SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125341. February 9, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOEY BARCELONA y SADILLE, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 223, Quezon
City, finding accused-appellant Joey Barcelona y Sadille guilty of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify complainant Dolly Maglinte in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages and to pay the costs of suit. Calrsc
The facts are as follows:
On November 8, 1993, an Information was
filed against accused-appellant charging him with the crime of rape, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about
the 1st day of November, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation with the use of a knife, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with the
undersigned complainant, a minor, 17 years old, all done against her will and
without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon being arraigned on April 19, 1994,
accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged, whereupon trial ensued.
Dolly Maglinte testified as follows:
From July 6, 1993[3] until November 1, 1993,[4] she worked in a bakery store located at No. 602
Quirino Highway, Bagbag, Novaliches, and was provided sleeping quarters in the
store, which could be accessed through a main door and a secret door. The main
door can be locked only from the outside by complainant’s employer. On the
other hand, the secret door is locked only by a hook which could easily be
unhooked. Inside the store is a folding bed where complainant would sleep.[5]
On October 31, 1993, complainant tended the
bakery until 10:30 in the evening when she decided to close the store and then
go to sleep.[6] At around two o’clock in the morning of November 1,
1993, complainant was awakened by someone opening the zipper of her shorts.
When she opened her eyes, she felt someone poking a bladed weapon at her. Sccalr
By the light coming from the bakery, she saw
that her assailant was accused-appellant who then proceeded to remove
complainant’s shorts and throw it on the floor. Thereupon, accused-appellant
parted complainant’s legs and inserted his penis into her private parts. Her
pleas went unheeded by accused-appellant who continued to force himself inside
her for around 10 minutes. Although she was crying, complainant could not shout
because she was afraid for her life, the knife being pointed at the left
portion of her neck.[7]
On November 5, 1993, complainant went to the
police station in Sangandaan. She was then referred to Camp Crame where she
filed a complaint for rape against accused-appellant.[8] Complainant was subjected to a medical examination,
the results of which are as follows:
SPECIMEN
SUBMITTED:
Person of Dolly
Maglinte, about 17 years old, saleslady and a resident of 602 [Quirino] Hi-way,
Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City.
PURPOSE OF
LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine
physical signs of abuse.
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND
EXTRA GENITAL:
Fairly developed,
fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are conical with pale
brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen
is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is moderate
growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with the
congested and abraded labia minora presenting in between. On separating the
same is disclosed an abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type
hymen, with deep healing laceration at 6 o’clock. External vaginal orifice
offers moderate resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger
and the virgin-sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent
rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency with moderate
amount of blood oozing from the external os.
CONCLUSION: xxx xxx xxx
Findings are
compatible with recent loss of virginity.
There are no
external signs of recent application of any form of violence.
REMARKS: Calrspped
Vaginal and
peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative diplococci and for
spermatozoa.[9]
Accused-appellant, for his part, denied that
he had raped complainant, and claimed that their sexual relationship was
consensual in nature. According to accused-appellant, he met complainant in the
bakery store where they both worked. He courted her. They became sweethearts on
October 1, 1993. Feeling happy, he kissed her on the lips. On November 1, 1993,
he asked complainant to marry him and she agreed. He then began kissing
complainant and she embraced him. Afterwards, she removed her shirt.
Accused-appellant asked complainant if she was acting of her own free will. When
she said that she was, they took off their clothes, lay on the bed and had
sexual intercourse. Afterwards, they made plans to talk to their parents about
their coming marriage. But before accused-appellant could fetch his parents, he
was arrested for raping complainant.[10]
To support his claim that complainant
consented to have sex with him because they were sweethearts, accused-appellant
presented as evidence a letter dated September 23, 1993,[11] a birthday card[12] and complainant’s picture,[13] which she had given him on his birthday. She also
gave him a face towel as a birthday gift.[14]
In addition to accused-appellant’s
testimony, the defense presented Editha dela Peña who claimed that complainant
had confided to her the love and affection she felt for accused-appellant.[15] Dela Peña presented a letter, dated September 19,
1993,[16] allegedly given to her by complainant wherein the
latter wrote about accused-appellant.
Based on the parties’ evidence, the trial
court rendered a decision, dated May 14, 1996, finding accused-appellant guilty
of the rape of complainant. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the
Court finds the accused JOEY BARCELONA y SADILLE guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Article 63 of the same code and hereby sentences him
to suffer Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the offended party in the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant
contends that ¾
THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[18]
It is contended that there was no meaningful
resistance on the part of complainant which would show that accused-appellant
used force or intimidation in order to have sexual intercourse with her.
We find no merit in accused-appellant’s
contention.
Scedp
In adjudging rape cases, the Court is guided
by the following principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the nature of the crime in which
only two persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[19]
The trial court found complainant’s
narration of the alleged rape to be clear, convincing and straightforward.[20] Such evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses
is binding upon the appellate court, there being no showing that it was made
arbitrarily, or that the trial court overlooked certain facts of substance
which, if considered, could affect the result of the case.[21]
According to accused-appellant, complainant
did practically nothing to defend herself while she was allegedly being raped.
