THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125688. March 31, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IGNACIO CUPINO,[1] VINCENT DEJORAS and RAMON
GALOS a.k.a. Jun, accused.
IGNACIO
CUPINO and VINCENT DEJORAS, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Conspiracy must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In the present appeal, the prosecution eyewitness
testified that one of the appellants had joined the other accused in
approaching the victim, but subsequently tried to prevent them from stabbing
this same victim. Such dubious participation is insufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the said appellant conspired with the others in
committing the offense. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of
innocence must be upheld. He must be acquitted. Misoedpâ
The
Case
Vincent Dejoras and Ignacio Cupino[2] appeal the March 6, 1995 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro
City (Branch 25). Dejoras and Cupino, together with one Ramon Galos,[4] were convicted of robbery with murder and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. Edpâ mis
On October 19, 1989, an Information[5] was filed by Fourth Assistant City Fiscal Petronio P.
Pilien, charging the three as follows:
"That on or
about August 16, 1989, at more or less 9:45 in the evening xxx, at Patag
Crossing, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill[;] armed with a knife
[with] which one of them was then conveniently provided[;] with treachery,
evident premeditation, superior strength, did then and ther[e] wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously [through] accused (Ramon Galos alias Jun), x x x
[stab] one Gromyco[6] Valliente[7] [hitting him] at the left/right portion of his arm
and abdomen, thus inflicting mortal wounds upon [the] offended party’s person
which directly caused his instantaneous death. LEX
"Contrary to
Article 248 in relation to Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code."
Arraigned on January 22, 1990,[8] both appellants entered a plea of not guilty. Trial
ensued. Thereafter, the lower court rendered its assailed Decision,[9] the dispositive part of which we quote thus:
"WHEREFORE,
premises considered, this Court finds all the three accused in conspiracy with
each other, GUILTY beyon[d] reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, qualified
by treachery as principal by direct participation as punished under the Revised
Penal Code. This Court hereby sentences the two accused, Vincent Dejoras and
Ignacio Copino, the third accused being at large, to individually suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA without the attendance of any mitigating
circumstance and to jointly and severally pay indemnity to the heirs of the victim
the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Gromyko Valliente, P40,000.00
as actual damages and burial expenses, P20,000.00 as moral damages, and
to pay the costs."[10]
In view of the penalty imposed, the appeal
was filed directly with this Court.[11]
The
Facts
Version
of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[12] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the
facts in this wise:
"At around
9:45 in the evening of August 16, 1989, during the celebration of the town
fiesta of Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, accused Ramon Galos and Gromyko Valiente
(herein victim) were having a heated argument in front of Dod's Store, which
was owned by a certain Piloton, located at the crossing of Patag (Testimony of
Silverio Bahian, TSN, September 6, 1990, pp. 4-5; Testimony of Ferdinand Bangayan,
TSN, July 2, 1990, pp. 5-6). Jjä sc
"Then,
appellants Ignacio Cupino and Vincent Dejoras arrived, and a fistfight erupted.
Cupino, Dejoras and Galos ganged up on Valiente who also fought back (Testimony
of Silverio Bahian at pp. 6-7, supra; Testimony of Ferdinand Bangayan at p. 7,
supra.). Beaten and outnumbered, Valiente ran away towards the direction of a
small pathway leading to the store of a certain Major Grio, which was beside
Dod's Store. The trio chased x x x him (Testimony of Ferdinand Bangayan at p.
10, id.). Galos caught up with Valiente and then stabbed him twice in the
stomach with a small bolo (Testimony of Silverio Bahian at pp. 9-10, supra.).
"With the
bolo still embedded on his stomach, Valiente crawled along the pathway. Cupino
also caught up with Valiente (pp. 11-12, id.). Then Cupino pulled the bolo from
the victim's body and was about to stab the victim again when Dejoras tried to
grab Cupino's hands, but instead Dejoras got hold of the blade of the bolo and
was injured in the process. Dejoras left, coming out of the pathway with his
wounded right hand (pp. 12-13, id.).
