THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124118. March 27, 2000]
MARINO,
RENATO, LETICIA, IMELDA, ALICIA, LIGAYA, and ZENAIDA, all surnamed ADRIANO, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CELESTINA, MANOLO and AIDA, all surnamed ADRIANO, respondents. Miä sedp
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Second Division,[1] affirming in toto the Joint Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55,[2] which dismissed Civil Case No. 88-115 for annulment
of will and ordered the disposition of the estate of Lucio Adriano in
accordance with the provisions of his last will and testament in Spec. Proc.
No. 4442.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
The testator, Lucio Adriano, also known as
Ambrocio Adriano, married Gliceria Dorado on October 29, 1933. Out of their
lawful marriage, they had three children, namely, Celestina, Manolo, and Aida,
private respondents in this case. Sometime in 1942 or prior thereto, Lucio and
Gliceria separated, and Gliceria settled in Rizal, Laguna where she died on
June 11, 1968. Also in 1942 or even earlier, Lucio cohabited with Vicenta
Villa, with whom he had eight children: Marino, Renato, Leticia, Imelda, Maria
Alicia, Ligaya, Jose Vergel, and Zenaida, all surnamed Adriano. All his
children by Vicenta Villa are the named petitioners in the instant case, with
the exception of Jose Vergel, who died before the inception of the proceedings.
On November 22, 1968, or five months after
the death of Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta. Lucio and Vicenta and their
children lived in Candelaria, Quezon until the spouses separated in 1972.[3]Misoedpâ
On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last
will and testament disposing of all his properties, and assigning, among
others, his second wife Vicenta and all his children by his first and second
marriages as devisees and legatees therein. Among the properties bequeathed in
the will were a 45,000 square meter lot and the residential house, rice mill,
warehouse and equipment situated thereon located in Candelaria, Quezon and
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. T-56553 in
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon[4], which was disposed of in the following manner: (1)
to private respondents, Lucio's children by his first wife, 10,000 square
meters of the disputed property, including the warehouse, rice mill, and
equipment situated thereon; (2) to Vicenta and petitioners, his children by his
second marriage, the remaining 35,000 square meters; and (3) to private
respondents, the residential house also within the same property.[5]
On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private
respondent Celestina Adriano, who was instituted in Lucio's will as its
executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will on February 18, 1981
before the RTC of Lucena City. The probate case was docketed as Spec. Proc. No.
4442. After due hearing and despite the Opposition filed by Vicenta, the RTC
allowed the probate of the will and directed the issuance of letters
testamentary to petitioner-executrix Celestina Adriano in an Order dated August
22, 1983. On November 10, 1983, Vicenta appealed said Order to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, which in turn affirmed the probate of the will.
Vicenta died on July 2, 1985.[6]
On August 17, 1988, and while the
proceedings for settlement of estate were pending before the RTC, petitioners
instituted an action for annulment of Lucio Adriano's will which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 88-115. In the complaint, plaintiffs-petitioners alleged that
before the marriage of Lucio and their mother, Vicenta, on November 22, 1968,
the two lived together as husband and wife and as such, acquired properties
which became the subject of inventory and administration in Spec. Proc. No.
4442. Plaintiffs claimed that the properties bequeathed in Lucio's will are
undivided "civil partnership and/or conjugal properties of Lucio Adriano
and Vicenta Villa", and thus, the will sought to be probated should be
declared void and ineffective insofar as it disposes of the rightful share or
properties of Vicenta.[7]
It is also not disputed that the contested
properties in Civil Case No. 88-115 and Spec. Proc. No. 4442 were also the
subject of a complaint filed sometime in 1980 by Vicenta against Lucio,
docketed with the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Lucena City, Branch
II as Civil Case No. 7534, wherein Vicenta sought the provisional partition or
separation of the properties pendente lite. The case was dismissed on
January 28, 1991 without prejudice, for lack of interest. Edpâ mis
Spec. Proc. No. 4442 and Civil Case No.
88-115 were consolidated and jointly heard by the RTC.
