THIRD DIVISION
[G. R. No. 128883. February 22, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SALVADOR GALIDO alias
"SALVADOR ‘BADONG’ UBERAS", accused-appellant. NewÓ miso
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the October 17,
1996 decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental,
Branch 47, finding accused-appellant Salvador Galido alias Salvador
"Badong" Uberas (hereafter GALIDO) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the sums of P50,000 as
indemnity, P148,800 for loss of income, and P10,000 as moral damages.
GALIDO was charged with murder in an
information, the accusatory portion of which reads: Acctä mis
That on or about
the 4th day of July, 1994, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court , the herein accused, without any
justifiable cause of [sic] motive, being then armed with a knife, with intent
to kill, and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, and stab with said
weapon one Dindo Panganiban, thereby inflicting upon the person of the latter
the following wound…which was the direct and immediate cause of his death,…
GALIDO was arraigned on September 20, 1994
and with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime charged,[2] whereupon trial ensued.
The prosecution witnesses were Renato
Fillera, PO3 Felimon Roderos, Dr. Johnnie V. Aritao, Jr. and Juana Panganiban.
GALIDO himself was the sole witness for the defense.
Renato Fillera testified that at about 12:30
in the morning of July 4, 1994, he was at the bandstand of the Bacolod City
public plaza looking for a "girl of pleasure" with whom he could pass
the time. While at such place, he saw a man approach another man asleep on the
floor of the bandstand and stab him, hitting his left breast, using a
double-bladed knife. The victim stood up for a moment before eventually falling
down again. Fillera was about 5 meters away from the victim. He claimed that he
was able to take a good look at the face of the assailant because of the light
in the bandstand as well as the light coming from the public plaza. After he
stabbed the man, the assailant left the bandstand and casually proceeded to the
direction of the Manokan, an eating place. Fillera did not do anything upon
seeing the stabbing because he was afraid since the assailant was armed and
because he knew neither the assailant nor the victim. After the incident,
Fillera proceeded to his aunt’s house at the Shopping Center. Misä act
Within the week, Fillera met with his friend
Kano, who told him that his brother-in-law was stabbed at the public plaza at
around 12:30 a.m. of July 4, 1994 and that they had no witnesses. Upon hearing
his friend’s account, Renato became convinced that he had witnessed the killing
of Kano’s brother-in-law.[3]
On cross-examination, Fillera testified that
the assailant was facing him when he stabbed the victim.[4] He also declared that the face of the assailant was
familiar to him because he often saw him at the public plaza.[5] Sâ djad
Police officer Felimon Roderos testified
that, while he was on duty at the police headquarters of Magsaysay, Bacolod
City during the early morning of July 4, 1994, the station received a radio
call from base control to proceed to the Western Visayas Regional Hospital to
investigate a stabbing incident. Roderos, together with SPO3 Amador Verzosa and
PO3 Edison Rosales, proceeded to the provincial hospital where they found the
victim in the emergency room, whom they were told was already dead upon arrival
at the hospital. They learned from the nurse that the victim’s name was Dindo Panganiban.
Roderos and the other police officers conducted an ocular inspection at the
public plaza, but there were no persons there. They then returned to police
headquarters to make a report. A follow-up investigation was conducted the
following day and they were able to interview a certain Leo Buoy y Garcia who
claimed to have witnessed the incident. Garcia told them that on July 4, 1994,
at 12:30 a.m., he saw the suspect Salvador Uberas climb up the stage and stab
the victim. Acting on Garcia’s testimony, they arrested accused.[6]
The post-mortem examination of the body of
Dindo Panganiban was conducted by Dr. Johnnie V. Aritao, Jr., the City Health
Officer and Medico-Legal Officer of Bacolod City. In his Autopsy Report,[7] Dr. Aritao made the following findings: stab wound 2
cm wide, 4 cm deep at the left 3rd intercostal space, line directed medially
forward rupturing the heart and left lung. The cause of death was
"cardio-respiratory arrest, shock, hemorrhage, severe, internal, ruptured
lung and heart, due to a stab wound."[8] Dr. Aritao testified that, based on the location and
the nature of the injuries sustained by the victim, the assailant most probably
used a sharp bladed instrument and the attack was frontal.[9] Sppedscâ
Juana Panganiban, the mother of the victim,
testified that her son was born on March 23, 1976. At the time of his death on
July 4, 1994, Dindo was a fish vendor at the Central Market of Bacolod City
with daily earnings of P100 to P150. He was single and lived with his mother.
Dindo was the sole breadwinner of the family.[10]
For his defense, GALIDO interposed a denial
and an alibi. He stated that on July 4, 1994, at about 12:30 a.m., he was at
his boarding house at Barangay 12, Mambulok, asleep beside his gay lover
Wilfredo Segovia, Jr., his nightly companion for more than 5 years. On July 3,
1994, GALIDO and Wilfredo Segovia went to sleep at about 11:30 p.m. after
watching television and woke up at 7:00 a.m. the following day. He asserted
that he never left his boarding house from the time he went to sleep until he
awoke the following morning.
