SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123912. June 8, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEVY MONIEVA, accused-apppellant.
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J.:
Accused-appellant Levy Monieva appeals the
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Masbate, Masbate, Branch 47 in Criminal
Case No. 6348 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Levy
Monieva" convicting him of murder and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua.
On May 20, 1991, an information was filed
against Levy Monieva charging him of murder committed as follows:
"That on or
about February 10, 1991 in the afternoon thereof, at Sitio Iraya, Barangay
Cagay, Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the said accused with intent to kill, evident
premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab and hack several times one Leonardo
Dumalag, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body thereby inflicting
wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death.
"CONTRARY TO
LAW."[1]
On July 17, 1991, the trial court issued an
order referring the accused to the Masbate Provincial Health Office, Masbate,
Masbate for mental examination and postponing indefinitely the pre-trial and
arraignment of the case until the results of the said examination shall have
become available for the consideration of the court.[2]
Considering however the refusal of the
Masbate Provincial Health Office to conduct a mental examination on the accused
there being no physician in that office competent enough to conduct the
requested mental examination, the court a quo issued another order on
October 1, 1991, referring the accused to the Rodriguez Memorial Mental
Hospital, Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur for mental examination.[3]
A letter dated April 23, 1993 was sent to
the court a quo by Chona C. Belmonte, MD, of the Department of Health
Regional Health Office No. 5, Don Susano J. Rodriguez Memorial Mental Hospital,
Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur. Some portions of her letter are quoted below:
"Dear Sir:
"Preliminary
examination was conducted on the subject LEVY MONIEVA on April 23, 1993 as per
request of your honorable court dated October 1, 1991.
"As you can
see it took the provincial jail almost 2 years to bring the accused here for
examination.
"At present,
there are no observable psychotic signs and symptoms noted on him. However, we
are still conducting psychological testing to further evaluate him. At this
point, the patient doesn’t need any form of treatment."[4]
xxx
Upon arraignment, accused Levy Monieva,
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The Regional
Trial Court thereafter proceeded with the trial.
Elvie Mabuti, one of the witnesses for the
prosecution, testified that on February 10, 1991 at about 5:30 o’clock in the
afternoon while she and her husband Rani Mabuti were inside their house located
at Iraya Cagay, Mobo, Masbate, Masbate she saw accused Levy Monieva hack the
victim Leonardo Dumalag. She also heard Leonardo Dumalag crying for help while
he was running away. The incident happened about 5 meters away from their
house. Upon seeing the incident, she and her husband together with their two
children jumped from their house and fled to the bushes where they stayed the
whole night. At about 10:00 o’clock the following morning, they returned home
and found the headless body of the victim. The head was recovered two days
later on the land tilled by accused Monieva.
Pacita Dumalag, the wife of the victim,
testified that on February 10, 1991 at about 7:30 o’clock in the evening she
was informed by Barangay Tanod Amador Dalanon and Abner Brioso that her husband
was killed by Levy Monieva near the house of their tenant Rani Mabuti at Cagay,
Masbate, Masbate. They then went to the place of incident and found the
lifeless body of her husband.
She also stated that on February 11, 1991,
the police arrested Levy Monieva near his house at Cagay, Masbate, Masbate. The
bolo used in killing her husband was recovered from the accused. For the burial
of her husband, she spent Eighteen Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00).
Dr. Artemio Capellan, the Municipal Health
Officer of Masbate, Masbate testified that he conducted a post mortem
examination on the body of victim Leonardo Dumalag on February 12, 1991. Based
on his examination, the victim sustained four (4) stab wounds, one of which was
the most fatal because the head of the victim was almost cut off. The
instrument used to kill the victim was a short bladed instrument and it was
possible that a bolo was used.
The defense presented only one witness, the
accused Levy Monieva. He denied the allegations that he killed Leonardo
Dumalag. He testified that at the time of the incident he was being attended to
by a quack doctor named Fedir Villanueva in his house located at Cagay,
Masbate, Masbate as he had a fever and his body was aching. He only learned
about the death of Leonardo Dumalag from Barangay Tanod Abner Brioso and Amador
Dalanon when he was investigated by the two. On February 11, 1991, he was
arrested by the police authorities.
On July 10, 1995, a decision was rendered by
the trial court convicting the accused and imposing the following penalty:
"WHEREFORE,
this court finds accused Levy Monieva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua; orders him to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the cost.
"IT IS SO
ORDERED."[5]
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant
assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE OTHERWISE UNCORROBORATED, INCREDIBLE
AND FABRICATED TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ELVIE MABUTI
II
THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT LEVY MONIEVA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 248 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.