"Meanwhile,
Cupino proceeded to stab the victim twice in the stomach. Afterward, Cupino and
Galos fled from the scene of the crime (p. 14, id.). Valiente, who was seriously
wounded and soaked in his own blood, cried for help. He was brought to a
hospital but later died (p. 19, id.; Testimony of Ferdinand Bangayan at pp.
12-13, supra.).
"The autopsy
conducted on the victim's body revealed that he sustained four (4) stab wounds:
one on the left subpostal margin, another wound on the right subpostal margin,
and two (2) sutured wounds on the left cocital area. The wound that was
inflicted on the pancreas of the victim was considered fatal since it caused
the massive hemorrhage. The cause of death was attributed to massive
intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds (Testimony of Dr.
Apolinar Vacalares, TSN, February 13, 1991, pp. 6-7)."[13]
Version
of the Defense
For their part, appellants submit the
following as the facts of the case:
"On August
16, 1999, Ignacio Copino celebrated the town fiesta of Patag, Cagayan de Oro
City at home with his family and friends, one of whom was Vincent Dejoras.
After eating dinner at around 7:00 p.m., Dejoras, together with his co-workers,
headed for home. Copino decided to accompany the group and at the Patag
crossing, he was able to convince Dejoras to go to the 'perya' and gamble, as
he had P30 with him.
"The pair
lost all of the P30 in the 'pula-puti' game and decided to call it quits. On
their way home, they saw Ramon Galos 'alias Panit' and Grom[yk]o Valiente
'alyas Bobong', two of their acquaintances, apparently having an altercation.
"They were
about two meters from Galos and Valiente when Galos suddenly said: 'Nasi is
here (referring to Copino), you hit him.' (Transcript of Stenographic Notes,
VINCENT DEJORAS, Hearing April 4, 1991, page 7). Galos then kicked Valiente and
the latter fell down. Valiente was able to get up and run towards an alley at
the back of Dod's store with Galos in close pursuit. Copino and Dejoras ran
after the two with the intention to pacify the fighters. Galos was able to
corner Valiente and once again, the two traded blows. When Copino and Dejoras
were finally able to catch up with the two, they noticed that Valiente was
already bleeding. Eyewitness Silverio Bahian later recounted that he saw Panit
pull out a bolo and stab Bobong.
"Dejoras, on
his part, tried to stop Galos from inflicting more wounds and he too was
wounded in the process. What happened was that instead of holding Galos' hand,
he was able to hold the blade of the knife, thereby injuring himself. Galos
then ran away. Upon the realization that his right hand was bloodied, and
fearing that more harm would fall upon them, Copino and Dejoras too ran away.
"Dejoras went
to City Hospital to have his wound treated and then they went home. At midnight
of the same day, a policeman went to his house and brought him to the OKK
Police Station where he was booked into the police blotter. The following day,
Copino and Dejoras learned that Gromyko Valiente had died. Together with their
parents the[y] went to the Tourism Hall to have their statements taken by the
police."[14]
Ruling
of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that (1) appellants
were guilty of murder, as the killing was qualified by treachery; (2)
conspiracy was proven by the chain of circumstantial evidence submitted; and
(3) the aggravating circumstance of superior strength was absorbed by treachery
and may no longer be used to increase the penalty to its maximum period. ScÓ jj
The
Issues
Appellants aver that the court a quo committed
the following errors:
"I. In
failing to appreciate the testimony of accused-appellants and in giving full
weight and credit to the version of prosecution witnesses.
II. In holding
that there was conspiracy between accused-appellants.
III. In holding
that accused-appellants herein [were] guilty as charged."[15]
We shall discuss the foregoing issues in the
following sequence: (1) credibility of the prosecution evidence, (2) conspiracy
and (3) proper penalty.
The
Court’s Ruling
This appeal is partly meritorious. We affirm
the challenged Decision in regard to Ignacio Cupino, but reverse it in regard
to Vincent Dejoras. Sjä cj
First
Issue
Credibility
of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellants challenge the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. They argue that
there are contradictions patent in their testimonies. We disagree. As we have
repeatedly said, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses
is generally binding upon us.[16] After a thorough review of the records before us, we
find no reason to disagree with the trial court in finding no material
inconsistency in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies.
