SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115990. March 31, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO BALTAZAR y ESTACIO @
"JOEY", accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.: JQUISUMBING
On appeal is the decision dated May 16,
1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31,[1] convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering
him to indemnify the offended party the amount of P50,000.00.
Appellant Joselito Baltazar y Estacio was a
22 year-old resident of Baybay, Sto. Tomas, La Union, where he was accused of
raping his neighbor, Josefina de Guzman, a 17 year-old high school student.
The facts are as follows:
On April 16, 1992, at around 7 o'clock in
the evening, appellant and Josefina with some other guests attended the pasyon
ritual at the house of the appellant's mother in Baybay.[2] The ritual lasted until about 3 o'clock the
following morning. Josefina was about to go home when Mrs. Baltazar prevailed
upon her to sleep in their house since it was already late. Mrs. Baltazar
pointed to a room where Josefina could sleep.[3] As Josefina was about to enter the room, appellant
suddenly grabbed her from behind and poked a knife at her neck.[4] Josefina fearfully asked him, "why are you
doing this to me?" But appellant ordered her to keep quiet. He pushed her
towards the bed and with his right hand holding the knife, appellant mounted
her while his left hand removed her short pants. Josefina struggled to push him
away, but appellant ordered her not to shout or he would kill her. Appellant
inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a push and pull movement, causing
her vagina to bleed.
After satisfying his lust, appellant
threatened her, telling her not to tell her mother or his own mother,
otherwise, he would kill her. Appellant then abruptly left the room. Totally
distraught at the assault, Josefina rushed home without asking permission from
appellant's mother. Mindful of appellant's threats to her life, she kept quiet
about the incident.[5] About a month thereafter, appellant left for Manila
to find work.
It was on May 13, 1992, when Josefina's
mother chanced upon her despondently crying in her room. After much prodding,
Josefina eventually broke down and told her mother of the rape. She cried that
she felt so ashamed of what happened but could not tell anyone for fear that
appellant would kill her. The following day, Josefina, accompanied by her
mother, reported the incident to the police authorities. Josefina was also
brought to the Doña Gregoria Memorial Hospital at Agoo, La Union for a medical
examination. Her family also hired a private prosecutor to prosecute the case.[6]
On September 3, 1992, upon filing of the Criminal
Complaint[7] and after preliminary investigation, the Provincial
Prosecutor filed the following Information[8] for rape against appellant: Esmsc
"The
undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, upon the sworn criminal
complaint of the seventeen-year-old offended woman JOSEFINA A. DE GUZMAN,
accuses JOSELITO BALTAZAR y ESTACIO @ "JOEY", of the crime of RAPE,
committed as follows:
That on or about
the 17th day of April, 1992, in the Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of La
Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with lewd design being then armed with a knife, did then
and there, by means of intimidation with the use of the said knife, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the aforenamed offended
woman against her will and without her consent, to her damage and
prejudice."
CONTRARY TO
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code."
On July 6, 1993, upon arraignment, appellant
entered a plea of not guilty.[9]
Trial commenced and the prosecution
presented the following witnesses: (1) Dr. Diana Imelda T. Palo, the physician
who examined[10] private complainant on May 15, 1992; (2) Josefina de
Guzman, private complainant; and (3) Natividad de Guzman, her mother.
The defense, for its part, presented
appellant himself, who denied the rape charges. He admitted, however, that he
attended the pasyon and that he slept in his mother's house at the time
of the incident. He claimed that he could not have possibly raped the victim
"since he was a married man and it was the holy week." He said that
he only learned of the accusation for rape when he was already working in
Manila.[11]
Appellant's mother, Mrs. Flora Baltazar,
corroborated his denial of the rape charges. She stated that she did not invite
Josefina to attend the pasyon, and in fact, the latter was not a
participant therein but a mere spectator. She even testified that after the pasyon,
Josefina went home with one Beatriz Estacio. Her son, appellant herein,
went to his room to sleep. Thereafter, she prepared breakfast but did not
notice any untoward incident in the house. At around 5:00 A.M., her son woke up
and went out to drive their tricycle. She further testified that her family had
been neighbors with the family of the victim, and that their relationship had
always been cordial.[12]
Other witnesses for the defense were
Faustino Estacio, who merely testified he was also present at the pasyon, but
he had gone home at around 11:00 o'clock.[13] Federico dela Cruz, another participant in the pasyon,
identified the persons who attended the ritual, but he stated that he does
not even know the victim.[14] Esmmis
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented the
victim who clarified, as to who were actually present during the pasyon, and
reiterated that the mother of appellant had actually invited her to attend it.[15]
On May 16, 1994, the trial court rendered
its decision,[16] disposing as follows:
"IN VIEW OF
THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused JOSELITO BALTAZAR guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the accused to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the offended party Josefina de
Guzman in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P 50,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED."
