THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138674. June 22, 2000]
SPS. ARTURO
REFUGIA and AURORA REFUGIA, petitioners, vs. HON. FLORO P. ALEJO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Br. 172, Valenzuela, M.M.,
RODOLFO REFUGIA, CANDELARIA REFUGIA, TERESITA-NEJAL, RICARDO REFUGIA, FRANCISCO
VIOLETA LEGAL and ROSARIO VELASCO (alleged representative of private
respondents), as substitute parties of deceased SPS. MAMERTO and FELIZA
REFUGIA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari,
petitioners seek to annul and set aside the (a) decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48315,[1] dated February 15, 1999 dismissing petitioners’
original action for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction which sought to set
aside the order of the trial court dated October 29, 1997, granting private
respondents’ motion for leave of court to file amended complaint and admitting the
complaint thereto attached, and (b) the resolution dated May 10,1999 denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.[2]
On November 15, 1993, Private respondent
Mamerto Refugia, joined by his wife Feliza and children Rodolfo and Candelaria,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela a complaint for
Specific-Performance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order against the petitioners spouses Arturo and Aurora Refugia –
and Judge Winlove M. Dumayas,[3] in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 81
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela.[4] The complaint alleged, among others, that Mamerto
Refugia was a former employee of San Miguel Corporation and had received the
amount of P20,000.00 as his retirement pay in 1975; that he dreamt of owning a
house and lot but his money was sufficient only to buy a lot; upon the advice
of his son, Arturo Refugia, as he was no longer qualified to avail of any
housing loan, Mamerto agreed to utilize Arturo’s SSS membership for the availment
of a housing loan; Mamerto agreed on condition that a two door or duplex
apartment shall be constructed and petitioner Arturo shall pay the monthly
amortizations and after full payment thereof, they shall divide the ownership
of the property between them; that private respondent Mamerto Refugia purchased
a parcel of land in Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila in September 1975 but the
land was titled in the name of petitioner Arturo Refugia as a requirement for
the latter's SSS housing loan; that a two door apartment was constructed on the
lot and after its completion, petitioners spouses Arturo and Aurora Refugia
occupied one door of the duplex apartment while private respondent Mamerto and
his family occupied the other door; that after petitioners had already paid in
full the SSS loan , private respondents made repeated demands for petitioners
to surrender ownership/title over the 1/2 portion of the said property in their
favor but petitioners refused to do so, and worse, filed an ejectment case against
private respondents based on the fact that the title of the lot was in
petitioners’ names. The complaint prayed, among others, that Mamerto Refugia be
declared the owner of one half portion of that parcel of land covered by TCT
No. T-218979 including the one door apartment erected thereon.
Spouses Arturo and Aurora filed their answer[5] and raised the affirmative defense of prescription.
The case was archived sometime in July 1995 to give way for the final
determination of the ejectment case earlier filed by spouses Arturo and Aurora
Refugia against Mamerto Refugia, et. al.[6]
On January 21, 1997, Private respondents
filed with the trial court a Motion to Revive their complaint for
specific performance[7] and the case was withdrawn from the archives and was
set for hearing on April 3, 1997.
On August 22, 1997, petitioners spouses
Arturo and Aurora Refugia filed a motion to set for preliminary hearing their
affirmative defense of prescription.
On September 4, 1997, counsel for the
private respondents filed a Notice of Death informing the trial court that
Mamerto Refugia had already died sometime in 1993, while his wife,
co-respondent Feliza Payad-Refugia died in July, 1997. Thus, it was prayed that
the deceased spouses be substituted by their legal heirs, namely: Teresita
Nejal, Ricardo Refugia, Francisca Violeta Legal and Rosario Velasco.[8]
On September 8, 1997, the trial court denied
the affirmative defense of prescription raised by the petitioners.[9] Petitioners then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the foregoing order on October 6, 1997.[10]
On October 17, 1997, private respondents
filed a MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT,[11] attaching therewith an AMENDED COMPLAINT, and
alleging the necessity to amend the complaint in order to point out the complete
claim of private respondents against the petitioners. Petitioners filed their Opposition
thereto alleging that the amendments would merely delay the proceedings of the
instant case and that the ground relied upon by private respondents was
fictitious and baseless.[12]
On October 29, 1997, the trial court issued
its assailed order[13] granting the motion for leave to file amended
complaint and admitted the amended complaint upon a finding that the purpose of
the amended complaint was only to correct inadequate allegations in the
original complaint.