Neither are we impressed with appellants’
assertion that the evidence for the prosecution is weak. The claims of the
defense are belied by the clear, credible and straightforward testimony of
Prosecution Eyewitness Silverio Bahian, which we quote:
"Q At this
time, August 16, 1989, at more or less 9:45 p.m., what particular place in the
store of Piloton?
A [In front] of
the store.
Supremeä
x x x
x x x x x x
Q What where you
doing there?
A I was reading
komiks.
x x x
x x x x x x
Q While you were
there at Piloton store, reading komiks, what happened if any?
A There was an
argument between Bobong Valiente[17] and Panit.[18]
x x x
x x x x x x
Q Now, you said
that there was an argument, where did this altercation [take] place?
A [In front] of
me. Courtä
Q How far away
from you? From where you are sitting, point to any object within the court room
to indicate what you [meant by "in front"] of you?
A Less than a
meter. Jä
lexj
Q From where you
are sitting, point to any object[.]
A This chair. This
table or this chair I am sitting on. [In front] of me. Just very near me.
Q From what
direction was this Bobong coming x x x?
A Going to the
checkpoint.
Q What about the
other person [with] whom he had an altercation?
A Going to the
crossing
Q What happened
after they had an altercation? LexjÓ uris
A After their
altercation, this Nasi[19] and Beni[20] were walking from the road.
Q Who is this
Nasi?
A Nasi Copino.
Q Who is this
Beni?
A Dejoras. JuriÓ smis
Q When these two
came, Beni and Nasi, where were the two who were having an argument?
A Mr. Bahian
approached the two who were having an altercation.
Q What about the
person [with] whom he had an altercation? Where was he at that time?
A He followed him.
Q So, what
happened after Bobong went to Nasi and Beni and the other person Panit?
A They ganged up
[on] Bobong.
Jjjä uris
Q When you said
they ganged up on Bobong, to whom are you referring x x x?
A Panit, Nasi and
Beni.
Q From your place
in relation to the place where they ganged up on Bobong, how far away was that?
A About three
meters. lex
x x x
x x x x x x
Q Where [was] this
place in relation to you whe[n] they ganged up on Bobong?
A In the middle of
the road.
Q And what was the
condition of the road on that night of August 16, 1989 at 9:45 p.m.?
A It was bright. Jksm
Q Why do you say
that it [was] 'hayag'?
A Because there
was a lamppost.
Q Where [was] this
lamppost located in relation to you?
A [In front] of
me.
Q So, what
happened after they ganged up x x x this Nasi, Beni and Panit, as you said,
they ganged up on Bobong? What happened?
A Since Bobong
[could] not keep up a fight with the three, Bobong ran towards me.
Q What happened
after Bobong ran towards you as you said?
A He was being
held by Panit.
Q Will you
demonstrate how he was h[e]ld by Panit?
A (Witness
demonstrating by stretching his left arm and closing hi[s] fist and twisting it
to his left side)
Q So, what
happened after that? After he was held up and as you said twisted?
A Panit stabbed
Bobong.
Q Will you please
demonstrate again how Panit stabbed Bobong after he held him and[,] pulling
him[,] he thrust the knife forward?
A (Witness
demonstrating his right arm forward)
Q How many times
was he stabbed by Panit? This Bobong?
A I think twice.
Q And where was
this Bobong hit if he was hit?
A In the stomach. Chief
Q What was used in
the stabbing of Bobong by Panit?
A A small bolo.
Q Will you please
describe the small bolo or what appears to be a bolo to you? How long was this?
A About 12 inches
including the handle.
Q What about the
blade? Was this double bladed or not?
A Single bladed. Esmsc
x x x x x x x x x
ACP CABALLERO,
JR.: (resuming)
Q Now, what
happened after Bobong was held up by this Panit and stabbed twice as you said?
What happened to Bobong?
A Bobong crawled
going to a small alley. Esmmis
Q You mentioned
this alley. Now, from where you are situated then while reading komiks [on]
this alley, how far was this from you?
A Just here.
