SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108951. March 7, 2000]
JESUS B.
DIAMONON, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; HON.
BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, as the undersecretary of Labor; MANASES[1] T. CRUZ, in his capacity
as the Med-Arbiter; ATTY. ZOILO DE LA CRUZ, JR., and MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL
CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP) and
PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL WORLER’S UNION (PACIWU), respondents. Misedp
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari
seeking to annul the twin Orders dated December 29, 1992[2] and January 25, 1993[3] of public respondent Bienvenido E. Laguesma, acting
then as Undersecretary, now the secretary, of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), in his affirmance of the dismissal[4] by the Med-Arbiter of the complaint for unauthorized
and illegal disbursement of union funds filed by petitioner Jesus B. Diamonon
against private respondent Atty. Zoilo V. de la Cruz and Sofia P. Mana-ay.
The facts of the case are the following:
Petitioner served as the National Executive
Vice President of the National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the
Philippines (NACUSIP) and Vice President for Luzon of the Philippine
Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU). Misoedp
In a letter dated March 23, 1991, petitioner
learned[5] of his removal from the positions he held in both
unions in a resolution approved during a meeting[6] of the National Executive Boards of both unions.[7]
On April 22, 1991, petitioner sought[8] reconsideration of the resolution on his removal. At
the same time, he initiated a complaint[9] (hereafter referred to as FIRST) before the DOLE
against the National President of NACUSIP and PACIWU, private respondent Atty.
Zoilo V. de la Cruz, Jr., and the members of the National Executive Boards of
NACUSIP and PACIWU questioning the validity of his removal from the positions
he held in the two unions.
While the FIRST case was pending with the
Med-Arbiter, petitioner filed on May 16, 1991 a second complaint[10] (hereafter referred to as SECOND) against private
respondent Atty. Zoilo V. de la Cruz, Jr., and the National Treasurer of
NACUSIP and PACIWU, Sofia P. Mana-ay. He accused them of three (3) offenses,
namely: (a) wanton violation of the Constitution and By-Laws of both
organizations, NACUSIP and PACIWU; (b) unauthorized and illegal disbursement of
union funds of both organizations; (c) and abuse of authority as national
officers of both organizations. Edpmis
On August 2, 1991, an Order[11] was issued in the FIRST case declaring that
petitioner’s removal from the positions he held is null and void. Private
respondents appealed[12] this decision to the public respondent DOLE.
In view of the pendency of their appeal in
the FIRST case, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[13] dated October 21, 1991 in the SECOND case.
In an Order[14] dated November 5, 1991, the Med-Arbiter dismissed
the SECOND case on the ground of lack of personality of petitioner to file the
complaint in view of his removal from the offices he held.
On December 27, 1991, public respondent
Laguesma, acting as the then Undersecretary of DOLE, decided on the FIRST case
on appeal and issued a Resolution[15] which affirmed the assailed Order dated August 2,
1991 declaring as null and void petitioner’s removal from the positions he
held. Jjsc
In view of the adverse Order dated November
5, 1991 dismissing the SECOND case, petitioner appealed[16] to the public respondent DOLE. Public respondent
Laguesma, issued the assailed Order[17] dated December 29, 1992, holding that petitioner’s
failure to show in his complaint that the administrative remedies provided for
in the constitution and by-laws of both unions, have been exhausted or such
remedies are not available, was fatal to petitioner’s cause.[18] Resultantly, he affirmed[19] the dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioner sought[20] reconsideration of the Order dated December 29,
1992. However, public respondent in his Order[21] dated January 25, 1993 denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner anchors his petition on two (2)
grounds, to wit: Scjj
"I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT
HONORABLE BIENVENIDO V. LAGUESMA HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISS [sic] THE APPEAL
INTERPOSED FROM THE ORDER OF THE MED ARBITER MENESIS [sic] T. CRUZ, AND WHEN IT
DENIED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON FLIMSY GROUNDS.
