SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128550. March 16, 2000]
DIGITAL
MICROWAVE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ASIAN HIGH
TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
On December 14, 1994, private respondent
Asian High Technology Corp. filed a complaint against petitioner Digital
Microwave Corp. for a sum of money and damages before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig city. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint. The trial
court denied the motion, as well as petitioner’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner then initiated a special civil
action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court. However, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for failure to comply with Revised Circular No. 28-91,
as amended by Administrative Circular No. 04-94. Said circular requires the
petition filed before the Court of Appeals to be accompanied by a sworn
certification against forum shopping, signed by petitioner himself.
Petitioner’s certification was signed by counsel; the petition was, thus,
dismissed. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal and
submitted a sworn certification against forum shopping duly signed by one of
its senior officers. The motion was, however, denied, with the Court of Appeals
stating that
"In the
present case, absent any compelling reason for petitioner’s failure to comply,
at first instance, with Revised Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, the Court
cannot therefore, accept its subsequent compliance."[1]
Aggrieved, petitioner is now before this
Court seeking reversal of the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Revised Circular No. 28-91 provided:
"To avoid
[forum shopping], every petition or complaint filed with the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, shall comply with the following requirements, aside from pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court and existing circulars:
x x x
2.
Certification.-The party must certify under oath that he has not commenced
any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, and that to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is
pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency. If there is any other action pending,
he must state the status of the same. If he should learn that a similar action
or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he
should notify the court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days from such
notice."[2]
The requirement for a sworn certification
against forum shopping was extended by administrative Circular No. 04-94 to
complaints, petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings filed in all
courts or agencies other than the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner contends that in the case of a
corporation as petitioner, the certification against forum shopping may be
signed by a natural person authorized to do so and with knowledge of the required
facts. The authorized person may be anyone authorized by the corporation, not
necessarily an officer thereof. In such a case, petitioner argues, the counsel
of record has the authority to execute the certification on behalf of the
corporation, particularly considering that under the Rules of Court, counsel’s
authority to represent his client is presumed. No written power of attorney is
required for counsel to appear for his client.
If we follow petitioner’s line of reasoning,
then the requirement in Revised Circular No. 28-91 that petitioner himself must
make the certification against forum shopping would have been rendered useless.
Why require petitioner himself to certify when his counsel can anyway execute
the certification on his behalf?
The reason the certification against forum
shopping is required to be accomplished by petitioner himself is because only
the petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated
similar actions or proceedings in different courts or agencies. Even his
counsel may be unaware of such fact. For sure, his counsel is aware of the
action for which he has been retained. But what of other possible actions?
We disagree with petitioner that a
corporation cannot possibly hope to comply with the requirement laid down by
Revised Circular No. 28-91 because it is a juridical entity and not a natural
person. If this were so, then it would have been impossible for a corporation
to do anything at all. Needless to say, this is the reason why
corporations have directors and officers, to represent it in its transactions
with others. The same is true for the certification against forum shopping. It
could easily have been made by a duly authorized director or officer of the
corporation. That petitioner did not in the first instance comply with the
requirement of revised Circular No. 28-91 by having the certification against
forum shopping signed by one of its officers, as it did after its
petition before the Court of Appeals had been dismissed, is beyond our
comprehension.
In the recent case of Spouses Valentin
Ortiz and Camilla Milan Ortiz v. Court of Appeals, et al., 299 SCRA 708,
711-712 (1998), we ruled that
"Regrettably,
we find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving
strict observance as provided for in Circular No. 28-91. The attestation
contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the Court’s
consideration, petitioners here must show reasonable cause for failure to
personally sign the certification. The petitioners must convince the court that
the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of
justice."
In this case, petitioner has not adequately
explained its failure to have the certification against forum shopping signed
by one of its officers.
Neither has it shown any compelling reason
for us to disregard strict compliance with the rules.
As we further stated in Spouses Ortiz,
"Utter
disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy
of liberal construction."[3]
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition, the petition is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.