The trial court favored the evidence of
private respondents, which indicated that the purchase money for the contested
properties came from the earnings of Lucio in a business partnership that he
entered into in 1947, or during the subsistence of his marriage to Gliceria.
The trial court further found that Lucio's initial capital infusion of
P15,000.00 in the business partnership was in fact obtained from the conjugal
fund of his first marriage. The evidence of private respondents is thus
summarized by the trial court:
Defendants'
evidence, on the other hand, tends to show that the original common fund of
Lucio (Ambrocio) Adriano in the amount of P15,000.00 was invested by Lucio
Adriano in a partnership called the "Central Rice Mill & Co."
which was formed and organized on November 30, 1947. Such initial investment
came from the savings of Lucio Adriano and Gliceria Dorado before World War II,
which was earned by said spouses by means of ambulant peddling of betel nuts
and ikmo leaves and, subsequently, by the selling of (a) variety (of) goods and
rice retailing at a market stall which they acquired at the public market of
Candelaria, Quezon. On these savings, spouses Lucio Adriano and Gliceria Dorado
added the proceeds of the sale of a "fairbanks" rice mill made during
the Japanese occupation, sometime between the years 1943 and 1944. The same
rice mill was then located at the south end of Gonzales Street near the public
market of Candelaria, Quezon, and was acquired by the same spouses through
their joint efforts and industry made from the time of their marriage in 1933.
It is likewise
shown by defendants' evidence that on January 8, 1951, the Articles of
Co-Partnership of "Central Rice Mill & Co." was amended and its
name was changed to "Quezon Central Rice Mill & Co." Lucio
Adriano then made a new investment into the partnership out of savings from the
conjugal partnership with Gliceria Dorado for the period 1947 until 1950 in the
amount of P18,750.00 (Exhibit "1-A") thereby increasing his
investment to P33,750.00 (par. 7(c) of Amended Articles of Co-Partnership,
Exhibit "1-A"). On January 22, 1952, another partnership called
"The Lessee of the Quezon Central Rice Mill" as formed by Lucio
(Ambrocio) Adriano and four (4) partners and he invested the amount of
P25,000.00 (Exhibit "2") thereby making his total capital investment
reach the amount of P58,750.00.
On May 3, 1952,
Lucio Adriano bought the share of Tan Kim alias "Joaquin Tan", a
partner who withdrew from the partnership of the Quezon Central Rice Mill &
Co. and who, in consideration of the sum of P34,342.55, executed a Deed of Sale
and Mortgage (Exhibit "3") in favor of Lucio Adriano covering his
proportional share in the properties of the partnership consisting of two (2)
rice mills, two (2) diesel engines and a camarin, which are situated at
Candelaria, Quezon. Lucio Adriano declared these properties in his name for
taxation purposes under TCT Property Index No. 22-11-01-043-B (Exhibit
"4") and Tax Declaration No. 564 (Exhibit "5").LEX
All in all, the
withdrawals made out of the savings of the conjugal partnership of Lucio
Adriano and his wife, Gliceria Dorado, are the following:
1. Upon signing of the contract of sale and
mortgage (Exhibit "3"), Lucio Adriano paid the sum of P10,342.45 and
the balance of P24,000.00, as reflected in the statement of account of Tan Kim
as receivables from Lucio Adriano (Exhibit "6") were settled on
subsequent dates;
2. Original copy of a receipt dated May 3,
1953 (Exhibit "7") covering expenses of registration of Exhibit
"3" in the sum of P160.00;
3. Handwritten list of registration expenses
(Exhibit "8"); and
4. Originals of receipts covering amounts
paid by Lucio Adriano to Tan Kim on various dates from June 3, 1953 (Exhibits
"9" to "20", inclusive) in the aggregate sum of P24,492.15.
