-examination, she testified that the appellant dragged
her into the bedroom.[55] Such minor inconsistencies do not impair Marites’
credibility. It is settled that minor discrepancies do not damage the essential
integrity of the evidence in its material whole nor reflect adversely on the
witnesses’ credibility.[56] In fact, they may even strengthen their credibility.[57] Considering that Marites’ experience was harrowing,
it is understandable that she would not remember its minor details for
precisely, no woman would wish to retain in her memory file such tragedy which
had befallen her. Thus, the Court has held that victims of rape hardly remember
the dates, number of times and manner they were violated.[58]
The defense’s effort to undermine Marites’
credibility by pointing out the one month delay in reporting the sexual assault
upon her also proves futile in view of the justification provided by Marites.
She chose to suffer in silence and not to reveal her deplorable experience to a
single soul until one month after that fateful day in May for fear that the
appellant would carry out his threat to kill Marites’ whole family if she
reported the rape incident. By June 26, 1996, however, the appellant had left
for Manila. Believing that the appellant no longer posed a threat to her family,
Marites finally revealed her agonizing experience to her parents and reported
it to the police authorities. In a number of cases, the Court has held that
delay or vacillation in filing criminal charges does not necessarily undermine
the credibility of witnesses if such delay is satisfactorily explained. Among
the reasons considered sufficient by the Court are fear of reprisal, social
humiliation, familial considerations and economic reasons. The Court declared
that it was understandable that a fourteen-year old rape victim, similar to
Marites, would be cowed into silence as the accused warned her that she would
be killed if she divulged the incident to anybody.[59]
The appellant likewise makes much of the
fact that a public artesian well was located near the Eliang residence, thus
making it highly improbable that the rape was perpetrated in said house which
was within hearing and seeing distance from the well.[60] This argument of the appellant deserves scant
consideration for the Court has repeatedly held that lust respects no time and
place. In People v. Agbayani, the Court stated that, "(t)he evil in
man has no conscience. The beast in him bears no respect for time and place; it
drives him to commit rape anywhere -- even in places where people congregate
such as in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, and inside a
house where there are other occupants."[61] Rape does not necessarily have to be committed in an
isolated place[62] and can in fact be committed in places which to many
would appear to be unlikely and high-risk venues for sexual advances.[63]
As demonstrated above, the facts which
appellant claims to have been overlooked by the trial court are not of such
substance and value as to affect the outcome of the case. Therefore, the Court
finds no reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the findings of the
trial court with respect to the credibility of the witness deserve great
weight. It is quite significant that the trial court noted that during her
testimony, Marites could not immediately answer some questions propounded to
her because she was crying and sobbing in between her answers. It was only
after she had regained her composure that she would continue with her
testimony.[64] The following are some parts of her testimony which
are apropos:
Supr-eme
"Q. You also
said that you struggled but you were overpowered, now my question is, did he
hold both of your hands that is why you were Overpowered?
A. No madam, he
only hold (sic) one of my hand (sic) but I was cowed by fear because of his
threat that he is (sic) going to kill me and that is (sic) enough to overpower
me.
Q. So you did not
infact (sic) struggle because you were so scared that he might kill you?
A. (The witness is
in tears.)[65]
x x xCo-urt
Q. You also said
Madam Witness, that when you were already inside the room, accused tried to
kiss you, now, where did he kiss you?
A. My lips, madam.
Q. How long?
PROS. QUINIT
We want to put
again on record, your Honor, that the witness is again crying on that bad
experience she had. Since the time a question was asked when she was brought to
the room up to this point, witness has been continuously crying because of the
traumatic experience she had with this incident, your Honor.[66]
x x x
Q. It was Wilson
Mitra who undressed you? Jle-xj
A. Yes madam,
because he forced to undress me, (and at this juncture the witness is again
crying)"[67]
It is a matter of judicial cognizance that
the crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of
the rape charge.[68] Furthermore, the trial court also noted that Marites
"stuck to his (sic) testimony inspite (sic) of the exhaustive and
intelligent cross-examination made by the defense counsel."[69]
Again, the Court takes judicial notice of
the fact that it is highly inconceivable that a young barrio lass, such as the
herein complaining witness, Marites Eliang, "would fabricate a charge of
defloration, allow a medical examination of her private parts, subject herself
to public trial, and tarnish her family’s honor and reputation unless she was
motivated solely by a potent desire to seek justice for the wrong committed
against her."[70]
Anent the third assignment of error, the
Court has pronounced that aggravating circumstances not alleged in the
information may be proved during the trial and appreciated in imposing the
sentence. Evidence in support thereof merely forms part of the actual
commission of the crime and its appreciation by the courts does not constitute
a violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.[71] It is equally settled that an aggravating
circumstance justifies an award for exemplary damages under Art. 2230[72] of the Civil Code of the Philippines even in the
