THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136021. February 22, 2000]
BENIGNA
SECUYA, MIGUEL SECUYA, MARCELINO SECUYA, CORAZON SECUYA, RUFINA SECUYA,
BERNARDINO SECUYA, NATIVIDAD SECUYA, GLICERIA SECUYA and PURITA SECUYA, petitioners,
vs. GERARDA M. VDA. DE SELMA, respondent. Ed-p
D E C I S I ON
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In an action for quieting of title, the
plaintiffs must show not only that there is a cloud or contrary interest over
the subject real property, but that they have a valid title to it. In the
present case, the action must fail, because petitioners failed to show the
requisite title.
The
Case
Before us is a Petition for Review seeking
to set aside the July 30, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 38580,[1] which affirmed the judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. The
CA ruled:
"WHEREFORE,
[there being] no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto."[3]
The decretal portion of the trial court
Decision reads as follows: Mis-edp
"WHEREFORE,
in view of all the foregoing [evidence] and considerations, this court hereby
finds the preponderance of evidence to be in favor of the defendant Gerarda
Selma as judgment is rendered:
"1.
Dismissing this Complaint for Quieting of Title, Cancellation of Certificate of
Title of Gerarda vda. de Selma and damages;
"2. Ordering
the plaintiffs to vacate the premises in question and turn over the possession
of the same to the defendant Gerarda Selma;
"3. Requiring
the plaintiffs to pay defendant the sum of P20,000 as moral damages, according
to Art. 2217, attorney’s fees of P15,000.00, litigation expenses of P5,000.00
pursuant to Art. 2208 No. 11 and to pay the costs of this suit.
"SO
ORDERED."[4]
Likewise challenged is the October 14, 1998
CA Resolution which denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.[5]
The
FactsMis-oedp
The present Petition is rooted in an action
for quieting of title filed before the RTC by Benigna, Miguel, Marcelino,
Corazon, Rufina, Bernardino, Natividad, Gliceria and Purita -- all surnamed
Secuya -- against Gerarda M. vda. de Selma. Petitioners asserted ownership over
the disputed parcel of land, alleging the following facts:
"xxx xxx xxx
"8. The
parcel of land subject of this case is a PORTION of Lot 5679 of the
Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate, referred to and covered [o]n Page 279,
Friar Lands Sale Certificate Register of the Bureau of Lands (Exh.
"K"). The property was originally sold, and the covering patent
issued, to Maxima Caballero Vda. de Cariño (Exhs. "K-1"; "K-2).
Lot 5679 has an area of 12,750 square meters, more or less;
"9. During
the lifetime of Maxima Caballero, vendee and patentee of Lot 5679, she entered
into that AGREEMENT OF PARTITION dated January 5, 1938 with Paciencia
Sabellona, whereby the former bound herself and parted [with] one-third (1/3)
portion of Lot 5679 in favor of the latter (Exh. "D"). Among others,
it was stipulated in said agreement of partition that the said portion of
one-third so ceded will be located adjoining the municipal road (par. 5, Exh. "D"); Ed-pm-is
"10.
Paciencia Sabellona took possession and occupation of that one-third portion of
Lot 5679 adjudicated to her. Later, she sold the three thousand square meter
portion thereof to Dalmacio Secuya on October 20, 1953, for a consideration of
ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P1,850.00), by means of a private
document which was lost (p. 8, tsn., 8/8/89-Calzada). Such sale was admitted
and confirmed by Ramon Sabellona, only heir of Paciencia Sabellona, per that
instrument denominated CONFIRMATION OF SALE OF UNDIVIDED SHARES, dated
September 28, 1976 (Exh. "B");
"11. Ramon
Sabellona was the only [or] sole voluntary heir of Paciencia Sabellona, per
that KATAPUSAN NGA KABUT-ON UG PANUGON NI PACIENCIA SABELLONA (Last Will and
Testament of Paciencia Sabellona), dated July 9, 1954, executed and
acknowledged before Notary Public Teodoro P. Villarmina (Exh. "C").
Pursuant to such will, Ramon Sabellona inherited all the properties left by
Paciencia Sabellona;
"12. After
the purchase [by] Dalmacio Secuya, predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs, of
the property in litigation on October 20, 1953, Dalmacio, together with his
brothers and sisters - he being single - took physical possession of the land
and cultivated the same. In 1967, Edilberto Superales married Rufina Secuya,
niece of Dalmacio Secuya. With the permission and tolerance of the Secuyas,
Edilberto Superales constructed his house on the lot in question in January
1974 and lived thereon continuously up to the present (p. 8., tsn. 7/25/88 -
Daclan). Said house is inside Lot 5679-C-12-B, along lines 18-19-20 of said
lot, per Certification dated August 10, 1985, by Geodetic Engineer Celestino R.
