SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125536. March 16, 2000]
PRUDENTIAL
BANK, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LETICIA TUPASI-VALENZUELA
joined by husband Francisco Valenzuela, respondents. Ed-pm-is
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the Decision dated
January 31, 1996, and the Resolution dated July 2, 1997, of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 35532, which reversed the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 171, in Civil Case No.
2913-V-88, dismissing the private respondent's complaint for damages.[1]
In setting aside the trial court's decision,
the Court of Appeals disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE,
the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, another rendered
ordering the appellee bank to pay appellant the sum of P100,000.00 by way of
moral damages; P50,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, P50,000.00 for and as
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs. Jjs-c
SO ORDERED."[2]
The facts of the case on record are as
follows:
Private respondent Leticia Tupasi-Valenzuela
opened Savings Account No. 5744 and Current Account No. 01016-3 in the
Valenzuela Branch of petitioner Prudential Bank, with automatic transfer of
funds from the savings account to the current account.
On June 1, 1988, herein private respondent
deposited in her savings account Check No. 666B (104561 of even date) the
amount of P35,271.60, drawn against the Philippine Commercial International
Bank (PCIB). Taking into account that deposit and a series of withdrawals,
private respondent as of June 21, 1988 had a balance of P35,993.48 in her
savings account and P776.93 in her current account, or total deposits of
P36,770.41, with petitioner. Sc-jj
Thereafter, private respondent issued
Prudential Bank Check No. 983395 in the amount of P11,500.00 post-dated June
20, 1988, in favor of one Belen Legaspi. It was issued to Legaspi as payment
for jewelry which private respondent had purchased. Legaspi, who was in jewelry
trade, endorsed the check to one Philip Lhuillier, a businessman also in the
jewelry business. When Lhuillier deposited the check in his account with the
PCIB, Pasay Branch, it was dishonored for being drawn against insufficient
funds. Lhuillier's secretary informed the secretary of Legaspi of the dishonor.
The latter told the former to redeposit the check. Legaspi's secretary tried to
contact private respondent but to no avail.
Upon her return from the province, private
respondent was surprised to learn of the dishonor of the check. She went to the
Valenzuela Branch of Prudential Bank on July 4, 1988, to inquire why her check
was dishonored. She approached one Albert Angeles Reyes, the officer in charge
of current account, and requested him for the ledger of her current account.
Private respondent discovered a debit of P300.00 penalty for the dishonor of
her Prudential Check No. 983395. She asked why her check was dishonored when
there were sufficient funds in her account as reflected in her passbook. Reyes
told her that there was no need to review the passbook because the bank ledger
was the best proof that she did not have sufficient funds. Then, he abruptly
faced his typewriter and started typing. S-jcj
Later, it was found out that the check in
the amount of P35,271.60 deposited by private respondent on June 1, 1988, was
credited in her savings account only on June 24, 1988, or after a period of 23
days. Thus the P11,500.00 check was redeposited by Lhuillier on June 24, 1988,
and properly cleared on June 27, 1988.
Because of this incident, the bank tried to
mollify private respondent by explaining to Legaspi and Lhuillier that the bank
was at fault. Since this was not the first incident private respondent had
experienced with the bank, private respondent was unmoved by the bank's
apologies and she commenced the present suit for damages before the RTC of
Valenzuela.
After trial, the court rendered a decision
on August 30, 1991, dismissing the complaint of private respondent, as well as
the counterclaim filed by the defendant, now petitioner.
Undeterred, private respondent appealed to
the Court of Appeals. On January 31, 1996, respondent appellate court rendered
a decision in her favor, setting aside the trial court's decision and ordering
herein petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P100,000.00 by way of
moral damages; P50,000.00 exemplary damages; P50,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees; and to pay the costs.[3]
Petitioner filed a timely motion for
reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition, raising the following
issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DEVIATING FROM ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE IN
REVERSING THE DISMISSAL JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT AND INSTEAD AWARDED MORAL
DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. Supr-eme
II. WHETHER OR NOT
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHERE, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE AS FOUND BY THE
TRIAL COURT, AWARDED MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P100,000.00.
III. WHETHER OR
NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHERE, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE AS
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT, AWARDED P50,000.00 BY WAY OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. Co-urt
IV. WHETHER OR NOT
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE EVEN
IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE, AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Simply stated, the issue is whether the
respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion in awarding moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees to be paid by petitioner to private
respondent.
Petitioner claims that generally the factual
findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court. However,
there are exceptions to this rule. One is where the trial court and the Court
of Appeals had arrived at diverse factual findings.[4] Petitioner faults the respondent court from
deviating from the basic rule that finding of facts by the trial court is entitled
to great weight, because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the
deportment of witness and the evaluation of evidence presented during the
trial. Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its
discretion when it awarded damages to the plaintiff, even in the face of lack
of evidence to prove such damages, as found by the trial court.
