EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129433. March 30, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO, accused.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v.
Orita[1] finally did away with frustrated rape[2] and allowed only attempted rape and consummated rape
to remain in our statute books. The instant case lurks at the threshold of
another emasculation of the stages of execution of rape by considering almost
every attempt at sexual violation of a woman as consummated rape, that is, if
the contrary view were to be adopted. The danger there is that that concept may
send the wrong signal to every roaming lothario, whenever the opportunity bares
itself, to better intrude with climactic gusto, sans any restraint, since
after all any attempted fornication would be considered consummated rape and
punished as such. A mere strafing of the citadel of passion would then
be considered a deadly fait accompli, which is absurd.
In Orita we held that rape was
consummated from the moment the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim
since by it he attained his objective. All the elements of the offense were
already present and nothing more was left for the offender to do, having
performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime and accomplish it. We
ruled then that perfect penetration was not essential; any penetration of
the female organ by the male organ, however slight, was sufficient. The Court
further held that entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, even
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, was sufficient to
warrant conviction for consummated rape. We distinguished consummated rape from
attempted rape where there was no penetration of the female organ
because not all acts of execution were performed as the offender merely
commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts.[3] The inference that may be derived therefrom is that
complete or full penetration of the vagina is not required for rape to be
consummated. Any penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise the crime
to its consummated stage.
But the Court in Orita clarified the
concept of penetration in rape by requiring entry into the labia or lips
of the female organ, even if there be no rupture of the hymen or laceration of
the vagina, to warrant a conviction for consummated rape. While the entry of
the penis into the lips of the female organ was considered synonymous with mere
touching of the external genitalia, e.g., labia majora, labia
minora, etc.,[4] the crucial doctrinal bottom line is that touching
must be inextricably viewed in light of, in relation to, or
as an essential part of, the process of penile penetration, and not just
mere touching in the ordinary sense. In other words, the touching
must be tacked to the penetration itself. The importance of the requirement of
penetration, however slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia
or the lips of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime
committed amounts merely to attempted rape.
Verily, this should be the indicium
of the Court in determining whether rape has been committed either in its
attempted or in its consummated stage; otherwise, no substantial distinction
would exist between the two, despite the fact that penalty-wise, this distinction,
threadbare as it may seem, irrevocably spells the difference between life and
death for the accused - a reclusive life that is not even perpetua but
only temporal on one hand, and the ultimate extermination of life on the
other. And, arguing on another level, if the case at bar cannot be deemed
attempted but consummated rape, what then would constitute attempted rape? Must
our field of choice be thus limited only to consummated rape and acts of
lasciviousness since attempted rape would no longer be possible in light of the
view of those who disagree with this ponencia?
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was
found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court a quo to the
extreme penalty of death,[5] hence this case before us on automatic review under
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.[6]
As may be culled from the evidence on
record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4 o’clock in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P.
Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the
second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2)
children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling
small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at
the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon.
As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry,
"Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!"[7] prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she
saw Primo Campuhan inside her children’s room kneeling before Crysthel whose
pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his
short pants were down to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his
penis into Crysthel’s vagina. Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - t
- ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her
blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block
his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her brother,
a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the
accused.[8] Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who
answered Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at the back of their
compound until they were advised by their neighbors to call the barangay officials
instead of detaining him for his misdeed. Physical examination of the victim
yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was
noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel’s body as her hymen was intact
and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a
witness in his defense. He maintained his innocence and assailed the charge as
a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him
for his refusal to run an errand for her.[9] He asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a playing
mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing
both of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position that Corazon
chanced upon them and became hysterical. Corazon slapped him and accused him of
raping her child. He got mad but restrained himself from hitting back when he
realized she was a woman. Corazon called for help from her brothers to stop him
as he ran down from the second floor.
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded
to her call for help and accosted Primo. Vicente punched him and threatened to
kill him. Upon hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards the house of
Conrado Plata but Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a chance to
explain as he reasoned out that the accusation was not true. But Vicente kicked
him instead. When Primo saw Vicente holding a piece of lead pipe, Primo raised
his hands and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the relatives
and neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon him to take Primo to the barangay
hall instead, and not to maul or possibly kill him.
Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his
innocence, the trial court on 27 May 1997 found him guilty of statutory rape,
sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death, and ordered him to pay his
victim P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary
damages, and the costs.
The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails
the credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that her narration should
not be given any weight or credence since it was punctured with implausible
statements and improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and
experience. He claims that it was truly inconceivable for him to commit the
rape considering that Crysthel’s younger sister was also in the room playing
while Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo drinks for her daughters.