Orozco (Exh. "F"); Jjs-c
"13. Dalmacio
Secuya died on November 20, 1961. Thus his heirs - brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces - are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. CEB-4247 and now the petitioners;
"14. In 1972,
defendant-respondent Gerarda Selma bought a 1,000 square-meter portion of Lot
5679, evidenced by Exhibit "P". Then on February 19, 1975, she bought
the bigger bulk of Lot 5679, consisting of 9,302 square meters, evidenced by
that deed of absolute sale, marked as Exhibit "5". The land in
question, a 3,000-square meter portion of Lot 5679, is embraced and included
within the boundary of the later acquisition by respondent Selma;
"15.
Defendant-respondent Gerarda Selma lodged a complaint, and had the
plaintiffs-petitioners summoned, before the Barangay Captain of the place, and
in the confrontation and conciliation proceedings at the Lupong Tagapayapa,
defendant-respondent Selma was asserting ownership over the land inherited by
plaintiffs-petitioners from Dalmacio Secuya of which they had long been in
possession x x x in concept of owner. Such claim of defendant-respondent Selma
is a cloud on the title of plaintiffs-petitioners, hence, their complaint
(Annex "C")."[6]
Respondent Selma’s version of the facts, on
the other hand, was summarized by the appellate court as follows: Sc-jj
"She is the
registered owner of Lot 5679-C-120 consisting of 9,302 square meters as
evidenced by TCT No. T-35678 (Exhibit "6", Record, p. 324), having
bought the same sometime in February 1975 from Cesaria Caballero as evidenced
by a notarized Deed of Sale (Exhibit "5", Record, p. 323) and ha[ve]
been in possession of the same since then. Cesaria Caballero was the widow of
Silvestre Aro, registered owner of the mother lot, Lot. No. 5679 with an area
of 12,750 square meters of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate, as shown
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4752 (Exhibit "10", Record, p.
340). Upon Silvestre Aro’s demise, his heirs executed an "Extrajudicial
Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale" (Exhibit "11", Record, p.
341) wherein one-half plus one-fifth of Lot No. 5679 was adjudicated to the
widow, Cesaria Caballero, from whom defendant-appellee derives her title."[7]
The
CA Ruling
In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the
appellate court debunked petitioners’ claim of ownership of the land and upheld
Respondent Selma’s title thereto. It held that respondent’s title can be traced
to a valid TCT. On the other hand, it ruled that petitioners anchor their claim
on an "Agreement of Partition" which is void for being violative of
the Public Land Act. The CA noted that the said law prohibited the alienation
or encumbrance of land acquired under a free patent or homestead patent, for a
period of five years from the issuance of the said patent. S-jcj
Hence, this Petition.[8]
The
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners urge the
Court to resolve the following questions:
"1. Whether
or not there was a valid transfer or conveyance of one-third (1/3) portion of
Lot 5679 by Maxima Caballero in favor of Paciencia Sabellona, by virtue of
[the] Agreement of Partition dated January 5, 1938[;] and
"2. Whether
or not the trial court, as well as the appellate court, committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not making a finding that
respondent Gerarda M. vda. de Selma [was] a buyer in bad faith with respect to
the land, which is a portion of Lot 5679."[9]
For a clearer understanding of the above
matters, we will divide the issues into three: first, the implications
of the Agreement of Partition; second, the validity of the Deed of
Confirmation of Sale executed in favor of the petitioners; and third,
the validity of private respondent’s title. Supr-eme
The
Court’s Ruling
The Petition fails to show any reversible
error in the assailed Decision.
Preliminary
Matter: The Action for Quieting of Title
In an action to quiet title, the plaintiffs
or complainants must demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to, or an
interest in, the subject real property.[10] Likewise, they must show that the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud on their title is in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.[11] This point is clear from Article 476 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
"Whenever
there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title. Co-urt
"An action
may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein."
In the case at bar, petitioners allege that
TCT No. 5679-C-120, issued in the name of Private Respondent Selma, is a cloud
on their title as owners and possessors of the subject property, which is a
3,000--square-meter portion of Lot No. 5679-C-120 covered by the TCT. But the
underlying question is, do petitioners have the requisite title that would
enable them to avail themselves of the remedy of quieting of title?
Petitioners anchor their claim of ownership
on two documents: the Agreement of Partition executed by Maxima Caballero and
Paciencia Sabellona and the Deed of Confirmation of Sale executed by Ramon
Sabellona. We will now examine these two documents.
