SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No.
129667. July 31, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERIC BAID Y OMINTA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an
appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
95, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Eric Baid y Ominta guilty of the
crime of rape against Nieva Garcia y Saban, a mental patient, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
victim the amount of P50,000.00
as moral damages.
The information
against accused-appellant, based on the complaint filed by the offended woman
and her mother, alleged -
That on or about the 22nd day of
December 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by means of force
and intimidation, to wit: by then and there [willfully], unlawfully and
feloniously undressing one NIEVA GARCIA y SABAN, a mental patient
suffering [from] schizophrenia and put himself on top of her, and thereafter
have carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against her will and
without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
When arraigned,
accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon trial of the case on
the merits proceeded.
The prosecution
presented three witnesses, namely, the complainant, Dr. Herminigilda Salangad,
the complainant's attending psychiatrist, and Dr. Emmanuel Reyes, the
medico-legal officer who examined the complainant.
Complainant is a
27-year old single woman, who was diagnosed as having suffered from
schizophrenia since 1988. In December
1996, she was confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic in Cubao, Quezon City because
of a relapse of her mental condition.[3] On the other hand,
accused-appellant was a nurse-aide of said clinic.
On December 22,
1996, at around 3 a.m., accused-appellant sneaked into the patients' room. He woke the complainant up and offered her a
cigarette, at the same time touching her foot.
Complainant took the cigarette.
As she smoked it, accused-appellant caressed her. Apparently, she was aroused, because she
afterward removed her pants. It turned
out she was not wearing any underwear.
Accused-appellant also removed his pants and the two had sexual
intercourse. Afterwards, they
transferred under the bed and continued their sexual intercourse. Complainant said she felt accused-appellant
had an orgasm. A female patient who had
been awakened tried to separate the two, and, as she failed to do so, she went
out to call the two nurses on duty. The
nurses responded but, when they arrived, accused-appellant had left, while complainant
had already put on her pants.[4]
Complainant was
brought later during the day before Dr. Emmanuel Reyes for medico-legal
examination. She told him what
happened. Dr. Reyes reduced her
narration of the incident into writing[5] and then gave her a physical
examination. His report stated:[6]
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly developed, and coherent
female subject. Breasts are
hemispherical with pale brown areola and nipples from which secretions could be
pressed. Abdomen is flabby and soft.
GENITAL:
There is moderate growth of pubic
hair. Labia majora are full, convex and
coaptated with the pale brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an abraided
posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with deep healed
lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 o'clock.
External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the introduction
of the examining finger and the virgin-sized speculum. Vaginal canal is wide with flattened
rugosities. Cervix is normal in size,
color and consistency.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state
physically.
There are no external signs of
application of any form of violence.
REMARKS:
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears
are negative for gram negative diplococci and for spermatozoa.
Dr. Reyes said
the fresh abrasion, located at 6 o'clock posterior of the complainant's
genitalia, could have been recently caused by a hard blunt object, such as an
erect penis during sexual intercourse, or by the insertion of a finger. Dr. Reyes found that complainant was
suffering from mental illness and that she had lapses in the course of her
interview.[7]
Accused-appellant
testified in his behalf. He stated that
he had been a nurse-aide of the Holy Spirit Clinic since September 18,
1995. His job was to watch the
patients, especially when they become violent.
He also fetched them from their homes.
He admitted that he knew the complainant but claimed he did not know the
reason for her confinement. He denied
the allegations against him. He
testified that, on the date and time referred to by the complainant, he was
asleep in the nurse-aide quarters located about ten meters from the room where
complainant was staying. He admitted,
however, that to go to the patients' room, he did not have to pass by the
nurses' station. He said he knew that,
at the time in question, there were two nurses on duty and ten patients in the
room. He described the patients' room
as having an area of about eight by five square meters with wooden beds
arranged one foot apart from each other.[8]
Accused-appellant
was questioned by the trial court. He
testified that on December 22, 1996, he was on duty from 4 p.m. to 12
midnight. He was a stay-in nurse-aide
of the clinic. He stated that the
clinic consisted of two floors and five rooms.
