SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 131103 &
143472. June 29, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ERNESTO M. SANTOS, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal
from the decision, dated July 21, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72,
Antipolo, Rizal, insofar as it finds accused-appellant Ernesto Santos guilty of
two counts of rape and orders him to pay complainant P500,000.00 in
moral and exemplary damages in Criminal Case Nos. 94-11360 and 94-11361.
In three
informations, all dated May 20, 1994, filed in the RTC, Antipolo, Branch 72,
Rizal, accused-appellant was charged with two counts of rape and one count of
attempted rape of his daughter Mary Ann, then aged 14.[1] The informations alleged:[2]
Criminal Case No.
94-11359:
That on or about
the 7th day of February 1994, in the Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal,
Philippine and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence, and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of
rape upon the person of one Mary Ann Santos Y Tabucao directly by overt acts,
to wit: While the complainant was asleep, the accused touched her private parts
and undressed her and tried to rape her, but was not able to perform all the
acts that would have constituted the crime of rape by reason of the refusal and
vigorous fight made by the complainant in defense of her honor and the timely
arrival of complainant’s aunt which caused the accused to desist from his
intention.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Criminal Case No.
94-11360:
That on or about
and sometime in the year 1988, in the Municipality of Taytay, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mary Ann
Santos Y Tabucao, a minor nine (9) years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No.
94-11361:
That on or about
and sometime in the year 1989 in the Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mary Ann
Santos Y Tabucao, a minor ten (10) years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Accused-appellant
pleaded "not guilty" in all three cases, whereupon trial was held.
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
The prosecution
presented evidence showing the following:[3]
Sometime in 1988 in
their house at L. Wood Street, Taytay, Rizal, complainant Mary Ann Santos slept
with her father on a wooden bed (papag), as her mother, Nilda Tabucao
Santos, had to stay beside her younger brother because he was sick. Mary Ann
was awakened as she was being fondled by her father. Mary Ann resisted by
pushing and kicking accused-appellant, but the latter threatened her, saying,
"Papatayin ko kayong mag-iina" ("I’ll kill you and your
mother"). Her mouth was covered so that she could not shout.
Accused-appellant went atop her and inserted his penis into her vagina. As Mary
Ann cried in pain, she was assured by accused-appellant that "it will take
. . .a few minutes only." After he was through, accused-appellant withdrew
his organ, but he still held her in a tight embrace. At that point, Mary Ann’s
mother, Nilda, woke up and saw her husband embracing her daughter, both of them
naked. She cursed accused-appellant and hurled invectives at him.
As a result of the
incident, Nilda took her children and left accused-appellant. The separation,
however, lasted for three months only. Upon the intercession of accused-appellant’s
mother, Nilda and her children returned to live with him again. The return,
however, only made things worse for Mary Ann. From 1989 to 1994, she was raped
"many times" by accused-appellant. Things came to a head on February
7, 1994. That evening, at around 8:00, while Mary Ann was sleeping, she was
awakened because accused-appellant lay beside her. She asked him "what he
was doing there. But he did not answer."
Mary Ann stood up
and went to the sewing machine. Accused-appellant, however, followed her and
told her, "Gusto kong makabawi" ("I want to get
even"). When she asked him what he meant, he said she knew what he meant.
This made Mary Ann ask him bluntly, "[W]hy is it that you are always doing
those things to me as if I am not your daughter?"
Instead of
answering, accused-appellant pulled Mary Ann towards the bathroom. Mary Ann got
hold of a pair of scissors and tried to stab accused-appellant, but she was
overpowered.
At that point, Mary
Ann saw her cousin Marie.[4] She asked Marie to fetch her grandmother. It was
Mary Ann’s Aunt Josie, however, who came and saved her from disgrace by
accused-appellant. Mary Ann and her mother then reported the matter to the
police. Mary Ann filed a complaint against accused-appellant.
On February 14,
1994, Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory, examined Mary Ann. Dr. Cosidon’s report shows the
following:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND
EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly nourished,
fairly developed and coherent female subject. Breasts are hemispherical with
pale brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out.
Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is moderate
growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex, and coaptated with the pale
brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating, the same is disclosed
[as] an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with shallow healed lacerations at 1, 9, and
11 o’clock positions. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to
the introduction of the examining index finger and the virgin sized vaginal
speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is normal
in size, color, and consistency.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in
non-virgin state physically.
There are no
external signs of recent application of any form of violence.
REMARKS:
Vaginal and
peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative diplococci and for
spermatozoa.
Dr. Cosidon
testified that the healed lacerations were at least a week old and shallow
because they only "reached about one-half of the width of the hymen."
