SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115192. March 7, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELMER SALAS y DAVID, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 45, in Criminal Case No. 6656,
finding appellant Elmer Salas y David guilty of Robbery with Homicide and
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The factual background of this case is as
follows:
On October 14, 1992, Salas was charged in an
Information filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, as
follows:
"That on or
about the 6th day of March 1992, at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, in
barangay San Nicolas, municipality of Mexico, province of Pampanga, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
ELMER SALAS y DAVID, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation by then
and there stabbing one Virginia S. Talens on the different parts of her body
with the use of a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the said Virginia S.
Talens mortal and fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death and
thereafter take, steal and carry away with him the victim’s money amounting to
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) more or less and a piece of gold earring valued
at SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P750.00) to the damage and prejudice of the said
victim, Virginia S. Talens.
"Contrary to
law."[1]
On November 9, 1992, appellant was arraigned
with assistance of counsel. He entered a plea of "Not Guilty."[2] Trial on the merits immediately ensued.
The prosecution’s evidence as synthesized by
the trial court reads:
"[A]t about
6:00 o’clock in the morning of March 6, 1992, a 60 year old woman, identified
as Virginia Talens was found lying dead in a canal at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico,
Pampanga; she was last seen alive at about 3:00 o’clock early morning of March
6, 1992 by Orlando Pangan and Richard Pangan who were with her going home
coming from the wake of one Leonardo Flores; both Orlando and Richard Pangan
testified that accused was with them (four [4] all in all, Orlando, Richard,
Virginia and accused) in going home at about 3:00 o’clock in the morning of March
6, 1992; Orlando and Richard Pangan reached first their house and left the two
(Virginia and accused) on the way and that was the last time Virginia was seen
alive; just a few minutes after reaching his house and while inside his house,
Orlando Pangan heard a shout; another woman, one Serafia Gutierrez, testified
that she likewise was awakened by a shout at about 3:00 in the morning; Dr.
(Dominic) Aguda who autopsied the victim found hematoma on the head and chest,
an abrasion on the left chin and stabwound on the neck which stabwound, the
doctor claims, was the cause of death of the victim; Police Investigator
(Danilo) Gonzales who immediately responded upon report, recovered at the scene
a pin (perdible), the victim’s wristwatch, earring, a ring and P135.00
money; he likewise found on March 9, 1992 when he continued his investigation
bloodstain on the front door of the house of the accused which bloodstain when
submitted for examination was found to be of human blood; one (Florentina)
Resultay was with Virginia Talens at about 5:00 afternoon of March 5, 1992 in
going to the wake, who claims that Virginia had money on a purse as while they
were on the way Virginia bet on a jueteng she saw Virginia got money from her
purse a P500.00 bill but as she had no change she instead took P8.00 from her
other pocket; one Ramil Talens, a son of the victim corroborated the claim of
Resultay that Virginia had with her at that time money worth P2,000.00 as in
the morning of March 5, 1992 he gave her (sic) mother for safekeeping the sum
of P1,500.00 which he claims his mother placed in her purse and claims further
that at the wake, he asked and was given P50.00 by his mother as he also
participated in the gambling thereat, however, the purse of Virginia containing
about P2,000.00 was no longer to be found when she was found dead; Orlando
Pangan saw the accused gambled in the wake; Virginia likewise gambled at the
wake; accused had been working for three (3) days before March 6 at Sta. Ana,
Pampanga and up to March 5, 1992, but the following day, he did not anymore
report for work at Sta. Ana, Pampanga, was no longer to be found and was last
seen at about 3:00 morning together with Virginia Talens on their way home
coming from the wake; the parents of [the] accused were informed by
Investigator Gonzales that their son was the suspect and adviced (sic) them to
surrender him, but since March 6, 1992 when accused left Mexico, Pampanga, he
returned only on September 19, 1992 at Arayat, Pampanga, not at Mexico,
Pampanga where he was ultimately apprehended by the Mexico Police on September
22, 1992 after chancing on a radio message by the police of Arayat to their
Provincial commander that a vehicular incident occurred at Arayat, Pampanga
where one Elmer Salas was the victim and was hospitalized at the district
hospital at Arayat, Pampanga where he used the name of Rommel Salas and not
Elmer Salas."[3]
Appellant’s defense was denial. He also
asked the trial court to appreciate his voluntary surrender. The lower court
summed up his version of the incident as follows:
"...While he
denied having killed Virginia Talens, through his claim though that he chanced
upon Virginia on her way home together with Richard and Orlando Pangan at about
3:00 early morning of March 6, 1992, it can be inferred that he was around or
in the place of the incident at about that time when Virginia Talens was last
seen alive. To support the denial or having fled, he claim(ed) that upon
arrival at his house from the wake at about 3:00 in the morning of March 6,
1992, he ate, change(d) clothes, rested for a while and left for Calamba, for
his new job arriving (in) Manila at about 5:00 morning and reached Calamba at
about 11:00 morning. He however stayed at Calamba until September 19,
1992."[4]
On March 14, 1994, the trial court rendered
its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused Elmer Salas y
David Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
hereby sentencing him of (sic) the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
"He is
likewise hereby ordered to reimburse the amount of P2,000.00 and to indemnify
the heirs of the late Virginia Talens, the sum of P50,000.00.