II.
THE CASE OF THE
PETITIONER IS QUITE MERITORIOUS AND TO DISREGARD THE SAME WOULD [sic]
TANTAMOUNT TO WILLFULLY [sic] CLOSING OUR EYES TO AVOID SEEING AND REALIZING
THE NAKED TRUTH."[22]
Petitioner emphatically stresses that the
only issue on appeal before the DOLE was petitioner’s alleged lack of personality
to file the complaint. When public respondent "switched" the ground
for dismissal of the complaint from "lack of personality of the
[petitioner] to file the complaint" to "non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies," he staunchly claims that the latter committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[23] For, in doing so, the challenged orders "went
outside the issues and purported to adjudicate something upon which the parties
were not heard."[24]
The petition lacks merit. Sjcj
Generally, an appellate court may only pass
upon errors assigned.[25] However, this rule is not without exceptions.[26] In the following instances,[27] the Supreme Court ruled that an appellate court is
accorded a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of assignment of errors
and consider errors not assigned:
(a) Grounds not
assigned as errors but affecting the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter;
(b) Matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law;
(c) Matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in
arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the
interests of a justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
(d) Matters not
specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties
failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; Supreme
(e) Matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned;
(f) Matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question
properly assigned, is dependent.
There is no reason why this rule should not
apply to administrative bodies as well, like the case before us, for the
instant controversy falls squarely under the exceptions to the general rule.
In the instant case, not only did petitioner
fail to comply with Section 2, Rule VIII, Book V of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code as amended[28] but also the record reveals that neither did he
exhaust the remedies[29] set forth by the Constitution and by-laws of both
unions. In the National Convention of PACIWU and NACUSIP held on August 10 and
11, 1991, respectively, nothing was heard of petitioner’s complaint against
private respondents on the latter’s alleged unauthorized and illegal
disbursement of union funds. In fact, what the National Convention resolved was
to approve and adopt the resolution of the National Executive Board removing
petitioner from the positions he held.[30] His failure to seek recourse before the National
convention on his complaint against private respondents taints his action with
prematurity.
Court
When the Constitution and by-laws of both unions
dictated the remedy for intra-union dispute, such as petitioner’s complaint
against private respondents for unauthorized or illegal disbursement of unions
funds, this should be resorted to before recourse can be made to the
appropriate administrative or judicial body, not only to give the grievance
machinery or appeals’ body of the union the opportunity to decide the matter by
itself, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to administrative
or judicial bodies. Thus, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely
initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also
pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention.[31] This rule clearly applies to the instant case. The
underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests
on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery,
as in this case, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide
the same correctly.[32] Petitioner’s premature invocation of public
respondent’s intervention is fatal to his cause of action.[33]Jlexj
Evidently, when petitioner brought before
the DOLE his complaint charging private respondents with unauthorized and
illegal disbursement of union funds, he overlooked or deliberately ignored the
fact that the same is clearly dismissible for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Thus, public respondent Bienvenido E. Laguesma, in dismissing
petitioner’s complaint, committed no grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the twin
Orders dated December 29, 1992 and January 25, 1993 by public respondent
Bienvenido E. Laguesma affirming dismissal of the complaint dated May 15, 1991
filed by petitioner against private respondents are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Buena, JJ., concur. Lexjuris
Quisumbing, J., no part, close relation to the party.
[1] The petitioner in his petition spelled "Manases" as "Menesis".
[2] Annex "H" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 90-94.
[3] Annex "K" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 103.
[4] Order dated November 5, 1991 and penned by Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz, Annex "D" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 74-76.
[5] Sub-Annexes "B" and "B-1" of Annex "A" of the Petition, Rollo, 32-33.
[6] Record, pp. 48-52.
[7] The decisions of the National Executive Boards of NACUSIP and PACIWU were duly ratified and confirmed by the National Conventions of both Unions held August 10, 1991 and August 11, 1991, Record at pp. 53-54.
