SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124582. June 16, 2000]
REGGIE
CHRISTI LIMPO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VERONICA GONZALES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the
decision,[1] dated
January 26, 1996, of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals,
dismissing for lack of merit a special civil action of certiorari filed
by petitioner to set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Malolos, Bulacan, which granted private respondent’s ex parte petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession.
The following are the facts:
Petitioner Reggie Christi S. Limpo (Regina
Christi Schaetzchen Limpo) and Bong Diaz (Maria Lourdes Gamir Diaz) were
acquitted of nine counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal
Case Nos. 9638-M to 9646-M. She and her co-accused, Bong Diaz, and Leonarda
Mariano y Bernardo, were likewise acquitted of seven counts of estafa, in
Criminal Case Nos. 9647-M to 9653-M. But petitioner and Diaz jointly were held
severally liable to private respondent Veronica Gonzales, complainant in the
two criminal cases, in the total amount of P275,000.00, plus interests at the
legal rate computed from the date of the first demand, or on November 19, 1985,
until the amount was fully paid, in the decision rendered October 28, 1991 by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan.
The decision became final and executory on
December 1, 1991. On December 29, 1992, private respondent filed a motion for
the enforcement of the civil liability, whereupon the trial court issued a writ
of execution. Consequently, the sheriff levied upon two (2) parcels of land
registered in the name of petitioner under TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396 of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan. At the auction sale subsequently held, the
properties were sold to private respondent as the highest bidder and a
certificate of sale dated June 8, 1993 was duly issued in her favor. As
petitioner failed to redeem the properties, a final deed of sale was executed
in favor of private respondent on June 20, 1994.
To consolidate her ownership over the two
(2) parcels of land, private respondent demanded from petitioner the surrender
of her owner’s copy of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396. Petitioner, however,
failed to do so, whereupon private respondent filed a petition under §107 of
P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree),[2] to
compel petitioner to surrender her owner’s duplicate certificates of title. The
petition was docketed as LRC Case No. P-292-M and assigned to Branch 21 of the
court.
The proceedings in that case are stated in
the decision rendered on November 10, 1994, thus:
On October 26,
1994, this Petition was set for hearing and the petitioner thru counsel
presented the judicial requirements of this Court. Marked in evidence are: the
Order dated September 22, 1994 setting this petition for hearing on October 26,
1994 marked as Exhibit ‘A’; the registry return card showing receipt of the
said Order by the Land Registration Authority marked as Exhibit ‘A-1’ and stamp
receipt of the Office of the Solicitor General marked as Exhibit ‘A-2’; stamp
receipt of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos, Bulacan marked as
Exhibit ‘A-1’; and the Certificate of Posting marked as Exhibit ‘B’. Likewise
marked is the Order setting the continuation of hearing of this petition to
November 4, 1994 as Exhibit ‘C’ and the receipt of the notice to respondent
Reggie Christi Limpo was hereto marked as Exhibit ‘C-1’.
Despite Reggie
Limpo’s receipt however, no opposition was filed prompting the Court to enter
an Order of general default and
allowing the presentation of ex parte evidence for the petitioner on November
7, 1994. (Underscoring supplied)
On the basis of these documents, judgment
was rendered by the court as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding
the evidence adduced by the herein petitioner to be sufficient to warrant the
relief prayed for under the aforesaid law, the respondent Reggie Christi Limpo
is hereby directed to surrender the said owner’s duplicate copies of TCT No.
T-30395 and T-30396 to the Register of Deeds at Malolos, Bulacan. In the event
that she failed or refused to do so, the said public officer is hereby ordered
to cancel or annul the same and in lieu thereof, issue new copies of
certificates of title in the name of herein petitioner, Veronica R. Gonzales,
with the proper notations as provided by law.
SO ORDERED.[3]
No motion for reconsideration nor appeal
having been filed by petitioner within the reglementary period, the decision
became final and executory. Consequently, on December 16, 1994, pursuant to the
order of RTC Branch 21, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled TCT Nos.
T-30395 and T-30396 in the name of petitioner and, in lieu thereof, issued TCT
Nos. T-62002 and T-62003 in the name of private respondent.