Their presence alone as possible eyewitnesses and the fact that the episode
happened within the family compound where a call for assistance could easily be
heard and responded to, would have been enough to deter him from committing the
crime. Besides, the door of the room was wide open for anybody to see what
could be taking place inside. Primo insists that it was almost inconceivable
that Corazon could give such a vivid description of the alleged sexual contact
when from where she stood she could not have possibly seen the alleged touching
of the sexual organs of the accused and his victim. He asserts that the absence
of any external signs of physical injuries or of penetration of Crysthel’s
private parts more than bolsters his innocence.
In convicting the accused, the trial court
relied quite heavily on the testimony of Corazon that she saw Primo with his
short pants down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty
were supposedly "already removed" and that Primo was "forcing
his penis into Crysthel’s vagina." The gravamen of the offense of
statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as provided in
Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years
old when sexually molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion
perpetua to death, to the single indivisible penalty of death under RA
7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being below seven (7) years old. We have said
often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full
penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the
rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the external
genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to
constitute carnal knowledge.[10] But the act of touching should be understood
here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the
female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the
pudendum.
In People v. De la Peña[11] we clarified that the decisions finding a case for
rape even if the attacker’s penis merely touched the external portions of the
female genitalia were made in the context of the presence or existence of an
erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an
erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not
fit into the victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was
consummated on the basis of the victim's testimony that the accused repeatedly
tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood
reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his organ
on the lips of her vulva,[12] or that the penis of the accused touched the
middle part of her vagina.[13] Thus, touching when applied to rape cases
does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a
slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s
vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and
convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid
into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof,
for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.[14] As the labias, which are required to be
"touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or
location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch
them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the
surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia
minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the
collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal
area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the
hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the
rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible
within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips
of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface.
The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is
pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair
but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia
minora.[15] Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora
must be entered for rape to be consummated,[16] and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface
of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or
touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to
constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of
the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum
by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has
not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female organ,"[17] but has also progressed into being described as
"the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum,"[18] or "the bombardment of the drawbridge."[19] But, to our mind, the case at bar merely constitutes
a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated,
a "strafing of the citadel of passion."
A review of the records clearly discloses
that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of proving
that Primo’s penis was able to penetrate Crysthel’s vagina however slight. Even
if we grant arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually
molesting her daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of her claim that she
saw the inter-genital contact between Primo and Crysthel. When asked what she
saw upon entering her children’s room Corazon plunged into saying that she saw
Primo poking his penis on the vagina of Crysthel without explaining her
relative position to them as to enable her to see clearly and sufficiently, in
automotive lingo, the contact point. It should be recalled that when Corazon
chanced upon Primo and Crysthel, the former was allegedly in a kneeling
position, which Corazon described thus:
Q: How was Primo
holding your daughter?
A: (The witness
is demonstrating in such a way that the chest of the accused is pinning down
the victim, while his right hand is holding his penis and his left hand is
spreading the legs of the victim).
It can reasonably be drawn from the
foregoing narration that Primo’s kneeling position rendered an unbridled
observation impossible. Not even a vantage point from the side of the accused
and the victim would have provided Corazon an unobstructed view of Primo’s
penis supposedly reaching Crysthel’s external genitalia, i.e., labia majora,
labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and arms of Primo
would have hidden his movements from Corazon’s sight, not to discount the fact
that Primo’s right hand was allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it
from Corazon’s view. It is the burden of the prosecution to establish how
Corazon could have seen the sexual contact and to shove her account into
the permissive sphere of credibility. It is not enough that she claims that she
saw what was done to her daughter. It is required that her claim be properly
demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed in this respect, thus we
cannot conclude without any taint of serious doubt that inter-genital
contact was at all achieved. To hold otherwise would be to resolve the
doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run roughshod over the constitutional
right of the accused to be presumed innocent.
Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain
himself from pursuing his wicked intention despite her timely appearance, thus
giving her the opportunity to fully witness his beastly act.
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent
with man’s instinct of self-preservation to remain where he is and persist in
satisfying his lust even when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have
already been discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of his victim.
For, the normal behavior or reaction of Primo upon learning of Corazon’s
presence would have been to pull his pants up to avoid being caught literally
with his pants down. The interval, although relatively short, provided more
than enough opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but even to conceal
his evil design.
What appears to be the basis of the
conviction of the accused was Crysthel's answer to the question of the court -
Q: Did the penis
of Primo touch your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
But when asked further whether his penis
penetrated her organ, she readily said, "No." Thus -
Q: But did his
penis penetrate your organ?