The room where complainant and the other patients were staying and his
quarters were both on the ground floor of the building. He admitted that the clinic was for the
mentally ill and that, as a nurse-aide, he was supposed to know the status of every patient and his job was to watch
them and pacify them whenever they become violent. He said he was very well acquainted with the behavior of the
patients considering the length of time he had been working in the clinic. He claimed, however, that he did not specifically
know from what ailment complainant was suffering, but only that she was
undergoing treatment because of mental deficiency.[9]
On
cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted that he knew it was prohibited to
give cigarettes to patients. He further
admitted that, as a nurse-aide, he could enter the patients' room anytime to
check their condition and see to it that the lights were turned off when they
were not needed. He further stated that
he was not investigated by the police when he was invited to their
headquarters.[10]
On June 20,
1997, the trial court rendered its decision,[11] the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused Eric Baid y Ominta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape defined in and penalized by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Rep. Act 7659, and hereby sentences the said accused to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused is further ordered to indemnify the victim Nieva
Garcia y Saban the amount of P50,000.00, as moral damages.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant
contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of rape.[12]
Complainant is
suffering from schizophrenia, a psychotic disorder of unknown etiology,
characterized by disturbance in thinking involving a distortion of the usual
logical relations between ideas, a separation between the intellect and the
emotions so that the patient's feelings and his or her manifestations seem
inappropriate to his or her life situation, and a reduced tolerance for the
stress of interpersonal relations so that the patient retreats from social
intercourse into his or her own fantasy life and commonly into delusions and
hallucinations, and may, when untreated or unsuccessfully treated, go on to marked
deterioration or regression in his or her behavior though often
unaccompanied by further intellectual loss.[13] The following are the symptoms of schizophrenia:
A. Characteristic
symptoms: Two (or more) of the following, each present for a significant portion
of time during a 1-month period (or less if successfully treated):
(1) delusions
(2) hallucinations
(3) disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence)
(4) grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior
(5) negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition
Note: Only one criterion A symptom is required if delusions
are bizarre or hallucinations consist of a voice keeping up a running
commentary on the person's behavior or thoughts, or two or more voices
conversing with each other.
B. Social/occupational
dysfunction: For a significant portion of the time since the onset of the
disturbance, one or more major areas of functioning such as work, interpersonal
relations, or self-care are markedly below the level achieved prior to the
onset (or when the onset is in childhood or adolescence, failure to achieve
expected level of interpersonal, academic, or occupational achievement).
C. Duration: Continuous signs of the disturbance persist for at
least 6 months. This 6-month period
must include at least 1 month of symptoms (or less if successfully treated)
that meet criterion A (i.e., active-phase symptoms) and may include periods of
prodromal or residual symptoms. During
these prodromal or residual periods, the signs of the disturbance may be
manifested by only negative symptoms or two or more symptoms listed in
criterion A present in an attentuated form (e.g., odd beliefs, unusual
perceptual experiences).
D. Schizoaffective
and mood disorder exclusion: Schizoaffective disorder and mood disorder
with features have been ruled out because either (1) no major depressive,
manic, or mixed episodes have occurred concurrently with the active-phase
symptoms; or (2) if mood symptoms, their total duration has been brief relative
to the duration of the active and residual periods.
E. Substance/general
medical condition exclusion: The disturbance is not due to the
direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a
medication) or a general medical condition.
F. Relationship
to a pervasive developmental disorder: If there is a history of autistic
disorder or another pervasive developmental disorder, the additional diagnosis
of schizophrenia is made only if prominent delusions or hallucinations are also
present for at least a month (or less if successfully treated).[14]
Schizophrenia is
classified into five subtypes, namely, paranoid, disorganized (hebephrenic),
catatonic, undifferentiated, and residual.[15]
Dr. Herminigilda
Salangad, the complainant's attending psychiatrist and consultant at the
Medical Center in Muntinlupa, the Perpetual Help Medical Center, the Philippine
National Police, and the Holy Spirit Clinic, was presented as an expert
witness. According to her, complainant
was, at the time of the incident, suffering from an undifferentiated type of
schizophrenia, described as having the characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia
but does not fit the profile for paranoid, disorganized, or catatonic
schizophrenia. Dr. Salangad stated that
complainant seemed to shift from one type of schizophrenia to another. Complainant was catatonic when she first
treated her, a situation where the patient shows waxy flexibility (e.g.,
when a limb is repositioned, that limb remains in that position for a prolonged
period of time as if the patient is made of wax), mutism or agitation, and the
patient mimics words and actions during examination. Later, complainant became paranoid, i.e., suspicious,
hostile and aggressive. She also
manifested a behavior where she mumbled and smiled to herself.[16]
It is contended
that as complainant is a schizophrenic, her testimony should not have been
given credence by the trial court. It
is argued that: (1) there were serious inconsistencies between her sworn
statement and her testimony in court; (2) the prosecution failed to present
witnesses to corroborate her testimony; (3) complainant failed to identify
accused-appellant; (4) the results of the medico-legal examination were
negative for spermatozoa; (5) the healed lacerations showed that complainant
had sexual intercourse seven days before the alleged incident; and (6) the
probability was that her allegations of rape were merely a product of her
fantasy.[17]
We disagree.
