SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132703. June 23, 2000]
BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. EDGAR D. GUSTILO, Presiding Judge, Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo
City, TALA REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION, NANCY L. TY, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, REMEDIOS
A. DUPASQUIER, PILAR D. ONGKING, ELIZABETH H. PALMA, DOLLY W. LIM, RUBENCITO M.
DEL MUNDO, ADD INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari
to set aside and annul the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated December 18, 1996,
which sustained the dismissal [2] of the complaint of petitioner Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank (hereafter, Banco Filipino) for recovery of real
properties filed against Tala Realty Services Corporation (hereafter, Tala
Realty) on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum-shopping.
The antecedent facts are the following:
The General Banking Act [3] regulates the number of branches that a bank may
operate. Under the said law, a bank is allowed to own the land and the
improvements thereon used as branch sites but only up to a maximum of fifty
percent (50%) of the bank’s net worth.
In 1979, Banco Filipino had reached the
allowable limit in branch site holdings but contemplated further expansion of
its operations. Consequently, it unloaded some of its holdings to Tala Realty.
Banco Filipino thereafter leased the same branch sites from Tala Realty which
was conceived and organized precisely as a transferee corporation by the major
stockholders [4] of Banco Filipino. On March 26, 1979, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Tala Realty’s certificate of registration.[5]
Shortly
thereafter, the board of directors of Banco Filipino authorized negotiations
for the sale of some of its branch sites, through a Board Resolution [6]
dated April 17, 1979 (hereafter, Board
Resolution).
On August 25, 1981, respondent Banco
Filipino sold the above branch sites to Tala Realty under separate deeds of
sale for each branch site. On the same date, Tala Realty leased the same branch
sites to Banco Filipino under separate instruments for each branch site.[7]
The instant case originated from the sale by
Banco Filipino to Tala Realty of four (4) lots in Iloilo City, covered and
described in the aforementioned TCT Nos. 62273 and 62274, for two million one
hundred ten thousand pesos (P2,110,000.00).[8] Tala Realty then leased them back to Banco Filipino
for a monthly rental of twenty one thousand pesos (P21,000.00) /for a
period of twenty (20) years and renewable for another twenty (20) years.[9] The lease contracts of the other branch sites sold
to Tala Realty have substantially similar terms and conditions, except for the
amount of the rent.
Banco Filipino alleges that a trust was
created by virtue of the above transactions. Tala Realty was allegedly
established to serve as a corporate medium to warehouse the legal title of the
said properties for the beneficial interest of Banco Filipino and to purchase
properties to be held in trust for the latter.[10]
However, sometime in August 1992, Tala
Realty demanded payment of increased rentals, deposits and goodwill from Banco
Filipino, with a threat of ejectment in case of failure to comply thereto. On
April 20, 1994, some stockholders of Banco Filipino filed a derivative suit
against Tala Realty before the SEC for the reconveyance of the properties sold
by the former to the latter. However, on March 6, 1995, the SEC dismissed the
case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[11]
Due to Banco Filipino’s failure to comply
with Tala Realty’s terms, the latter carried out its threat by filing numerous
ejectment suits against Banco Filipino.[12] This prompted Banco Filipino to file, on August 16,
1995, an action for recovery of real properties[13] before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
28, on the ground of breach of trust. Incidentally, during the period from
August to September 1995, Banco Filipino also filed sixteen (16) other
complaints for recovery of real properties which it had previously sold to Tala
Realty.[14]
These complaints, including the one filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 28, were uniformly worded in
their material allegations.[15]
As regards Banco Filipino’s complaint in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Tala Realty filed on October 9, 1995 a
motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) forum-shopping; (2) litis
pendentia; (3) pari delicto; (4) failure to implead indispensable
parties; and (5) failure to state a cause of action.[16] On the same date, private repondents Pilar D.
Ongking, Elizabeth H. Palma, Dolly W. Lim and Rubencito del Mundo filed a
separate motion to dismiss in the same case on the following grounds: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; and (3)
failure to state a cause of action.[17] Likewise, on November 10, 1995, private respondent
Nancy L. Ty filed a separate motion to dismiss, alleging the same grounds as
those invoked by private respondents Ongking, et. al.[18]
These motions to dismiss alleged, among
others, that aside from the said suit before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 28, other suits involving certain Quezon City, Lucena City,
Malolos and Manila branches of Banco Filipino are also pending in other
Regional Trial Courts.