It likewise
appears from the evidence of the defendants that by the end of 1953, the total
capital investment of Lucio Adriano taken from his conjugal partnership with
his first wife, Gliceria Dorado, reached the amount of P94,744.88. In the late
part of 1954, however, the same partnership was dissolved by means of a verbal
agreement reached by Lucio Adriano and his partners and this resulted to an equal
division of the partnership properties with the left portion thereof going to
Tan Kang and Tan Giam and the right portion, to Lucio Adriano and Francisco
Ramirez. Furthermore, by the end of 1955, Francisco Ramirez withdrew his share
totalling P16,250.00 in favor of Lucio Adriano, who acquired the same, and from
that time on, the latter became the sole owner of the rice mill which he later
registered as the "Adriano Central Rice Mill". When the partnership
was finally dissolved in 1955, the total capital investment of Lucio Adriano
therein was P110,994.88, consisting of the fruit or income of his common fund
with Gliceria Dorado, which was cumulatively used in the acquisition of other
properties listed in the Inventory submitted to this Court by the administratrix
and defendant, Celestina Adriano de Arcilla on February 19, 1987.[8]
The decretal portion of the Order dated May
8, 1991 issued by the RTC of Lucena City reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Civil Case No. 88-115, this Court
finds and so holds that no cogent reasons or grounds exist to affect adversely,
if not nullify, the testamentary dispositions and provisions contained in the
Last Will and Testament of the late Lucio (Ambrocio) Adriano. Accordingly, the
complaint filed in this case is hereby ordered dismissed with costs against
plaintiffs.
Jjä sc
In like manner,
the counterclaim is hereby ordered dismissed.
2. In Spec. Proc. No. 4442, it is hereby
ordered that the settlement, liquidation, and partitioning of the estate of the
late Lucio (Ambrocio) Adriano, more particularly the delivery of the respective
shares of his heirs, the plaintiffs and defendants, be effected and implemented
in accordance with the testamentary provisions set forth in the Last Will and
Testament of the testator, Lucio (Ambrocio) Adriano.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners'
appeal for lack of merit, and affirmed in toto the Joint Order of the
RTC of Lucena City.
As elevated before us, the petition takes
issue only in respect of the property covered by TCT No. T-56553. Petitioners
insist that it was erroneous of respondent court not to have upheld the
co-ownership of Vicenta to 1/2 of said property, and to have declared the
entire property as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Lucio and Gliceria.
The petition essentially relies on the following grounds: (1) TCT No. T-56553,
issued to "Spouses, LUCIO ADRIANO and VICENTA VILLA"[10], constitutes conclusive and indefeasible evidence of
Vicenta's co-ownership in the property,[11] and (2) the Deed of Sale dated March 15, 1964, as
annotated in OCT No. O-9198[12], the mother title of TCT No. T-56553, designates
Vicenta Villa as a co-vendee. Petitioners maintain that the Deed of Sale, being
the "best evidence" of the contents thereof, proves Vicenta's
co-ownership in the land.
We see no reason to reverse respondent
court. Petitioners' insistence that a co-ownership of properties existed
between Lucio and Vicenta during their period of cohabitation before their marriage
in 1968 is without lawful basis considering that Lucio's marriage with Gliceria
was then subsisting. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code [13] requires that the man and woman living together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be
incapacitated to marry.[14] Considering that the property was acquired in 1964,
or while Lucio's marriage with Gliceria subsisted, such property is presumed to
be conjugal unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife.[15] Thus, we ruled in Pisueña vs. Heirs of Petra
Unating and Aquilino Villar[16] that the prima
facie presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal
cannot prevail over a court's specific finding reached in adversarial proceedings
to the contrary. ScÓ jj
As found by both the trial court and
respondent court in this case, not only did petitioners fail to overcome the
presumption of conjugality of the disputed property, private respondents have
also presented sufficient evidence to support their allegation that the
property was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal fund of
his first marriage. This factual finding, which is clearly borne out by the
evidence on record, is binding and conclusive upon us and will not be
disturbed.