Notwithstanding
her mental illness, complainant showed that she was qualified to be a witness, i.e.,
she could perceive and was capable of making known her perceptions to others.[18] Her testimony indicates that she
could understand questions particularly relating to the incident and could give
responsive answers to them. Thus she
testified:
PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
Q Miss
Nieva Garcia, are you still confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic, Los Angeles
St., Cubao, Quezon City?
A Not
anymore, sir.
Q On
December 22, 1996, do you know whether you are at the Holy Spirit Clinic, Los
Angeles St., Cubao, Quezon City?
A Yes,
sir.
Q Why
were you there, Miss Witness?
A My
mother asked me if I want to be confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic and I chose
to be confined at the Holy Spirit because during that time, I was then taking
my medicine.
Q At
around three o'clock in the morning of December 22, 1996, do you know where
were you?
A Yes,
I was lying on the bed inside the Holy Spirit Clinic.
Q And
while lying on the bed, inside the Holy Spirit Clinic, do you know what
happened then, Miss Witness?
A At
that time, there was a person shorter than the person (witness pointing to the
person dressed in yellow t-shirt whose name when asked, answered the name Eric
Baid) and that person is smaller than the person inside the courtroom was
disturbing "kinakalabit" another person inside the room.
Q And
what happened after that first man entered the room at the Holy Spirit Clinic?
A The
girl was trying to avoid the other person because at that time, the accused
Eric Baid was entering the room.
Q And
what happened after Eric Baid entered the room?
A When
Eric Baid entered the room as if he knew me already and he asked me,
"Nieva, gusto mo ng sigarilyo?", at the same time, Eric Baid was
touching my foot.
ATTY. VENTURANZA:
I would just want to manifest that the witness while
testifying, she was smiling.
PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
Q And
after he asked you whether you like a stick of cigarette and touched your foot,
what happened next, Madam Witness?
A I
said yes.
Q And
what happened next after you said yes, I liked cigarette?
A After that, he
caressed me.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q How
did he caress you?
A He
went on top of me.
COURT: (to the prosecutor)
Go ahead.
PROSECUTION: (to the
witness)
Q How
about the other man who entered earlier, what happened him?
A The
smaller person went in and out of our room twice, the first time that he went,
he touched the other woman beside me on the foot but the woman resisted and
shouted. After that, the second time,
the other man went inside the room, he touched the other woman but the woman
shouted and that smaller one went outside of the room.
Q When
Eric Baid placed himself on top of you, where was that other man?
A He
was no longer there.
….
PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
Q When
Eric Baid was already on top of you, do you know if the small man entered
again your room?
A No,
sir.
Q And
then, what happened when Eric Baid placed himself on top of you?
A I
agreed.
Q Agreed
to what?
A I
agreed to the sex.
Q You
mean to say that you and Eric Baid has sexual intercourse while on top of your
bed?
A Yes,
sir.
Q And
what happened during the sexual intercourse while both of you were on top of
the bed?
A Somebody
was awakened and told me, "Hoy, asawa mo ba iyan? Kinukubabawan ka."
and I answered no.
Q And
was Eric Baid, was he able to consummate that sexual intercourse, Miss Witness?
A Yes,
sir.
Q And
more or less, how long did the sexual intercourse last, Miss Witness?
A Around
three to five minutes.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Why,
was he able to insert his private organ into your private organ?
A Yes,
your Honor.
Q What
did he do when he was able to insert his private organ into your private organ?
A As
if his orgasm suddenly appeared.
Q Do
you understand when you say as if his orgasm suddenly appeared?