Firstly, petitioner questions the award of
moral damages. It claims that private respondent did not suffer any damage upon
the dishonor of the check. Petitioner avers it acted in good faith. It was an
honest mistake on its part, according to petitioner, when misposting of private
respondent's deposit on June 1, 1988, happened. Further, petitioner contends
that private respondent may not "claim" damages because the
petitioner's manager and other employee had profusely apologized to private
respondent for the error. They offered to make restitution and apology to the
payee of the check, Legaspi, as well as the alleged endorsee, Lhuillier. Regrettably,
it was private respondent who declined the offer and allegedly said, that there
was nothing more to it, and that the matter had been put to rest.[5]Jle-xj
Admittedly, as found by both the respondent
appellate court and the trial court, petitioner bank had committed a mistake.
It misposted private respondent's check deposit to another account and delayed
the posting of the same to the proper account of the private respondent. The
mistake resulted to the dishonor of the private respondent's check. The trial
court found "that the misposting of plaintiff’s check deposit to another
account and the delayed posting of the same to the account of the plaintiff is
a clear proof of lack of supervision on the part of the defendant bank."[6] Similarly, the appellate court also found that
"while it may be true that the bank's negligence in dishonoring the
properly funded check of appellant might not have been attended with malice and
bad faith, as appellee [bank] submits, nevertheless, it is the result of lack
of due care and caution expected of an employee of a firm engaged in so
sensitive and accurately demanding task as banking."[7]
In Simex International (Manila), Inc, vs.
Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 360, 367 (1990), and Bank of Philippine
Islands vs. IAC, et al., 206 SCRA 408, 412-413 (1992), this Court
had occasion to stress the fiduciary nature of the relationship between a bank
and its depositors and the extent of diligence expected of the former in
handling the accounts entrusted to its care, thus: Lex-juris
"In every
case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the utmost
fidelity, whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of
millions. The bank must record every single transaction accurately, down to the
last centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to be done if the account
is to reflect at any given time the amount of money the depositor can dispose
of as he sees fit, confident that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever
he directs. A blunder on the part of bank, such as the dishonor of a check
without good reason, can cause the depositor not a little embarrassment if not
also financial loss and perhaps even civil and criminal litigation.
The point is that
as a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its
functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the account of its depositors
with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their
relationship. x x x"
In the recent case of Philippine National
Bank vs. Court of Appeals,[8] we held
that "a bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors
with meticulous care whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos
or of millions of pesos. Responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. While petitioner's
negligence in this case may not have been attended with malice and bad faith,
nevertheless, it caused serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation".
Hence we ruled that the offended party in said case was entitled to recover
reasonable moral damages.
Even if malice or bad faith was not
sufficiently proved in the instant case, the fact remains that petitioner has
committed a serious mistake. It dishonored the check issued by the private
respondent who turned out to have sufficient funds with petitioner. The bank's
negligence was the result of lack of due care and caution required of managers
and employees of a firm engaged in so sensitive and demanding business as
banking. Accordingly, the award of moral damages by the respondent Court of
Appeals could not be said to be in error nor in grave abuse of its discretion. Juri-smis
There is no hard-and-fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case
must be governed by its own peculiar facts. The yardstick should be that it is
not palpably and scandalously excessive. In our view, the award of P100,000.00
is reasonable, considering the reputation and social standing of private
respondent Leticia T. Valenzuela.[9]
The law allows the grant of exemplary
damages by way of example for the public good.[10] The public relies on the banks' sworn profession of
diligence and meticulousness in giving irreproachable service. The level of
meticulousness must be maintained at all times by the banking sector. Hence,
the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding exemplary damages. In our view,
however, the reduced amount of P20,000.00 is more appropriate. Jj-juris
The award of attorney's fees is also proper
when exemplary damages are awarded and since private respondent was compelled
to engage the services of a lawyer and incurred expenses to protect her
interest.[11] The standards in fixing attorney's fees are: (1) the
amount and the character of the services rendered; (2) labor, time and trouble
involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation and business in which
the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of
money and the value of the property affected by the controversy or involved in
the employment; (6) the skill and the experience called for in the performance
of the services; (7) the professional character and the social standing of the
attorney; (8) the results secured, it being a recognized rule that an attorney
may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is
not.[12] In this case, all the aforementioned weighed, and
considering that the amount involved in the controversy is only P36,770.41, the
total deposit of private respondent which was misposted by the bank, we find
the award of respondent court of P50,000.00 for attorney's fees, excessive and
reduce the same to P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION. The petitioner is ordered to pay
P100,000.00 by way of moral damages in favor of private respondent Leticia T.
Valenzuela. It is further ordered to pay her exemplary damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 and P30,000.00, attorney's fees. Jksm
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 65.
[2] Id. at 72.
[3] Supra, note 2.
[4] Cang vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 128, 145 (1998).
[5] Rollo, pp. 21-24.
[6] Id. at 62.
[7] Id. at 70.
[8] G.R. No. 126152, September 28, 1999, citing the cases of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 761 (1994) and Leopoldo Araneta vs. Bank of America, 40 SCRA 144 (1971).
[9] Cf. Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126152, September 28, 1999, p. 7; Tan vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 310, 324 (1994).
[10] See CIVIL CODE, Article 2229.
[11] See CIVIL CODE, Article 2208.
[12] Pascual v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 214, 233 (1998).