THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138377. February 28, 2000]
CONCEPCION V.
AMAGAN, JOSEFINA V. AMAGAN and DINA V. AMAGAN, petitioners, vs.
TEODORICO T. MARAYAG, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot
be abated or suspended by the mere filing before the regional trial court (RTC)
of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue. As an
exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal,
on considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners' house
would result from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC)
judgment.
The
Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 9, 1999 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 50472,[1] which disposed as follows:
"It is plain
to see that this Court, under its Decision, merely nullified the Order of the
Respondent, dated November 26, 1996 granting Private Respondent’s ‘Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal’ and denying Petitioners’ ‘Motion for Reconsideration’
[of] its said Order. This Court did not enjoin the Respondent Court from
resolving Petitioners’ appeal from the Decision of the Municipal [Circuit]
Trial Court, on its merits.
"Petitioners’
complaint for ‘Quieting of Title and Reconveyance in Civil Case No. 1632’ filed
[at] the Regional Trial Court does not abate the proceeding in Civil Case No.
1671 (TG) before the Respondent Court (Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of
Appeals, 229 SCRA 627; Felicidad Javier, et al., versus Hon. Regino T.
Veridiano, II, et al., 237 SCRA 565.
"In sum,
then, the [im]pugned Orders of the Respondent Court are in accord with case law
and issued in the exercise of its sound discretion.
"IN THE LIGHT
OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is denied due course and is hereby
dismissed. No cost.
"SO
ORDERED."[2]
Also challenged by petitioners is the April
22, 1999 CA Resolution[3] denying their Motion for Reconsideration.
The
Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals
are as follows:
"x x x. On
June 3, 1996, the private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioners
for 'unlawful detainer' with the Municipal [Circuit] Trial Court in
Silang, Cavite. On September 27, 1996, the trial court promulgated a Decision
in favor of the private respondent and against the petitioners, the decretal
portion of which reads as follows:
'IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, this Court finds for the plaintiff and against the defendants
ordering the latter as follows:
1.......To vacate the property of plaintiff located at
San Vicente, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 420 square meters and covered
by Tax Declaration No. 13023 and remove their house constructed thereon;
2.......To pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the
amount of P10,000.00 starting from June 1, 1996 until the subject premises are
fully vacated, as reasonable compensation for their continued unlawful use and
occupation of the same and another amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees and other litigation expenses; and
3.......To pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.'
"The
petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Cavite from said Decision,
which appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 1671. On November 26, 1996, the
private respondent filed a 'Motion for Execution Pending Appeal' with
the Respondent Court which, on November 26, 1996, issued an Order granting said
motion, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
'As prayed for by
the plaintiff(s), through (their) counsel, and finding the grounds alleged in
their 'Motion for Immediate Exec(u)tion' to be impressed with merit, the same
is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, let a
writ of execution pending appeal be issued in this case.'
"The Petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration' [of] said Order, was denied by the
Respondent Court per its Order dated February 21, 1997.
"In the
interim, the petitioners filed, on December 10, 19[96], a complaint against
private respondent in the Regional Trial Court for 'Quieting of Title,
Reconveyance and Damages,' entitled 'Concepcion v. Amagan, et al. versus
Teodorico Marayag, Civil Case No. 1682 (TG).'
"The
petitioners filed, a 'Petition for Certiorari,' in the Court of Appeals,
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dated April 28, 1997, against the
respondents for the nullification of the aforesaid Orders of the Respondent
Court, dated November 26, 1996 and February 21, 1997, in Civil Case No.
1671, granting private respondent's 'Motion for Reconsideration'
respectively, which Petition was entitled 'Concepcion v. Amagan, et al.,
versus Regional Trial Court, et al., CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611].' This Court
issued a Resolution granting petitioners' plea for a temporary restraining
order which expired on June 25, 1997.