She opined that the lacerations could not be deeper because Mary Ann’s hymen
was thick.[5]
After the
prosecution had rested its case, accused-appellant testified in his defense,
focusing solely on the charge of attempted rape against him.[6] He denied that he had made an attempt on his
daughter’s honor in the evening of February 7, 1994, alleging that he was then
away working in another place. He claimed that on February 5, 1994, he had had
an altercation with his daughter Mary Ann because of the latter’s refusal to
wash his work clothes. Mary Ann allegedly told him, "Why don’t you wash
your clothes?", and when he asked her where her mother was, Mary Ann
allegedly said, "Why are you asking me?" According to accused-appellant,
he got mad and slapped Mary Ann. It was then when Mary Ann asked her cousin
Marie to call her Aunt Josie. When Josie arrived, she talked to Mary Ann. That
was the end of the matter as far as accused-appellant was concerned. He claimed
he did not know why Mary Ann filed rape charges against him. He speculated that
it was because he had maltreated his wife after he caught her flirting with a
certain Romualdo.
Accused-appellant’s
relatives testified in his behalf. His sister, Josie Santos, corroborated his
allegations, although she said the argument between accused-appellant and Mary
Ann occurred in the morning of February 7, 1994. According to Josie, she was
fetched by her niece Marie who told her that Mary Ann wanted to talk to her.
When Jose saw Mary Ann, the latter was crying "[b]ecause her father asked
her to do the laundry" and "that her father was holding something and
was attempting to hit her." No mention was made by Mary Ann of
accused-appellant’s attempt to rape her, according to Josie.[7]
Mary Ann’s brother,
Alan, likewise testified. He said Mary Ann never told him that
accused-appellant had molested her.[8] Mary Ann’s paternal grandmother, Marcela M. Santos,
who owns the house where the incidents subjects of these cases occurred,
testified to the same effect.[9]
On July 21, 1997,
the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the
Court finds accused ERNESTO SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of Statutory Rape and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua for each count and to pay the amount of P50,000.00
for each count as provided for by law.
However, the Court
finds said accused NOT GUILTY of the offense of Attempted Rape and he is thus
ACQUITTED of the said charge.
Although the
prosecution failed to prove any damages, moral and exemplary, the Court motu
proprio awarded the amount of P500,000.00 as damages in both cases to
the private complainant.[10]
The trial court
held:
Analyzing
carefully the testimony of the accused and his witnesses, nothing has been said
about the statutory rape[s], hence, the castle built by the prosecution stands
on the basis of the testimony of Mary Ann. The Court firmly believes that it
can stand the meticulous scrutiny of any legal mind, hence, the prosecution was
able to prove the guilt of the accused Ernesto Santos beyond reasonable doubt.
For the Court believes that Mary Ann, daughter of the accused, could not allow
herself to be exposed to public ridicule and scandal leading to the destruction
of her future and that of her family if such were not a fact in her complaint
and if only to seek justice and redress for a despicable and bestial wrong
inflicted upon her by the accused.
Moreover, the
Court gives great weight and credence over private complainant’s testimony
considering the tender age of the complainant and the moral ascendancy
exercised over her by the accused. Furthermore, the Court believes that accused
could easily perpetrate his lustful desires on her daughter with a modicum of
effort as when accused merely laid beside her and had carnal knowledge with her
daughter with least resistance.
Further, the
reason advanced by accused is patently shallow and unworthy of belief. The fact
remains that Mary Ann considered the accused as her father and regarded him
with respect and love that a daughter has for her father when she murmured the
words "Why is it that you are always doing those things to me as if I am
not your daughter?" The Court finds that such gesture inculcated upon the
person of the private complainant could not possibly make her concoct and
fabricate such charges against the accused if the same were not true.
Lastly, it should
be worthy of note that no less than the Supreme Court, on more than one
occasion has declared that rape committed by a father upon his daughter is
"so monstrous that no punishment which is in the power of this, or any
other human tribunal to decree, could possibly be sufficient expiation of the
defense."[11]
Hence this appeal.
After due
consideration of the records of these cases, we find accused-appellant’s
conviction fully warranted.
I.
