THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1187. February
15, 2000]
PACIFICA A.
MILLARE represented by: PATERNO A. MILLARE, complainant, vs. Judge
REDENTOR B. VALERA, Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, respondent. miso
R E S O L U T I O N
VITUG, J.:
Pacifica A. Millare, represented by her son
Paterno A. Millare, has charged Judge Redentor B. Valera of the Municipal Trial
Court ("MTC") of Bangued, Abra, with gross negligence and
inefficiency in the performance of his duties relative to the delay in the
disposition of Civil Case No. 661 ("Pacifica A. Millare vs. Elsa Co")
for ejectment and Civil Case No. 961 ("Pacifica A. Millare vs. Elsa
Co") for unlawful detainer.
Civil Case No. 661, for ejectment, was
initially archived pending the resolution of another civil case (Civil Case No.
1436) for the renewal of a contract of lease filed by the spouses Antonio and
Elsa Co. Following the dismissal of the latter case (Civil Case No. 1436),
Civil Case No. 661 was revived and, by agreement of the parties, jointly tried
with Civil Case No. 961 for unlawful detainer. The cases were assigned to Judge
Esteban Guy. On 03 May 1990, the spouses Co filed an "urgent motion to
defer action on the cases with motion to dismiss." On 01 June 1990, Judge
Guy issued an order denying the motion to defer the hearings and to dismiss the
cases. In the same order, Judge Guy ruled that "for failure of the
defendants to secure a restraining order and failure to proceed with the trial
of the cases, the evidence of the defendants are ordered CLOSED, and the above
entitled cases are deemed submitted for decision." The defendants appealed
the order.
miso
At some point later, Judge Guy inhibited
himself from further trying the two cases. Respondent Judge Valera then took
over from Judge Guy. On 22 August 1990, Judge Valera ordered that the cases be
set for hearing. The spouses Co moved for the elevation of the cases to the
Regional Trial Court of Abra stating that they had meanwhile filed a notice of
appeal on the thesis that the actions had become moot and academic, the
premises having been vacated since 01 May 1987 and that, moreover, the amount
of rent being claimed by the plaintiffs was beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC.
The plaintiff opposed the motion and averred that the key to the premises was
turned over not to her but to Atty. Demetrio V. Pre (an uncle of the counsel
for the plaintiff) and that the defendants allowed one Lilia Co and her family
to use the premises from 13 September 1988 to January 1989. In an order, dated
03 December 1990, Judge Valera ordered Atty. Demetrio V. Pre to hand over the
key of the leased premises to the plaintiff or to her counsel or through the
court. The key was later withdrawn by the plaintiff.
On 11 December 1990, the plaintiff filed a
motion for an early resolution of the cases. Another motion for early
resolution was filed on 25 February 1991. On 29 June 1993, a similar motion was
filed. The inaction of respondent prompted complainant to file the instant
administrative case. Sdaadsc
Respondent Judge, in his answer to the
complaint, denied the asseveration of inaction on the cases and averred that
the cases were not yet submitted for decision. According to him, the motions
for early resolution and for rendition of decision filed by the plaintiff were
mere scraps of paper for failure to comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15,
of the Rules of Court. In addition, the motions had become moot and academic in
view of the act of the defendants in voluntarily vacating the premises. He
further averred that the issue on the back rentals was beyond the jurisdiction
of the MTC to decide.
Complainant, in her reply, contended that an
order submitting the cases for decision was issued by Judge Guy on 31 June
1990. She also argued that the return of possession of the premises did not
render the cases moot and academic since still unresolved was the obligation to
pay the accrued rentals and damages.
In a rejoinder, respondent Judge admitted
the existence of the 01 June 1990 order of Judge Guy. He countered, however,
that the order was not yet final because of the appeal interposed by the
defendants on 13 June 1990 which remained unresolved. He set the cases for
hearing but the defendants moved to elevate the cases to the Abra RTC. He also
learned that the key to the leased premises was already deposited in the law
office of Atty. Demetrio Pre, counsel for the plaintiff, and that the
defendants already vacated the premises.
In her sur-rejoinder, complainant claimed
that her counsel, Atty. Cielo Pre, did not receive the key and that the notice
of appeal filed by the defendants was not yet perfected. Rtcspped
The Office of the Court Administrator, after
evaluating the case, recommended that respondent Judge Redentor B. Valera be
fined P10,000.00 for his failure to decide Civil Case No. 661 and No. 961
within the prescribed period therefor, and that he be directed to decide the
aforementioned cases with utmost dispatch. The OCA explained:
"It is a
firmly settled rule that only a final order or judgment on the merits may be
the subject of an appeal (Gold City Integrated vs. IAC, 171 SCRA 579; Day vs.
RTC of Zamboanga City, Branch XIII; Investments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 147
SCRA 334). A judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination
of which party is in the right and must prevail, as distinguished from a
judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point. In
other words, after a final order or judgment, the court should have nothing
more to do in respect of the relative rights of the parties to the case.
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the cases and does not
end the court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions in determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates
that other things remain to be done by the court, is interlocutory (BA
Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 589).
"The lower
court's order dated June 1, 1990 closing the reception of evidence on the part
of the defendants and submitting the cases for decision is merely an
interlocutory order as it does not dispose of the case completely but leaves
something more to be done upon its merits. A judgment completely disposing of
the cases is yet to be rendered. This is what respondent Judge failed to do
even after the lapse of more than six years from the time the cases were
submitted for decision. Korte
"x x x x x x x
x x
"Similarly,
respondent Judge ought to know that all judgments determining the merits of
cases shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge,
stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court. This is a requirement not
only of the Rules of Court but by the Constitution. Hence, his claim that the cases
for ejectment and unlawful detainer have become moot and academic by reason of
the return of possession did not automatically dispose of the controversy
unless a judgment or decision is rendered to that effect. If ever that is his
finding, he should render a decision on the matter to give the parties the
opportunity to appeal or to exhaust any other remedy available under the
rules."
The Court agrees with the above report. Sclaw
Indeed established was that Judge Guy had
issued an order, dated 01 June 1990, submitting the cases for decision. Hardly
acceptable was respondent's allegation that he could not have acted on the
cases because of the notice of appeal said to have been filed by the
defendants. Clearly, the order of Judge Guy, being interlocutory, could not
have been the subject of an appeal.[1] Nor could respondent's claim that the unpaid rentals
exceeded P20,000.00 be a valid excuse. At the time Civil Case No. 661 was
filed on 01 September 1980, the exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases rested upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.[2] It is true that when Civil Case No. 961 was filed
on 06 November 1986, the Rule on Summary Procedure was already in effect[3] vesting upon the Metropolitan Trial Court, the
Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, except where the damages or unpaid rentals
sought to be recovered by the plaintiff exceeded P20,000.00 at the time of the
filing of the complaint. This amendatory rule, however, did not excuse
respondent Judge from his inaction. He could have de-consolidated the cases and
forthwith dismiss the one over which the court had no jurisdiction instead of
sitting on them for years. The Code of Judicial Conduct required him to dispose
of the court's business promptly and to act, one way or the other, on cases
pending before him within the prescribed period therefor.
The Court, therefore, adopts the
recommendation of the OCA with the modification that the suggested amount of
P10,000.00 fine be reduced, given the circumstances of this case, to P5,000.00.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Redentor B. Valera is found to
have remiss in seasonably disposing of Civil Case No. 661 and Civil Case No.
961 before his court and a FINE of P5,000.00 is imposed on him. He is directed
to decide said cases with utmost dispatch and to submit to the Office of the
Court Administrator a copy of his decision within ten (10) days from
promulgation thereof. Sclex
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.