THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135297. June 8, 2000]
GAVINO
CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. Spouses GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA GROSPE, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The sale, transfer or conveyance of land
reform rights are, as a rule, void in order to prevent a circumvention of
agrarian reform laws. However, in the present case, the voluntary surrender or
waiver of these rights in favor of the Samahang Nayon is valid because such
action is deemed a legally permissible conveyance in favor of the government.
After the surrender or waiver of said land reform rights, the Department of
Agrarian Reform, which took control of the property, validly awarded it to
private respondents.
The
Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari of the May 14, 1998 Decision[1] and the August 19, 1998 Resolution[2] in CA-GR SP No. 47176, in which the Court of Appeals
(CA)[3] dismissed the petitioner’s appeal and denied
reconsideration respectively.
The decretal portion of the assailed
Decision reads:[4]
"IN THE
LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is denied due course and is hereby
dismissed. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. With costs against
the Petitioner."
The
Facts
Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a
farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No.
27, he was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of
agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012) with a total area of 3.3 hectares situated
in Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. The lots were formerly owned by a
certain Florentino Chioco and registered under Title No. 126638.
To pay for his wife’s hospitalization,
petitioner mortgaged the subject land on January 20, 1982, in favor of Virginia
de Leon. When the contract period expired, he again mortgaged it to Respondent
Hilaria Grospe, wife of Geronimo Grospe, for a period of four years (December
5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32,500. The parties
executed a contract denominated as "Kasunduan Sa Pagpapahiram Ng Lupang
Sakahan,"[5] which allowed the respondents to use or cultivate the
land during the duration of the mortgage.
Before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Cabanatuan City (Region III), petitioner
instituted against the respondents an action for recovery of possession.[6] In his Complaint, he alleged that they had entered
the disputed land by force and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991, and
destroyed the palay that he had planted on the land.
Respondents,
in their Answer, claimed that the "Kasunduan" between them and
petitioner allowed the former to take over the possession and cultivation of
the property until the latter paid his loan. Instead of paying his loan,
petitioner allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights"[7]
over the landholding in favor of respondents
in consideration of P54,394.
Petitioner denied waiving his rights and
interest over the landholding and alleged that his and his children’s
signatures appearing on the Waiver were forgeries.
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) Ernesto P. Tabara ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered the
landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva
Ecija, which had passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27 recommending the reallocation
of the said lots to the respondent spouses, who were the "most qualified
farmer[s]-beneficiaries."[8]
The Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB),[9] in a Decision promulgated on October 8, 1997 in DARAB
Case No. 1251, affirmed the provincial adjudicator’s Decision.[10] Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied
in the Resolution dated February 26, 1998.[11] As earlier stated, petitioner’s appeal was denied by
the Court of Appeals.
Ruling
of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court ruled that petitioner
had abandoned the landholding and forfeited his right as a beneficiary. It
rejected his contention that all deeds relinquishing possession of the
landholding by a beneficiary were unenforceable. Section 9 of Republic Act (RA)
1199 and Section 28 of RA 6389 allow a tenant to voluntarily sever his tenancy
status by voluntary surrender. The waiver by petitioner of his rights and his
conformity to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions reallocating the landholding to
the respondents are immutable evidence of his abandonment and voluntary
surrender of his rights as beneficiary under the land reform laws.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to prove with
clear and convincing evidence the alleged forgery of his and his sons’
signatures.
Hence, this recourse.[12]
Issues
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner alleges in
his Memorandum that the appellate court committed these reversible errors:[13]
"I
xxx [I]n relying
on the findings of fact of the DARAB and PARAD as conclusive when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts and the inference taken is manifestly
mistaken.
"II
xxx [I]n
disregarding and/or ignoring the claim of petitioner that the alleged waiver
documents are all forgeries.
"III
xxx [I]n ruling
that petitioner had forfeited his right to become a beneficiary under PD No.
27.
"IV
xxx [I]n failing
to rule on the legality and/or validity of the waiver/transfer action."
In short, the focal issues are: (1) Was the
appellate court correct in finding that the signatures of petitioner and his
sons on the Waiver were not forged? (2) Assuming arguendo that the
signatures in the Waiver were genuine, was it null and void for being contrary
to agrarian laws? (3) Did the petitioner abandon his rights as a beneficiary
under PD 27? (4) Did he, by voluntary surrender, forfeit his right as a
beneficiary?
The
Court’s Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
First
Issue: Factual Findings
Alleging that an information for estafa
through falsification was filed against the respondents, petitioner insists
that his signature on the Waiver was forged.