"SO
ORDERED."[5]
On April 4, 1994, Salas filed his notice of
appeal. Appellant assigns the following errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CHAIN OF EVENTS PRESENTED BY THE STATE CONSTITUTE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION;
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THERE IS ROBBERY IN THIS CASE;
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE MERELY BECAUSE OF MINOR AND IMMATERIAL
VARIANCE OF THE TESTIMONIES OF DEFENSE WITNESSES;
4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
BASED ON MERE SUSPICION AND SCANTY EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;
5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED FOR FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant submits that the errors assigned
are intertwined and hence, may be discussed jointly.
In his brief,[6] appellant raises the following arguments to support
his claim of innocence: First, he denies that he was the last person seen in
the company of the victim during the wee hours of that fateful morning.
Instead, he points an accusing finger at the father and son duo of Orlando and
Richard Pangan, as the last persons to be with the victim. He insists that he
passed the three of them on his way home to San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga and
did reach his house ahead of them. Appellant particularly assails the testimony
of Orlando Pangan that he heard a loud shout after the latter had entered his house.
Appellant argues that Richard failed to corroborate Orlando’s claim, thus
making their story doubtful. He also contends that Orlando’s statement that he
failed to come out of his house to see what the shouting was about or to render
assistance and succor to the victim is contrary to human knowledge and
experience. He submits that the Pangans should be the prime suspects in the
offense charged and not him.
Second, he faults the court a quo for
relying on speculation, surmise, and conjecture in finding that he robbed the
victim. Appellant vehemently insists that there is not a shred of concrete
evidence to show that the deceased Virginia Talens was carrying the sum of P2,000.00
in her purse at the time of the incident or that he stole the same. He now insists
that to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the robbery must be as
conclusively proven as any other essential element of a crime.
Third, appellant charges the court below
with reversible error when it held that his failure to report for work on March
6, 1992 was a sign of flight and evident guilt. He insists that he quit his
painting job in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, over a disagreement with his employer over
his work rates and had a better offer in Calamba, Laguna. He claims that he
never went into hiding and begs this Court to take a second look at the
probative value of the testimonies of the witnesses he presented to support his
claim.
Finally, appellant argues that the trial
court committed grave error when it failed to consider his voluntary surrender.
He said that he was hospitalized and thus could not surrender at that time. He
said he used the name "Rommel Salas,"[7] when he was hospitalized following a vehicular
accident in Arayat, Pampanga. His use of "Rommel" instead of
"Elmer" should not have been taken by the court as a sign of his
intent to evade the law. He asks us to take notice of his explanation that his
nickname is "Rommel." Besides, he insists that it makes no difference
whether he used "Rommel" or "Elmer," as the two have the
same sound (idem sonans). His use of Rommel cannot be successfully used
to hide his identity.