First
Issue: The Real Nature of the "Agreement of Partition"
The duly notarized Agreement of Partition
dated January 5, 1938, is worded as follows: Jle-xj
"AGREEMENT
OF PARTITION
"I, MAXIMA
CABALLERO, Filipina, of legal age, married to Rafael Cariño, now residing and
with postal address in the Municipality of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, depose
the following and say:
"1. That I am
the applicant of vacant lot No. 5679 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Estate and the
said application has already been indorsed by the District Land Officer,
Talisay, Cebu, for private sale in my favor;
"2. That the
said Lot 5679 was formerly registered in the name of Felix Abad y Caballero and
the sale certificate of which has already been cancelled by the Hon. Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce; Lex-juris
"3. That for
and in representation of my brother, Luis Caballero, who is now the actual
occupant of said lot I deem it wise to have the said lot paid by me, as Luis
Caballero has no means o[r] any way to pay the government;
"4. That as
soon as the application is approved by the Director of Lands, Manila, in my
favor, I hereby bind myself to transfer the one-third (1/3) portion of the
above mentioned lot in favor of my aunt, Paciencia Sabellana y Caballero, of
legal age, single, residing and with postal address in Tungkop, Minglanilla,
Cebu. Said portion of one-third (1/3) will be subdivided after the approval of
said application and the same will be paid by her to the government [for] the
corresponding portion.
"5. That the
said portion of one-third (1/3) will be located adjoining the municipal road;
"6. I,
Paciencia Sabellana y Caballero, hereby accept and take the portion herein
adjudicated to me by Mrs. Maxima Caballero of Lot No. 5679 Talisay-Minglanilla
Estate and will pay the corresponding portion to the government after the
subdivision of the same;
"IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands this 5th day of January, 1988, at
Talisay, Cebu."[12]
The Agreement: An Express Trust, Not a
Partition
Notwithstanding its purported nomenclature,
this Agreement is not one of partition, because there was no property to
partition and the parties were not co-owners. Rather, it is in the nature of a
trust agreement. Juri-smis
Trust is the right to the beneficial
enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another. It is a
fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for
the benefit of the beneficiary.[13] Trust relations between parties may either be
express or implied. An express trust is created by the intention of the trustor
or of the parties. An implied trust comes into being by operation of law.[14]
The present Agreement of Partition involves
an express trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, "[n]o particular
words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient
that a trust is clearly intended." That Maxima Caballero bound herself to
give one third of Lot No. 5629 to Paciencia Sabellona upon the approval of the
former's application is clear from the terms of the Agreement. Likewise, it is
evident that Paciencia acquiesced to the covenant and is thus bound to fulfill
her obligation therein.
As a result of the Agreement, Maxima
Caballero held the portion specified therein as belonging to Paciencia
Sabellona when the application was eventually approved and a sale certificate
was issued in her name.[15] Thus, she should have transferred the same to the
latter, but she never did so during her lifetime. Instead, her heirs sold the
entire Lot No. 5679 to Silvestre Aro in 1955.
From 1954 when the sale certificate was
issued until 1985 when petitioners filed their Complaint, Paciencia and her
successors-in-interest did not do anything to enforce their proprietary rights
over the disputed property or to consolidate their ownership over the same. In
fact, they did not even register the said Agreement with the Registry of
Property or pay the requisite land taxes. While petitioners had been doing
nothing, the disputed property, as part of Lot No. 5679, had been the subject
of several sales transactions[16] and covered by several transfer certificates of
title.
Jj-juris
The Repudiation of the Express Trust
While no time limit is imposed for the
enforcement of rights under express trusts,[17] prescription may, however, bar a beneficiary's
action for recovery, if a repudiation of the trust is proven by clear and
convincing evidence and made known to the beneficiary.[18]
There was a repudiation of the express trust
when the heirs of Maxima Caballero failed to deliver or transfer the property
to Paciencia Sabellona, and instead sold the same to a third person not privy
to the Agreement. In the memorandum of incumbrances of TCT No. 3087[19] issued in the name of Maxima, there was no notation
of the Agreement between her and Paciencia. Equally important, the Agreement
was not registered; thus, it could not bind third persons. Neither was there
any allegation that Silvestre Aro, who purchased the property from Maxima’s
heirs, knew of it. Consequently, the subsequent sales transactions involving
the land in dispute and the titles covering it must be upheld, in the absence
of proof that the said transactions were fraudulent and irregular. Jksm
Second
Issue: The Purported Sale to Dalmacio Secuya
Even granting that the express trust
subsists, petitioners have not proven that they are the rightful
successors-in-interest of Paciencia Sabellona.
The Absence of the Purported Deed of
Sale
Petitioners insist that Paciencia sold the
disputed property to Dalmacio Secuya on October 20, 1953, and that the sale was
embodied in a private document. However, such document, which would have been
the best evidence of the transaction, was never presented in court, allegedly
because it had been lost. While a sale of a piece of land appearing in a
private deed is binding between the parties, it cannot be considered binding on
third persons, if it is not embodied in a public instrument and recorded in the
Registry of Property.[20]
Moreover, while petitioners could not
present the purported deed evidencing the transaction between Paciencia
Sabellona and Dalmacio Secuya, petitioners’ immediate predecessor-in-interest,
private respondent in contrast has the necessary documents to support her claim
to the disputed property.