We are not persuaded. The filing of an
information for estafa does not by itself prove that the respondents forged his
signature. It only means that the public prosecutor found probable cause
against the respondents, but such finding does not constitute binding evidence
of forgery or fraud.[14] We agree with the well-reasoned CA ruling on this
point:[15]
"xxx We are
not swayed by Petitioner’s incantations that his signature on the ‘Waiver of
Rights’ is a forgery. In the first place, forgery is never presumed. The
Petitioner is mandated to prove forgery with clear and convincing evidence. The
Petitioner failed to do so. Indeed, the ‘Waiver of Rights’ executed by the Petitioner
was even with the written conformity of his four (4) sons (at page 11,
Rollo). The Petitioner himself signed the Resolution of the Board of
Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, surrendering his
possession of the landholding to the Samahang Nayon, (idem, supra). Under
Memorandum Circular No. 7, dated April 23, 1979 of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, transactions involving transfer of rights of possession and or
cultivation of agricultural lands are first investigated by a team leader of
the DAR District who then submits the results of his investigation to the
District Officer who, in turn, submits his report to the Regional Director who,
then, acts on said report. In the present recourse, the requisite investigation
was conducted and the report thereon was submitted to and approved by the
Regional Director. Under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Evidence,
public officers are presumed to have performed their duties regularly and in
accordance with law."
As a rule, if the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals coincide with those of the DARAB -- an administrative body
which has acquired expertise on the matter – such findings are accorded respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal.[16] The presence or the absence of forgery was an issue
of fact that was convincingly settled by the agrarian and the appellate
tribunals. Petitioner utterly failed to convince us that the appellate court
had misapprehended the facts. Quite the contrary, its findings were
well-supported by the evidence.
Second
Issue: Validity of the "Waiver of Rights"
Petitioner insists that agreements
purportedly relinquishing possession of landholdings are invalid for being
violative of the agrarian reform laws.
Private respondents contend that petitioner
was no longer entitled to recognition as a farmer-beneficiary because of the
series of mortgages he had taken out over the land. They also cite his
"Waiver of Rights" and abandonment of the farm.
We have already ruled that the sale or
transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer is
void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or through
hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the
old feudal system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus
negating the government’s program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the
soil.[17] In Torres v. Ventura,[18] the Court
clearly held:
"xxx As such
[the farmer-beneficiary] gained the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the
landholding for himself. Those rights over that particular property were
granted by the government to him and to no other. To insure his continued
possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any
valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to
his successors.
"xxx [T]he
then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued the following Memorandum Circular [No.
7, Series of 1979, April 23, 1979]:
"‘Despite the
above prohibition, however, there are reports that many farmer-beneficiaries of
PD 27 have transferred the ownership, rights, and/or possession of their
farms/homelots to other persons or have surrendered the same to their former
landowners. All these transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27 and
therefore, null and void.’"
Third
Issue: Abandonment
Based on the invalidity of the Waiver,
petitioner concludes that the PARAD, the DARAB and the CA erroneously ruled on
the basis of the said document that he had abandoned or voluntarily surrendered
his landholding. Denying that he abandoned the land, he contends that the
transaction was a simple loan to enable him to pay the expenses incurred for
his wife’s hospitalization.
We agree. Abandonment[19] requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to
renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property; and (b) an external
act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect.[20] The intention to abandon implies a departure, with
the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the
interest that have been abandoned.[21]
The CA ruled that abandonment required (a)
the tenant’s clear intention to sever the agricultural tenancy relationship;
and (b) his failure to work on the landholding for no valid reason.[22] The CA also deemed the following as formidable
evidence of his intent to sever the tenancy relationship: (a) the mortgage and
(b) his express approval and conformity to the Samahang Nayon Resolution
installing the private respondents as tenants/farmers-beneficiaries of the
landholding. We disagree.
As earlier shown, the Waiver was void.
Furthermore, the mortgage expired after four years. Thus, the private
respondents were obligated to return possession of the landholding to the
petitioner. At bottom, we see on the part of the petitioner no clear, absolute
or irrevocable intent to abandon. His surrender of possession did not amount to
an abandonment because there was an obligation on the part of private
respondents to return possession upon full payment of the loan.
Fourth
Issue: Voluntary Surrender
Contrary to the finding of the appellate
court, the petitioner also denies that he voluntarily surrendered his
landholding.
His contention is untenable. The nullity of
the Waiver does not save the case for him because there is a clear showing that
he voluntarily surrendered his landholding to the Samahang Nayon which, under
the present circumstances, may qualify as a surrender or transfer, to the
government, of his rights under the agrarian laws.