"On July 7,
1997, the private respondent filed, with the Respondent Court, in Civil Case
No. 1671 (TG), an 'Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion to Direct Sheriff To Make a
Report And/Or Implement Writ of Execution and Declare the Case Submitted for
Decision' with the parties submitting to the Respondent Court their
respective 'Memorandum on Appeal.' The next day, July 18, 1997, this
Court promulgated, in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611], a Decision in favor of the
petitioners and against the respondents therein the decretal portion of which
reads as follows:
'WHEREFORE, the
Petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order dated
February 21, 1997, allowing execution pending appeal is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.'
On July 11, 1997,
the Respondent Court issued an Order granting private respondent's Omnibus
Motion,' supra. The private respondent likewise filed a Petition for
Review' with the Supreme Court, from the Decision of this Court in CA-G.R.
[SP No. 43611] and its Resolution denying private respondent's 'Motion for
Reconsideration' but the Supreme Court, per its Resolution dated November
12, 1997, issued a Resolution denying private respondents['] 'Petition for
Review.' The Resolution of the Supreme Court became final and executory.
"On December
12, 1997, the private respondent filed with the Respondent Court, in Civil Case
No. TG-1671, a 'Manifestation and Ex-Parte Motion' praying that the
Respondent Court resolve the case and promulgate its Decision on the merits.
However, the petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondent's motion,
contending that the proceedings before the Respondent Court, in Civil Case
No. 1671 (TG), be suspended pending decision, on the merits, of the
Regional Trial Court, in Civil Case No. 1682 (Quieting of Title,
Reconveyance with Damages). On April 3, 1998, the Respondent Court issued
its Order granting private respondent's motion, declaring that the Court, under
its Decision, in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611], merely nullified its Order granting
execution pending appeal but did not enjoin the Respondent Court from hearing
and resolving Civil Case No. 16[7]1 on the merits. The petitioners filed a 'Motion
for Reconsideration' of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court but the
latter issued an Order dated December 14, 1998 denying petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration, in this language:
'Anent the Motion
for Reconsideration, movants anchored their arguments that this Court should
restrain itself from further proceeding with the appealed case because of the
decision, resolution of the Court of Appeals, and resolution of the Supreme
Court. It is worthy to note that [what] was brought up with the higher Courts
was the Order of the Court allowing the execution pending appeal, the said
Order was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals[;] however, there was
no permanent injunction that has been issued for this Court to stop from
further proceeding with the case. The said motion is, therefore, DENIED for
lack of merit.'"
The facts of this case may be simply summarized
as follows. The MCTC rendered a Decision granting the ejectment suit filed by
respondent against herein petitioners. While an appeal was pending before the
RTC, respondent filed a Motion for immediate execution of the MCTC judgment,
which was granted. However, the Court of Appeals[4] later reversed the RTC Order granting the execution
pending appeal, a reversal that was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, petitioners also filed before the RTC a new action for quieting of
title involving the same property.
Petitioners thence claimed that the
proceedings in the ejectment appeal should be suspended pending final judgment
in the quieting of title case. The RTC ruled in the negative.
Ruling
of the Court of Appeals
In sustaining the RTC, the CA held in two
short paragraphs that its earlier Decision in CA-GR SP No. 43611 enjoined only
the execution of the judgment pending appeal. Without discussing petitioners'
plea for an exception, it curtly applied the jurisprudential principle that an
action for quieting of title would not abate an ejectment suit.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The
Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners submitted
for the consideration of the Court the following issues:
"I.......Whether or not the 8 July 1997 Decision and 23
September 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43611
(Annex I), as affirmed in toto by the Supreme Court, called off and
restrained the proceedings in this case;
II. Whether or not
the dispositive portion of the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 43611 should be
referred to its body and text.
III. Whether or
not the Court of Appeals’ Decision having been based on Vda. de Legaspi vs.
Avendano x x x, is now final and executory as it was upheld by the Supreme
Court in toto.