First. Accused-appellant argues that the informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 94-11360 and 94-11361, charging him with rape, simply allege
that "on or about and sometime" in 1988 and in 1989, respectively, he
raped his daughter. He argues that these allegations are indefinite and have
deprived him of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. He cites United States v. Javier Dichao[12] in which it was held:
. . . To allege in
an information that the accused committed rape on a certain girl between
October, 1910, and August, 1912, is too indefinite to give the accused an
opportunity to prepare his defense, and that indefiniteness is not cured by
setting out the date when a child was born as a result of such crime. Section 7
of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not warrant such pleading. Its purpose
is to permit the allegation of a date of the commission of the crime as near to
the actual date as the information of the prosecuting officer will permit, and
when that has been done any date may be proved which does not surprise and
substantially prejudice the defense. It does not authorize the total omission
of a date or such an indefinite allegation with reference thereto as amounts to
the same thing.[13]
Accused-appellant’s
argument is without merit. Accused-appellant never asked for a bill of
particulars nor moved to quash the informations before he was arraigned. This
circumstance alone distinguishes this case from Dichao because in the
latter case, the accused moved to quash the information on the ground that it
did not allege the date of commission of the crime with some specificity.[14] It is thus too late in the day for accused-appellant
to question the form or substance of the informations in these cases.[15]
Above all, under
the Rules on Criminal Procedure,[16] it is not necessary for the information to allege
the date and time of the commission of the crime with exactitude unless the
time is an essential ingredient of the offense. In the crime of rape, the date
of commission is not an essential element of the crime.[17]
The case of People
v. Ladrillo[18] is not
applicable either to these cases because in that case, the information alleged
that the rape was committed "on or about the year 1992," and this
Court explained -
The phrase
"on or about the year 1992" encompasses not only the twelve
(12) months of 1992 but includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g.,
1991 and 1993, for which accused-appellant has to virtually account for his
whereabouts. Hence, the failure of the prosecution to allege with particularity
the date of the commission of the offense and, worse, its failure to prove
during the trial the date of the commission of the offense as alleged in the
Information, deprived accused-appellant of his right to intelligently prepare
for his defense and convincingly refute the charges against him.
In contrast, in
these cases, the informations alleged that the rapes were committed in a
definite year, i.e., 1988 in Criminal Case No. 94-11360 and 1989 in
Criminal Case No. 94-11361.
Second. Accused-appellant questions the credibility of his
daughter Mary Ann, pointing out that it took her more than five years (from the
time the first rape was allegedly committed in 1988) to report the same to her
mother and the police in February 1994. He argues that her failure as well as
that of her mother to remember the day and month of the alleged rape that took
place in 1988 make their testimonies untrustworthy.
These contentions
are likewise without merit. We do not find the long silence of Mary Ann
unnatural. As she said, since she was six years old, her father had already
been molesting her by poking his finger into her vagina and she was "never
taught that the acts of my father [were] wrong."[19] When he first raped her in 1988, she was silenced by
his threats. In the years which followed, while she testified her father
continued to abuse her, she kept her silence out of fear of her father.[20] But in February 1994, Mary Ann finally had enough.
She asked accused-appellant why he had been abusing her when she is his
daughter. The following observations of this Court in People v. Melivo[21] are relevant:
A rape victim’s
actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. It is this
fear, springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build a
climate of extreme psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb his victim
into silence and submissiveness. Incestuous rape magnifies this terror, because
the perpetrator is a person normally expected to give solace and protection to
the victim. Furthermore, in incest, access to the victim is guaranteed by the
blood relationship, proximity magnifying the sense of helplessness and the
degree of fear.
. . . The rapist
perverts whatever moral ascendancy and influence he has over his victim in
order to intimidate and force the latter to submit to repeated acts of rape
over a period of time. In many instances, he succeeds and the crime is forever
kept on a lid. In a few cases, the victim suddenly finds the will to summon
unknown sources of courage to cry out for help and bring her depraved
malefactor to justice.
Given this
pattern, we have repeatedly ruled that the failure of the victim to immediately
report the rape is not indicative of fabrication. "Young girls usually
conceal for some time the fact of their having been raped." . . .
In all of these
and other cases of incestuous rape, the perpetrator takes full advantage of his
blood relationship, ascendancy, and influence over his victim, both to commit
the sexual assault and to intimidate the victim into silence. Unfortunately for
some perpetrators of incestuous rape, their victims manage to break out from
the cycle of fear and terror. In People v . Molero [144 SCRA 397
(1986)], we emphasized that "an intimidated person cowed into submitting
to a series of repulsive acts may acquire some courage as she grows older and
finally state that enough is enough, the depraved malefactor must be
punished."[22]
Indeed, the
following testimony of Mary Ann during direct examination clearly establishes
accused-appellant’s guilt:
PROSECUTOR:
....Now, in these 2 complaints which are the subject of
the 3 information[s] against the accused, I am calling your attention
particularly to Exhibit "D," a complaint for rape. You mentioned here
the year 1988, could you recall the month when the incident happened?