On December 1, 1997, petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the aforementioned order arguing, among others, that the
trial court should not have allowed the amendment in view of the pendency of
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the Order dated September 8,1997
finding no merit in petitioners’ affirmative defense of prescription.[14] Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied in
an Order dated May 5, 1998.[15]
On July 17, 1998, petitioners spouses Arturo
and Aurora Refugia filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and or
temporary restraining order wherein they alleged that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
granting private respondents’ motion for leave of court to file amended
complaint and for admitting the amended complaint without first resolving the
motion for reconsideration dated October 3, 1997 filed by the petitioners, the
resolution of which would determine whether or not the case filed by private
respondents against petitioners had already prescribed.
On February 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals
issued its assailed order finding no merit in the petition and dismissing the
same. A motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated May 10,
1999. Petitioners are now before us alleging that the respondent Court of
Appeals committed a serious reversible error amounting to grave abuse of
discretion when it held that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
public respondent judge (1) in failing to first resolve petitioners' motion for
reconsideration before admitting the questioned complaint and (2) in finding
that the intended amendments are for no other purpose than to correct
inadequate allegations in the original complaint.[16]
In their Memorandum, petitioners contend
that the respondent Court of Appeals committed serious reversible error when it
ruled that-
"it is to us
rather too late in the day for the petitioners to raise at this time the
non-resolution by the respondent judge of their motion for reconsideration of
the order of September 8, 1997 as a bar to the admission of the private respondents’
amended complaint and to impute grave abuse of discretion on the same public
respondent on account of his admission of the amended complaint
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx petitioners themselves
are to be blamed for what they presently lament."
Petitioners claim that the trial court
should have first resolved the pending motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the affirmative defense of prescription before ruling on any subsequent
incidents. Moreover, granting that petitioners did not raise the issue of
non-resolution of the motion for reconsideration in their opposition to private
respondents’ motion for leave to file amended complaint, such issue has been
timely and properly raised by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration
of the trial court’s order granting the motion for leave to file amended
complaint.
We sustain the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
motion for leave to file amended complaint and admitting the same. The
procedural objection raised by petitioners is not substantial. To be sure, no
rule was transgressed by resolving the motion to admit amended complaint ahead
of the motion for reconsideration of the order rejecting petitioners’ defense
of prescription. None has been brought to our attention. More important, if
there was error, the error is not one which goes into the jurisdiction of the
court. And as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than
errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special
civil action of certiorari.[17]
Moreover, the failure to resolve the motion
for reconsideration of the order dated September 8, 1997 was belatedly raised.
In fact, it was only in petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the order
granting the amended complaint where for the first time put in issue their
unresolved motion for reconsideration of the order dated September 8, 1997.
Petitioners were given the chance to call the attention of the trial court to
this pending incident but notwithstanding this, the trial court still denied
their motion for reconsideration of the order granting the motion for leave to
file amended complaint. We fully agree with the observation made by the Court
of Appeals as follows:[18]
"Be it
remembered that when the private respondents filed their MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT on October 17, 1997 (Annex "Q", Petition),
petitioners had already filed their Motion for Reconsideration relative to the
order of September 8, 1997. In fact, going by the records, said Motion for
Reconsideration was filed as early as October 6, 1997 (Annex "P",
petition). In short the motion was already pending and was yet acted upon by
the respondent judge when the private respondents filed their MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT. For sure, the same Motion for Reconsideration
continued to pend even up to the time when the petitioners filed on October 23,
1997 their Opposition to private respondents’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED
COMPLAINT (Annex "R", petition). Yet surprisingly, the pendency of
said Motion for Reconsideration was never raised at all by the petitioners in
their Opposition to the private respondents’ MOTION FOR LEAVE, etc., even as
they could have then and there easily informed the respondent court of the
necessity of first resolving the motion before any precipitate action may be
taken on the MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT. For sure, petitioners
could have even invoked the pendency of their motion for reconsideration as a
bar to a premature grant of the MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT. It
can thus be seen that petitioners themselves are to be blamed for what they presently
lament. True, they did subsequently speak about their pending motion for
reconsideration. Unfortunately, however, the MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED
COMPLAINT had already been granted and the amended complaint thereto attached
already admitted when they belatedly realized their mistake. We can assume that
in granting leave to private respondents to amend their complaint, the
respondent judge in effect denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
of the order of September 8, 1997. xxx"
Petitioners also claim that granting that
the trial court had no recourse but to admit the amended complaint based on the
rule of liberality in amendments of pleadings, it should have dismissed the
same considering that the amended complaint showed that private respondents’
cause of action which was based on the alleged oral contract was subject to a
potestative condition which had already prescribed.