(Witness
stretching his left arm going to his left side)
Q What happened to
the small bolo which was used in the stabbing? Do you know where was it at the
time Bobong crawled?
A The small bolo
was still embedded on the left portion just below the breast, solar plexus.
Q So, what
happened after Bobong crawled[;] who was going to the area which you testified
was just near you?
A Nasi caught up
with him.
Q You mentioned,
of course, x x x Nasi. Nasi who?
A Copino.
Q What happened
after he was overtaken by Nasi Copino?
A Nasi pulled the
small bolo.
Es-mso
Q What happened
next after Nasi pulled the small bolo?
A When he was
about to thrust the small bolo to the body of Bobong, his friend held his
hand.
Q Who [was]
this companion of Nasi that you are referring to who held up his hand?
A Beni.
Q Do you know the
real name of Beni?
A It is only his
nickname that I know. Ms-esm
Q Beni what?
A Dejoras.
Q What happened
after the hand of Nasi was held up by Beni?
A It was the
small bolo which was held by Beni.
Q Which part of
the knife was held by Beni Dejoras?
A The blade.
Q So, what
happened after he held the blade?
A Nasi pulled
the small bolo, and that [was] why Beni was wounded.
Q What happened
after Beni was injured?
A Beni went out.
Q And where was
Nasi then at this time when Beni, as you said, went out?
A Nasi was still
[in front] of Bobong.
Q Was he
motionless [in front] of Bobong or what?
A He continued to
stab Bobong.
Q Where was Bobong
hit when he was stabbed by Nasi?
A At first, he was
able to parry the thrust of Nasi. E-xsm
Q So, what
happened to Bobong after he parried the stab of Nasi?
A Bobong fell
down. Ky-le
Q What happened
after that?
A Nasi again
stabbed Bobong.
Q And where was
Bobong hit at this particular time?
A In the stomach.
Q So, what
happened after that?
A Nasi ran
away."[21]
The above testimony clearly demonstrates the
conspiracy between Ramon Galos and Appellant Ignacio Cupino. Both of them
showed their common intent to kill Valliente. On the part of Galos, conspiracy
was shown by his act of grabbing the fleeing victim, simultaneously drawing his
small bolo or pisaw, and stabbing the latter twice. By running after the
wounded victim, Cupino showed unity of purpose with Galos. When he eventually
caught up with the victim, Cupino pulled out the bolo that was embedded in the
body of the latter and used it to stab him again. Clearly, by the consonance of
their deeds, both assailants conspired to kill Valliente.[22]
We agree with the court a quo that
treachery qualified the slaying to murder. By diverting the attention of Valliente
to the approaching Dejoras and Cupino, Galos was obviously making sure that the
victim could not defend himself. When Valliente turned his back, Galos began
his attack, which eventually led to the stabbing of the former. Treachery was
not necessarily precluded by either the occurrence of a tussle before the
victim was killed[23] or by the frontal nature of the attack.[24] We also agree with the lower court that the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed by alevosia.[25]
Second
Issue
Conspiracy:
Dejoras’ Liability
Though we uphold the findings of the trial
court with regard to Appellant Cupino, we differ with its conclusion that
Appellant Dejoras was guilty. Ky-calr
It is axiomatic that the prosecution must
establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.[26] Conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be
taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes
culpability under specific circumstances.[27] As such, it must be established as clearly as any
element of the crime. The quantum of evidence to be satisfied is, we repeat,
beyond reasonable doubt.[28]
In People v. Elijorde,[29] a case with similar facts, we said:
"Indeed, with
respect to accused Reynaldo Punzalan, the Court cannot assert with moral
certainty that he is guilty of murder. Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably
as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by
conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at
the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly
showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death
of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by
proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yielded the reasonable
inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design.
Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts
established by the requisite quantum of proof do reasonably yield that
inference." (Footnotes omitted) Calr-ky
Thus, in Elijorde we found one of the
accused, a certain Punzalan, innocent under the circumstances.[30] Similarly, in the present case, we find Appellant
Vincent Dejoras not guilty.