A....No,
sir.
Q....You
could not also remember the exact day when the incident happened?
A....I
cannot.
Q....Do
you remember the place of the incident occurred?
A....Yes,
sir.
Q....Where?
A....In
our house.
Q....You
could also recall the time when the incident happened?
A....One
o’clock in the morning.
Q....Can
you explain to us how that incident happened in your house at around 1:00
o’clock in the morning in the year 1988 of a date which you can no longer
recall?
A....On
that date I slept together with my father [on] one bed while my mother slept
together with my youngest brother when all of a sudden, I felt that my father
was touching my body.
Q....Please
proceed.
A....When
I opened my eyes, I saw it was my father Ernesto Santos. I resisted and he
threatened me by uttering the words "Papatayin ko kayong Mag-iina."
Q....What
happened next?
A....He
took off all my clothes.
Q....After
he took off all your clothes, what happened next?
A....While
my father was removing my clothes I saw that he was also removing his short
pants and his brief and once again, I resisted and he said that he will break .
. . the bottle in my face if I will not heed . . . his desire.
Q....What
else happened?
A....Because
of his threat I was not able to talk and after that he went on top of me and
tried to insert his penis [into] my vagina [in] which I felt extreme pain.
Q....You
said extreme pain, what part of your body felt extreme pain?
A....My
vagina.
Q....What
happened next?
A....I
moaned because of the pain that I felt and I told him that is enough father
because its painful but my father told me that it will only take . . . a few
minutes only and on that situation my mother woke up and saw that my father and
I were both naked.
Q....Then
what happened?
A....That
was the cause of their quarrel and separation.
Q....Now,
at that point when your mother saw you and your father both naked did she utter
anything?
A....Yes,
sir. She cursed invective words against my father.
Q....Was
your father able to penetrate your vagina at that time of the sexual attempt?
A....Yes,
sir.
Q....Did
you see anything in your vagina?
A....Yes,
sir. White hot fluid.
Q....Do
you know from whose person that white hot fluid came from?
A....Yes,
sir from my father’s penis.
Q....So
after that incident your father and mother have a quarrel which was the result
of their separation, for how long did they separate?
A....Only
for a few months.
Q....After
a few months did you return to your house?
A....Yes,
sir because my grandmother talked to my parents and after that they live
together again.
Q....Now,
in your statement, which you mentioned particularly in paragraph 6 you
mentioned the year 1989 "ay muling naulit po sa akin ang panghahalay niya
sa taong 1989" can you explain or describe to us how that incident
happened again?
A....The
same thing he did to me the first time by threatening me.[23]
It must not be
forgotten that the crimes involved in these cases are rapes in which the victim
is below 12 years of age so that the lack of consent of the victim to have
sexual intercourse with accused-appellant is irrelevant.[24]
As for Mary Ann’s
mother, Nilda, she explained that she did not report the incident to the police
even after seeing her husband in 1988 in a compromising position with her
daughter because of accused-appellant’s plea for mercy and promise that he
would not do it again.[25] But as accused-appellant broke his promise, Nilda
wasted no time in denouncing her husband to the police.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that the charges of rape
were not supported by the results of the physical examination made on the
victim by Dr. Rosaline Cosidon. Accused-appellant cites Dr. Cosidon’s testimony
that "the lacerations on the vagina of complainant daughter could have
been inflicted about just a week before the date of the physical examination.
Or, that probably it was a month old or a year old but certainly not six (6)
years old."[26]
What Dr. Cosidon
actually said was that the lacerations in complainant’s hymen "[were]
probably inflicted more than a week at the time of the examination, sir."[27] She further testified:
PROSECUTOR
GONZALES:
Q....Now,
could that shallow healed lacerations on the organ of the victim be caused by
[a] male organ?
A....Possible,
sir.
Q....And
you said it was shallow healed lacerations, how shallow is it?
A....Those
lacerations have reached about one-half of the width of the hymen, sir.
Q....What
is . . . the difference between deep laceration and shallow laceration?
A....When
you say deep, the laceration have reached more than one-half of the width of
the hymen and when we say shallow the laceration have reached about one-half of
the width of the hymen, sir.
Q....You
mean the penis was not able to penetrate fully . . . the vaginal canal?
A....When
we say shallow it does not mean it has penetrated the vaginal canal, sir.
Q....Was
the hymen thick or thin?
A....Thick,
sir.
Q....So
the laceration could not be [deep] because of the thickness of the hymen?
A....Possible,
sir.
Q....So
that doctor, it could have been possible that the sexual intercourse could have
. . . happened way back 1985?