Although in cases of common-law relations
where an impediment to marry exists, equity would dictate that property
acquired by the man and woman through their joint endeavor should be allocated
to each of them in proportion to their respective efforts,[17] petitioners in the instant case have not submitted
any evidence that Vicenta actually contributed to the acquisition of the
property in question. Sjä cj
We cannot agree with petitioners’ bare and
expedient assertion that, because the title to the property was registered in
the name of both Lucio and Vicenta, she should thereby be deemed owner to half
of it. A certificate of title under the Torrens system is aimed to protect
dominion, and should certainly not be turned into an instrument for deprivation
of ownership.[18] Because a just and complete resolution of this case
could only be arrived at by determining the real ownership of the contested
property, evidence apart from or contrary to the certificate of title bears
considerable importance.[19] This assumes peculiar force in the instant situation
where the heirs of a lawful pre-existing marriage stand to be deprived. Thus,
in Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals,[20] we held that property acquired by a man while living
with a common-law wife during the subsistence of his marriage is conjugal
property, even when the property was titled in the name of the common-law wife.
In such cases, a constructive trust is deemed to have been created by operation
of Article 1456 of the Civil Code over the property which lawfully pertains to
the conjugal partnership of the subsisting marriage.
Article 1456. If
property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes.
InVicenta’s case, it is clear that her
designation as a co-owner of the property in TCT No. T-56553 is a mistake which
needs to be rectified by the application of the foregoing provisions of article
1456 and the ruling in Belcodero. The principle that a trustee who takes
a Torrens title in his or her name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration, is a well-known exception to the principle of conclusiveness of a
certificate of title.[21]
On petitioners’ second ground, we note that
the Deed of Sale dated March 15, 1964 which purportedly designates Vicenta as a
co-buyer of the property was not even presented in evidence. The entry in OCT
No. 0-9198 of the Deed of Sale bears no weight in proving Vicenta’s supposed co-ownership,
applying petitioners’ own argument that the document itself, the Deed of Sale
in the instant case, is the best evidence of its contents. The memorandum in
the OCT is not admissible as evidence of the contents of said Deed of Sale, but
only of the fact of its execution, its presentation for notation, and its
actual notation for purposes of constructive notice to the public of the
preferential rights created and affecting that property.[22] Besides, even if said Deed of Sale was submitted in
evidence, it still has no bearing because it could not be said to affect or
bind third parties to the sale, such as private respondents herein.
WHEREFORE, the Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 41509 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Supremeä
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Purisima, J., no part.
[1] Written by Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul, and concurred in by Associate Justices Fidel P. Purisima (Chairman) and Eubulo G. Verzola.
[2] Presided by Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero.
[3] RTC Order; Rollo, 103-104.
[4] Exhibit "P"; Folder of Exhibits, 17.
[5] Paragraph 2 of the Last Will and Testament of Lucio Adriano; Records of the Case, 5-6.
[6] Joint Stipulation of facts and Issues; Records of the Case, 85.
[7] Complaint; Records of the Case, 3.
[8] RTC Order; Rollo, 104-106.
[9] RTC Order; Rollo, 112.
[10] Exhibit "P", op. cit., note 4.
[11] Citing Sinoan vs. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 407; Centeno vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 545; Umbay vs. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427.
[12] Exhibit "FF"; Folder of exhibits, 66-67.
[13] Article 144 of the Civil Code provides:
"When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules of co-ownership."
[14] Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 303; Juaniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306; Camporedondo vs. Aznar, 102 Phil. 1055; Osmeña vs. Rodriguez, 54 O.G. 5526; Malijacan vs. Rubi, 42 O.G. 5576.
[15] Civil Code, Art. 160.
[16] G.R. No. 132803 dated August 31, 1999, see p. 14.
[17] The Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988,
now clearly provides in cases of cohabitation where the common-law spouses
suffer from legal impediment to marry:
Art. 148. xxx (O)nly the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. xxx
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article (i.e., in favor of their common children). Xxx
[18] Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377.
[19] See Padilla vs. Padilla, supra, where the Court held that property recorded in the name of both husband and wife may be shown to be exclusive property of either spouse.
[20] Supra, note 16.
[21] Padilla vs. Padilla, supra; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343.
[22] Philippine National Bank vs. Tan Ong Zse, 51 Phil. 317.