Banco Filipino filed separate oppositions,
dated October 14, 1995, October 31, 1995 and November 21, 1995 respectively, to
the motions to dismiss.[19] After a protracted exchange of pleadings, the trial
court dismissed the complaint on April 22, 1996 in this wise:[20]
A thorough and
careful perusal was made by the undersigned Presiding Judge of the arguments of
opposing counsels, ventilated in their respective memoranda. Opposing counsels
cited the pertinent Supreme Court Circulars, provisions of the Rules of Court
and related Decisions of the Supreme Court in support of their arguments.
After weighing the
foregoing, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that the contention of the
defendants in their motions to dismiss, etc., is meritorious.
Wherefore, in view
of the foregoing, the defendants separate motions to dismiss are hereby
granted.
Therefore, let
this case be, as it is hereby Dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
On June 27, 1996, the trial court denied
Banco Filipino’s motion for reconsideration.[21] Banco Filipino received a copy of said order of
denial on July 5, 1996 but instead of filing an appeal, it filed, on July 24,
1996, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of
Appeals.[22] Banco Filipino alleged in its petition that the
trial court’s decision was issued with grave abuse of discretion because it did
not comply with the constitutional mandate on the form of decisions.
However, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Banco Filipino’s petition on the ground, among others, that the
"[p]etitioner’s recourse to Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is
patently malapropos."[23] It reiterated the rule that a special civil action
for certiorari may be resorted to only when there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Banco
Filipino’s failure to appeal by writ of error within the reglementary period
and its belated recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was
interpreted by the Court of Appeals as a desperate attempt by Banco Filipino to
resurrect what was otherwise already a lost appeal.[24] Furthermore, the Court of Appeals debunked Banco
Filipino’s theory that the assailed order of the RTC did not comply with the
substantive requirements of the Constitution, and was thus, rendered with grave
abuse of discretion.
On December 28, 1996, Banco Filipino
received a copy of the Court of Appeals’ decision dismissing its petition
thereby prompting the latter to file a motion for reconsideration on January
10, 1997. The Court of Appeals denied the said motion for reconsideration on
December 19, 1997 in a resolution, a copy of which was received by Banco
Filipino on January 7, 1998.[25] Banco Filipino then filed with this Court its
subject petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court on March 9, 1998.[26]
Petitioner advances the following arguments:
I......RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO CORRECT BY CERTIORARI THE DISMISSAL ORDER BY THE RTC WHICH
PATENTLY DISREGARDED THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESCRIPTION AS TO FORM AND JUDGMENT,
AND EFFECTIVELY DENIED PETITIONER DUE PROCESS OF LAW;[27]
II......BANCO FILIPINO WAS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO
PROVE ITS CAUSE OF ACTION OF AN IMPLIED TRUST;[28]
III......RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT A
WRIT OF ERROR SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY INSTEAD OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 65;[29]
IV......RESPONDENT CA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING THAT BANCO FILIPINO IS GUILTY OF SPLITTING CAUSES OF ACTION MERELY ON
THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS THUS FILED.[30]
Without need of delving into the merits of
the case, this Court hereby dismisses the instant petition. For in filing a
special civil action for certiorari instead of an ordinary appeal before
this Court, Banco Filipino violated basic tenets of remedial law that merited
the dismissal of its petition.
First. Banco Filipino’s proper remedy from the adverse resolutions of the
Court of Appeals is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a petition for
review under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A petition for certiorari under Rule
65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.[31]
We have said time and again that for the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari to lie by reason of grave abuse of
discretion, the abuse of discretion, must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility.[32]
Nothing in the record of this case supports
Banco Filipino’s bare assertion that the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed
resolutions with grave abuse of discretion. On the contrary, Banco Filipino
even admitted that the Court of Appeals painstakingly "labored to defend
in thirty-three (33) [single spaced] pages"[33] the rationale behind its decision, clearly setting
forth therein the applicable provisions of law and jurisprudence. In other
words, there being no grave abuse of discretion on its part, the Court of
Appeals rendered the assailed resolutions in the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction. Hence, even if erroneous, the Court of Appeals’ resolutions can
only be assailed by means of a petition for review. The distinction is clear: a
petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction while a
petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court.