GALIDO denied knowing Leo Boy Y Garcia and
Dindo Panganiban. He claims that the first time he heard the name Dindo
Panganiban was when he was arrested by the police. On August 21, 1994, as he
was returning to his job after having bought cigarettes, he was called by a
policeman who requested him to go with them because there was a charge against
him for having killed Dindo Panganiban. When he refused to go with the
arresting officers, they struck him with an armalite. CÓ alrsc
GALIDO testified that the public plaza is
only about 30 meters from Barangay 12 where he lives. He stated that Barangay
12 was at the back of Manokan Country, a refreshment parlor, which is two
blocks away from the public plaza. However, immediately after GALIDO said this,
counsel for the defense asked him to point out to the court the distance of 30
meters from where he was seated and GALIDO pointed to an area about 300 to 400
meters away. Yet, on cross-examination, GALIDO admitted that it only takes five
minutes to traverse the distance between Barangay 12 and the public plaza.[11] Sccalä r
The trial court gave credence to the
testimony of Renato Fillera, an eyewitness to the killing of Dindo Panganiban.
The court found Fillera’s comportment to be "natural and normal" and
that his testimony was given "with candor and sincerity" and replete
with the necessary details. The court stated that the fact that Fillera’s
testimony was uncorroborated did not make it any less worthy of credit since it
is intrinsically credible and there was no showing that it was improperly or
maliciously motivated. Finally, the court said that the failure of Fillera to
report the crime to the police and to mention the incident to his aunt with
whom he was living was understandable since he feared reprisal from GALIDO,
whom he often encountered at the public plaza.[12]
The alibi of GALIDO was not accepted by the
trial court. First of all, the crime scene was only five minutes away from the
house of accused, therefore it was not physically impossible for accused to
have been at the crime scene at the time of its commission. Secondly, such
alibi was uncorroborated, even by Wilfredo Segovia, Jr. who was supposed to
have been with GALIDO on the night of the killing.[13]
The qualifying circumstance of treachery was
appreciated by the trial court due to the fact "that the victim was in a
slumber when accused administered and delivered the fatal blow with the use of
a lethal weapon, a knife, at the left breast of his totally unsuspecting
victim. Being asleep at the time of the attack, the victim could not have put
up any defense whatsoever against the sudden assault by accused."[14]
Thus, in its decision,[15] the trial court decreed: Calrspä ped
WHEREFORE, finding
accused Salvador Galido alias "Salvador ‘Badong’ Uberas" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder punishable under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659, judgment is hereby
rendered, sentencing him to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA, as well as the accessory
penalty provided by law. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Dindo
Panganiban P50,000 for his death, P148,800 for loss of income, and P10,000 as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[16]
In his appellant’s brief,[17] GALIDO contends that the trial court gravely erred
in giving full weight and credit to the testimony of Renato Fillera. According
to accused, the lower court failed to consider that Fillera is a friend of the
decedent’s brother-in-law, which relation "unequivocally dictated and/or
pushed him to testify against the accused-appellant." GALIDO insists that
Fillera’s failure to report the incident to the police belies his credibility,
considering that there was a police precinct near the scene of the crime. That
Fillera feared reprisal from GALIDO was not believable since even after the
accused was arrested on August 21, 1994, Fillera only came forward after about
six months. Based on the foregoing circumstances, GALIDO submits that the
testimony of Renato Fillera was incredible and tainted with partiality and is
not sufficient to sustain a conviction. Sceä dp
Finally, GALIDO contends that, assuming that
he had in fact stabbed Dindo Panganiban, the prosecution had not established
the qualifying circumstance of treachery as there was no proof "that prior
to the killing the accused-appellant had made some sort of preparation to kill
the deceased in such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to
make [it] hard or impossible for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate."
GALIDO contends that "it does not always follow that if the attack was
sudden and unexpected, it should be attended with treachery." Edpä sc
Based on a careful study of the records, we
uphold the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of Renato Fillera. The
transcripts reveal that his testimony was candid, straightforward, and
consistent on all material points. It is doctrinal that the trial court’s
evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect,
for the trial court has the distinct opportunity of directly observing the
demeanor of a witness and, thus, to determine whether he is telling the truth.[18]
Other than accused’s bare accusations, there
is no showing that Fillera testified falsely due to the promptings of his
friend Kano, the brother-in-law of the victim. We have held that where the
defense fails to prove that witnesses are moved by improper motives, the
presumption is that they are not so moved and their testimonies are therefore
entitled to full weight and credit.[19] The fact that Fillera is a friend of deceased’s
brother-in-law does not taint his testimony with bias, as accused would have us
hold.