A....Possible,
sir.
Q....Is
it possible because of the thickness of the hymen?
A....Yes,
sir.[28]
As held in People
v. Palicte,[29] the fact
that there was no deep penetration of the victim’s vagina and that her hymen
was still intact does not negate the commission of rape. If the victim is a
child, rape can be done without penetration.
In these cases, the
findings of the medical examination, which also stated that "[s]ubject is
in non-virgin state physically," actually support the charges of rape
against accused-appellant.
II.
As already shown,
the circumstances of minority of the victim and relationship between her and
accused-appellant are present in this case. Under R.A. No. 7659, the
concurrence of these circumstances, if alleged in the information, would
constitute a special aggravating circumstance. However, as the rapes in these
cases were committed before R.A. No. 7659 took effect on December 31, 1993,
these circumstances cannot be appreciated for the purpose of imposing the
penalty of death under R.A. No. 7659. The paternal relationship, however, can
be considered a generic aggravating circumstance[30] for the purpose of awarding exemplary damages under
Art. 2230 of the Civil Code.[31] The penalty in the two cases remains reclusion
perpetua as it is an indivisible penalty. The Revised Penal Code provides
in pertinent part:
Art. 63. Rules
for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
The trial court’s
awards of civil liability should be modified. While the trial court correctly
awarded P50,000.00 civil indemnity for each count of rape, its award of P500,000.00
moral and exemplary damages is excessive and should be reduced as follows: P50,000.00
for moral damages for each count of rape, or a total of P100,000.00
moral damages[32] and P25,000.00 for exemplary damages for each
count of rape, or a total of P50,000.00 exemplary damages.[33]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
72, Antipolo, Rizal is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the awards of moral
damages and exemplary damages shall be REDUCED to P100,000.00 and P50,000.00,
respectively.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo,
(Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Mary Ann’s Birth Certificate (Exh. A) states that she
was born on June 12, 1979.
[2] Records of Criminal Case No. 94-11359, p. 1; Records
of Criminal Case No. 94-11360, p. 1; Records of Criminal Case No. 94-11361, p.
1.
[3] TSN (Mary Ann Santos), pp. 2-15, Nov. 24, 1994; pp. 2-24,
Dec. 1, 1994; pp. 3-6, March 14, 1995; TSN (Nilda Santos), pp. 2-22, Oct. 13,
1994.
[4] Also referred to as "Maricris" in the
Records.
[5] TSN, pp. 8-9, Oct. 9, 1995.
[6] According to accused-appellant’s counsel, PAO Atty.
Danilo Leyble, this was necessary so as "not to entangle the proceedings
in the three cases." (TSN, p. 2, Dec. 19, 1995) Accused-appellant,
however, never took the witness stand again.
[7] TSN, pp. 1-9, July 18, 1996.
[8] Id., p. 13.
[9] Id., p. 16.
[10] RTC Decision, p. 7, Rollo, p. 25.
[11] Id., pp. 6-7; id., pp. 24-25.
[12] 27 Phil. 421 (1914)
[13] Id., p. 426.
[14] See People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 (1997)
[15] People v. Lim, G.R. Nos. 131861-63, Aug. 17, 1999;
People v. Alba, 305 SCRA 811 (1999); People v. Dimapilis, 300 SCRA 279 (1998)
[16] Rule 110, §11, provides: Time of the commission of
the offense .¾ It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information
the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a
material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was
committed as the information or complaint will permit.
[17] People v. Lim, supra; People v. Losano,
G.R. No. 127122, July 20, 1999.
[18] G.R. No. 124342, Dec. 8, 1999.
[19] TSN, p. 14, Dec. 1, 1994.
[20] Id., pp. 19-20.
[21] 253 SCRA 347 (1996)
[22] Id., pp. 356-358.
[23] TSN, pp. 7-11, Nov. 24, 1994.
[24] People v. Fraga, G.R. No. 134130-33, April 12, 2000.
[25] TSN, p. 16, Oct. 13, 1994.
[26] Supplemental Reply Brief, p. 1.
[27] TSN, p. 7, Oct. 9. 1995.
[28] Id., pp. 8-9.
[29] 257 SCRA 543 (1994)
[30] People v. Perez, 270 SCRA 526 (1997); People v.
Lucas, 181 SCRA 316 (1990); People v. Porres, 58 Phil. 578 (1993)
[31] Civil Code, Art. 2230: In criminal offenses, exemplary
damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate
and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
[32] People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998)
[33] People v. Tabion, G.R. No. 132715, Oct. 20, 1999.