Errors of judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s
findings.[34] Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and
the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is
an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the
exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.[35]
Second. The availability to Banco Filipino of the remedy of a petition for
review from the decision of the Court of Appeals effectively foreclosed its
right to resort to a petition for certiorari. This Court has often
enough reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari is not allowed when a
party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that
remedy. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or successive.[36]
The antithetic character of the remedies of
appeal and certiorari has been generally observed by this Court save
only in those rare instances where appeal is satisfactorily shown to be an
inadequate remedy. In the case at bar, Banco Filipino has failed to show any
valid reason why the issues raised in its petition for certiorari could
not have been raised on appeal. To justify its resort to a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, it erroneously claims that an appeal is
not a speedy and adequate remedy because further delay in the disposition of
this case would effectively deprive Banco Filipino of the full use and enjoyment
of its properties.[37] However, the further delay that would inadvertently
result from the dismissal of the instant petition is one purely of Banco
Filipino’s own doing. We cannot countenance an intentional departure from
established rules of procedure simply to accommodate a case that has long been
pending in the courts of law because of the party’s own fault or negligence.
Third. Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost
remedy of appeal. Banco Filipino’s recourse to a special civil action for certiorari
was borne not out of the conviction that grave abuse of discretion attended the
resolution of its petition before the Court of Appeals but simply because of
its failure to file a timely appeal to this Court. This observation is shared
by the Court of Appeals which was quick to point out that when Banco Filipino
filed its petition for certiorari assailing the RTC order, the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals had already lapsed.
It is true that this Court may treat a
petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45 to serve the
higher interest of justice, but not when the petition is filed well beyond the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review and without offering any reason
therefor.
Concomitant to a liberal application of the
rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to at least explain its failure to comply with the rules. In the
case at bar, Banco Filipino’s petition is bereft of any valid reason or
explanation as to why it failed to properly observe the rules of procedure. The
record shows that Banco Filipino failed, not once but twice, and for an
unreasonable length of time, to file an appeal within the period required by law.
From the order of the RTC, it filed its petition for certiorari some
fourteen (14) days after the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal to the
Court of Appeals. Likewise, when Banco Filipino filed its petition for certiorari
before this Court, forty five (45) days have already passed since the end of
the fifteen (15) day reglementary period for filing an appeal to the Supreme
Court.
Allowing appeals, although filed late in
some rare cases, may not be applied to Banco Filipino in the case at bar for
this rule is qualified by the requirement that there must be exceptional
circumstances to justify the relaxation of the rules.[38] We cannot find any such exceptional circumstances in
this case and neither has Banco Filipino endeavored to prove the existence of
any. This being so, another elementary rule of procedure applies and that is
the doctrine that perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not
only mandatory but also jurisdictional so that failure to do so renders the
questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal.[39]
As a final word, we quote herein our
relevant pronouncement in the case of Bank of America, NT and SA v. Gerochi,
Jr. that:
The case at bench,
given its own factual settings cannot come close to those extraordinary
circumstances that have indeed justified a deviation from an otherwise
stringent rule. Let it not be overlooked that the timeliness of an appeal is
a jurisdictional caveat that not even this Court can trifle with.[40] (Underscoring provided.)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman) Mendoza,
Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo and concurred in by Associate Justices Gloria C. Paras and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., Rollo, pp. 35-67.
[2] By the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, in a decision penned by Judge Edgar D. Gustilo dated April 22, 1996, in Civil Case No. 22493, Rollo, pp. 272-273.
[3] Republic Act No. 337: " Sec. 25. Any commercial
bank may purchase, hold and convey real estate for the following purposes:
(a) such as shall be necessary for its
immediate accomodation in the transaction of its business: Provided, however,
that the total investment in such real estate and improvements thereof,
including bank equipment, ,shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of net worth:
xxx."
xxx.....xxx.....xxx."
"Sec. 34. Savings and mortgage bank may purchase, hold and convey real estate under the same conditions as those governing commercial banks as specified in Section twenty-five of this Act."
[4] Antonio Tiu, Tomas B. Aguirre, Nancy Ty and Pedro B. Aguirre.
[5] Rollo, p. 115.