On March 29, 1995, because of petitioner’s
refusal to vacate the premises, private respondent filed a petition for
issuance of a writ of possession. The petition, which was docketed as LRC Case
No. P-123-95, was assigned to Branch 11 of the trial court. It was subsequently
substituted by an amended ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of
possession. Private respondent alleged that pursuant to Rule 39, §35 of the
Rules of Court, she was entitled to possession of the properties.
On April 27, 1995, the trial court granted
ex parte private respondent’s amended petition for issuance of a writ of
possession and, on May 26, 1995, a writ of possession was issued commanding the
sheriff to place private respondent in possession of the properties in
question.
On June 19, 1995, petitioner filed an urgent
motion to stop the sheriff from implementing the writ of possession. She prayed
that, after notice and hearing, the order of April 27, 1995 and the writ of
possession issued pursuant to it be set aside. Petitioner alleged that she had
never been furnished a copy of private respondent’s petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession, nor given a notice of hearing concerning the same and,
consequently, she was deprived of due process. Hence, the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over her and had no authority to issue a writ of possession under
Rule 39, §35.
On July 21, 1995, the court denied
petitioner’s motion for lack of merit. On September 5, 1995, it denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and directed the issuance of an alias
writ of possession.
Petitioner, thereupon filed on September 29,
1995 a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals and obtained from
it a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the alias writ
of possession until further orders. She reiterated her contention that RTC
Branch 11 had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession ex parte
under Rule 39, §35 of the Rules of Court. She argued that such writ could be
issued ex parte only in connection with an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage under Act No. 3135, §7, as amended. For this reason, she asked the
appellate court to set aside the trial court’s order dated April 27, 1995
granting ex parte private respondent’s amended petition for a writ of
possession, including the writ of possession and the alias writ issued pursuant
thereto; the order dated July 21, 1995 denying petitioner’s urgent omnibus
motion; and the order dated September 5, 1995, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
On January 26, 1996, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision, now the subject of this petition for review on certiorari,
dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari and, on April 8, 1996,
it denied reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
The question for decision is whether a writ
of possession may be issued ex parte under Rule 39, §35 of the Rules of
Court.
Petitioner contends that in the absence of
any complaint filed with it and a decision duly rendered by it, RTC Branch 11
had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession on the basis of an ex parte
petition filed by private respondent. She argues that such may be issued ex
parte only in cases of an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act
No. 3135, §7, as amended. She points out that private respondent should have
filed the amended ex parte petition before Branch 12 the same court where
Criminal Case Nos. 9638-M to 9653-M was filed, citing the case of Kaw v.
Anunciacion[4] where
it was ruled that even in the case wherein the party is held liable or the case
is adversely decided against the party, an ex-parte motion is not
allowed.
The petition has no merit.
First. Petitioner is right that, as a matter of strict procedure, the writ of
possession should have been sought in Branch 12 of the RTC as an incident of
the execution of its decision. Moreover, it should have been sought by mere
motion and not in the form of an independent action in which summons should be
issued and the defendant required to file his answer.
However, what was filed as a petition for
issuance of a writ of possession was in substance merely a motion, as private
respondent actually sought just the execution of the final decision rendered in
her favor. Such motion could be made ex parte. Indeed, petitioner has
not asserted any defense to private respondent’s motion. All she says is that
because the proceedings were ex parte, she was deprived of her right to
be heard.
However, no practical benefit can be derived
by setting aside the order of the court granting ex parte a writ of
possession. On the other hand, private respondent’s right to possession over
the property is clear and is based on her right of ownership as purchaser of
the properties in the auction sale.
Rule 39, §35 of the Rules of Court provides:
Deed and possession
to be given at expiration of redemption period. By whom executed or given. - If no redemption be made within twelve (12)
months after the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled to a
conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed, whenever sixty
(60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and notice
thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner,
or his assignee, is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases
the judgment debtor shall have the entire period of twelve (12) months from the
date of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the
officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter case
shall have the same validity, as though the officer making the sale had
continued in office and executed it.