A: No, sir.[20]
This testimony alone should dissipate the
mist of confusion that enshrouds the question of whether rape in this case was
consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primo’s penis penetrating her
vagina, however slight. Crysthel made a categorical statement denying
penetration,[21] obviously induced by a question propounded to her
who could not have been aware of the finer distinctions between touching
and penetration. Consequently, it is improper and unfair to attach to
this reply of a four (4)-year old child, whose vocabulary is yet as
underdeveloped as her sex and whose language is bereft of worldly
sophistication, an adult interpretation that because the penis of the accused touched
her organ there was sexual entry. Nor can it be deduced that in trying to
penetrate the victim's organ the penis of the accused touched the middle
portion of her vagina and entered the labia of her pudendum as
the prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to
penetrate Crysthel.[22] Corazon did not say, nay, not even hint that Primo's
penis was erect or that he responded with an erection.[23] On the contrary, Corazon even narrated that Primo
had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to
attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim.
Antithetically, the possibility of Primo’s
penis having breached Crysthel’s vagina is belied by the child's own assertion
that she resisted Primo’s advances by putting her legs close together;[24] consequently, she did not feel any intense pain but
just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her.[25] Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!"
not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases where penetration was not
fully established, the Court had anchored its conclusion that rape nevertheless
was consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the
medico-legal finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or
the labia minora was already gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags were no
longer visible.[26] None was shown in this case. Although a child's
testimony must be received with due consideration on account of her tender age,
the Court endeavors at the same time to harness only what in her story appears
to be true, acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the accused.
Thus, we have to conclude that even on the basis of the testimony of Crysthel
alone the accused cannot be held liable for consummated rape; worse, be
sentenced to death.
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the
medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were no external signs
of physical injuries on complaining witness’ body to conclude from a medical
perspective that penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena
explained, although the absence of complete penetration of the hymen does not
negate the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no
medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the
victim.[27]
In cases of rape where there is a positive
testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respects complement
each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter
disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be
productive of unwarranted or even mischievous results. It is necessary to
carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the
labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that rape
was consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that separates attempted rape
from consummated rape will significantly disappear.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of
the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted
rape - and only of attempted rape - are present in the instant case, hence, the
accused should be punished only for it.
The penalty for attempted rape is two (2)
degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense charged,
which is statutory rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower
is reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the
penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the medium period of
reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years, in any of its periods.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding
accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty of statutory rape and
sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is instead
found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of
eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor
medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., in the result.
[1] People v. Ceilito Orita alias "Lito," G.R.
No. 88724, 3 April 1990, 184 SCRA 105.
[2] People v. Eriñia, 50 Phil. 998 (1927)
[3] See Note 1.
[4] People v. Quinañola, G.R. No. 126148, 5 May 1999.
[5] Decision penned by Judge Benjamin T. Antonio, RTC-Br.
170, Malabon, Metro Manila (Crim. Case No. 16857-MN)
[6] An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous
Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as amended, other
Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, effective on 31 December 1993.
[7] "Ayoko," apparently is a contraction of
"ayaw ko." "Ayoko, ayoko" means "I don’t like, I don’t
like."
[8] Corazon’s brother Vicente Plata responded to her
call, as well as others living within the compound namely, Criselda Carlos
Manalac, Fernando Bondal, Jose Carlos and Reynoso Carlos.
[9] Accused alleged that the charge of rape was merely
concocted by Ma. Corazon Pamintuan because of his refusal to buy medicine for
her, and perform the other tasks asked of him by her relatives.
[10] See the following American cases where the doctrine
originated: Kenny v. State, 65 L.R.A. 316; Rodgers v. State, 30
Tex. App. 510; Brauer v. State, 25 Wis. 413, as cited in People v.
Oscar, 48 Phil. 528 (1925)
[11] G.R. No. 104947, 30 June 1994, 233 SCRA 573.
[12] People v. Bacalso, G.R. No. 89811, 22 March
1991, 195 SCRA 557; People v. Hangdaan, G.R. No. 90035, 13 September
1991, 201 SCRA 568; People v. De la Peña, G.R. No. 104947, 30 June 1994,
233 SCRA 573; People v. Clopino, G.R. No. 117322, 21 May 1998, 290 SCRA 432;
People v. Quinañola, G.R. No. 126148, 5 May 1999.
[13] People v. Navarro, G.R. No. 96251, 11 May
1993, 221 SCRA 684.