[6] ["RESOLVED, that the President, or in his absence
the Executive Vice President be authorized to negotiate and come into agreement
with any and all liable persons or corporations for the purpose of selling the
following branch sites of Banco Filipino at terms hereinafter set forth. The
branch sites covered by said authority with their corresponding selling prices
are:
C.M. RECTO............-........P 3,550,000.00
R. HIDALGO............-.......... 1,690,000.00
MARIKINA..............-............. 910,000.00
PARANAQUE..........-.......... 1,460,000.00
LAS PINAS...............-............ 755,000.00
DAVAO....................-.......... 1,450,000.00
ILOILO.....................-.......... 1,460,000.00
LA UNION...............-............. 845,000.00
LUCENA..................-...........1,550,000.00
URDANETA.............-.............620,000.00
xxx.....xxx.....xxx." (Rollo, pp. 112-114)
[7] Petitioner’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 22493, p. 8, Rollo, p. 101.
[8] Rollo, p. 135.
[9] Rollo, p. 147.
[10] Petitioner’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 22493, p.7, Rollo, p. 100.
[11] Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 5-6, Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[12] Petition, pp. 27-28, Rollo pp.29-30; The ponente in this case is also the ponente of G.R. No. 129987, entitled Tala Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, which originated from the ejectment suit filed by Tala Realty against Banco Filipino concerning the Urdaneta branch site.
[13] Docketed as Civil Case No. 22493.
[14] Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 7-8, Rollo,
pp.41-42:
Civil Case
No....................Venue.....................................TCT No.
|
1. 95-127 |
Lucena City |
26037 |
|
2. 95-24830 |
Quezon City |
288850 |
|
3. 95-75212 |
Manila |
109823 |
|
4. 95- 75213 |
Manila |
189468 |
|
5. 95- 75214 |
Manila |
126730 |
|
6. 545-M-95 |
Bulacan |
261375 |
|
7. 4521 |
Batangas City |
510 |
|
8. U- 6026 |
Urdaneta, Pangasinan |
124643 |
|
9. 28,821-95 |
Davao City |
35418 |
|
10. 95-170-MK |
Marikina |
69147 |
|
11. 3026 |
Cotabato City |
15954 |
|
12. 4992 |
La Union |
23655 |
|
13. 2176 |
Cabanatuan City |
28354 |
|
14. 2506 |
Malabon |
28001 |
|
15. 95-0230 |
Paranaque |
439665 |
|
16. 96- 0036-LP |
Las Pinas |
S-90620. |
[15] Respondent Ty’s Comment, pp.2-3, Rollo, pp. 439-440.
[16] Rollo, pp.151-160.
[17] Rollo, pp. 161-166.
[18] Rollo, pp.167-174.
[19] Rollo, pp. 175-194.
[20] Rollo, pp. 272-273.
[21] Rollo, p. 288.
[22] Petition, pp.12-13, Rollo, pp. 14-15; see also Rollo, pp. 289-320.
[23] Rollo, p.50.
[24] Rollo. p. 51.
[25] Rollo, p.7.
[26] Rollo, p. 3.
[27] Rollo, p. 16.
[28] Rollo, p. 19.
[29] Rollo, p. 22.
[30] Rollo, p. 25.
[31] 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, sec. 1; Manila Midtown Hotel and Land Corp. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 288 SCRA 259, 264 (1998)
[32] Dominador Sanchez vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 124348, August 19, 1999; Toyota Autoparts Phil. vs. Director of Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R. No. 131047, March 2, 1999.
[33] Rollo, p. 19.
[34] GSIS vs. Olisa, G.R. No. 126874, March 10, 1999.
[35] Toyota Autoparts Phil. vs. Director of Bureau of Labor Relations, supra.
[36] Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 423, 426 (1997)
[37] Rollo, p.8.
[38] Bank of America, NT &SA vs. Gerochi, Jr., 230 SCRA 9 (1994) citing Alto Sales Corp. vs. IAC, 197 SCRA 618 (1991), Falcon Mfg. vs. NLRC, 199 SCRA 814 (1991), Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. IAC, 203 SCRA 583 (1991)
[39] The Republic of the Philippines through the Department of Education , Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 132425, August 31, 1999; Pedrosa vs. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, 375 (1996)
[40] Bank of America, NT & SA vs. Gerochi, Jr, supra at p. 16.