A They
are like what they call, your Honor, as if "naiputok".
Q And
what did he do when according to you "naiputok"?
A As
if it was okay for him.
Q You
were wearing an underwear?
A None,
your Honor.
Q You
were actually naked?
A I
was wearing pants but I have no panty.
Q But
who removed your pants?
A I
was the one, your Honor.
Q What
about Eric Baid, what was he wearing?
A He
was also wearing pants.
Q Who
removed the pants of Eric Baid?
A He
was the one.[19]
When complainant
was questioned on cross and redirect examination, she explained how she was
able to identify accused-appellant, to wit:
ATTY. SALATANDRE:
Q You
said a while ago that when the sex affair happened it was dark so all
throughout you did not see the face of the accused?
A During
that time it was dark but the latter part when he opened the light, I saw his
face, sir.
Q When
the light was opened, he was about to leave the room?
A About to leave,
sir.
Q He
was already facing the door?
A Yes,
Sir.
Q And
you were at his back left inside the room?
A No,
Sir.
Q Where
were you then?
A I
was just inside the room in my bed not at his back, sir.
Q You
were already on your bed when he was about to leave the room?
A Yes,
Sir.
Q At
that time that sex affair transpired between you and the accused, you did not
even know his name?
A Yes,
Sir.
Q You
were only told later on about this person?
A Yes,
Sir.
ATTY. SALATANDRE: (to the
Court)
That will be all, Your Honor.
COURT:
Any redirect?
PROSECUTION:
Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Go ahead.
PROSECUTION:
Q You
said that you were only able to identify the accused when he put on the lights,
when he was about to leave the room, how far were you from the accused?
A This
distance, sir. (parties stipulated a
distance of four meters, more or less)
Q You
said that you saw his face at that time?
A Yes,
sir.
Q And
before this incident of December 22, 1996, were there any other occasion that
he had any sexual intercourse with you?
A None,
sir.
Q And
you often saw him as attendant in that clinic?
A Yes,
sir.
Q And
when you said that room was dark, is it totally dark or was it only a little
dark?
A Little
light, sir. It was a little bit dark
and a little bit light. (medyo may
ilaw)
Q So
the time that you had sexual intercourse with the accused at that time, you can
identify the face of this person?
A Yes,
sir.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q You
said that medyo may ilaw, where was the light emanating at about 3:00 in the
morning?
A From
the window outside, the room can be illuminated through the window, Your Honor.
Q So
when the light came from outside, was the source from the moon, from the bulb
of the Meralco post or from another light coming from another building
or house?
A It
is the light actually coming from the ceiling of the building of the clinic
which was outside the window, Your Honor.[20]
Though she may
have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of a rape victim
("inappropriate affect") during her testimony, such as by smiling
when answering questions, her behavior was such as could be expected from a
person suffering from schizophrenia.
Otherwise, complainant was candid, straightforward, and coherent.
Furthermore,
aside from the testimony of Dr. Salangad on complainant's consciousness and
memory,[21] it is established that
schizophrenic persons do not suffer from a clouding of consciousness and gross
deficits of memory.[22] It has long been settled that a
person should not be disqualified on the basis of mental handicap alone.[23]
With regard to
the alleged inconsistencies between complainant's sworn statement[24] and her testimony as to the number
of times she and accused-appellant had sexual intercourse and where they did
the same, an examination of the evidence for the prosecution, particularly
complainant's sworn statement and her interview with the examining medico-legal
officer, shows that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her in
different positions at various places in the same room. When complainant testified, she stated that,
aside from the fact that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her on
her bed, he made her transfer later under the bed. Be that as it may, complainant has consistently established in
all of her statements that he had sexual intercourse with her on her bed. Whether or not he had sex with her near the
window and while facing him is of no moment and does not negate the finding of
rape. Whatever may be the
inconsistencies in her testimony, they are minor and inconsequential. They show that complainant's testimony was
unrehearsed, and rather than diminish the probative value of her testimony,
they reinforce it.[25]
In the case at
bar, the rape of complainant occurred in a room where other patients were
sleeping. This circumstance, it is
argued, is antithetical to the possibility of the commission of rape. As this Court has repeatedly said, lust is
no respecter of time and place and the crime of rape can be consummated even
when the malefactor and the victim are not alone.[26]
The plausibility
of an allegation of rape does not depend on the number of witnesses presented
during the trial, so much so that, if the testimonies so far presented clearly
and credibly established the commission of the crime, corroborative evidence
would only be a mere surplusage.[27] In this case, the trial court gave
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the basis of which
it adjudged accused-appellant guilty.