Hence, the present appeal. Appellant
contends that the trial court erred:[17]
a)......... IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE BASIS OF INCREDIBLE AND SUSPICIOUS DECLARATIONS
OF THE COMPLAINANT.
b)......... WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE TESTIMONY
OF DRA. DIANA PALO THAT THE LACERATIONS FOUND IN THE PRIVATE PARTS OF THE
COMPLAINANT WERE OLD LACERATIONS ABOUT THREE (3) MONTHS OLD AT THE TIME OF
EXAMINATION WHICH NEGATES THE ASSERTION OF COMPLAINANT THAT SHE WAS RAPED ON
APRIL 17,1992.
c).........IN RENDERING JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION NOT ON
THE BASIS OF THE STRENGTH OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE BUT ON THE BASIS OF THE
WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE. Esmso
Appellant belittles the rape charge
considering that the victim's story on the whole is incredible and
unbelievable. He claims that the scene of the alleged rape renders its
commission impossible, there being other occupants of the house, including
appellant's own mother. Further, he faults the victim for not making any
tenacious physical resistance to the alleged rape by "pulling down the
curtains and kicking the aparador, which she could easily do to call the
attention of the other occupants of the house that she is in danger." He
contends that the victim's conduct after the alleged rape is highly unnatural,
since she did not even report the incident to the members of her own family and
even continued with her daily chores at home. Appellant points out
inconsistencies between the victim's statement before the police, that she did
not have companions in going to the pasyon, and her testimony in court,
that the other members of appellant's family were present at the ritual.
Appellant contends that applying the maxim of falsus in onus,
falsus in omnibus, the other portions of the victim's testimony
should be disregarded. Appellant insists that he could not have raped
the victim since her own Physician even opined that the lacerations were about
three (3) months old at the time of examination, when the alleged rape
allegedly occurred only a month prior to her physical examination. Finally,
appellant makes the assertion that sexual intercourse, if it did occur, was
consensual.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the
State, contends that rape can be committed almost anywhere, even inside a house
where there are other occupants. The failure of the victim to call out to the
other occupants of the house can be attributed to her fear for her life.
Further, delay in reporting a rape incident does not indicate that the charge
was fabricated, nor does it cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant.
The alleged inconsistencies between the sworn statement and testimony of the
victim pertain to details which have nothing to do with the commission of the
rape and do not necessarily render the testimony not credible, and therefore
the maxim of falsus in onus, falsus in omnibus need not be applied.
Finally, the OSG asserts that the physician’s testimony regarding the possible
date of the rape cannot prevail over the victim’s own testimony.
In sum, appellant questions the credibility
of private complainant and the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of
the crime charged.
The peculiar nature of rape is that
"conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely upon the word of the
private complainant."[18] The crime of rape is essentially one committed in
relative isolation or even secrecy, hence it is usually only the victim who can
testify with regard to the fact of forced coitus.[19] In the assessment of credibility of witnesses, we
have laid down
the following parameters :[20] Msesm
"First, the
appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court unless
there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the
result of the case;
Second, the
findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to examine
their demeanor as they testified on the witness stand; and
Third, a witness
who testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner
and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness."
The victim herein bravely recounted her
story before the police investigators, submitted herself to a medical
examination by a physician, took to the witness stand no less than three (3)
times and was subjected to rigorous cross-examination. Her actuations and her
testimony bear the earmarks of a credible witness for no woman would subject
herself to the humiliation of a rape trial, the attendant embarrassment of a
medical examination, and suffer the stigma of a sexual assault for no motive at
all, unless the accusation be true.[21]
Appellant contends that private
complainant's testimony is inconsistent as to who were her actual companions
during the pasyon. In her sworn statement she stated that there were
other people during the pasyon while in her testimony, she stated that
only the members of the Baltazar family were present. This matter, to our mind,
does not pertain to the commission of the crime of rape. Discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness referring to minor details, and
not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair her
credibility.[22]
Appellant further negates the commission of
the rape considering the location of room and the presence of his mother in the
house. It is however an accepted rule in criminal law that rape may be
committed even when the rapist and the victim are not alone. Rape was held to
have been committed in the same room while the rapist's spouse was asleep, or
in a small room where other family members also slept.[23] It is common judicial experience that rapists are
not deterred from committing their odious act by the presence of people nearby.[24] Apparently, neither are they deterred by the solemn
atmosphere of the holy week. Exsm
As to the delay in reporting the rape
incident, the victim already explained that she did not immediately report the
incident because of appellant's threats to kill her.[25] Even after the rape, he was always guarding her
everytime she would leave the house. It was only after appellant left for
Manila that she finally gathered enough courage to tell her mother of the
sexual assault upon her person.[26] It is not uncommon for rape victims to conceal for
sometime the assaults on their virtue or person because of the rapist's threats
on their lives.[27]
The more pressing issue is whether all the
elements of rape as alleged in the Information were duly proved by the
prosecution. Here we find the following duly established beyond reasonable
doubt.
