FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124391. July 5, 2000]
PEOPLE of the
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELMER YPARRAGUIRE y SEPE,
accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
After his indictment[1] and trial, accused-appellant appeals from his
conviction for the crime of rape of a mental retardate. [2]Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law
of 1997, rape is a crime against person which may be prosecuted de oficio.
However, considering that the alleged rape was committed in 1994, which was
prior to the effectivity of R.A. 8353, we apply the old law and treat rape as a
private crime.
The facts as narrated by the trial court
are:
"On March 24,
1994, at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening, while complainant Charmelita D.
Ruina, an invalid and mentally retarded, was on her bed at the store of her
mother at the Public Market at Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, where she and her
mother lived, accused Elmer Yparraguirre alias "Lalo" entered her
room, the door of which was not locked because her mother went to the store of
her elder sister. Upon getting inside, he undressed himself and approached the
Complainant who was apparently awake. He caressed her and sucked her breasts.
She shouted for help but nobody came to rescue her, perhaps because it was late
already in the evening and her voice was not loud enough to be heard at the
distance as, in fact, it could be heard at only about three to five meters away
x x x. Accused told her to keep quiet and when she put up some limpy
resistance, he boxed her. He then removed her panty went on top of her and
inserted his manhood into her most private part. She felt pain. After raping
her, he left her room. Soon her mother, Sanselas Leongas Ruina, arrived. She
reported to her the incident. The following morning, accused went back to the
store and apologized for what he did and promised not to do it again. But his
plea would not mollify Sanselas. She took the complainant to the Madrid
(Surigao del Sur) District Hospital for physical examination. Dr. Carlo P.
Altrecha recorded the following findings in the Medical Certificate that he
issued on March 26, 1994:
POLIO
MYELITIS-MENTALLY RETARDED
PPE:
n ABRASION, AT THE
LEVEL OF THE MID-CLAVICULAR AREA, BOTH, LEFT AND RIGHT.
n CONTUSION, BOTH BREAST, LEFT AND RIGHT.
n CONTUSION, AT THE LEVEL OF THE 8TH THORACIC RIB, ME-AXILLARY LINE, RIGHT.
GENITALIA:
n LABIA MAJORA: NO
CONGESTION, NO HEMATOMA.
n LABIA MINORA: CONGESTED, SLIGHT SWOLLEN.
n VAGINAL ORIPICE: CONGESTED, SLIGHT SWOLLEN HYMEN NOT INTACT.
n VAGINAL SMEAR FOR THE PRESENCE OF SPERMATOZOA: NO SPERMATOZOA SEEN."[3]
Appellant did not testify in court but
instead relied on the lone testimony of his father, who alleged that the
complaint for rape was filed as a result of a "misunderstanding"
between appellant and the mother of the victim.
In this appeal, the basic issue raised by
appellant is that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case
because the complaint was signed and filed by the chief of police and not by
the complainant.
Appellant’s contention has no merit. Section
5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides in part:
"The offense
of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. In case the offended
party dies or becomes incapacitated before she could file the complaint and has
no known parents, grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the
criminal action in her behalf.
The offended
party, even if she were a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution for
the above offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless
she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her
minority. Where the offended party who is a minor fails to file the complaint,
her parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right to file the
action granted to the parents, grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of
all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein
provided, except as stated in the immediately preceding paragraph."