Newmiso
Although the defense makes much of the
failure of Fillera to immediately report the incident to the police, we hold
that the same does not impair his credibility. Fillera testified that he was
afraid that accused would harm him if he reported the crime to the police, as
the latter knew him at least by face and knew that he frequented the public
plaza. Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved
in a criminal case are sufficient explanations for a witness’ delay in
reporting a crime to the authorities.[20]
The positive identification of GALIDO as the
perpetrator of the crime by Renato Fillera, absent any showing of ill motive,
must prevail over the weak and obviously fabricated alibi of the accused.[21]
GALIDO testified that, at the time of the
killing of Dindo Panganiban at the public plaza, he was sleeping together with
Wilfredo Segovia in their boarding house in Barangay 12. Accused himself
testified, however, that Barangay 12 is near the public plaza and the distance
can be negotiated by a short five-minute walk. For the defense of alibi to serve
as a basis for acquittal, the accused must establish by clear and convincing
evidence his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
offense and that it would thus be physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime.[22] Accused failed to discharge this evidentiary burden. Acctmis
Since alibis are inherently weak and
unreliable, they must receive credible corroboration from disinterested
witnesses. The failure of the defense to present Wilfredo Segovia as a witness,
the only person who could attest to the truth of accused’s testimony, further
weakens GALIDO’s alibi. When the accused is unable to substantiate his alibi
with the testimony of a credible witness, the same is reduced to self-serving
evidence undeserving of any weight in law.[23]
We affirm the trial court’s appreciation of
the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Treachery exists when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms
which tend directly and specially to insure the execution of the crime without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[24] Dindo Panganiban was sleeping when GALIDO suddenly
and unexpectedly stabbed him in the chest, without any warning. There is no
doubt that the victim in this case could not have repelled the attack or
offered any defense of his person. Misact
The existence of treachery qualifies the
killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Under R.A. No.
7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The trial
court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon accused
since no generic aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were proven, pursuant
to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Consistent with current jurisprudence, we
affirm the award of P50,000 as indemnity for the victim’s untimely death[25] and order the increase of the award of moral damages
to P50,000.[26]
With regard to the decedent’s loss of
earning capacity, the trial court limited its award to the amount of P148,800
because this is the amount which the prosecution alleged in the information.
Such award is erroneous. The formula for computing loss of earning capacity is
2/3 x [ 80 – age
of victim at the time of death ] x [reasonable portion of the annual net income
which would have been received as support by heirs ][27]
Dindo Panganiban was eighteen years old on
July 4, 1994. As testified to by Juana Panganiban, he was earning P100 to P150
each day, or an average daily income of P125 or P3,750 monthly. From this
monthly income must be deducted the reasonable amount of P1,875 representing
the living and other necessary expenses of the deceased.[28] Thus, the victim’s net annual income would be
P22,500. The lost earnings of the deceased should be computed as follows:
= [ 2/3 x (80 –
18) ] x [ 22,500 ] Sdjad
= P930,000
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental is AFFIRMED, except that the moral damages should be
increased to P50,000 and the amount awarded for loss of income should be
increased to P930,000.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur. Sppedsc
[1] Docketed as G.R. No. 16626 and penned by Judge Edgar G. Garvilles. Rollo, 55-64.
[2] Rollo, 56.
[3] TSN, February 15, 1995, 1-13.
[4] Ibid., 16.
[5] Ibid., 23-24.
[6] TSN, October 4, 1995, 1-18.
[7] Exhibit B.
[8] Exhibit C.
[9] TSN, December 6, 1995, 1-15.
[10] TSN, January 24, 1996, 1-4.
[11] TSN, February 28, 1996, 1-31.
[12] Rollo, 61.
[13] Ibid., 62-63.
[14] Ibid., 59-60.
[15] Supra note 1.
[16] Rollo, 64.
[17] Ibid., 44-53.
[18] People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 (1998).
[19] People v. Mendoza, 284 SCRA 705 (1998).
[20] People v. Viovicente, 286 SCRA 1 (1998); People v. Villanueva, 284 SCRA 501 (1998).
[21] People v. Andres, 296 SCRA 318 (1998); People v. Enriquez, 292 SCRA 656 (1998).
[22] People v. Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687 (1998); People v. Ravanes, 284 SCRA 634 (1998).
[23] People v. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 (1998).
[24] People v. Gungon, 287 SCRA 618 (1998).
[25] People v. Vermudez, G.R. No. 119464, January 28, 1999.
[26] People v. Gutierrez, 302 SCRA 643 (1999); People v. Reyes, 287 SCRA 229 (1998); People v. Aringue, 283 SCRA 291 (1997).
[27] People v. Jerez, 285 SCRA 393 (1998).
[28] People v. Verde, G.R. No. 119077, February 10, 1999; People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 116281, February 8, 1999. In these cases, the Court considered 50% of the gross annual income as a reasonable amount representing the living and other necessary expenses of the deceased.