SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132964. February 18, 2000]
REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by
his Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN,
MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES seeks the
nullification of the 5 March 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] which affirmed the dismissal by the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 77, Malolos, Bulacan, of the petition for escheat filed by the Government.[2] Â h Y
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American
citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman,[3] a naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers
Guzman, an American citizen. In 1968 Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs
Helen and David an estate consisting of several parcels of land located in
Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-146837 (M), T-146839 (M),
T-146840 (M), T- 146841 (M), T-146842 (M), T-120254 (M) and T-120257 (M).
On 29 December 1970 Helen and David executed
a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and
adjudicating to themselves all the property belonging to the estate of Simeon.
The document of extrajudicial settlement was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds on 8 December 1971. The taxes due thereon were paid through
their attorneys-in-fact, Attys. Juan L. Austria and Lolita G. Abela, and the
parcels of land were accordingly registered in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman
and David Rey Guzman in undivided equal shares.
On 10 December 1981 Helen executed a
Quitclaim Deed assigning, transferring and conveying to her son David her
undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the parcels of land subject matter of
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman. Since the
document appeared not to have been registered, upon advice of Atty. Lolita G.
Abela, Helen executed another document, a Deed of Quitclaim, on 9 August 1989
confirming the earlier deed of quitclaim as well as modifying the document to
encompass all her other property in the Philippines.[4]
On 18 October 1989 David executed a Special
Power of Attorney where he acknowledged that he became the owner of the parcels
of land subject of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen on 9 August 1989 and
empowering Atty. Lolita G. Abela to sell or otherwise dispose of the lots. On 1
February 1990 Atty. Lolita G. Abela, upon instruction of Helen, paid donor’s
taxes to facilitate the registry of the parcels of land in the name of David.
On 16 March 1994 a certain Atty. Mario A.
Batongbacal wrote the Office of the Solicitor General and furnished it with
documents showing that David’s ownership of the one-half (1/2) of the estate of
Simeon Guzman was defective. On the basis thereof, the Government filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan a Petition for Escheat praying that
one-half (1/2) of David's interest in each of the subject parcels of land be
forfeited in its favor. On 9 August 1994 David Rey Guzman responded with a
prayer that the petition be dismissed. Sppedsc
On 11 July 1995 the trial court dismissed
the petition holding that the two (2) deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen
Meyers Guzman had no legal force and effect so that the ownership of the
property subject thereof remained with her.[5]
The Government appealed[6] the dismissal of the petition but the appellate
court affirmed the court a quo.
Petitioner anchors its argument on Art. XII
of the Constitution which provides -
Sec. 7. Save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Thus as a rule, only a Filipino citizen can
acquire private lands in the Philippines. The only instances when a foreigner
can acquire private lands in the Philippines are by hereditary succession and
if he was formerly a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine
citizenship. Petitioner therefore contends that the acquisition of the parcels
of land by David does not fall under any of these exceptions. It asserts that
David being an American citizen could not validly acquire one-half (1/2)
interest in each of the subject parcels of land by way of the two (2) deeds of
quitclaim as they are in reality donations inter vivos. It also reasons out that
the elements of donation are present in the conveyance made by Helen in favor
of David: first, Helen consented to the execution of the documents; second, the
dispositions were made in public documents; third, David manifested his
acceptance of the donation in the Special Power of Attorney he executed in
favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela; fourth, the deeds were executed with the
intention of benefiting David; and lastly, there was a resultant decrease in
the assets or patrimony of Helen, being the donor. Petitioner further argues
that the payment of donor’s taxes on the property proved that Helen intended
the transfer to be a gift or donation inter vivos.
David maintains, on the other hand, that he
acquired the property by right of accretion and not by way of donation, with
the deeds of quitclaim merely declaring Helen’s intention to renounce her share
in the property and not an intention to donate. He further argues that,
assuming there was indeed a donation, it never took effect since the Special
Power of Attorney he executed does not indicate acceptance of the alleged
donation. Calrsc
There are three (3) essential elements of a
donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in
the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or
animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law
further requires that the donation be made in a public document and that there
should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of donation or in a separate
public document.[7] In cases where the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified thereof in an
authentic form, to be noted in both instruments.[8]
Not all the elements of a donation of an
immovable property are present in the instant case. The transfer of the
property by virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen resulted in the
reduction of her patrimony as donor and the consequent increase in the
patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen’s intention to perform an act of
liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently established. A perusal of the
two (2) deeds of quitclaim reveals that Helen intended to convey to her son
David certain parcels of land located in the Philippines, and to re-affirm the
quitclaim she executed in 1981 which likewise declared a waiver and
renunciation of her rights over the parcels of land. The language of the deed
of quitclaim is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her rights,
title and interest over the lands in favor of David, and not a donation. That a
donation was far from Helen's mind is further supported by her deposition which
indicated that she was aware that a donation of the parcels of land was not
possible since Philippine law does not allow such an arrangement.[9] She reasoned that if she really intended to donate
something to David it would have been more convenient if she sold the property
and gave him the proceeds therefrom.[10] It appears that foremost in Helen’s mind was the
preservation of the Bulacan realty within the bloodline of Simeon from where
they originated, over and above the benefit that would accrue to David by
reason of her renunciation.[11] The element of animus donandi therefore was missing.
