FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124863. June 19, 2000]
ANTONIO G.
PACHECO, CONFEDERATION OF SUGAR PRODUCERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC., TIMOTEO Y.
CONSING, JR., ASSOCIATION OF INTEGRATED MILLERS, INC., PHILIPPINE SUGAR MILLERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY [NACUSIP],
KASUCO WORKERS AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE, INC., JOSE MARIA B. MONTINOLA, VIENTE
OLIVA, DENNIS AFABLE, and ROLANDO SICAT, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, THE SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION [SRA], THE SUGAR BOARD,
and ROLLEO R. IGNACIO, in his capacity as Acting SRA Administrator, respondents. batas
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari[1] seeking review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals dismissing the petition for mandamus to compel the Sugar
Regulatory Administration [SRA] to issue rules and regulations governing the
importation of sugar.
On May 28, 1986, the President of the
Philippines issued Executive Order No. 18 creating a Sugar Regulatory Administration
with the following powers and functions:
"(A) To
recommend the establishment of a sugar production coefficient and a production
quota which shall be attached to the land for each planter;
"(B) To
institute regulations for implementation, controlling and monitoring the
production quotas;
"(C) To
establish domestic, export and reserve allocations;
"(D) To
explore and expand the domestic marker and foreign markets for sugar and
by-products, to assure mutual benefits to consumers and producers, and to
promote and maintain a proper balance of production of sugar and its
by-products;
"(E) To
institute, implement and regulate an orderly system of quedanning, disposition
and withdrawals of various forms of sugar from warehouse;
"(F) To
evaluate and recommend to the President new projects involving the production
of sugar and its by-products and other products derived from sugarcane and
sugar;
"(G) To issue
permits and licenses and collect corresponding fees and levies on the
processing and manufacture of sugar and its by-products and other products
derived from sugarcane and sugar; katarungan
"(H) To
enter, make and execute routinary contracts as may be necessary for or
incidental to the attainment of its purposes between any persons, firm, public
or private, and the Government of the Philippines;
"(I) To do
all such other things, transact such other business and perform necessary,
incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purposes of the Sugar
Regulatory Administration."[2]
On October 18, 1994, petitioners filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus to compel the Sugar
Regulatory Administration to issue rules and regulations governing the
importation of sugar pursuant to Executive Order No. 18, series of 1996
creating the Sugar Regulatory Administration.[3]
After due proceedings, on November 17, 1995,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision[4] ruling that mandamus does not lie to compel
SRA to issue rules and regulations to regulate sugar importation in the absence
of a specific legal authority to do so vested in it under E. O. No. 18, and,
accordingly, dismissed the petition.
On December 11, 1995, petitioners moved for
reconsideration of the decisions;[5] however, on April 24, 1996, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion.[6]
Hence, this petition.[7]
The issue raised is whether mandamus
lies to compel the Sugar Regulatory Administration to issue rules and
regulations governing sugar importation.
The petition must fail. The Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the court may not compel the Sugar Regulatory
Administration to issue rules and regulations governing the importation of
sugar in the absence of "a standard for the control and regulation of
sugar importation" vested in it under the law.[8] In other words, it is not the ministerial duty of
the SRA specifically enjoined by law to issue rules and regulations governing
sugar importation. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of a clear
legal duty[9] or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the
defendant or respondent to perform the act required[10] that the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from office, trust or station.[11] A clear legal right is one that is founded or
granted by law.[12] Unless the right to relief is clear, mandamus
will not issue. If there is any discretion as to the taking or non-taking of
the action sought, there is no clear legal duty. Petitioners failed to prove
that they have a clear legal right. They have failed to point to any specific
provision in Executive Order No. 18 vesting in the Sugar Regulatory
Administration the power to regulate sugar importation. That is not a power
expressly or impliedly vested in the SRA by law.
Such being the case, the remedy is not mandamus.
The remedy is legislative, which is to ask Congress to enact legislation
expressly vesting such power in the SRA.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
decision of the Court of Appeals. No costs.
SO ORDERED. Esmsc
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno,
Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
[2] 82 Offiicial Gazette No. 40, pp. 4726-4727 (1986)
[3] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35492.
[4] Petition, annex "A", Rollo, pp. 27-33.
[5] Petition, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 34-47.
[6] Petition, Annex "C", Rollo, p. 49.
[7] Rollo, pp. 3-25. On February 12, 1997, we gave due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 106)
[8] Cf. Olsen & Co. vs. Herstein, 32 Phil. 520 (1915)
[9] University of San Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 761 (1994); Palileo vs. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272 (1950)
[10] Tangonan vs. Paņo, 137 SCRA 245 (1985)
[11] Repacom vs. Morfe, 120 SCRA 460 (1983); Sagun vs. PHHC, 162 SCRA 411 (1988)
[12] Palileo vs. Ruiz Castro, supra, Note 9.