absence of an allegation of the aggravating circumstance in the information.[73] The trial court was therefore correct in awarding the
complaining witness exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in view of
the presence of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling[74] and use of a deadly weapon[75] in the commission of the crime. Lex-juris
While, moral damages was properly awarded,
we reduce it to P50,000.00 as dictated by recent jurisprudence.[76] The victim testified that she suffered pain and
public humiliation, loss of appetite and sleepless nights brought about by her
traumatic experience.[77] Indeed, even without proof in the pleadings to
support an award of moral damages, the Court has declared that in crimes of
rape, in addition to civil indemnity, moral damages may be awarded to the
victim.[78] It is quite apparent that the victim had to endure
much anguish and pain that it would be expecting too much for her to recite in
detail her traumatic experience merely to obtain pecuniary restitution. As
aptly stated by the Court, "a rape victim is a victim many times over. She
is physically, psychologically and emotionally scarred resulting in trauma
which may last a lifetime."[79]
With respect to the accused’s civil
liability ex delicto, the Court has outrightly awarded victims of rape
P50,000.00 as indemnity. Juri-smis
We give short shrift to appellant’s defense
of alibi. He claims that he could not have committed the odious act narrated by
Marites because at the time of the rape incident, he was in his house which was
then being constructed. The defense relied upon by the appellant simply cannot
stand in the face of the positive identification made by Marites. Time and
again, the Court has held that alibi is the weakest defense not only because of
its inherent weakness and unreliability, but also because it is easy to
fabricate. For it to prosper, it does not suffice to prove that the accused was
at another place when the crime was committed, but it must also be shown
that there was physical impossibility for the accused to have been at the scene
of the crime.[80] In general, this defense is rejected especially when
the complaining witness positively established the identity of the accused.[81]
In the instant case, although the appellant
claims to have been at another place at the time of the rape incident, he has
failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime. It is worth noting that the house under construction, where
appellant claims to have been at the time of the rape incident, was only twenty
meters away from the house of the Eliang’s.[82] The appellant also admitted that while he spent the
whole day of May 23, 1996 at his house under construction, he occasionally left
the construction site to run errands for the carpenters who were working on his
house.[83] He also testified that on that fateful day, he went
back home to the house of his parents-in-law which was right next to the Eliang
residence.[84] Under these circumstances, appellant has failed to
satisfy the proof required to establish the physical impossibility for him to
have been at the scene of the crime.
A last word. The imposition of the sentence
of reclusion perpetua upon the appellant does not only serve the desire
of the victim, Marites B. Eliang, to seek justice for the wrong committed
against her. It is likewise a reminder that man is endowed with reason and
temperance so that in the face of lust which chooses neither time nor place, he
will not act like a beast. This, the appellant has utterly failed to do, and
for this he must suffer the penalty meted out to him.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds the accused-appellant Wilson Mitra
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, attended by the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and use of a deadly weapon, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended party, Marites B. Eliang,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs. Jj-juris
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan,
Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 30.
[2] Rollo, p. 7.
[3] TSN, December 3, 1996, p. 3.
[4] Id., p. 5.
[5] Id., p. 6.
[6] Id., p. 7.
[7] TSN, January 21, 1997, p. 5.
[8] Original Records, p. 3; TSN, January 21, 1997, p. 8.
[9] Original Records, p. 3.
[10] TSN, December 3, 1996, p. 8.
[11] TSN, January 21, 1997, p. 5.
[12] TSN, December 3, 1996, p. 10.
[13] Original Records, p. 3.
[14] Id., p. 152.
[15] TSN, March 25, 1997, p. 4; Exhibit "D", Original
Records, p. 152.
[16] Original Records, p. 152.
[17] Exhibit "B", Original Records, p. 5.
[18] TSN, January 23, 1997, p. 9.
[19] Exhibit "A", Original Records, p.3.
[20] Original Records, p. 2.
[21] TSN, May 26, 1997, p. 9.
[22] Id., p. 9.
[23] Id., p. 39.
[24] Id., p. 10.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Id., p. 11.
[27] Id., p. 12.
[28] Id., p. 13.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Id., p. 14.
[31] TSN, April 8, 1997, p. 5.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Id., p. 6.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Id., p. 8.
[36] TSN, May 16, 1997, p. 20.
[37] TSN, May 26, 1997, p. 23.
[38] TSN, May 16, 1997, p. 19.
[39] People v. Quisay, G.R. No. 106833, December
10, 1999, citing People v. Peralta, 283 SCRA 81 (1997).
[40] 284 SCRA 315 (1998), citing People v.
Delovino, 317 Phil. 741, 753 (1995), citing Creamer v. Bivert, 214 MO
473, 474 (1908) as cited in M. FRANCES MCNAMARA, 2000 FAMOUS LEGAL QUOTATIONS
548 (1967).
[41] Id., citing People v. Conde, 322 Phil.
757, 766 (1996).
[42] People v. Quisay, supra, citing People v.
Dizon, G.R. No. 128889, August 20, 1999.
[43] Rollo, p. 60.
[44] TSN, December 3, 1996, p. 7.
[45] Id., p. 9.
[46] TSN, January 21, 1997, p. 5.
[47] People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998), citing
People v. Rabosa, 273 SCRA 142 (1997); People v. Quiamco, et
al., 268 SCRA 516 (1997); People v. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55
(1996).
