SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1519. June 27,
2000]
GREGORIO
LIMPOT LUMAPAS, complainant, vs. JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, MOLAVE, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, BRANCH 23, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint,
for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, filed against the Honorable Camilo
E. Tamin, presiding judge of Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court, Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur. In said complaint, it was also alleged inter alia
that respondent "displayed an unusual interest, despite of the censure or
reproof by the Court of Appeals," such that the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 7, 1997, in CA-G.R. SP No. 41099 granting the Writ of Mandamus
prayed for by petitioner and ordering respondent court [presided by Judge
Tamin] to issue the writ of execution in petitioner’s favor, was not executed
by respondent.
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the
Office of the Court Administrator, are as follows:
"A certain Guillermo
Lumapas died single and intestate on April 8, 1965. He left a parcel of land
covered by OCT No. P-157 registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Sur on April 21, 1953. The complainant [Gregorio Limpot Lumapas],
claiming to be the only son and heir of the deceased Guillermo Lumapas,
succeeded in obtaining OCT No. 06-151 over the same parcel of land on August
20, 1985 by virtue of Cadastral Decree No. 190636, Cad. Case No. N-3, Cad.
Record No. N-10 dated October 31, 1984 by substituting his name in the stead of
Guillermo Lumapas in the cadastral proceedings.
Complainant filed
a complaint for Recovery of Possession/Ownership over the said parcel of land
against Alan U. Lumapas, et al., nephews and nieces of the deceased Guillermo,
in RTC, Branch 25, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur presided over by the respondent
docketed as Civil Case No. 90-20.015(2631). On the other hand, Alan Lumapas and
his co-defendants also filed a complaint for Recovery of the same parcel of
land against Gregorio Limpot Lumapas, et al., in the same court, docketed as
Civil Case No. 90-20,025(2993). These two (2) cases were consolidated, and on
February 12, 1991, the respondent rendered a judgment declaring that the
complainant is the son of the deceased Guillermo Lumapas and his sole heir, and
ordered the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur to cancel OCT-RP-157 in the
name of Guillermo Lumapas and deal with said land as registered only under
OCT-0-6-151 in the name of Gregorio Limpot Lumapas.
Alan Lumapas and his
co-heirs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, and on February 28,
1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated a judgment declaring that Gregorio
Lumapas has not sufficiently proved that he is the son of Gregorio Lumapas but
he has the right of possession over lot 4329 (subject of Civil Cases Nos.
90-20,015 and 90-20,025)…"[1]
In its decision promulgated February 28,
1994, in CA G.R. CV No. 31820, the Court of Appeals awarded complainant the
conditional right of possession to the land in litigation, dependent upon the
validity of his title to be determined in an appropriate proceeding.[2]
On March 13, 1995, the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 31820 became final and executory.[3] Consequently, complainant filed a motion for
execution but respondent judge denied the motion in an order dated December 6,
1995, explaining in this wise:
"Gregorio
Limpot has been declared by the Honorable Court of Appeals to be not the legal
heir of Guillermo Lumapas.
x x x
…Gregorio Limpot
has no legal right to use the surname "Lumapas" without the consent
of the putative father. "Gregorio Limpot-Lumapas" is therefore, a
non-entity in so far as the law is concerned for there is in fact no such
person existing.
Inasmuch as
Gregorio Limpot, the movant is not a legal heir of Guillermo Lumapas,
therefore, he has no legal authority or personality to act for and in behalf of
Gregorio Limpot-Lumapas, the non-existing person to whom the Honorable Court of
Appeals has awarded the possession of the land in litigation. He is a mere
pretender who should not be allowed to benefit from his illegal manuevers
(sic). He is a complete stranger in so far as the estate of Guillermo Lumapas
is concerned."[4]
Because of respondent judge’s denial to
issue a writ of execution on a final and executory judgment, complainant filed
a Petition for Mandamus docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 41099 with the Court
of Appeals, which issued the writ on July 7, 1997. Respondent judge, instead of
obeying or implementing the writ, filed a motion for reconsideration before the
Court of Appeals. The motion was denied.
Meanwhile, in view of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, the
Lumapas heirs, defendants in the civil cases cited above, filed another case on
June 18, 1996, this time, a petition for the cancellation of complainant’s OCT.
The case was also filed before RTC, Branch 23, presided over by respondent
judge. This case was docketed as SPL Case No. 96-50,022. On July 9, 1996,
complainant moved for the inhibition of respondent judge, believing him to have
already prejudged the case in favor of his opponents. Respondent judge denied
the motion.