Their argument is not acceptable.
The granting of leave to file amended
pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that
the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the
theory of the case or that it was made to delay the action.[19] Once exercised, that discretion will not be disturbed
on appeal, except in case of abuse thereof.[20] The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments
to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real
controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and
the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay.[21] This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially
in this case where the amendment to the complaint was made before the trial of
the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to
prepare for trial. As to the wisdom or soundness of the trial court’s order
dismissing petitioners’ affirmative defense of prescription, this involves a
matter of judgment which is not properly reviewable by petition for certiorari,
which is intended to correct defects of jurisdiction solely and not to correct
errors of procedure or matters in the trial court’s findings or conclusions. We
adopt the Court of Appeals’ disquisition in this wise:[22]
"In a very
real sense, We see in this recourse a clever attempt on the part of the
petitioners to ventilate before this Court their discarded arguments in their
Position Paper (Annex "K", Petition), relative to their affirmative
defense of prescription, and in the process, put at issue via this petition for
certiorari the merit or lack of it of the respondent judge’s order of September
8, 1997. This cannot be done thru the instant proceeding. For, apart from the
quieting passage of time since the issuance of His Honor’s order of September
8, 1997, there is the more important rule in the law of certiorari that this
extraordinary remedy is available only to keep a court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The writ is never available to correct
errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge’s findings or conclusions
(citations omitted) xxx;
x x x
x x x x x x;
Hence, even on the
extreme assumption that the respondent judge erred in ruling via his order of
September 8, 1997 that private respondents’ cause of action in Civil Case No.
42949-V-93 has not yet prescribed when the original complaint therefor was filed
in November 15, 1993, and, conversely, that petitioners’ contrary view is
exceedingly "meritorious", still petitioners’ challenge to the order
of September 8, 1997 is improper in this recourse."
Petitioners also argue that since the
amended complaint was admitted and they were already ordered to answer the
same, they will be forced to abandon their pending cause for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of prescription. We are not persuaded. Petitioners’
affirmative defenses could still be raised in their answer to the amended
complaint which the trial court directed them to file, and if the decision is
adverse after trial, the issues may be reiterated on appeal.
Petitioners next contend that by allowing
the amendment of the original complaint, the trial court allowed the delay in
the disposition of the instant case considering the fact that what appears to
be a simple dispute involving a question of ownership over the duplex apartment
becoming complicated by the sudden claim of ownership over the parcel of land
on which the duplex apartment was erected.
The argument deserves scant consideration.
The Court of Appeals ruled, and we agree,
that the trial court is correct when it found that the amendments were merely
to correct inadequate allegations in the original complaint and allowed private
respondents to amend its complaint.[23] A reading of the amended complaint shows that it
merely supplements an inadequate allegation of the cause of action stated in
the original complaint so as to submit the real matter in dispute and not to
delay the disposition of the case, as the petitioners argued. Private
respondents in their original complaint prayed that private respondent Mamerto
Refugia be declared owner not only of the one door of the duplex apartment but
also the ½ portion of the land where their apartment was erected. We find no
reason to disturb the following ratiocination stated by the Court of Appeals:[24]
"We must at
once reject petitioners’ imputation of delay. For, let alone its utter lack of
factual support, we find it hard to understand why the private respondents who
are no less the very ones who filed the main case herein (Civil Case No.
4249-V-93), would themselves resort to dilatory tactics to prolong the
disposition of their case. Given the fact that their eviction from the premises
was sustained by the Supreme Court no less, and that their attempt to hold at
bay the implementation of the High Court’s decision had been rejected by the
respondent court, it is undoubtedly to private respondents’ interest that their
complaint for specific performance be decided with dispatch, more so that they
have already been evicted from the place. Indeed, judging from the petitioners’
conduct. We are even inclined to believe that they are the ones who are really
on the go to delay and prolong the termination of the main case.