PD 27 provides that title to land acquired
pursuant to the land reform program shall not be transferable except through
hereditary succession or to the government, in accordance with the provisions
of existing laws and regulations. Section 8 of RA 3844 also provides that
"[t]he agricultural leasehold relation xxx shall be extinguished by: xxx
(2) [v]oluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee,
xxx."
In this case, petitioner’s intention to
surrender the landholding was clear and unequivocal. He signed his concurrence
to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions surrendering his possession of the
landholding. The Samahan then recommended to the team leader of the DAR
District that the private respondent be designated farmer-beneficiary of said
landholding.
To repeat, the land was surrendered to the
government, not transferred to another private person. It was the government,
through the DAR, which awarded the landholding to the private respondents who
were declared as qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian laws. Voluntary
surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require
court approval as long as it is convincingly and sufficiently proved by
competent evidence.[23]
Petitioner’s voluntary surrender to the
Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government because
such action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and the
reallocation of farmholdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become
beneficiaries of PD 27. Under Memorandum Circular No. 8-80 of the then Ministry
of Agrarian Reform, the Samahan shall, upon notice from the agrarian reform
team leader, recommend other tenant-farmers who shall be substituted to all
rights and obligations of the abandoning or surrendering tenant-farmer.
Besides, these cooperatives are established to provide a strong social and
economic organization to ensure that the tenant-farmers will enjoy on a lasting
basis the benefits of agrarian reform.
The cooperatives work in close coordination
with DAR officers (regional directors, district officers, team leaders and
field personnel) to attain the goals of agrarian reform (DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 10, Series of 1977). The Department of Local Government (now the
Department of Interior and Local Government) regulates them through the Bureau
of Cooperative Development (Section 8, PD 175). They also have access to
financial assistance through the Cooperative Development Fund, which is
administered by a management committee composed of the representatives from the
DILG, the Central Bank, the Philippine National Bank, the DAR and the DENR
(Section 6, PD 175).
Petitioner insists that his act of allowing
another to possess and cultivate his land did not amount to abandonment or
voluntary surrender, as the rights of an OLT beneficiary are preserved even in
case of transfer of legal possession over the subject property, as held in Coconut
Cooperative Marketing Association (Cocoma) v. Court of Appeals.[24]
We disagree. Petitioner misconstrued the Cocoma
ruling because what was prohibited was the perpetration of the tenancy
or leasehold relationship between the landlord and the farmer-beneficiary. The
case did not rule out abandonment or voluntary surrender by the agricultural
tenant or lessee in favor of the government.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed
petitioner’s appeal. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., abroad on official business.
[1] Rollo, pp. 31-36.
[2] Ibid., p. 37.
[3] Thirteenth Division composed of JJ Romeo J. Callejo Sr. (ponente); Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez (Division chairman) and Mariano M. Umali (member), both concurring.
[4] CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 36.
[5] Ibid., p.
78.
"KASUNDUAN
SA PAGPAPAHIRAM NG LUPANG SAKAHAN
"PARA SA KALAALAMAN NANG LAHAT:
........"Ako si GAVINO A. CORPUZ, may
sapat na taong gulang, biyudo at sa kasalukuyan ay nakatira sa Malaya, Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija ay tumanggap ng halagang P32,500.00 (Tatlumpu’t dalawang
libo at limang daang piso) perang Pilipino ngayong ika 5 ng Disyembre 1986 mula
kay Gng. HELARIA F. GROSPE. Dahil sa pagkatanggap ko ng halagang nabanggit ay
binibigyan ko si Gng. Helaria F. Grospe, may asawa at may bahay ni Ginoong
GERONIMO R. GROSPE ng lubos na karapatan para sakahin ang aking lupa na
nagtutukoy ng mga sumusunod:
Lot
Number......:.....Not available
Location...........:.....Salungat,
Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija
Existing
Title.....:.....Not available
Land
Area........:.....22,000 sq. m.
........"Na sa kasunduang ito ay may
karapatan si Gng. Helaria F. Grospe na gamitin o sakahin ang aking lupa sa loob
ng APAT NA TAON mula sa 5 Disyembre 1986 hanggang Disyembre 5, 1990 at ito ay
mapapawalang bisa lamang ayon sa bagong kasunduan namin. Pagkatapos ng apat na
taon ay ibabalik ko rin ang halagang P32,500.00 (Tatlumpo’t dalawang
libo at limang daang piso) na aking nahiram kay Gng. Helaria F. Grospe.