Unlike the trial court, we are quite mindful
of the testimony of Prosecution Eyewitness Bahian regarding Appellant Dejoras’
participation in that bloody incident on the eve of the fiesta. His
answers to the propounded questions merely established that Dejoras joined
Galos and Cupino when they approached the victim. The prosecution failed,
however, to show what Dejoras specifically did that proved his participation in
the conspiracy. Rather, what the said eyewitness said was that Dejoras tried to
prevent Cupino from stabbing the victim, clearly showing that he did not
support the criminal intent and conspiracy of the other two accused.[31] These incontrovertible data lead to one conclusion:
there is reasonable doubt on whether Dejoras conspired with Galos and Cupino in
killing Valliente. We are therefore constrained to exonerate him. Indeed, guilt
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, there is reasonable doubt
on the culpability of Appellant Dejoras as a principal.
Dejoras cannot be held liable as an
accomplice, either.[32] In Elijorde,[33] we said: Me-sm
"The
cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally
rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act
intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either
as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the
accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation." S-l-x
The acts of Appellant Dejoras showed that he
was not aware of his companions’ intent to kill Valliente; at the very least,
there is reasonable doubt as to his knowledge thereof. In any event, community
of design, the first of the requisite elements that must be present before a
person may be held liable as an accomplice, is lacking.[34]
On the prosecution’s theory that Dejoras may
have inflicted injury on the victim when he joined in the fray, we have combed
the records and found no basis for this speculation. We note that the
eyewitness could not recount the details of the brawl, but merely provided a
general picture, saying that everything happened so fast.[35] Hence, we find no basis for Appellant Dejoras’
liability even for physical injuries.[36]
Additional
Questions Penalty and Damages
When the crime was committed, the penalty
for murder was reclusion temporal (maximum) to death.[37] Since no generic modifying circumstance was proven,
the trial court correctly sentenced Cupino to reclusion perpetua.[38]
We increase to P50,000 the award for
moral damages, in consonance with current jurisprudence.[39] The facts showing moral damages were proven during
the trial. However, the established actual damages amount to only P30,000,
not P40,000 as found by the lower court.[40] The award of P50,000 civil indemnity for the
death of Gromyko Valliente is affirmed.[41]
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the appealed Decision insofar as
it found Appellant Ignacio Cupino GUILTY of MURDER and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua. Appellant Cupino is solely responsible for
paying the heirs of the victim, Gromyko Valliente, the amounts of P50,000
as indemnity ex delicto, P30,000 as actual damages and P50,000
as moral damages. Appellant Vincent Dejoras is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED
from custody IMMEDIATELY, unless he is being legally held for another
cause. In this regard, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
report his compliance, within five (5) days from receipt hereof. Costs against
Appellant Cupino. Sc-slx
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] Also spelled "Copino" in the records.
[2] Spelled "Copino" in the Appellants’ Brief
and the TSN.
[3] Penned by Judge Noli T. Catli.
[4] At large.
[5] Records, p. 2.
[6] Spelled "Gromyko" in the assailed Decision.
[7] Spelled "Valiente" in the Appellee’s Brief
and in the TSN.
[8] Assisted by Attorney Adrian Barba.
[9] Records, pp. 425-440; rollo, pp. 15-30.
[10] Decision, p. 15; records, p. 439.
[11] The Notice of Appeal was filed on August 25, 1995
(records, p. 441). The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon the
Court’s receipt of the Brief for the Appellee on December 7, 1999. The filing
of a reply brief was deemed waived, as none was submitted within the
reglementary period.
[12] Signed by Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez,
Assistant Solicitor General Roman G. Del Rosario and Associate Solicitor
Hedeliza O. Hormachuelos.
[13] Appellee’s Brief, pp. 3-5; rollo, pp. 107-109.
[14] Appellants’ Brief, pp. 3-5; rollo, pp. 87-89.
This was signed by Atty. Cesilo A. Adaza.
[15] Appellants’ Brief, p. 2; rollo, p. 86.
[16] See People v. Torejos, GR No. 132217, February 18,
2000; People v. Milliam, GR No. 129071, January 31, 2000; People v. Ricafranca,
GR No. 124384-86, January 28, 2000; People v. Barona, GR No. 119595, January
25, 2000; People v. Enolva, GR No. 131633-34, January 25, 2000; People v.