First, appellant had carnal knowledge with
the victim. As testified to by the victim:
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR
ALBERTO GOROSPE TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT[28]
"Q: When you
were trying to push him with your two hands while Joselito was on
top of you, did you say anything?
A: I told him to
please pity me but he said don't shout, I will kill you.
Q: After saying
that to you, what else did Joselito do if he did anything after that?
A: After
undressing me, he inserted his penis inside my vagina and made a push and pull
movement." (Emphasis supplied) KyleX
Second, carnal knowledge took place by using
force or intimidation. Appellant insists that "the complainant did not
offer any tenacious resistance to the alleged sexual assault."[29] Nowhere is it required in our law or jurisprudence,
however, that a woman must offer "tenacious" resistance to a sexual
assault. The law does not impose upon the rape victim the burden of proving
resistance.[30] We have held countless of times that "the force
or violence required in rape cases is relative. When applied, it need not be
overpowering or irresistible; it is enough that it has enabled the offender to
consummate his purpose or to bring about the desired result."[31] For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the
force or intimidation employed in accomplishing the crime be so great or of
such character as could not be resisted. What is necessary is that the
force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused
had in mind.[32] In this case, the victim testified that appellant
poked a knife at her neck,[33] threatened her not to shout or he would kill her.[34] The act of holding a knife by itself is strongly
suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a
knife is sufficient to bring her into submission.[35] Thus we have held that physical resistance need not
be established in rape cases when intimidation is exercised upon her and she
submits herself against her will to the rapist's lust because of fear for her
life and personal safety.[36] The victim's failure to resist the accused's assault
successfully and to escape when the opportunity presented itself should not be
construed as a manifestation of consent.[37]
It follows from these circumstances that,
thirdly, the coitus was against her will and without her consent.
Appellant makes much of the fact that the
physician who examined the victim a month after the rape testified that the
hymenal lacerations could have been inflicted even as far as three (3) months
previous to the date of examination. Considering that the medical examination
took place almost a month after the rape incident, the physician could at best
only estimate the possible date of the rape within the range of a certain
period. Furthermore, laceration of the hymen, even if considered the most
telling and irrefutable physical evidence of sexual assault, is not always
essential to establish the consummation of the crime of rape.[38] In fact, even the absence of hymenal lacerations
does not disprove sexual abuse for the mere introduction of the male organ into
the labia of the pudendum constitutes carnal knowledge.[39] Insofar as the evidentiary value of a medical
examination is concerned, we have held that "a medical examination of the
victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in
character and is not an indispensable element in rape. What is important is
that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal
and credible."[40] A medical examination is not indispensable to the
prosecution of rape as long as the evidence on hand convinces the court that a
conviction for rape is proper.[41] Kycalr
The rape was committed with the use of a
knife, which is a deadly weapon.[42] At the time of the commission of the crime on April
16, 1992, the penalty for rape "committed with the use of a deadly
weapon" was reclusion perpetua to death.[43] The 1987 Constitution having suspended the
imposition of the death penalty at that time, the trial court correctly imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As to the amount of damages, it has been the
policy of the Supreme Court to outrightly award an amount not exceeding
P50,000.00 to rape victims which relates to and should be categorized as actual
or compensatory damages.[44] In addition, moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 should be awarded without further need of proof.[45]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo,
La Union, Branch 31, in Criminal Case No. A-2442 convicting appellant JOSELITO
BALTAZAR y ESTACIO of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to the amount of damages.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the private complainant the sum of
one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) consisting of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.6/27/00 3:10 PM
[1] Judge Marianito A. Licudan, presiding.
[2] TSN, August 4, 1993, pp. 10-12.
[3] Id. at 13-15.