........"Na sa kasunduang ito ay
isasagawa ngayon sa (illegible) 1986 sa Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
|
(sgd.)
GAVINO A. CORPUZ |
(sgd.)HELARIA
F. GROSPE |
|
SA KAPAHINTULUTAN
NG MGA ANAK: |
SAKSI: |
[6] The case was docketed as DARAB Case No. 1286-NE-91.
[7] Rollo, p.
79.
"WAIVER
OF RIGHTS
"KAMI, mga nakalagda sa ibaba nito,
pawang may mga sapat na gulang, Pilipino, at sa kasalukuyan ay pawang
naninirahan sa Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, matapos makapanumpa nang
naaayon sa batas ay nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod:
"Na, kami ang
mga tagapagmana ng lupang sakahin na dati ay nakatala sa pangalan ng aming
ina/ama/kapatid na si G/Gng. Gabino A. Corpuz na makikilala (na) Lote Blg. 3017
na may sukat na 2.2830 ektarya humigit kumulang na dating pag-aari ni
Florentino Chioco na matatagpuan sa Malaya, Sto. Domingo, NE, na napapaloob sa
Titulo Blg. 126638.
"Na, bilang
tagapagmana ng lupang sakahin na nabanggit sa itaas aming inililipat ang lahat
ng karapatan at pamomosisyon kay GERONIMO R. GROSPE.
"Na, ginawa
namin ito upang maisaayos sa Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) ang paglilipat
ng mga karapatan sa nasabing Lote sa pangala(n) ni GERONIMO A. GROSPE.
"SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITO, kami ay
lumagda sa kasulatang ito ngayong ika 02 ng Enero 1990, dito sa bayan ng Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
|
PANGALAN AT LAGDA |
SEDULA BLG. |
KINUHA SA |
NOONG |
|
(Sgd.) Raymundo S. Corpuz |
10152182 |
Sto. Domingo, N.E. |
11/06/89 |
|
(Sgd.) Jimmy S. Corpuz |
10152183 |
Sto. Domingo, N.E. |
11/06/89 |
|
(Sgd.) Anacleto S. Corpuz |
00976119 |
Sto. Domingo, N.E. |
03/20/89 |
CONFORME:
(sgd.) GABINO A.
CORPUZ
Sedula Blg......---.....10113264
Kinuha sa.......---.....Sto. Domingo, N.E.
noong............---.....June 22, 1989
x x x...............x x x ...............x x x."
[8] Rollo, p. 41.
[9] The Board was composed of Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, chairman; with Undersecretaries Hector D. Soliman and Artemio A. Adasa Jr.; Assistant Secretaries Lorenzo R. Reyes, Augusto P. Quijano, Sergio B. Serrano and Clifford C. Burkley, members.
[10] Rollo, p. 52.
[11] Ibid, p. 59.
[12] This case was deemed submitted for decision upon this Court’s receipt of the Memorandum for the Petitioner on June 14, 1999. Respondents’ Memorandum was received earlier, on May 28, 1999.
[13] The Petitioner’s Memorandum was signed by Atty. Nicolas P. Lapeña Jr. and the Respondents’ Memorandum, by Atty. Jaime P. Batalla.
[14] Villanueva v. United Coconut Planters Bank, GR No. 138291, March 7, 2000, p. 14.
[15] CA Decision, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 33-34.
[16] Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 568, 581, August 19, 1988; Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 263, 269, December 14, 1978; and Domingo v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 4 SCRA 1151, 1156, April 28, 1962.
[17] See Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 12; rollo,
p. 106, citing Gloria Cuhinusayan vda. de Oliver et al. v. Sesinando
Cruz et al., SP-116191-CAR, June 22, 1981.
.....Although Executive Order No. 228, issued on July 17, 1987, allowed the transfer of ownership of lands acquired by farmer-beneficiary after full payment of amortization, there is no allegation in this case that the petitioner has fully amortized his payment.
[18] 187 SCRA 96, 104-105, July 2, 1990, per Gancayco, J.
[19] Administrative Order No. 2, issued March 7, 1994, defined abandonment or neglect as a "willful failure of the agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his farm household, to cultivate, till or develop his land to produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar years."
[20] Medrana v. Office of the President, 188 SCRA 818, 826, August 21, 1990.
[21] Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 692, 699, December 18, 1992.
[22] CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 35.
[23] Talavera v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 778, 782, February 27, 1990.
[24] 164 SCRA 568, 584-585, August 19, 1988.