In the absence of bias, partiality, and grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the presiding judge, his findings as to their credibility are entitled
to utmost respect as he had the opportunity to observe their demeanor on the
witness stand.[28]
Nor does the
absence of spermatozoa in the genitalia of complainant destroy the finding of
rape since ejaculation is never an element thereof.[29] What consummates the felony is the
contact of the penis of the perpetrator, however slight, to the vagina of his
victim without her consent.[30] Neither is it required that
lacerations be found in the victim's hymen.
We have held that a medical examination is not a requisite for a rape
charge to prosper as long as the victim categorically and consistently declares
that she has been defiled.[31] In this case, aside from
complainant's positive testimony, the medical examination of the complainant
showed an abrasion on her labia minora, indicating that she had recent sexual
intercourse.[32] That the deep healed lacerations
found on the complainant's genitalia may have been caused seven days prior to
December 22, 1996 is immaterial and irrelevant considering that she is a
non-virgin.
Accused-appellant
also claims that complainant could have been hallucinating in alleging that she
had sexual intercourse with him on December 22, 1996. In answer, suffice it to say that complainant was steadfast and
consistent in stating that she was raped by accused-appellant. She maintained her allegation of rape when
she was physically examined by the medico-legal officer, when she made her
statement to the police and again when she testified in court.[33]
Accused-appellant
assails the trial court's finding of lack of consent on the part of the
complainant to the sexual act. As the facts show, complainant herself admitted
that she agreed to have sex with him after he gave her a stick of cigarette. However, it should be stressed that
complainant was in no position to give her consent. As Dr. Salangad said in her testimony:
COURT:
Q If
you claim that the private complainant is suffering from this kind of illness,
schizophrenia, and manifests behavior to the effect that she can not be active
during lucid intervals now if she is suffering from this kind or mental state,
can she give an intelligent consent considering that the private complainant is
already above 20 years of age?
A In
her case, I would say no, Your Honor.
Q I
will rephrase my question. Because when I asked to give an intelligent consent,
you might be referring to acts that are very important to her like, for
example, "do you want to eat?" of course, she will give an intelligent
consent. "Do you want to sleep?" of course, she will give an
intelligent consent?
A Yes,
Your Honor.
Q But
things that would destroy her honor or reputation like for example having sex
with her, can she give an intelligent consent?
A No,
Your Honor.
Q In
other words, she would not know the consequences of her consenting to such a
proposal to have sex?
A Yes,
Your Honor.
. . . .
ATTY. SALATANDRE:
Q She
can not give an intelligent consent to sex, your patient?
A Yes,
sir.
Q Meaning
she will just agree?
A She
has said so when I asked her. She was just offered a cigarette.
Q Meaning
if she opens her legs, she does not understand what she was doing?
A She
probably knew what she was doing but when we say an intelligent consent, she
has weighed the pros and cons on an action and its future significance and also
based on the upbringing, sir.
Q That
she was on top of the bed, then the accused allegedly opened the zipper of his
pants and pulled down the pants up to his knees and placed himself on top of
the patient and tried to insert his organ to her organ and the girl said she
agreed to it because she likes it, does it mean all those things that
transpired she does not know or understand what was happening?
A She
knew what was happening but there is a difference in her judgment, in her
discernment. A child can be asked to lie down and knows that somebody was on
top of him or her and that is the thing of being aware. But the judgment of the
consent itself, the significance, the effect, we all know that a normal person
does not do these unless he or she contemplates it.
Q I
just do not know if I am correct, my interpretation about what you are saying
is that physically they are doing that, meaning the organ of the accused was
inserted into the organ of the patient allegedly but the girl did not resist,
the girl did not comment whatsoever because she did not understand what is
happening?
COURT:
No, she did not say that she did not understand what
was happening, she can not discern.