IV. Whether or not
Lao vs. Court of Appeals [x x x] is applicable to the present case, and
V. Whether or not
the Court of Appeals failed to consider and pass judgment on the exceptional
nature of the present case."[6]
In the main, the issue is whether the
peculiar circumstances of this case justify the suspension of the ejectment
proceedings on appeal before the RTC, pending the resolution of the action for
quieting of title.
The
Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main
Issue: Suspension of the Ejectment Suit
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits
under Rule 70 are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece
of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof,
without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical
possession in appropriate proceedings. It has been held that these actions
"are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take
the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of
possession."[7] In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de
facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are
provisional in nature.
As a general rule, therefore, a pending
civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the
suspension of ejectment proceedings. "The underlying reasons for the above
ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve
physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the
case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the
ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as
easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved."[8]
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed
to await the outcome of the pending civil action. One such exception is Vda.
de Legaspi v. Avendaño, wherein the Court declared:
"x x x. Where
the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of
forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is
seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable
and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical
possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court
in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is
brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with
it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order
to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal
possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as
a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be
immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact
that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the
premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru
force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts."[9]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the
mere existence of a judicial proceeding putting at issue the right of the
plaintiff to recover the premises is not enough reason to justify an exception
to the general rule. In Salinas v. Navarro,[10] the Court explained that "the exception to the
rule in x x x Vda. de Legaspi is based on strong reasons of equity not
found in the present petition. The right of the petitioners is not so seriously
placed in issue in the annulment case as to warrant a deviation, on equitable
grounds, from the imperative nature of the rule. In the Vda. de Legaspi
case, execution of the decision in the ejectment case would also have meant
demolition of the premises, a factor not present in this petition."
After a close reading of the peculiar
circumstances of the instant case, however, we hold that equitable
considerations impel an exception to the general rule. In its earlier July 8,
1997 Decision in CA-GR No. 43611-SP which has long become final, the Court of
Appeals, through Justice Artemio G. Toquero, arrived upon the following factual
findings which are binding on herein parties:
"Admittedly,
petitioners who appealed the judgment in the ejectment case did not file a
supersedeas bond. Neither have they been depositing the compensation for their
use and occupation of the property in question as determined by the trial
court. Ordinarily, these circumstances would justify an execution pending
appeal. However, there are circumstances attendant to this case which would
render immediate execution injudicious and inequitable.
"ONE. Private
respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful detainer on the
theory that petitioners’ possession of the property in question was by mere
tolerance. However, in answer to his demand letter dated April 13, 1996 (Annex
‘D’), petitioners categorically denied having any agreement with him, verbal or
written, asserting that they are ‘owners of the premises we are occupying at
108 J. P. Rizal Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite.’ In other words, it is not
merely physical possession but ownership as well that is involved in this case.
"TWO. In
fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an
action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against private
respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1682 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership is squarely raised in this
action. Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will be determinative of who
is entitled to the possession of the premises in question.
"THREE. The
immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will include
the removal of the petitioners’ house [from] the lot in question.
"To the mind
of the Court it is injudicious, nay enequitable, to allow demolition of
petitioner's house prior to the determination of the question of ownership [of]
the lot on which it stands.[11]
Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC
Decision would have resulted in the demolition of the house subject of the
ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require
the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de
Legaspi, the respondent's suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of
forcible entry. And most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would mean a
demolition of their house, a matter that is likely to create the
"confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and expenses" mentioned in
the said exceptional case.
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC
Decision[12] would cause the respondent to go through the whole
gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the premises
they claim to have been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming ownership
only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the
courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein
the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent,
unjust and probably irreparable.
We should stress that respondent's claim to
physical possession is based not on an expired or a violated contract of lease,
but allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in any way prejudging the
proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem it judicious under the present
exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment case.
The Suspension of Proceedings Even
During Appeal
One final point. In Vda. de Legaspi,
the Court held that "if circumstances should so require, the proceedings
in the ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found."