[4] Id. at 17, 19.
[5] Id. at 20-25; TSN, August 9, 1993, pp. 9, 15-16.
[6] TSN, August 4, 1993, pp. 26-29; TSN, August 17, 1993, pp. 3-17.
[7] Records, p. 2.
[8] Id. at 22.
[9] Records, p. 36.
[10] Medico-Legal Certificate, Exh. "A," "A-1," to "A-5," Records, p. 3; TSN, August 4, 1993, pp. 5-7.
[11] TSN, October 14, 1993, pp. 5-9, 15-19.
[12] TSN, September 15, 1993, pp. 4-8, 11-19.
[13] TSN, September 14, 1993, pp. 3-5, 8-9.
[14] TSN, October 14, 1993, pp. 2-4.
[15] TSN, December 14, 1993, pp. 2-6.
[16] Rollo, pp. 14-36.
[17] Rollo, pp. 59-60.
[18] People v. Altagtag, G.R. Nos. 124449-51, June 29, 1999, p. 7.
[19] People v. Sagun, 303 SCRA 382, 392 (1999); People v. De Guzman, 265 SCRA 228, 240 (1996); People v. Domingo, 226 SCRA 156, 166 (1993)
[20] People v. Sahor, G.R. No. 128384, June 29, 1999, p. 5; People v. Galimba, 253 SCRA 722, 727 (1996)
[21] People v. Gastador, G.R. No. 123727, April 14, 1999, p. 14; People v. Alquizalas, G.R. No. 128386, March 25, 1999, p. 7; People v. Lapinoso, 303 SCRA 664, 676 (1999); People v. Esguerra, 256 SCRA 657, 664 (1996)
[22] People v. Maglente, G.R. Nos. 124559-66, April 30, 1999, pp. 22-23; People v. Empante, G.R. Nos. 130665 and 137996-97, April 21, 1999, pp. 9-10.
[23] People v. Alitagtag, G.R. Nos. 124449-51, June 29, 1999, p. 10, People v. Perez, 296 SCRA 17, 30 (1998); People v. Leoterio, 264 SCRA 608, 615 (1996); People v. Dones, 254 SCRA 696, 707 (1996); People v. Cura, 240 SCRA 234, 242 (1995)
[24] People v. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559, 571 (1998)
[25] TSN, August 4, 1993, p. 23.
[26] Id. at 26-27.
[27] People v. Tayaban, 296 SCRA 497, 509 (1998); People v. Bartolome, 296 SCRA 615, 628 (1998)
[28] TSN, August 4, 1993, p. 22.
[29] Rollo, p. 64.
[30] People v. Cantos, G.R. No. 129298, April 14, 1999, p. 12; People v. Talabac, 256 SCRA 441, 450 (1996)
[31] People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 122453, July 28, 1999, p. 11; People v. Sagaysay, G.R. No. 128818, June 17, 1999, p. 11; People v. Mendoza, 163 SCRA 568, 571 (1988)
[32] People v. Alfeche, 294 SCRA 352, 372 (1998)
[33] TSN, August 4, 1993, p. 20.
[34] Id. at 22.
[35] People v. Dizon, G.R. Nos. 126044-45, July 2, 1999, p. 9; People v. Reynaldo, 291 SCRA 701, 713-714 (1998); People v. Pili, 289 SCRA 121, 135 (1998)
[36] People v. Berana, G.R. No. 123544, July 29, 1999, p. 10.
[37] People v. Monfero, G.R. No. 126367, June 17, 1999, p. 12; People v. Reñola, G.R. Nos. 122909-12, June 10, 1999, pp. 22-23; People v. Tayaban, 296 SCRA 497, 508 (1998)
[38] People v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 126714, March 22, 1999, p. 12; People v. Tumalad, 188 SCRA 203, 214 (1990)
[39] People v. Ayo, G.R. No. 123540, March 30, 1999, p. 15; People v. de la Pena, 276 SCRA 558, 562 (1997)
[40] People v. Brandares, G.R. No. 130092, July 26, 1999, p. 6; People v. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251, 268 (1998)
[41] People v. Rebose, G.R. No. 131104, June 17, 1999, p. 7; People v. Devilleres, 269 SCRA 716, 726 (1997)
[42] People v. Alfeche, 294 SCRA 352, 378 (1998)
[43] Article 335, Revised Penal Code.
[44] People v. Perez, 296 SCRA 17, 36 (1998)
[45] People v. Acala, G.R. Nos. 127023-25, May 19, 1999, p. 30.