Upon the execution
and delivery of said deed, the purchaser, or redemptioner, or his assignee,
shall be substituted to and acquire all the right, title, interest and claim of
the judgment debtor to the property as of the time of the levy, except as
against the judgment debtor in possession, in which case the substitution shall
be effective as of the date of the deed. The possession of the property shall
be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a
third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.
In the instant case, private respondent
acquired the property after the levy on execution and sale of the property at
public auction. No procedural infirmity attended these proceedings. As the
Court of Appeals noted:
The mandate under
Section 35 of Rule 39, supra, is unmistakable: if no redemption of the
property auctioned is made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the
purchaser "is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the
property," which possession "shall be given to the purchaser"
except when a third party with an interest adverse to the judgment debtor is
actually holding the same.
Here, it is not
disputed that the 12-month period within which Limpo may exercise her right of
redemption had long expired without any redemption having been effected.
Neither is it disputed that a final deed of sale following the expiration of said
period had been executed by the sheriff in favor of Gonzales as purchaser in
the auction sale. Finally, and this is likewise undisputed, Gonzales had
already consolidated her ownership of the same property, as in fact Limpo’s
former certificates of title thereon had already been cancelled and replaced
with new certificates in the name of Gonzales, who, unquestionably, is now the
registered owner of the realties.
Given the above,
we cannot perceive of any reason why an ex parte writ of possession may
not be issued in favor of Gonzales. To our mind, under the factual milieu
obtaining in this case, the issuance of such writ upon Gonzales’ application
therefor is a matter of course of which no discretion is left to the respondent
court. After all, a writ of possession "is but complimentary to the writ
of execution" (Vda. de Bogacki vs. Inserto, 111 SCRA 356, 363), and, in
case of an execution sale done through public auction is but a
"consequence" of the writ of execution (Cometa vs. IAC, 151 SCRA
563).
True it is that in
Cometa, supra, the Supreme Court made it clear that the issuance of a
writ of possession "is dependent on the valid execution of the procedural
stages preceding it," and that "any flaw affecting any of its stages
x x x could affect the validity of its issuance." In the present case,
however, petitioner has not impugned or ascribed any irregularity in the entire
process taken against her properties prior to the ex parte issuance of
the assailed writ of possession. And it is in this respect where, in our view,
the Archilles’ heels in petitioner’s recourse lies.
We have perused
the petition filed in this case and found nothing therein whereby the
petitioner imputes any flaw or irregularity in any of the proceedings which led
to the ultimate issuance of the questioned writ. For one, petitioner does not
at all dispute the fact that the decision in Criminal Case Nos. 9638-M to
9653-M, whereunder she was adjudged civilly liable to the private respondent in
the principal amount of P275,000.00 has long became final and executory. For
another, petitioner makes no claim nor pretense that the execution sale
conducted by the sheriff to enforce the civil aspect of the same decision,
including the certificate of sale and final deed of sale executed by the same sheriff
in favor of Gonzales, was attended with any irregularity. Then, too, the
petition could be searched in vain of any allegation of fraud or accident which
prevented her from exercising her right of redemption over the properties. So
also, there is nothing in the petition indicating that petitioner was left in
the dark as to the steps then being taken by the private respondent to
ultimately place the latter in possession of the premises. Indeed, it would be
preposterous on the part of the petitioner to feign ignorance of such steps.