Petitioner, therefore, prays that we reverse
the decision of the trial court and acquit him of the offense charged.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or
not there is evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of the appellant of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
In this case, there was no eyewitness nor
direct evidence, either to the robbery or to the homicide and none of the
things allegedly stolen were ever recovered. However, direct evidence is not
the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its findings and conclusion
of culpability.[8] Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential when
to insist on direct testimony would result in setting felons free.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient
to support a conviction,[9] all the circumstances must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis excepting that of
guilt.[10] All the circumstances established must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one and fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
solely to the accused, to the exclusion of all other persons, as the author of
the crime.[11] The facts and circumstances consistent with the
guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence can constitute
evidence which, in weight and probative value, may be deemed to surpass even
direct evidence in its effect on the court.[12]
The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens
occurred at around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant hastily abandoned his
house in Barrio San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since childhood,
on that very date. Appellant was nowhere when his co-worker and barriomate,
Eduardo Bagtas, came to appellant’s house to fetch him for work at around 6:30
to 7:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992.[13] Appellant also abandoned his job as a painter in
Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on March 6, 1992, the date of the crime, leaving behind an
unfinished painting project. He was not seen again from said date.[14] Police investigators found human bloodstains on the
front door of appellant’s house, on his clothing, and on his yellow slippers
after the victim was killed.[15] Despite efforts of the police to find appellant as
the principal suspect, a fact known to appellant’s family and neighbors,
appellant did not present himself to the authorities.[16] Appellant was apprehended only a full six (6) months
after the date of the crime, following his confinement in a hospital in Arayat,
Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a Victory Liner bus in Arayat.[17] When hospitalized, appellant used the alias Rommel
Salas, instead of his true name Elmer Salas.[18] These circumstances denote flight, which when
unexplained, has always been considered by the courts as indicative of guilt.[19]
Both appellant and victim gambled at the
wake they attended.[20] The victim was, in fact, enjoying a winning streak
when her son, Ramil Talens, came to fetch her but which he failed to do because
his mother was winning, and she refused to leave.[21] The purse of Talens containing cash was gone when
her corpse was found in the canal with a stab wound and bruises. What was left
was a safety pin which victim used to fasten the missing purse to her clothes.[22]
The foregoing circumstances, together, lead
to no other conclusion except that appellant robbed and killed the victim.
Appellant insists that he neither robbed nor
killed Virginia Talens. He vehemently denies being the last person seen with
the victim alive. He instead points to prosecution witness Orlando Pangan and
his son, Richard Pangan, as the most likely malefactors. We note, however, that
appellant failed to rebut Orlando Pangan’s testimony that it was appellant who
was last seen with the victim alive about 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992, in the
company of appellant who was her next-door-neighbor.[23] Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[24] Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be
given greater evidentiary weight over the testimonies of credible witnesses who
positively testified that appellant was at the locus criminis and was
the last person seen with the victim alive.[25]
We likewise note that appellant is the
nephew of prosecution witness Orlando Pangan. Appellant miserably failed to
show any reason why Orlando Pangan should wrongly testify against his own kin
who stands accused. The absence of evidence showing any improper motive on the
part of the principal witness for the prosecution to falsely testify against
the appellant strongly tends to buttress the conclusion that no such improper
motive exists and that the testimony of said witnesses deserve full faith and
credit.[26]
The trial court found the testimonies of
appellant’s two witnesses, Meliton Ocampo and Wilfredo Salas, biased and
inconsistent.[27] The transcript of stenographic notes shows that
their testimonies not only contradicted each other, but likewise contradicted
appellant’s testimony. Appellant claimed that he left during the wee hours of
March 6, 1992, for his new painting job in Calamba, Laguna[28] and that it was his first time to go to said place.[29] Defense witness Meliton Ocampo, however, testified
that the appellant had been to Calamba several times before the incident.[30] Defense witness Wilfredo Salas, appellant’s brother
and son-in-law of Meliton, claimed that the bloodstains found on the front door
of appellant’s house were his. He testified that the stains were the result of
an injury his hand sustained when he boxed their front door in February 1992.[31] Appellant, however, testified that the boxing
incident happened in January 1992.[32] We note also that Wilfredo’s testimony failed to
explain the presence of bloodstains on appellant’s clothes and slippers after
the killing of Virginia Talens. Wilfredo further claims that he was residing in
Mexico, Pampanga, at the time Virginia Talens was killed.[33] However, his father-in-law testified that Wilfredo
was then residing in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.[34] We find that the trial court did not err when it
found the testimonies for the defense so riddled with inconsistencies as to
have no probative value. The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe
the demeanor and conduct of the defense witnesses on the stand, was not
convinced of their credibility. It is a time-tested doctrine that the trial
court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight,
and is even conclusive and binding upon us, if not tainted with arbitrariness
or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.[35]
Appellant contends that the trial court
erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
After the killing of Virginia Talens, appellant as the prime suspect was the
object of a police manhunt, which lasted for half a year. During said period,
appellant continued to evade arrest. The essence of voluntary surrender is
spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or
he wants to save the State the trouble of having to effect his arrest. Spontaneity
and an intent to give one’s self up are absent where the accused went into
hiding for six months after the incident and had to resort to an alias when he
was involved in an accident being investigated by the police authorities.