Likewise, the two (2) deeds of quitclaim
executed by Helen may have been in the nature of a public document but they
lack the essential element of acceptance in the proper form required by law to
make the donation valid. We find no merit in petitioner’s argument that the
Special Power of Attorney executed by David in favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela
manifests his implied acceptance of his mother’s alleged donation as a scrutiny
of the document clearly evinces the absence thereof. The Special Power of
Attorney merely acknowledges that David owns the property referred to and that
he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. There is no intimation,
expressly or impliedly, that David’s acquisition of the parcels of land is by
virtue of Helen’s possible donation to him and we cannot look beyond the
language of the document to make a contrary construction as this would be
inconsistent with the parol evidence rule.[12]
Moreover, it is mandated that if an
acceptance is made in a separate public writing the notice of the acceptance
must be noted not only in the document containing the acceptance but also in
the deed of donation. Commenting on Art. 633 of the Civil Code from whence Art.
749[13] came Manresa said: "If the acceptance does not
appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Solemn words are not
necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the intention to accept x x x x it is
necessary that formal notice thereof be given to the donor, and the fact that
due notice has been given must be noted in both instruments. Then and only then
is the donation perfected.[14] "
Thus, in Santos v. Robledo we emphasized
that when the deed of donation is recorded in the registry of property the
document that evidences the acceptance - if this has not been made in the deed
of gift - should also be recorded. And in one or both documents, as the case
may be, the notification of the acceptance as formally made to the donor or
donors should be duly set forth.[15] Where the deed of donation fails to show the
acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a separate
instrument is either not given to the donor or else noted in the deed of
donation, and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.[16]
These requisites, definitely prescribed by
law, have not been complied with, and no proof of compliance appears in the
record. The two (2) quitclaim deeds set out the conveyance of the parcels of
land by Helen in favor of David but its acceptance by David does not appear in
the deeds, nor in the Special Power of Attorney. Further, the records reveal no
other instrument that evidences such acceptance and notice thereof to the donor
in an authentic manner. It is well-settled that if the notification and
notation are not complied with, the donation is void. Therefore, the provisions
of the law not having been complied with, there was no effective conveyance of
the parcels of land by way of donation inter vivos.[17] Scncm
However, the inexistence of a donation does
not render the repudiation made by Helen in favor of David valid. There is no
valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the
inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29 December 1970 dividing and
adjudicating between the two (2) of them all the property in Simeon’s estate.
By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered
in her and her son’s name in undivided equal share and for eleven (11) years
they possessed the lands in the concept of owner. Article 1056 of the Civil
Code provides -
The acceptance or
repudiation of an inheritance, once made is irrevocable and cannot be impugned,
except when it was made through any of the causes that vitiate consent or when
an unknown will appears.
Nothing on record shows that Helen’s
acceptance of her inheritance from Simeon was made through any of the causes
which vitiated her consent nor is there any proof of the existence of an
unknown will executed by Simeon. Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot
belatedly execute an instrument which has the effect of revoking or impugning
her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property
from Simeon’s estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim deeds which she executed
eleven (11) years after she had accepted the inheritance have no legal force
and effect.
Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation
does not ipso facto operate to convert the parcels of land into res
nullius[18] to be escheated in favor of the Government. The
repudiation being of no effect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to
their private owner, Helen, who, although being an American citizen, is
qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of the
litigation.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals which
sustained the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
dismissing the petition for escheat is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. Sdjad
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Decision penned by Justice Emeterio C. Cui, concurred in by Justice Ramon U. Mabutas Jr. and Justice Hilarion L. Aquino.
[2] Decision penned by Judge Aurora Santiago-Lagman.
[3] Referred to alternatively as "Simeon de Guzman" in the pleadings.
[4] This deed was denominated as "Deed of Quitclaim" to be differentiated from the first one captioned as "Quitclaim Deed."
[5] RTC Decision, p. 5.
[6] Appeal instituted on 31 May 1996.
[7] Art. 749, New Civil Code.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Q: Ms. Guzman, did you intend to donate your share of
the properties to your son, David?
A: No, sir. That would have been foolish.
Q: Foolish?
A: Yes. Lita explained to me that while I
could hold the properties in my own name, sell them and even renounce my rights
over them, Philippine law did not allow me to donate them to David. I thought
that was a little strange but, if that’s your law, what can I do?
Anyway, she said I could only take the properties or renounce them in David’s favor. So I renounced. Besides, if I really wanted to donate anything to David, I could have as easily sold the properties and given him the money I would have made. There wouldn’t have been any point in renouncing and all that. xxx ( Deposition of Helen Meyers, 12 October 1994, Chicago, Illinois)
[10] Ibid.
[11] Q: What did you tell her? Juris
A: I told her my sentiments about Simeon’s
properties.
Q: Which were?
A: I felt that the properties came from the
labor of Simeon’s forebears. While he was alive he did tell me that he
inherited some land in the Philippines sometime in the 1920’s. Since the
properties came from his family, I thought it was only fair that they should
remain with them.
Q: Who is "them"?
A: Simeon’s blood family; David, that is. x x x (Deposition of Helen Meyers Guzman, 12 October 1994, Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A)
[12] Rule 130, Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. – When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement x x x x.
[13] Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable
may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. Jjlex
The acceptance may be made in the same deed
of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect
unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments (Civil Code).
[14] Di Siock Jian vs. Sy Lioc Suy, 43 Phil. 562 [1922), citing 5 Manresa 115.
[15] Santos vs. Robledo, 28 Phil, 245 (1914)
[16] See Note 14.
[17] Legasto v. Verzosa, 54 Phil. 766 (1930); see Note 14.
[18] The property of nobody. A thing which has no owner, either because a former owner has finally abandoned it, or because it has never been appropriated by any person, or because (in the Roman Law) it is not susceptible of private ownership; Black's Dictionary of Law. 4th Ed., p. 1470.