Complainant then filed a petition for
prohibition and/or disqualification before this Court, which remanded the same to
the Court of Appeals, therein docketed as CA. G.R. SP No. 43507.
However, before the Court of Appeals
resolved the petition for prohibition, respondent judge set for pre-trial the
petition for cancellation of the OCT. Complainant moved for its postponement
but respondent judge denied it. Complainant was subsequently declared in
default on March 11, 1997. His motion to set aside the order of default was
likewise denied.
On July 23, 1997, respondent rendered his
judgment in SPL Case No. 96-50,022, in which he reversed his decision in the
consolidated Civil Cases No. 90-20,015 (2631) and No. 90-20,025 (2993).
On September 4, 1997, the Court of Appeals
denied on technical grounds, complainant’s petition for prohibition. The motion
for reconsideration was also denied on January 19, 1998, for being moot and
academic. By that time, respondent judge had already rendered his decision in
SPL Case No. 96-50,022 in favor of the Lumapas heirs.
Complainant filed the present complaint on
September 11, 1997, alleging that respondent judge knowingly rendered an unjust
judgment in SPL Case No. 96-50,022 since, in the earlier consolidated cases
concerning the same subject matter, respondent judge had already ruled in favor
of complainant.
In his reply, respondent judge justified his
refusal to issue a writ of execution for Civil Cases No. 90-20,015 (2631) and
No. 90-20,025 (2993) on the ground that the Court of Appeals reversed his
decision in those cases, thus making it of no force and effect. He further
averred that his decision in SPL Case No. 96-50,022 is in accordance with law
and supported by the evidence.
In its report dated November 8, 1999, the
OCA stated that complainant failed to sufficiently establish that respondent
knowingly rendered an unjust judgment in SPL Case No. 96-50,022. It recommended
that the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment be dismissed.
However, the OCA pointed out that respondent judge, indeed, erred when he
refused to issue a writ of execution even after the CA decision became final and
executory. The OCA observed that respondent judge had the temerity to disregard
the writ of mandamus issued by the CA. For this, the OCA recommended
that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000.00.
We agree with the OCA that complainant
failed to present substantial evidence that respondent knowingly rendered an
unjust judgment in SPL Case No. 96-50,022. For such a charge to prosper,
complainant must prove that the judgment is patently contrary to law or is not
supported by the evidence and made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an
injustice.[5] None of these elements is present in this case.
We also agree with the OCA that it was error
for respondent to refuse to issue the writ of execution of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 31820 which awarded conditional right of
possession to complainant. His refusal to issue said writ is without sufficient
justification. The issuance of a writ of execution is a ministerial duty on the
part of the court, after a judgment becomes final and executory, and leaves no
room for the exercise of discretion.[6] In this case, the decision of the Court of Appeals
concerning complainant’s right of possession over the property subject of the
litigation in the RTC became final and executory on March 13, 1995. Respondent
was duty bound to grant complainant’s petition filed on December 6, 1995, for
the issuance of the writ.
A writ of mandamus lies to compel the
issuance of a writ of execution.[7] The writ of mandamus is one commanding a
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person that or who unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[8]
Mandamus literally means "we command."[9] Again, respondent had no option but to obey the
writ. Refusal to obey it is clearly a violation of the order of, and a manifest
disrespect towards, a court of superior jurisdiction.
The OCA recommended that respondent judge be
fined in the amount of P10,000.00. However, we find this amount inappropriate
under the circumstances, there being previous administrative cases[10] decided against respondent judge, with a stern
warning that a repetition thereof or similar act or offense shall be dealt with
more severely. Thus, we increase the fine to twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos.
WHEREFORE, for refusing to fulfill a ministerial duty and to
obey an order issued by a superior court, respondent Judge Camilo E. Tamin,
presiding judge of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court, Molave, Zamboanga Del Sur,
is ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00. He is further warned that a commission
of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with even more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Report of the Office of the Court Administrator, pp. 1-2.
[2] CA Decision, p. 8.
[3] CA Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 41099, p. 3.
[4] Order of December 6, 1995, pp. 1-2.
[5] De la Cruz v. Concepcion, 235 SCRA 597, 603 (1994)
[6] Toledo-Banaga v. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 331, 343 (1999)
[7] Toledo-Banaga v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[8] RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 3; Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 268 SCRA 301, 304 (1997)
[9] Black’s Law Dictionary 866 (5th ed., 1979)
[10] Alcantara vs. Judge Camilo E. Tamin, 243 SCRA 549 (1995) Re: Rufino Aloot; Ariosa vs. Judge Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-92-798; Barinaga vs. Judge Tamin, 226 SCRA 206 (1993)