Reduca, GR No. 126094-95, January 21, 1999; People v. Lotoc, GR No. 132166, May
19, 1999; People v. Merino, GR No. 132329, December 17, 1999.
[17] The victim, Gromyko Valliente.
[18] Ramon Galos.
[19] Appellant Ignacio Cupino
[20] Appellant Vicente Dejoras.
[21] TSN, September 6, 1990, pp. 4-14; records, pp.
293-303; italics supplied.
[22] See People v. Datun, 272 SCRA 380, May 7, 1997.
[23] People v. Elijorde, GR No. 126531, April 21, 1999.
[24] See People v. Alib, GR No. 130944, January 18, 2000;
People v. Belaro, GR No. 99869, May 26, 1999.
[25] Ibid. See also People v. Lumacang, GR No.
120283, February 1, 2000; People v. De Vera, GR No. 128966, August 18, 1999;
People v. Datun, supra.
[26] People v. De Vera, GR No. 128966, p. 16, August 18,
1999, citing several cases.
[27] The Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines provides:
"Art. 8. Conspiracy and
proposal to commit felony. -- Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are
punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty
therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.
There is proposal when
the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to some
other person or persons."
[28] See People v. Patalinhug, GR No. 125814-15, November
16, 1999; People v. Bolivar, GR No. 108174, October 28, 1999; People v. Tabuso,
GR No. 113708, October 26, 1999; People v. De Vera, supra.
[29] GR No. 126531, p. 4, April 21, 1999, per Bellosillo, J.
[30] There we said:
"xxx [T]he only
involvement of Punzalan was kicking Hierro at the back before the latter was
pursued and stabbed by accused Elijorde. After kicking the vctim, Punzalan
ramained where he was and did not cooperate with Elijorde in pursuing Hierro to
ensure that the latter would be killed. There is no other evidence to show
unity of purpose and design between Punzalan and Elijorde in the execution of
the killing, which is essential to establish conspiracy. His act of kicking
Hierro prior to the actual stabbing by Elijorde does not of itself demonstrate
concurrence of wills or unity of purpose and action. For it is possible that
the accused Punzalan had no knowledge of the common design, if there was any,
nor of the intended assault which was committed in a place far from where he
was. The mere kicking does not necessarily prove intention to kill. The
evidence does not show that Punzalan knew that Elijorde had a knife and that he
intended to use is to stab the victim." (Ibid., p. 7)
[31] This was affirmed during the
cross-examination of Bahian:
"Q So when Nasi
[Cupino], according to you, remove[d] the bolo, he stabbed again?
A Beni [Dejoras] held the
hand of Nasi when he was about to stab for the first time.
Q In short, you are saying
that Beni was trying to stop Nasi from stabbing Bobong Valiente?
A Yes, and he said ‘Ayaw
bay’.
Q And in the process,
according to you Beni suffered injuries because he was able to hold on [to] the
blade of the bolo?
A Yes, sir." (TSN,
September 6, 1990, pp.56-57; records, pp. 345-346)
[32] "Art. 18. Accomplices. -- Accomplices are
those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution
of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts." (The Revised Penal Code
of the Philippines)
[33] GR No. 126531, p. 8, April 21, 1999, per Bellosillo, J.
[34] To be held liable as an accomplice, the following
must concur: (a) community of design; i.e., knowing the criminal design
of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his
purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime;
and (c) there is a relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as an accomplice. See People v. De Vera, supra.
[35] TSN, September 6, 1990, pp. 45-47.
[36] People v. Elijorde, supra.
[37] Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, before the effectivity
of RA 7659.
[38] People v. Elijorde supra.
[39] Ibid. See People v. Mier, GR No. 130598,
February 3, 2000; People v. Degamo, GR No. 129535, July 20,1999.
[40] TSN, January 24, 1991, pp. 5-15.
[41] Ibid. See People v. Mier, supra;
People v. Tomolin, GR No. 126650, July 28, 1999; People v.
Degamo, supra.