The Questionable Value of the Deed
Executed by Ramon SabellonaChief
To prove the alleged sale of the disputed
property to Dalmacio, petitioners instead presented the testimony of Miguel
Secuya, one of the petitioners; and a Deed[21] confirming the sale executed by Ramon Sabellona,
Paciencia’s alleged heir. The testimony of Miguel was a bare assertion that the
sale had indeed taken place and that the document evidencing it had been
destroyed. While the Deed executed by Ramon ratified the transaction, its
probative value is doubtful. His status as heir of Paciencia was not
affirmatively established. Moreover, he was not presented in court and was thus
not quizzed on his knowledge -- or lack thereof -- of the 1953 transaction.
Petitioners' Failure to Exercise
Owners' Rights to the Property
Petitioners insist that they had been
occupying the disputed property for forty-seven years before they filed their
Complaint for quieting of title. However, there is no proof that they had
exercised their rights and duties as owners of the same. They argue that they
had been gathering the fruits of such property; yet, it would seem that they
had been remiss in their duty to pay land taxes. If petitioners really believed
that they owned the property, they should have been more vigilant in protecting
their rights thereto. As noted earlier, they did nothing to enforce whatever
proprietary rights they had over the disputed parcel of land.
Third
Issue: The Validity of Private Respondent’s TitleEsm
Petitioners debunk Private Respondent
Selma’s title to the disputed property, alleging that she was aware of their
possession of the disputed properties. Thus, they insist that she could not be
regarded as a purchaser in good faith who is entitled to the protection of the
Torrens system.
Indeed, a party who has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would move a reasonably cautious man to make an
inquiry will not be protected by the Torrens system. In Sandoval v. Court of
Appeals,[22] we held:
"It is
settled doctrine that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens
system need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title. He is
charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the
title.
"The
aforesaid principle admits of an unchallenged exception: that a person dealing
with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title
and to dispense without the need of inquiring further except when the party has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry, or when the purchaser has knowledge of a
defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of title of the property in
litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should
then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title
of the vendor appearing on the face of the certificate. One who falls within the
exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a
purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the
law."
Esmsc
Granting arguendo that private
respondent knew that petitioners, through Superales and his family, were
actually occupying the disputed lot, we must stress that the vendor, Cesaria
Caballero, assured her that petitioners were just tenants on the said lot.
Private respondent cannot be faulted for believing this representation,
considering that petitioners' claim was not noted in the certificate of the
title covering Lot No. 5679.
Moreover, the lot, including the disputed
portion, had been the subject of several sales transactions. The title thereto
had been transferred several times, without any protestation or complaint from
the petitioners. In any case, private respondent's title is amply supported by
clear evidence, while petitioners’ claim is barren of proof.
Clearly, petitioners do not have the
requisite title to pursue an action for quieting of title.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. Esmmis
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] Seventeenth Division, composed of J. Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos (ponente), J. Buenaventura J. Guerrero (chairman) and J. Renato C. Dacudao (member).
[2] Penned by Judge German G. Lee Jr.
[3] Rollo, p. 29.
[4] RTC Decision, p. 13; rollo, p. 54.
[5] Rollo, p. 31.
[6] Petition, pp. 3-6; rollo, pp. 5-8.
[7] CA Decision, p. 3; rollo, p. 27.
[8] This case was deemed submitted for decision on July 29, 1999, upon simultaneous receipt by this Court of the Memoranda of both parties. Petitioners’ Memorandum was signed by Atty. Alejandro V. Peregrino; respondent’s Memorandum, by Atty. Roberto R. Palmares.
[9] Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 6; rollo, p. 145.
[10] Art. 477, Civil Code. "The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or an interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property."
[11] Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 150.
[12] Records, p. 53.
[13] Rizal Surety & Insurance Company v. CA, , 261 SCRA 69, August 28, 1996.
[14] Art. 1441, Civil Code.
[15] Records, p. 6.
[16] Lot No. 5679 was sold to Silvestre Aro in 1955, and TCT No. 4752 was issued in his name in 1959. Upon his death, his heirs inherited the property, and his children sold their shares to Cesaria Caballero, Aro’s widow. Cesaria Caballero then entered into several mortgage and sales transactions with several banks and with Francisco Sioson, Edgar Adlawan and Private Respondent Gerarda Selma.
[17] Aquino, Civil Code , Vol. II, p. 557.
[18] See Mindanao Development Authority v. CA, 113 SCRA 429, April 5, 1982.
[19] Dated March 9, 1954.
[20] Article 709, Civil Code.
[21] Records, p. 4.
[22] 260 SCRA 283, August 1, 1996, per Romero, J.