FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000]
IMELDA
MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a
first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having
been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second
marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on
petitioner’s complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against
respondent on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated
without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for
nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order
dated December 29, 1998.[1] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second
marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of
the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the
Family Code.[2]
The issue to be resolved in this petition is
whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for
bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises
in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein.[3] It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused.[4] It must appear not only that the civil case involves
facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of
the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the
criminal case.[5] Consequently, the defense must involve an issue
similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action
and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may
proceed.[6] Its two essential elements are:[7]
(a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively
resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency
of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is
deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a
crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the
prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or may
not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information
on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of
the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was
effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may
remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties,
particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the
marriage.[8] Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack
of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It
should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all
its elements concur – two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent
marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the
material time of the first marriage.[9]
In the case at bar, respondent’s clear
intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and
thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for
bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code,
contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming
that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally
void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party
may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually
the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without
obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the
first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on
bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:[10]
(P)arties to a
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity,
the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a
second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage
in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on
the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the
requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims that
prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had
been living together as husband and wife for at least five years.[11] The issue in this case is limited to the existence
of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve the validity
of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the Civil
Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every
intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds."[12] Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the
determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration
the presumption is that the marriage exists.[13] No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the
absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted
to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final
judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho
v. Relova,[14] he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question.[15] This ruling applies here by analogy since both
crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of
the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse.[16] The contracting of a marriage knowing that the
requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in
disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code.[17] The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and
every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the
judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why
should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to
delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own
disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous
marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence
during the trial proper in the criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution
of the first marriage before the second marriage was contracted rests upon the
defense,[18] but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial
of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every
defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to
obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred
in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was
indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies
appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy
that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to
the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of
frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above,
this cannot be done.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family
Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the
second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs
a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise
the second marriage will also be void.[19] The reason is that, without a judicial declaration
of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at
bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married
man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.[20] Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the
civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into
a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision
in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge.
It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent
cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action
against him.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December
29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed
with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno,
Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[2] Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 23.
[3] Fortich-Celdran v. Celdran, 19 SCRA 502
(1967); Zapanta v. Montessa; 114 Phil. 428 (1962); Merced v.
Diez, 109 Phil. 155 (1960); See also People v. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357
(1954) cited in Dichaves v. Judge Apalit, AM-MTJ-00-1274, June 8, 2000.
[4] Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 (1992); Donato v.
Luna, 160 SCRA 441 (1988); Quiambao v. Osorio, 158 SCRA 674 (1988);
Mendiola v. Macadaeg, 1 SCRA 593 (1961); Aleria v. Mendoza, 83
Phil. 427 (1949); Berbari v. Concepcion, 40 Phil. 837 (1920)
[5] Ras v. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125 (1980); Benitez v.
Concepcion, Jr., 2 SCRA 178 (1961) citing De Leon v. Mabanag, 70 Phil.
202 (1940)
[6] Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 (1992)
[7] Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 5. Elements of
prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (See also
Prado v. People, 218 Phil. 571)
[8] Niñal v. Badayog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000.
[9] People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935). The
elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) that the
first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) that he contracts a subsequent marriage; (4) the subsequent marriage would
have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. The exception
to prosecution for bigamy are those covered by Article 41 of the Family Code
and by P.D. 1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, which provides that penal laws relative to the crime of bigamy
"shall not apply to a person married xxx under Muslim Law" where the
requirements set therein are met. See also Sulu Islamic Association v.
Malik, 226 SCRA 193 (1993); Merced v. Diez, 109 Phil. 155 (1960)
[10] 22 SCRA 731, 735 (1968)
[11] Civil Code, Article 76.
[12] Civil Code, Article 220.
[13] Landicho v. Relova, supra.
[14] Supra.
[15] Beltran v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
137567, June 20, 2000.
[16] Civil Code, Article 3.
[17] Revised Penal Code, Article 350.
[18] People v. Dungao, 56 Phil. 805 (1931)
[19] Apiag v. Judge Cantero, 268 SCRA 47, 61 (1997)
[20] Wiegel v. Hon. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499, 501
(1986)
[21] People v. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357, 360 (1954)