[8] Annexes "F", "F-1" and "G" of the Reply, Rollo, pp. 204, 205, 206-215.
[9] Docketed as NCR-OD-M-91-04-053, annex "A" of the Reply, Rollo, pp. 157-163.
[10] The case, docketed as NCR-0D-M-91-05-052, was referred to the Med-Arbitration Branch and assigned to Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz, Annex "a" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 18-26.
[11] Annex "C" of the Reply, Rollo, pp. 177-183.
[12] Docketed as Case No. OS-A-9-290-91, appeal of Case No. NCR-OD-M-91-04-053.
[13] Annex "B" of the Petition, Rollo at pp. 64-72.
[14] See Note No. 4, supra. at 75.
[15] Annex "H" of the Reply, Rollo, pp. 216-225.
[16] Docketed as Case No. OS-MA-A-1-18-92, appeal of Case No. NCR-OD-M-91-05-052, Annex "E" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 77-85.
[17] See Note No. 2, supra.
[18] Ibid.
[19] See Note No. 2, supra at pp. 93-94.
[20] Annex "I" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 95-101.
[21] See Note No. 3, supra.
[22] Petition, Rollo, p. 10.
[23] Id., p. 12.
[25] Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 145, 153 [1997].
[26] Logronio v. Taleseo, G.R. No. 134602, August 6, 1999; Dando v. Frazer 227 SCRA 126, 133 [1993]; Espina v. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 484, 488 [1992]; Carillo v. De Paz, 18 SCRA 467, 471 [1966]; Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil 196, 209-210 [1947].
[27] Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 181, 191-192 [1996].
[28] Section 2, Rule VIII, Book V of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Labor Code as amended states:
"Sec. 2. Who may file. If the issue
involves the entire membership of the union, the complaint shall be signed by
at least 30% of the membership of the union.
In addition to the above requirement, the petition on its face must show that the administrative remedies provided for in the constitution and by-laws have been exhausted or such remedies are not readily available to the complaining members through no fault of their own. x x x" (italics supplied)
[29] Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and By-Laws
of NACUSIP states:
"Section 4. – The actions of the
National Executive Board shall be subjected [sic] to review only by the
National Convention and/or the General Council." (Italics supplied,
Record, p. 23.)
Article XII of the Constitution and By-Laws
of PACIWU states:
"Article XII – PROCEDURE FOR SETTLING
INTERNAL DISPUTE
Section 1. - In consonance with Article IV,
Section d, in relation to Article VII, paragraph F if, any officer or member of
the Union will be tried in accordance with the following trial procedures:
a) The
accusation may be brought by any officer or member in the form of a written
complaint duly signed and attested by two (2) witnesses, addressed to the
National president of the Union. The complaint shall state the date and place
of the commission of act or acts done or committed by the offenders with
specifications of the part or the provision of the Constitution violated;
b) The
National President, upon receipt of said complaint shall immediately appoint an
investigating committee who shall conduct an immediate investigation of the
charges;
c) The
Investigating Committee thus appointed shall then investigate the charges by
requiring the accuser and/or complainant as well as the accused and all the
witness to appear in person. Failure of any party to appear shall be construed
as a waiver of his/her right to be present in such investigation. After the
investigation, the Committee shall then submit its report or recommendation to
the executive Board for the latter’s review of the decision rendered;
d) The Executive Board may conduct a re-investigation or re-hearing of the case should it find compelling reasons therefor, and the decision of the Executive Board shall be final." (Record, p. 6.)
[30] See Note 7, supra.
[31] Carale v. Abarintos, 269 SCRA 132, 141 [1997].
[32] Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 198, 219 [1998]; University of the Philippines v. Catungal, Jr., 272 SCRA 221, 240 [1997].
[33] Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167, 175 [1997], National Development Company v. Hervilla, 151 SCRA 520, 529 [1987].