In this
connection. We took the pains of reproducing herein the original and amended
complaints in Civil Case No. 4249-V-93. Doubtless. We say without any
hesitation that, as correctly ruled by the respondent judge, the intended
amendments are truly for no other purpose than merely "to correct
inadequate allegation in the original complaint". We may even go farther
and say that on the basis of the original complaint, private respondents could
have gone into trial and adduced evidence to establish the fact that their
agreement with the petitioners covers not only the duplex apartment building
but also and more importantly the very land whereon it was constructed. Verily,
however, aware as the private respondents must be of petitioners’ penchant for
technicality, the former must have thought it wise to simply amend their
complaint rather than engage their opponents in procedural niceties. Of course,
petitioners’ conduct is quite understandable: having already won in the
ejectment suit where their victory was merely confined to the issue of
possession, petitioners must have wanted to duplicate their feat with speed in
the more important issue of ownership by outrightly knocking down their
adversary on a mere technicality. Hence, their present recourse, about which
petitioners must have been hoping against hope that this Court would pave the
way to the eventual consolidation in their names of both the possession and
ownership of the premises in dispute. This Court will never sanction such a
scheme."
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Court hereby
denies the petition and affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., abroad, on official business.
[1] Rollo, pp. 80-99; Penned by Justice Cancio C.
Garcia, Chairman, concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.,
and Teodoro P. Regino.
[2] Ibid, p.101.
[3] Rollo, pp. 213-214, Annex "G",
docketed as Civil Case No.. 4249-V-93, raffled to Branch 172.
[4] A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by
spouses Arturo and Aurora Refugia against Mamerto, Feliza, Rodolfo and
Candelaria, all surnamed Refugia on October 23, 1993, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6089.
[5] Rollo, pp. 217-221, Annex "H".
[6] On March 4, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Valenzuela dismissed the ejectment case filed by Arturo and Aurora Refugia
against Mamerto and Feliza Refugia and others concluding that Mamerto and his
family are the lawful occupants of the premises, and hence, ejectment will not
lie against them. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the court in its
decision dated April 29, 1994, (Branch 172, Civil Case No. 4347-V-94) affirmed
the dismissal with modification the judgment of the lower court by declaring
Arturo and his father Mamerto are co-owners of the subject lot and the two door
apartment. Still dissatisfied, spouses Arturo and Aurora elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals via petition for review (CA-GR SP No. 34647) and in its
decision dated December 9, 1994 reversed and set aside the decisions of the two
lower courts and accordingly ordered Mamerto and the other defendants in Civil
Case No. 6089 to vacate the premises and surrender possession thereof. This
time, it was Mamerto and his family who secured an appellate review thru an
appeal by certiorari to this Court, which in a decision dated July 5,
1996 (G.R.No.118284) affirmed in toto the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
[7] Civil Case No.4249-V-93.
[8] Rollo, p. 273, Annex "M".
[9] Ibid, p. 283, Annex "O".
[10] Ibid, p. 284, Annex "P".
[11] Ibid, p. 301, Annex "Q".
[12] Ibid, pp. 303-306, Annex "R".
[13] Ibid, p. 365, Annex "B".
[14] Ibid, pp. 309-316, Annex "S".
[15] Ibid, p. 377, Annex "A".
[16] Rollo, p. 476.
[17] Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, 257
SCRA 200; Day vs. RTC of Zamboanga City, Br. XII, 191 SCRA 610; GSIS vs.
CA, 169 SCRA 244.
[18] Rollo, pp. 96-97; CA Decision, pp. 17-18.
[19] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.vs. Presiding
Judge, RTC Manila Br. 39, 189 SCRA 820 citing Uy vs. Uy, 2 SCRA 675.
[20] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Presiding
Judge, RTC Manila, Br. 39, supra, citing Torres vda de
Nery vs. Tomacruz, 49 Phil 913.
[21] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Presiding
Judge, RTC Manila, Br. 39, citing Shaffer vs. Palma, et al., 22
SCRA 934; Demaronsing vs. Tandayag, 58 SCRA 484.
[22] Rollo, pp. 94-96; CA decision, pp.15-17.
[23] Section 1 Rule 10, Rules of Court:
Section 1. Amendments
in general- Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an allegation or
the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a
mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that
the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard
to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
[24] Rollo, pp. 97-98; CA decision, pp.18-19.