Pursuant to the afore-quoted provision, the
offended party can initiate a prosecution for rape even if she is a minor,
unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her
minority. Although the victim in this case is no longer a minor, it is
undisputed that she is a mental retardate and suffering from physical
deformity. No woman would come out in the open, inform the authorities of the
injustice done to her, make a statement of what had happened unless her purpose
is to redress the wrong done against her honor. Once the violation of the law
becomes known through a direct original participation initiated by the victim,
the requirements of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to the effect
that the offense of rape "shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended party or her parents," are satisfied. Said provision
is not determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over the private offenses
because the same is governed by the Judiciary law, not the Revised Penal Code
which deals with the definition of felonies and their punishment. Stated
differently, the complaint required in Article 344 is but a condition precedent
to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty
parties. Such condition was imposed out of consideration for the offended woman
and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through with the scandal of a public trial.[4] The complaint simply starts the prosecutory
proceeding but does not confer jurisdiction on the court to try the case[5] because the overriding consideration in determining
whether the condition precedent in Article 344 has been complied with is the
intent of the aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the affront
committed.[6]
Article 344 was
not enacted for the specific purpose of benefitting the accused. When it is
said that the requirement in Article 344 (that there should be a complaint of
the offended party or her relatives) is jurisdictional, what is meant is that
it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding. It is not the
complaint which confers jurisdiction in the court to try the case. The court’s
jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.[7]
Going now to the merits of the case, the
gravamen of the crime of rape is the sexual congress of a woman by force and
without consent.[8] These elements have been proven beyond reasonable
doubt to concur in this case. The evidence shows that appellant boxed the
victim in the neck and slapped her on the face while she was alone and lying in
bed on that fateful night. When she shouted for help, appellant told her to
keep quiet. Appellant then began sucking her breasts and her vagina. Then he
removed her panty and forcibly had sexual intercourse with the mentally
retarded victim causing pain in her private part. Her testimony in the oral
deposition confirms the statements she made in the vernacular in her affidavit
earlier executed. Thus,
P – Unsa may imong
guibuhat paghikita nimo niadtong tawo nga miduol kanimo.
T – Misinggit ako.
P – Unsay guibuhat
niadtong tawo sa imong pagsinggit?
T – Iyang guitampa
ang akong baba, dayon mipatong siya kanako.
P– Unsay sunod nga
guibuhat niadtong tawo sa dihang mipatong na siya kanimo?
T– Iyang guidun-an
ang akong tiyan, apan kay mikisikisi man ako iyang guisumbag ang akong kilid
dayon guihubo ang akong baro ug guisunod usab dayon ang akong pante.
P – Unsay sunod
nga guibuhat niadtong tawo kanimo sa tapos niya paghubo sa imong baro ug imong
pante?
T – Iya akong
gui-iyot senyor.
P – Unsay imong
guibuhat sa dihang guiiyot sa tawo?
T – Misinggit
ako senyor apan guipagngan ang akong baba busa mikisikisi ako apan guisumbag na
usab ug maoy nakapalipong kanako.[9] (Italics supplied).
The victim’s narrations are corroborated by
the medical findings of the physician who examined her and found that her labia
minora was "congested, slight swollen", and her hymen no longer
intact. She also suffered abrasions and contusions on both breasts and near her
right armpit, which may have been caused by the blows.
In rape, it is not essential that the force
employed in accomplishing the crime be so great or of such character or could
not be resisted.[10] Force in rape is relative, depending on the age,
size and strength of the parties. In the same manner, intimidation must be
viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule.[11] The victim was a mental retardate and suffering from
physical disability when appellant employed force by boxing and slapping her.
And when she shouted for help he intimidated her to keep her quiet. The fact
that the victim did not offer a tenacious resistance is immaterial considering
her physical nature – she is an invalid and unable to rise from the bed
unassisted. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself,
against her will, to the rapist’s advances because of fear for her life and
personal safety.[12] Although the victim shouted for help, her voice
could be heard only as far as three to five meters away.[13] This negates the contention of the father of
appellant that the rape could not have been committed because the locus
criminis of the crime was only about fifteen meters away from the
passengers’ terminal where there were people passing. In any case, it has been
consistently ruled that rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate, in parks along the roadsides, in a house where there are other
occupants,[14] in the same room where other members of the family
are sleeping,[15] and even in places which to many would appear
unlikely and high risk venues for its commission.[16] For rape to be committed, it is not necessary for
the place to be ideal, or the weather to be fine for rapists bear no respect
for locale and time when they carry out their evil deed.[17]
On the alleged misunderstanding that
appellant had with the victim’s mother which allegedly prompted the mother to
file the rape case against him, suffice it to say that no mother would expose
her own daughter to embarrassment and humiliation as well as to the trouble,
inconvenience, ridicule and scandal concomitant with a public trial if such was
not the truth and had not her intention been to bring the culprit to the folds
of justice. No mother, virtuous or not, will voluntarily and without compelling
reasons put her own daughter to shame and humiliation[18] if she were not motivated by an honest desire to
have her daughter’s transgressor punished accordingly.[19] Besides, it is unnatural for a parent to use her
offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to
embarrassment.[20]
In an apparent attempt to free himself from
liability, appellant on the very same night after the assault, asked
forgiveness from the victim’s mother and promised that the same will never be
repeated. Yet, no mother can just let pass an indignity committed against one
of her own blood. It is easy to forgive, but justice for her would be no less
than punishment. Moreover, a plea for forgiveness may be considered analogous
to an attempt to compromise, which offer of compromise by the appellant may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt pursuant to Section 27,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.[21]
With respect to the monetary awards, the
P50,000.00 "damages" granted by the trial court should be properly
denominated as moral damages, which is allowed even if there was no proof
during the trial as basis therefor.[22] The mental and physical suffering of the victims’
injury is inherently concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious
crime which per se warrants the award of moral damages.[23] In addition thereto, the complainant is also
entitled to a civil indemnity of P50,000.00[24] which is outrightly awarded to rape victims being in
the category of actual or compensatory damages[25] and because the rape herein is not effectively
qualified by any circumstance under which the death penalty is authorized by
present amended law.[26]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape is
AFFIRMED. Further, appellant is ORDERED TO PAY the complainant
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity in ADDITION to the
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) moral damages.