The appeal is meritorious in the sense that
the penalty should be lowered.
In his brief accused-appellant contends that
Elvie Mabuti is an unreliable witness because her testimony is contrary to
human experience, incredible, fabricated and wholly concocted. He points to the
following incongruities in the said witness’ testimony and rationalizes why he
considers them to be such.
a) Elvie Mabuti
and her family left their house and fled to the bushes that are in an open
field and that is where they stayed the whole night. – It is highly incredible
and unbelievable that they would leave their house to hide in an open field
where they could have easily been caught and attacked.
b) Upon their
return the following day, February 11, 1991, at about 10:00 o’clock in the
morning Elvie Mabuti found the body of the victim near their house. – This does
not jibe with the testimony of the victim’s wife, Pacita Dumalag, that upon
learning of the death of her husband Leonardo on February 10, 1991 at around
7:30 o’clock in the evening she immediately went to the place of the incident
where she found his lifeless body;
c) Elvie Mabuti
testified that the victim was beheaded and that the head was recovered two days
later. – This is false because the post mortem report of Dr. Artemio Capellan
stated that the head of the victim was almost cut off but not severed.
We find the testimony of Elvie Mabuti
credible. She testified in a categorical, straightforward manner –
manifestations that a witness is telling the truth.
Appellant finds it incredible that Elvie
Mabuti and her family opted to flee from their house instead of just staying
put.
Elvie Mabuti explains why: "(They)
jumped and escaped because (her) husband was afraid."[6]
At first blush it confounds the mind why
Rani Mabuti, the husband of Elvie, opted to flee the sanctuary of their abode.
Was it cowardice or fear for his family’s safety that prompted him to do so?
Whatever the reason for their hasty departure was, we deem it inconsequential
for the fact remains that they fled when they saw their neighbor Levy Monieva
hacking Leonardo Dumalag.
As admitted by Monieva himself except for
the Mabuti family he had no other neighbor.[7] Considering then that the Mabutis were witness to a
crime taking place and perhaps propelled by the belief that they could be
killed next Rani Mabuti made the decision to flee.
Given the same set of circumstances another
person might have had the same or an entirely different reaction. It is not
fair to gauge the action of Elvie Mabuti and her family with that of another
for it is difficult to ascertain what a person’s reactions would be when a
startling or frightening situation suddenly looms before him.
It has been held in the case of People vs.
Luzorata,[8]
"(d)ifferent
people act differently to a given stimulus or type of situation, and there is
no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange
or startling or frightful experience."
As to the alleged inconsistency between the
testimony of Elvie Mabuti and the victim’s wife Pacita Dumalag we find that the
time when the body was found is immaterial to appellant’s guilt. Where the
inconsistency is not an essential element of murder, such inconsistency is
insignificant and cannot have any bearing on the essential fact testified to,
that is, the fact of killing.[9]
It has been held that inconsistencies and
discrepancies in the testimony referring to minor details and not upon the
basic aspect of the crime do not impair the witnesses’ credibility. These
inconsistencies even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, the credibility of
witnesses as they negate any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[10]
But even if it were proven that that part of
Elvie Mabuti’s testimony was false, this will not cause her entire testimony to
be rejected, for
"Even where a
witness is found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars,
and it was not shown that there was such intended prevarication by complainant
in this case, it is not required that the entire testimony be rejected, since
such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited. It is perfectly
reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and
disbelieve it with respect to other facts.[11]
Finally, appellant was positively and
categorically identified by Elvie Mabuti as the person who hacked Leonardo
Dumalag. More than anything, this carries a great weight in the determination
of whether an accused is guilty or not. Some portions of the testimony of the
said witness follow:
"COURT
"Q On
February 10, 1991 at about 5:30 in the afternoon what happened to Leonardo
Dumalag?
"A He was
killed.
"ATTY.
VILLAMOR
"Q By whom?
"A Levy
Monieva.
"Q If this
Levy Monieva is in Court, can you identify him?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Please
point to Levy Monieva.
"A (Witness
pointed to a man who, when asked of his name, identified himself as Levy
Monieva.
"Q Now how
did Levy Monieva kill Leonardo Dumalag on February 10, 1991?
"A He hacked
him.
"Q How many
times did Levy Monieva hack Leonardo Dumalag?
"A Many
times.
"Q Where?
"A Parts of
his body.
"Q Where
particularly in Cagay did Levy Monieva hack Leonardo Dumalag?
"A Near our
house.
"Q How many
meters away from your house?