A Let
me give you a little information. In the psychological state of mentally ill
patients, the basic instinct of a person is very prominent. They respond, they
eat and they can have sex, that is normal and they are just responding on the
level of their basic instinct. When you are a mature person or a normal person
and you have attained maturity and clearness of mind, you now, of course, try
to put things into their proper perspective, socially and morally, that is
where upbringing and education come in. I would say that the patient's case,
she is more responding in an instinctual level without the use of intellect.[34]
Accused-appellant
questions in this appeal the qualifications of Dr. Salangad as an expert
witness. However, he cannot do this now
as he did not raise any objection to Dr. Salangad's qualifications in the trial
court. On the contrary, he even
cross-examined her on the matters on which she testified. In accordance with Rule 132, §36, objections
not timely raised are deemed waived.
The fact that
Dr. Salangad was hired by the family of complainant to give expert testimony as
a psychiatrist did not by that fact alone make her a biased witness and
her testimony unworthy of consideration.
As has been said:
. . . Although courts are not
ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they
choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of
expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to
decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon
the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has
supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he
testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for
study and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other
matters which deserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is
to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the
case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given
controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058).
The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation
of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.[35]
It has not been
shown in this case that the trial court abused its discretion in appreciating
the testimony of Dr. Salangad so as to justify setting aside its findings.
Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is
committed. - Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
(1) By using force
or intimidation;
(2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
(3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
. . . .
To warrant a
conviction for rape under paragraph (2) of Art. 335, a woman need not be proven
as completely insane or deprived of reason.
The phrase "deprived of reason" has been construed to include
those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency or some form of mental
retardation, those who are feebleminded although coherent.[36]
That the
complainant was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the rape is shown
by the fact that she was in the clinic precisely because of such illness and by
her behavior at the trial, during which she would smile for no reason at all
while answering the questions. Though
she may not have totally lost her memory, it was shown that she was suffering
from an impairment of judgment, which made her incapable of giving, an
intelligent consent to the sexual act.
It has been held that where the rape victim is feeble-minded, the force
required by the statute is the sexual act itself.[37]
Even assuming
then that the complainant consented to have sexual intercourse with accused-appellant,
the copulation would fall under the third paragraph of Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code in view of the fact that complainant was mentally ill. Sexual intercourse with an insane, deranged,
or mentally deficient, feebleminded, or idiotic woman is rape, pure and simple.[38]
At any rate,
complainant said in her sworn statement that she was afraid of
accused-appellant because of the nature of his job as a nurse-aid. Thus she stated:
28. Tanong
: Ikaw ba ay natatakot kay Eric?
Sagot : Kaunti lang, dahil sa trabaho niya.[39]
As Dr. Salangad
explained:
ATTY. SALATANDRE:
….
Q Meaning
that when she was asked on page 2 "Tanong 27 Q - Ikaw ba ay tinakot o
sinaktan ni Eric? S - Hindi naman po." This is her own answer, nobody
threatened her at that time?
A Yes,
sir, but may I add. There was no direct
threat but in her situation she was brought there for confinement and treatment
and for safekeeping. She is in a
situation wherein the attendants and the nurses are all authorities around her,
who dictate what to do. I believe that
there was some kind of threat or force in that level, although there was no
direct threat in the action.
COURT:
Q In
the mind of Nieva Garcia, who were those that might be threatening to
her?
A The
accused somehow had made the threat. Because
in their daily activity, the attendants and nurses dictate the things to do,
they follow, they are bosses in the clinic, they are in that kind of situation
always, Your Honor.
Q That
explains your presence during the investigation?
A To
assist her in order that she is not afraid and in response to earlier question
of counsel if the patient was directly threatened or intimidated during the
act, I am giving you a general situation in an institution, in this kind
of institution. Sometimes they are restrained
if they go out of line, they are ones who restrain them, the attendants and the
nurses do these, Your Honor.[40]
As already
stated, accused-appellant invoked alibi in his defense. He claimed that, at the time of the
incident, he was in his quarters at the Holy Spirit Clinic sleeping. For the defense of alibi to be believed, the
following requisites must be met: (a) his presence at another place at the time
of the perpetration of the offense must be proven; and (b) it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.[41]
Accused-appellant's
testimony itself demonstrates the untenability of his alibi. First, his declaration that he was in
another room of the clinic is uncorroborated.
Second, the room in which he said he was sleeping at that time of the
incident was only a few meters away from the patients' room where complainant
was confined. Third, he admitted that,
as a nurse-aide, he was allowed to enter the patients' room anytime for
purposes of checking on the patients.