Thus, she does not deny her receipt of a letter from the private respondent
requiring her (petitioner) to surrender her owner’s duplicate copies of her
title to the property in order that the same may be cancelled and replaced by
new ones in the name of the private respondent. And certainly, she cannot, with
more reason, pretend ignorance of the petition filed against her by the private
respondent on account of her refusal to surrender said owner’s copies. For
sure, despite notice of said petition, she opted not to appear in the scheduled
hearing thereof nor bothered to file any opposition thereto. This is obvious
from the order issued on November 10, 1994 by Branch 21 of the respondent court
in LRC Case No. P-292-M, quoted earlier in this decision. Finally, the petition
makes no allegation whatsoever that at the time the writ was issued, the
petitioner is not the one in possession of the premises in question but a third
person with a claim adverse to her. In short, in this recourse, petitioner
has not set forth any ground that she could have raised in opposition to
private respondent’s application for a writ of possession had she been given
the opportunity to contest it. Hence, even on the extreme assumption that
petitioner is entitled to notice before the respondent court should have acted
on private respondent’s application for a writ of possession, the process would
have served no useful purpose nonetheless because the petitioner is evidently
wanting of any valid ground to oppose the application. In any event, it is safe
to assume that the petitioner must have anticipated his ultimate ouster from
the premises. The filing of the petition in LRC Case No. P-292-M in Branch 21
of the respondent court after she refused to surrender the owner’s copies of
her title must have forewarned her of private respondent’s determination to
wrest possession of the premises from her. Unfortunately, however, she
seemingly did not attach any significance to the filing of said petition and
merely ignored the notice sent to her relative thereto, which explains why she
was declared as in default. It is thus too bad that petitioner should now cry
"foul" simply and solely because the writ which would effectively
take her out from the premises was issued ex parte. For, as we have
stated herein, petitioner has not cited any ground that she could have
validly raised by way of opposition to the application for the writ had she
been afforded the opportunity to be heard relative thereto. (Emphasis
added)
Private respondent’s reliance on the case of
Kaw v. Anunciacion is misplaced. Said case involved an administrative
matter filed by complainant against a judge and sheriff of MeTC for grave
misconduct, incompetence and partiality involving an ejectment suit where
respondents were fined P10,000.00 each. We held that respondent judge erred in
issuing an order of execution on the basis of an ex parte motion for
execution filed by the lessor against the lessee. The fact that the decision of
the MeTC in ejectment cases is immediately executory does not mean that notice
of the motion for execution to the adverse party is unnecessary under Rule 70,
§8 of the Rules of Court.
Second. Nor it there any doubt as to the power of RTC Branch 11 to issue the
alias writ of possession in LRC Case No. P-123-95 notwithstanding the fact that
the writ was issued to execute the decision of another branch of the court
(Branch 12). The different branches of a court in one judicial region are not
really independent of each other. As explained in Bacalso v. Ramirez:[5]
The various branches of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are coordinate and
equal courts, and the totality of which is only one Court of First Instance.
The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. And when a case is
filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch
or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or
proceedings continued by and before another branch or judge. It is for this
reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary
of Justice [now the Supreme Court], the administrative right or power to
apportion the cases among the different branches, both for the convenience of
the parties and for the coordination of the work by the different branches of
the same court. The apportionment and distribution of cases does not involve a
grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and continues to
be vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and the trials may be
held by any branch or judge of the court.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no reason
to disturb the decision of the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the petition for
review of Reggie Christi Limpo must be denied.
On April 25, 2000, while this case was
pending deliberation in this Court, the spouses Anselmo and Precilla Bulaong
filed a motion for leave to intervene. It appears that, in a decision rendered
on July 30, 1999, in Civil Case No. 170-M-95, the RTC Branch 12 ordered the
cancellation of TCT Nos. T-62002 and T-62003 in the name of private respondent
Veronica Gonzales and the execution of a deed of sale covering the lands in
question in favor of the spouses Bulaong; and the issuance to the latter of new
titles upon payment by them of P275,000.00 to private respondent Veronica
Gonzales representing the judgment debt of petitioner in Criminal Case Nos.