[14] In People v. Quinañola (G.R. No. 126148, 5 May 1999) the
Court held the word "touching" to be synonymous with the entry by the
penis into the labia declaring that "x x x the crime of rape is deemed
consummated even when the man’s penis merely entered the labia or lips of the
female organ, or as once said in a case, by the ‘mere touching of the external
genitalia by the penis capable of sexual act’ x x x x"
[15] Mishell, Stenchever, Droegemueller, Herbst
Comprehensive Gynecology, 3rd Ed., 1997, pp. 42-44.
[16] People v. Escober, G.R. Nos. 122980-81, 6 November 1997,
281 SCRA 498; People v. Galimba, G.R. Nos. 111563-64, 20 February 1996, 253
SCRA 722; People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 98402-04, 16 November 1995, 250
SCRA 14; People v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 99263, 12 October 1995, 249 SCRA
234; People v. Rejano, G.R. Nos. 105669-70, 18 October 1994, 237 SCRA
627; People v. Salinas, G.R. No. 107204, 6 May 1994, 232 SCRA 274;
People v. Palicte, G.R. No. 101088, 27 January 1994, 229 SCRA 543;
People v. Arce, G.R. Nos. 101833-34, 20 October 1993, 227 SCRA 406;
People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 92269, 30 July 1993, 244 SCRA 776; People v.
Tismo, No. L-44773, 4 December 1991, 204 SCRA 535; People v. Mayoral,
G.R. Nos. 96094-95, 13 November 1991, 203 SCRA 528, People v. Hangdaan,
G.R. No. 90035, 13 September 1991, 201 SCRA 568; People v. Caballes,
G.R. Nos. 93437-45, 12 July 1991, 199 SCRA 152; People v. Bacalso, G.R.
No. 89811, 22 March 1991, 195 SCRA 557.
[17] People v. Clopino, G.R. No. 117322, 21 May 1998, 290
SCRA 432.
[18] See Note 4.
[19] People v. Escober, G.R. Nos. 122980-81, 6 November
1997, 281 SCRA 498.
[20] TSN, 7 October 1996, p. 20.
[21] In Dulla v. CA (G.R. No. 123164, 18 February 2000)
the Court considered the testimony of a child aged three (3) years and ten (10)
months old sufficient and credible even if she answered "yes" or
"no" to questions propounded to her. However, the victim therein, who
was much younger than Crysthel in the instant case, demonstrated what she meant
when unable to articulate what was done to her, even made graphic descriptions
of the accused’s penis and demonstrated the push and pull movement made by the
accused. Yet conspicuously, the Court in the Dulla case found the accused
guilty only of acts of lasciviousness on the basis of certain inconsistencies
in the testimony of the victim on whether or not petitioner took off her
underwear.
[22] In People v. Clopino (G.R. No. 117322, 21 May 1998)
the Court rejected the argument of the accused that he should only be convicted
of either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. It adopted the reasoning of
the Solicitor General and declared that it was impossible for the penis of
accused-appellant not to have touched the labia of the pudendum in trying to
penetrate her. However, such logical conclusion was deduced in the light of
evidence presented that accused-appellant made determined attempts to penetrate
and insert his penis into the victim’s vagina and even engaged her in foreplay
by inserting his finger into her genitalia. The same inference cannot be made
in the instant case because of the variance in the factual milieu.
[23] Decisions finding the accused guilty of consummated
rape even if the attacker's penis merely touched the female external genitalia
were made in the context of the presence of an erect penis capable of full
penetration, failing in which there can be no consummated rape (People v.
De la Peña, see Note 11)
[24] See Note 16, p. 21.
[25] Ibid.
[26] People v. Villamayor, G.R. Nos. 97474-76, 18
July 1991, 199 SCRA 472; People v. Palicte, G.R. No. 101088, 27 January
1994, 229 SCRA 543; People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 98402-04, 16 November
1995, 250 SCRA 14; People v. Gabris, G.R. No. 116221, 11 July 1996, 258 SCRA
663; People v. Gabayron, G.R. No. 102018, 21 August 1997, 278 SCRA 78.
[27] Q:
Will you tell the Court, what do you mean by this No. 1 conclusion appearing in
Exhibit "A" which I quote "no evident sign of extra-genital
physical injury noted on the body of the subject at the time of the
examination?"
A: That means I was not able
to see injuries outside the genital of the victim, sir.
Q: I presumed (sic) that you
conducted genital physical examination on the victim in this case?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And you also made the
result of the genital physical examination shows (sic) that there is no injury
on any part of the body of the patient, correct, Doctor?
A: Yes sir.
Q: There was no medical
basis for saying that might have a contact between the patient and the accused
in this case?
A: Yes sir (TSN,
8 October 1996, pp. 3-4)