Above all, his alibi cannot be given credence because complainant has
pointed to him as the culprit of the rape. In cases in which the
accused-appellant was identified by the victim herself who harbored no ill
motive against him, the defense of alibi was rejected.[42]
The trial court
correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, in
accordance with our recent rulings that moral damages may be awarded in rape
cases without any need of proof of moral suffering. However, in addition, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00
should have been awarded the complainant consistent with the ruling that rape
victims are entitled to such an award without need of proof except the fact
of the commission of the offense.[43] On the other hand, the plea of the
prosecution that the indemnity should be raised to P75,000.00 cannot be granted because
such amount is awarded only in cases of qualified rape. In this case, there were no qualifying
circumstances raising the penalty to death.[44]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 95, Quezon City is AFFIRMED with the modification that, in
addition to the award of P50,000.00 for moral damages made by the trial
court, complainant should be indemnified in the amount of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing,
Buena, and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo,
J., (Chairman), on leave.
[1] Per
Judge Diosdado Madarang Peralta.
[2] Rollo,
pp. 12-13.
[3] TSN
(Dr. Salangad), pp. 5, 12, April 23, 1997.
[4] TSN
(Nieva Garcia), pp. 4-9, April 10, 1997; TSN (Nieva Garcia), p. 3, April 27, 1997;
Exhibit D; Records, pp. 5-6.
[5] Exhibit
B-2.
[6] Exhibit
A.
[7] TSN
(Dr. E. Reyes), pp. 2-8, March 17, 1997.
[8] TSN
(Eric Baid), pp. 2-6, May 22, 1997.
[9] Id.,
pp. 6-8.
[10] Id.,
pp. 8-11.
[11] Rollo,
pp. 14-22.
[12] Id.,
p. 42.
[13] WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged) 2030 (1993).
[14] 2
A. TASMAN, G. KAY, & J. LIEBERMAN, PSYCHIATRY 930 (1997), citing THE
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS by the American
Psychiatric Association (1994).
[15] Id.,
pp. 931-932.
[16] Id.;
TSN (Dr. Salangad), p. 8, April 23, 1997.
[17] Rollo,
pp. 42-49, 107-115.
[18] Rule
130, §§20-21.
[19] TSN
(Nieva Garcia), pp. 3-8, April 10, 1997.
[20] TSN,
(Nieva Garcia), pp. 7-8, April 24, 1997.
[21] TSN
(Dr. Salangad), pp. 10 and 16, April 23, 1997.
[22] PSYCHIATRY,
supra, 947-948.
[23] People
v. Almacin, 303 SCRA 399 (1999); People v. Atuel, 261 SCRA 339
(1996).
[24] Exhibits
D and D-1; Records, pp. 5-6.
[25] People
v. Padilla, 301 SCRA 265 (1999); People v. Atuel, 261 SCRA 339
(1996).
[26] People
v. Yabut, 311 SCRA 490 (1999); People v. Lozano, 310 SCRA 707
(1999).
[27] People
v. Gondora, 265 SCRA 558 (1996).
[28] People
v. Dizon, 309 SCRA 669 (1999).
[29] People
v. Yabut, supra.
[30] People
v. Abuan, 284 SCRA 46 (1998).
[31] People
v. Lacaba, G.R No. 130591, Nov. 17, 1999.
[32] People
v. Bation, 305 SCRA 253 (1999).
[33] The
complainant’s medico-legal examination an her sworn statement before the police
were both done on December 22, 1996.
Her direct testimony was presented on April 10, 1997. The rest of her testimony was proffered on
April 24, 1997.
[34] TSN,
(Dr. Salangad), pp. 8-9, 16-17, April 23, 1997.
[35] Espiritu
v. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 362, (1995); Solomon v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 185 SCRA 352 (1990).
[36] People
v. Almacin, 303 SCRA 399 (1999).
[37] Id.
[38] People
v. Atuel, 261 SCRA 339 (1996).
[39] Exhibit
D-1; Records, p. 6.
[40] TSN
(Dr. Salangad), p. 18, April 23, 1997.
[41] People
v. Magpantay, 284 SCRA 96 (1998).
[42] People
v. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 (1998).
[43] People
v. Capillo, G.R. No. 123059, Nov. 25, 1999.
[44] People
v. Lasola, G.R. No. 123152, Nov. 17, 1999.