"A About five
meters.[12]
Appellant denies having committed the crime
and interposes the defense of alibi. He contends that he could not have killed
the victim because he was sick at the time.
It has invariably been held that for an
alibi to prosper, it must be sufficiently convincing as to preclude any doubt
as to the physical impossibility of the accused-appellant’s being present at
the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the
incident.[13]
Appellant Levy Monieva admits that he was
being attended by a quack doctor in his house at Cagay, Masbate, Masbate at the
time of the incident. The crime occurred a few meters away from the house of
his nearest neighbor Rani Mabuti. Monieva was not so far away that he could not
have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.
Between the positive identification made by
Elvie Mabuti and the denial of the appellant, we are more inclined to give
weight to the former’s testimony. Moreover, there was no showing that Elvie
Mabuti was motivated by any ill-will when she testified against the appellant.
We have no reason to believe that she would knowingly put a person behind bars
if he was not the one who killed the victim.
Positive identification, where categorical
and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[14]
Anent the second assigned error we hold that
the trial court erred in convicting the appellant of murder. It was not
sufficiently proven that the killing was qualified by the aggravating
circumstances of abuse of superior strength, evident premeditation, and
treachery.
We are at a complete loss as to what the
sequence of events was from the time Levy Monieva and Leonardo Dumalag met to
the time the victim lay dead. The record does not disclose this information.
What the eyewitness, i.e., Elvie Mabuti saw (appellant chasing and hacking the
victim) and heard (the crying of the victim for help) was almost the tail end
of the altercation between the appellant and the victim. We do not know what
the means of defense available to the offended party was, if there was any, and
whether he made use of it from the inception of the altercation.
Abuse of superior strength means to purposely
use excessive force out of proportion to the means available to the person
attacked to defend himself.[15] (Emphasis Ours) Before abuse of superior strength may be appreciated, it
must be clearly shown that there was deliberate intent on the part of the
malefactor to take advantage thereof.[16]
The prosecution is of the opinion that since
the appellant was armed with a bolo and was chasing the unarmed victim who was
trying to flee, this shows that the latter was powerless to offer resistance
thereby admitting his inferiority and the superiority of his assailant.
This is mere conjecture on the part of the
prosecution. It was not at all apparent that the appellant consciously adopted
that particular means, i.e., the use of a bolo, to harm another.
The prosecution failed to prove the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. Treachery is present when the attack
comes without warning, is sudden and unexpected and the unsuspecting victim is
not in a position to parry the assault.[17]In the case of People vs.
Pena[18] it was held that treachery cannot be presumed; it
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as conclusively as the
killing itself.
The mere fact that the victim was running
away from the appellant who was wielding a bolo shows that the victim was aware
of the danger to himself, thus negating the suddenness of the attack for which
reason treachery cannot be appreciated in this case.
Neither was evident premeditation proven for
there was no showing as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched, or what
time had elapsed before it was carried out.[19] Evident premeditation must be clearly proven,
established beyond reasonable doubt, and must be based on external acts which
are evident, not merely suspected, and which indicate deliberate planning.[20]
From the above, we hold that there was an
absence of qualifying circumstances to justify the conviction of the accused
for murder.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the conviction of appellant Levy Monieva is
AFFIRMED, with the modification that he is declared guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide and not Murder. Thus, appellant is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. The monetary award of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death
of the victim is also AFFIRMED. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza,
Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
[1] Orig. Record, p. 1.
[2] Ibid., p. 25.
[3] Ibid., p. 44.
[4] Ibid., p. 71.
[5] Rollo, p. 46.
[6] T.S.N. dated October 29, 1993, p. 3.
[7] T.S.N. dated February 11, 1994, p. 12.
[8] 286 SCRA 487 [1998].
[9] People vs. Pandiano, 232 SCRA 619 [1994].
[10] People vs. Lising, 285 SCRA 595[1998].
[11] People vs. Empleo, 226 SCRA 454, 467 [1993].
[12] T.S.N. dated October 29, 1993, p. 2.
[13] People vs. Maguad, 287 SCRA 535 [1998].
[14] People vs. Enriquez, 292 SCRA 656 [1998];
Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 171 [1998].
[15] People vs. Asto, 277 SCRA 697, 711 [1997].
[16] People vs. Canete, 287 SCRA 490 [1998].
[17] People vs. Pallarco, 288 SCRA 151[1998].
[18] 291 SCRA 606 [1998].
[19] People vs. Sambulan, 289 SCRA 500 [1998].
[20] People vs. Pena, 291 SCRA 606 [1998].