Appellant also avers that his alias
"Rommel Salas" sounds the same as "Elmer Salas" and his use
of "Rommel" proves he was never in hiding. Under the rule of idem
sonans, two names are said to be "idem sonantes" if the
attentive ear finds difficulty in distinguishing them when pronounced.[36] It is not difficult to distinguish between the
pronunciation of "Rommel" and "Elmer." They do not sound
alike contrary to appellant’s assertion, hence, the use of "Rommel"
does hide appellant’s identity.
Is appellant’s crime homicide or robbery
with homicide?
Robbery with Homicide is a special complex
crime against property. Homicide is incidental to the robbery which is the main
purpose of the criminal.[37] In charging Robbery with Homicide, the onus
probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking of personal property with
the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property belongs
to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi; and
(d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide,
which is used in the generic sense, was committed."[38] Although there was no witness as to the actual
robbing of the victim, there is testimony that the victim had more or less P2,000.00;
and wore gold earrings valued at P750.00. These were never recovered.
While there is indeed no direct proof that
Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was killed, we may conclude from
four circumstances that the robbery occasioned her killing: (1) Both appellant
and victim gambled at the wake. (2) The appellant knew that victim was winning.
(3) The victim was last seen alive with appellant. (4) The victim’s purse
containing her money and earrings were missing from her body when found.
In our view, these circumstances logically
lead to the inescapable conclusion that appellant should be liable not just of
simple homicide, but robbery with homicide under Article 294 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code, as ruled by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 45, in Criminal Case No. 6656,
dated March 14, 1994, is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Records, p. 2.
[2] Id. at 8.
[3] Id. at 188-189.
[4] Id. at 189.
[5] Id. at 191.
[6] Rollo, p. 56.
[7] Exhibit s"DD-14", "DD-14-A" to "DD-14-J" and Exhibit "EE."
[8] People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 131151, August 25, 1999, p.4; People v. De La Cruz, G.R. No. 111704, March 17, 1999, p.10.
[9] Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when
sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There
is more than one circumstance;
(b) The
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt."
[10] People v. Olivarez, Jr., 299 SCRA 635, 652 (1998) citing People v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141 (1997).
[11] People v. Bantilan, G.R. No. 129286, September 14, 1999 citing People v. Parel, 261 SCRA 720 (1996), People v. Tabag, 268 SCRA 115 (1997), People v. Villaran, 269 SCRA 630 (1997) and People v. Salvame, 270 SCRA 766 (1997); People v. Tapales, G.R. No. 125808, September 3, 1999, p.8; People v. Gargar, et al., 300 SCRA 542, 552 (1998) citing People v. Danao, 323 Phil. 178 (1996).
[12] People v. Acuno, G.R. No. 130964, September 3, 1999, p. 12 citing People v. Eubra, 274 SCRA 180 (1997).
[13] TSN, November 11, 1992, pp. 16-17.
[14] Supra, at 18-19.
[15] TSN, December 15, 1992, pp. 28-33.
[16] Supra, at 34.
[17] Exhibit "X."
[18] TSN, January 25, 1993, pp. 4-5; see also Exhibit "X."
[19] People v. Mantung, G.R. No. 130372, July 20, 1999; People v. Abria, 300 SCRA 556, 564 (1998).
[20] Supra, Note 18 at 13-14.
[21] TSN, December 16, 1992, pp. 7-9.
[22] Supra, at 7-8.
[23] TSN, November 24, 1992, pp. 14-17.
[24] People v. Macuha, G.R. No. 110085, July 6, 1999, p. 8.
[25] People v. Mores, et al., G.R. No. 107746, July 28, 1999, p. 6.
[26] People v. Abdul, G.R. No. 128074, July 13, 1999, p. 18 citing People v. Lapinoso, G.R. No. 122507, February 25, 1999, p. 14; People v. Rada, et al., G.R. No. 128181, June 10, 1999, p. 15.
[27] Records, p. 189.
[28] TSN, October 13, 1993, pp 11, 17, 23 –24.
[29] Id. at 26.
[30] TSN, December 1, 1993, p. 4.
[31] TSN, November 3, 1993, pp. 4-5.
[32] TSN, October 13, 1993, p. 6.
[33] TSN, November 23, 1993, p. 3.
[34] TSN, December 1, 1993, p. 4.
[35] People v. Reduca, 301 SCRA 516, 528 (1999).
[36] Martin v. State, 541 S.W. 2d 605, 606.
[37] People v. Faco, G.R. No. 115215, September 16, 1999, p. 17 citing People v. Navales, 266 SCRA 569 (1997).
[38] People v. Faco, supra, citing People v. Nang, 289 SCRA 16 (1998).