[48] People v. Agbayani, supra, citing
People v. Grefiel, 215 SCRA 596, 608, 630 (1992); People v.
Matrimonio, 215 SCRA 613, 630 (1992); People v. Pamor, 237 SCRA 462, 472
(1994).
[49] People v. Reynaldo, 291 SCRA 701 (1998),
citing People v. Roll, 200 Phil. 665 (1982); People v. Espinoza,
317 Phil. 79 (1995) citing People v. Adlawan, Jr., 217 SCRA 489 (1993).
See also People v. Ulzoron, 286 SCRA 741 (1998), citing People v.
Bantisil, 249 SCRA 367, 377 (1995).
[50] People v. Ulzoron, supra, citing People
v. Soronio, 204 SCRA 741, 743 (1991), citing People v. Feliciano,
195 SCRA 19 (1991).
[51] TSN, January 23, 1997, p. 10.
[52] People v. Alfeche, et al., 294
SCRA 352 (1998), citing People v. Rivera, et. al. , 242 SCRA 26,
37 (1995); People v. Barera, 262 SCRA 63, 77 (1996).
[53] TSN, January 30, 1997, pp. 4-7.
[54] Exhibit "A", Original Records, p. 3.
[55] TSN, January 21, 1997, p. 2.
[56] People v. Sañez, G.R. No. 132512, December 15,
1999, citing People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994).
[57] People v. Carullo, 289 SCRA 481 (1998), citing
People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624 (1995).
[58] People v. Villamor, 297 SCRA 262 (1998),
citing People v. Zaballero, 274 SCRA 627 (1997).
[59] People v. Lusa, 288 SCRA 296 (1998), citing
People v. Fuensalida, G.R. No. 119963, November 6, 1997.
[60] Appellant’s Brief, p. 15; Original Records, p. 60.
[61] Supra at 45, citing People v. Aragona,
138 SCRA 569, 580 (1985); People v. Viray, 164 SCRA 135, 143 (1988);
People v. De los Reyes, 203 SCRA 707, 723 (1991).
[62] People v. Sumampong, 290 SCRA 471 (1998),
citing People v. Leoterio, 264 SCRA 608 (1996).
[63] People v. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 (1998),
citing People v. Quenevista, 244 SCRA 586 (1995); People v. Dado,
et al., 244 SCRA 655 (1995).
[64] TSN, January 21, 1997, pp. 4, 6, 9; January 14, 1997,
pp. 10, 21; January 30, 1997, pp. 5, 7-8, 12, 16.
[65] TSN, January 21, 1997, p. 4.
[66] Id., p. 6.
[67] Id., p. 9.
[68] People v. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559 (1998), citing
People v. Joya, et al., 227 SCRA 9 (1993).
[69] Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 27.
[70] People v. Dacoba, 289 SCRA 265 (1998), citing
People v. Esguerra, 256 SCRA 657 (1996). See also People v.
Taneo, 284 SCRA 251 (1998), citing People v. Dado, et al.,
supra; People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 (1993); People v.
Derpo, 168 SCRA 447 (1988); People v. Selfaison, et al., 1 SCRA
235 (1961).
[71] People v. Ramos, supra, citing People v.
Ang, et al., 139 SCRA 115 (1985).
[72] Art. 2230 of the Civil Code provides that, "(i)n
criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be
paid to the offended party."
[73] See People v. Chua, 297 SCRA 229
(1998), citing Art. 2230, Civil Code of the Philippines; People v.
Bergante, 286 SCRA 629 (1998); People v. Esguerra, 256 SCRA 659 (1996);
People v. Manero, Jr., 218 SCRA 85 (1993). See also People v.
Padlan, 290 SCRA 388 (1998) and People v. Daraman, 294 SCRA 27 (1998).
[74] Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code
provides in relevant part:
"Art. 14. Aggravating
circumstances. -- The following are aggravating circumstances:
x
x x
3. That the act be
committed . . in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not
given provocation."
[75] Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. 7659, provides in relevant part that, "(w)henever the crime of rape
is committed with the use of a deadly weapon . . . the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death."
[76] People v. Flores, G.R. No. 123599, December
13, 1999, citing People v. Bantilan, G.R. No. 129286, September 14,
1999.
[77] TSN, January 14, 1997, pp. 25-26.
[78] People v. Villamor, 297 SCRA 262 (1998),
citing People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998).
[79] People v. Villamor, supra.
[80] People v. Silvestre, 244 SCRA 479 (1995),
citing People v. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546 (1992); People v.
Martinado, 214 SCRA 712 (1992). See People v. Buka, 205 SCRA 557 (1992);
People v. Devaras, 205 SCRA 676 (1992); People v. Casinillo, 213
SCRA 777 (1992); People v. Florida, 214 SCRA 227 (1992).
[81] People v. Apostol, G.R. Nos. 123267-68,
December 9, 1999, citing People v. Roger Vaynaco, G.R. No. 126286, March
22, 1999.
[82] TSN, May 26, 1997, p. 39.
[83] Id., p. 41.
[84] Id., p. 9.