9638-M to 9653-M. It appears further that from the decision, both the spouses
Bulaong and private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals where the case
is now pending as C.A. G.R. SP No. 55423. In their motion for intervention, the
spouses Bulaong allege that on January 13, 1993, the Limpos (presumably the
family of herein petitioner Reggie Christi Limpo) mortgaged the lands in
question to them for P4.3 million, delivering to them for this purpose
the owner’s duplicates of TCT Nos. T-249639 and T-249641 registered in the name
of the persons from whom petitioner bought the properties on November 5, 1991;
that as the originals of the titles in the Register of Deeds of Malolos,
Bulacan had been destroyed by fire in 1987, they filed a petition for
reconstitution of the same, resulting in the issuance on February 4, 1993 of
TCT Nos. RT-29488 and RT-29489 which were later cancelled when, in their place,
TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396 in the name of petitioner were issued; that the
spouses found out "to their consternation . . . several entries with
various erasures and superimpositions appear[ing] in the pages of the
encumbrance of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396;" that "the position,
placing, and the number of entries favored spouses Bulaong, while the dates of
entries . . . indicate advantage on the part of Gonzales"; that the
mortgage lien of the spouses Bulaong was annotated on the reconstituted titles
on March 1, 1993; that on August 22, 1993, the mortgage was foreclosed and the
properties covered by it were sold for P4.3 million to the spouses Bulaong as
highest bidders; and that on August 23, 1994, a certificate of sale was issued
to them and inscribed on TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396 as Entry No. 46239. The
spouses Bulaong pray that "the conflict between the rights of spouses
Bulaong as mortgagees for P4.3 million . . . as against the entry in the primary
book for the P275,000.00 judgment claim of [private respondent] Gonzales . . .
be resolved."
Intervention cannot be allowed at this late
stage of this case. Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who
may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or in interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court
shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to
intervene - The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the
original parties.
Thus, intervention may be granted only where
its allowance will not unduly delay or prejudice the rights of the original
parties to a case. Generally, it will be allowed "before rendition of
judgment by the trial court," as Rule 19, §2 expressly provides. After
trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted.[6] Certainly
it cannot be allowed on appeal[7] without
unduly delaying the disposition of the case and prejudicing the interest of the
parties.
Indeed, there is no justification for
granting the motion for the intervention of the spouses Bulaong which they
filed only on April 25, 2000, after the appeal in this case had already been
submitted for resolution, when they could have done so earlier. On January 4,
1993, notice of the levy on execution in Criminal Case Nos. 9638-M to 9653-M
was entered in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds of Malolos,
Bulacan, per Entry No. 7808 and were later annotated on the owner’s duplicate
copies of TCT Nos. T-249639 and T-249641. Although the spouses Bulaong claim
that said owner’s duplicate copies of the titles were "clean" when
the Limpos mortgaged the properties to them on January 13, 1993, they
nonetheless admit that when the titles in the name of petitioner Reggie Christi
Limpo were issued shortly after February 4, 1993 (TCT Nos. T-30395 and
T-30396), they contained the notice of levy on execution in Criminal Case Nos.
9638-M to 9653-M. They, therefore, had notice of private respondent’s claims
over the properties in question.
On December 16, 1994, private respondent
filed a petition to compel petitioner, as registered owner, to surrender her
owner’s copy of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396. Assuming that the spouses Bulaong
were until then without knowledge of the sale of the properties to private
respondent, they could not have remained unaware of the claim of private
respondent. After all, they admit they were then in possession of the owner’s
copy of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396.
The result of all this is that the spouses
Bulaong, knowing private respondent’s interest in the properties in conflict
with theirs, could have sought to intervene much earlier and not only now on
appeal. It took them nearly five years from March 29, 1995, when private
respondent filed a petition for issuance of a writ of possession, before filing
their motion for leave to intervene in this case. Such delay amounts to laches
and justifies the denial of their motion. Allowance of intervention at this
late stage would unduly delay the resolution of the appeal as trial would be
conducted anew to allow the spouses Bulaong to present evidence in support of
their claim of ownership.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
The motion for leave to intervene, filed by the spouses Anselmo and Precilla
Bulaong, is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing,
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Per Justice Cancio C. Garcia, chairman, and concurred
in by Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, members.
[2] Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate
certificates. - Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title
pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the
registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be
registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the
owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a
petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The
court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding
the duplicate certificate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new
certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the
duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if for
any reason the outstanding owner’s duplicate certificate cannot be delivered,
the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new
certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates
thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding
duplicate.
[3] Rollo, pp. 21-22.
[4] 242 SCRA 1 (1995).
[5] 128 Phil. 559, 564-565 (1967).
[6] Trazo v. Manila Pencil Co., Inc., 1 SCRA 403
(1961).
[7] El Hogar Filipino v. National Bank, 64 Phil.
582 (1937); Pacursa v. Del Rosario, 24 SCRA 125 (1968).