SO ORDERED
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno,
Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
[1] The complaint reads: "That on the 24th day of March 1994, at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Carrascal Public Market, Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Charmelita Ruina, an invalid and mentally retarded girl, against the will of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the victim." (Regional Trial Court (RTC) Records, p. 6)
[2]
The dispositive portion of the decision dated
December 5, 1995 of RTC Branch 27, Tandag, Surigao del Sur penned by Judge
Ermelindo G. Andal states: "WHEREFORE, finding accused Elmer Yparraguirre
y Sepe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Rape, the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to suffer the
accessory penalties provided by law; to pay private complainant Charmelita I.
Ruina the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as damages; and to pay the
cost.
"Accused being detained, he is credited
in the service of his sentence with the full term of his preventive imprisonment,
if he agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed on
convicted prisoners, otherwise four-fifths (4/5) thereof.
"IT IS SO ORDERED."
[3] People’s Brief, pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 79-81.
[4] Samilin v. CFI of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298 cited in Valdepeñas v. People, 16 SCRA 871 (1966)
[5] People v. Babasa, 97 SCRA 672 (1980)
[6] People v. Ilarde, 125 SCRA 11 (1983)
[7] People v. Babasa, supra.
[8] People v. Igat, 291 SCRA 100 (1998)
[9] Affidavit of the Complainant; RTC Records, p. 7.
Q - What did you
do upon seeing the person who came near you?
A - I shouted.
Q- What did the
person do while you were shouting?
A - He covered
my mouth, then he came on top of me.
Q- What did the
person do next after coming on top of you?
A - He pressed my
stomach hard but I wiggled so he boxed my side then he removed my dress and
also my panty.
Q - What did he
do next after removing your dress and your panty?
A - He had
sexual intercourse with me, Sir.
Q - So, what did
you do when he was having sexual intercourse with you?
A - I shouted Sir, but he clamped my mouth so I wiggled again but he boxed me again which caused me to lose consciousness.
[10] People v. Alfeche, 294 SCRA 352 (1998)
[11] People v. Moreno, 294 SCRA 728 (1998)
[12] People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998); People v. Tayaban, 296 SCRA 497 (1998)
[13] Exh. "C", RTC Records, p. 148.
[14] People v. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647 (1992)
[15] People v. Lusa, 288 SCRA 296 (1998)
[16] People v. Dado, 314 Phil. 635; People v. Rafanan, 182 SCRA 811 (1990) cited in People v. Tan, Jr., 332 Phil. 465.
[17] People v. Emocling, 297 SCRA 214 (1998)
[18] People v. Deleverio, 289 SCRA 547 (1998)
[19] People v. Tumala, Jr., 284 SCRA 436 (1998)
[20] People v. Galleno, 291 SCRA 761 (1998)
[21] People v. Bartolome, 296 SCRA 615 (1998)
[22] People v. de los Reyes, G.R. No. 124895, March 1, 2000; People v. Medina, 300 SCRA 98 (1998)
[23] People v. Perez, 296 SCRA 17 (1998)
[24] People v. Atienza, G.R. No. 131820, February 29, 2000; People v. Batoon, G.R. No. 134194, October 26, 1999.
[25] People v. Fuertes, 296 SCRA 602 (1998)
[26] People v. Victor, 292 SCRA 186 (1998); People v. Mostrales, 294 SCRA 701 (1998)