This statement is unequivocally clear; it includes even the appellate stage.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the appealed
Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
of Cavite is DIRECTED to suspend further action in Civil Case No. 1671
until Civil Case No. 1682 is concluded. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by J. Romeo J. Callejo Sr. with the concurrence of JJ. Fermin A. Martin Jr., Division chairman; and Mariano M. Umali, member.
[2] CA Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 36.
[3] Rollo, p. 38; also penned by J. Callejo and concurred in by JJ Umali and Bernardo P. Abesamis (who took the place of J. Martin)
[4] The Decision was written by J. Artemio G. Tuquero with the concurrence of JJ. Artemon D. Luna (chairman) and Hector L. Hofilena (member)
[5] The case was deemed submitted for resolution on November 26, 1999, upon receipt by this Court of respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Joselito A. Oliveros. Petitioners’ Memorandum, signed by Atty. Florante C. Roxas, had been filed earlier on November 24, 1999.
[6] Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 7; rollo, p. 422.
[7] Vda [de Legaspi v. Avendaño, 79 SCRA 135, September 27, 1977, per Barredo, J.
[8] Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
208 SCRA 108, April 10, 1992, per Narvasa, CJ. In this case, the Court also
held:
"1. Injunction suits instituted in the
RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in the municipal trial courts or other
courts of the first level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 (1966)) do not
abate the latter; and neither do proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si
v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 (1956), citing Pue et al. v. Gonzales, 87
Phil. 81, (1950)).
2. An "accion publiciana" does not
suspend an ejectment suit against the plaintiff in the former (Ramirez v.
Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 (1981)).
3. A "writ of possession case"
where ownership is concededly the principal issue before the Regional Trial
Court does not preclude nor bar the execution of the judgment in an unlawful
detainer suit where the only issue involved is the material possession or
possession de facto of the premises (Heirs of F. Guballa Sr. v. CA et
al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518 (1988)).
4. An action for quieting of title to
property is not a bar to an ejectment suit involving the same property (Quimpo v.
de la Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 (1972)).
5. Suits for specific performance with
damages do not affect ejectment actions (e.g., to compel renewal of a lease
contract) (Desamito v. Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184 (1966); Pardo de Tavera v.
Encarnacion, 22 SCRA 632 (1968); Rosales v. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 (1987);
Commander Realty, Inc. v. CA, 161 SCRA 264 (1988)).
6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g.,
from deed of absolute sale to one of sale with pacto de retro) does not suspend
an ejectment suit between the same parties (Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA
600 (1975)).
7. An action for reconveyance of property or
"accion reivindicatoria" also has no effect on ejectment suits
regarding the same property (Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 (1963);
Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz v. CA, 133 SCRA 520
(1984); Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 (1987); Ching v. Malaya,
153 SCRA 412 (1987); Philippine Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v. CA, 174 SCRA
108; Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 (1989); Guzman v. CA (annulment
of sale and reconveyance), 177 SCRA 604 (1989); Demamay v. CA, 186 SCRA
608 (1990); Leopoldo Sy v. CA et al., (annulment of sale and
reconveyance), GR No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991).
8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property (Salinas v. Navarro (annulment of deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable mortgage), 126 SCRA 167 (1983); Ang Ping v. RTC (annulment of sale and title), 154 SCRA 153 (1987); Caparros v. CA (annulment of title), 170 SCRA 758 (1989); Dante v. Sison (annulment of sale with damages), 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. (annulment of document), 177 SCRA 288 (1989)"
[9] Supra, p. 145.
[10] 126 SCRA 167, November 29, 1983, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
[11] CA Decision in CA-GR SP No. 43611, p. 3; rollo, p. 90. Emphasis supplied.
[12] In fact, according to private respondent (Memorandum, p. 19; rollo, p. 477), the "RTC had already rendered its decision dated 7 April 1999 affirming in toto, the earlier judgment rendered by the (MCTC)in herein respondent's favor."