He asserts that there was no real struggle or determined effort on her part to
signify resistance such as to be expected of a woman defending her honor.[22]
This is not so. In the first place,
complainant testified that accused-appellant pointed a knife at her neck. There
was, therefore, the essence of force and intimidation sufficient to engender
fear in complainant’s mind that she would be killed if she did not yield to
accused-appellant’s desires. As stated in the case of People v. Paranzo:[23]
The Court has
repeatedly held that rape is committed when intimidation is used on the victim
and the latter submitted against her will because of fear for her life or
personal safety. It is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed be
so great or of such character as could not be resisted because all that is
required is that it be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused
had in mind. . .
Secondly, the fact that complainant failed
to shout or to fight off accused-appellant’s sexual advances when her room was
just adjacent to her employer’s room does not necessarily show consent. Failure
of the victim to shout for help does not negate rape.[24] The intimidation of the victim may be so
overpowering as to prevent the victim from making an outcry. Nor is there any
standard mode of behavior which can be set for people confronted with a
frightening event. As we held in another case:
. . . . The
behavior and reaction of every person cannot be predicted with accuracy. It is
a time-honored precept that "different people react differently to a given
situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange or startling experience."
Not every rape victim can be expected to act conformably to the usual
expectations of every one. Some may shout; some may faint; and some may be
shocked into insensibility, while others may openly welcome the intrusion.[25] Edpsc
Accused-appellant cites the case of People
v. Velasquez[26] wherein
the Court disbelieved the complaining witness’ testimony due to its inherent
improbabilities. In said case, the complainant testified that, while she was
sleeping inside her employer’s house, the accused, her employer, entered her
room, embraced her and held a bladed weapon against her. Frightened, the complainant
did not shout while the accused consummated the sexual act. The Court held
complainant’s testimony to be unbelievable for the following reasons: (a) there
was no sincere struggle on her part to preserve her virtue; (b) the complainant
engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused twice after the alleged rape but
no other charge was filed against the accused; (c) the complainant slept
afterwards in the same room where she was allegedly raped in spite of the fact
that the room had no lock, nor did she take any other precaution to prevent the
accused from taking advantage of her; (d) only when her mother noticed signs of
pregnancy did the complainant make an outcry against the alleged assault on her
virtue; (e) instead of eliciting pity from her family when she told them of the
paternity of her child, complainant was even slapped by her brother, a reaction
which cannot be expected if a woman had just told her kin that she had been the
victim of a bestial attack; (f) the filing of the case appeared to be motivated
by the accused’s refusal to marry the complainant; (g) the fiscal to whom
complainant made her complaint was unsure of whether to charge the accused with
seduction or rape; and, (h) complainant’s child was born after at least 10
months and 11 days from the time of the last intercourse, casting a reasonable
doubt on complainant’s credibility.[27]
But in the case at bar, no such
circumstances exist so as to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of this
Court that accused-appellant actually raped Dolly Maglinte. Complainant never
wavered in her assertion that accused-appellant was able to have sexual
intercourse with her only at knife point. She never admitted loving
accused-appellant nor did she give any indication that she was attracted to
him. On the contrary, she categorically denied having special feelings toward
accused-appellant.[28] Even under cross-examination, complainant’s
testimony did not falter on that material fact. "The rule is that when a
rape victim’s testimony is straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid
cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its
material points, the same must be given full faith and credit."[29]
Absent any showing of ill motive on the part
of complainant, we uphold the principle that the lone, uncorroborated testimony
of the complainant is sufficient to convict the accused, provided that such
testimony is clear, positive, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.[30]
Accused-appellant makes much of the fact
that complainant gave him a birthday card, a picture, a letter and a face towel
for his birthday, to show that they were sweethearts and that on November 1,
1993 they were trysting. Edp
While the Court has upheld the defense of
consensual sex in some cases, this was on the basis of strong evidence,
consisting of letters and the testimonies of witnesses, showing that the
alleged rape was actually sex by mutual consent.[31] Having been raised as an affirmative defense, the
"sweetheart theory" must be established by convincing proof.[32] Accused-appellant bears the burden of proving that
he and complainant had an affair which naturally led to a sexual relationship.
This accused-appellant failed to do.
The letter presented by accused-appellant is
not, in fact, a love letter. It contains no passage in which complainant
professes her love to accused-appellant. On the contrary, complainant wrote
"Happy Birthday, my friend," leaving no room for interpretation as to
what she felt toward accused-appellant. At best, this letter can be taken as a
friendly greeting on accused-appellant’s birthday. Surely, the letter was not
intended to be a carte blanche or an open invitation for sexual
indulgence.[33]
As for the other presents given by
complainant, e.g., birthday card, picture and face towel, the same
cannot be considered evidence to support accused-appellant’s claims as it is
not unnatural for friends to give each other gifts on special occasions.
Neither is the testimony of Editha dela Peña
believable insofar as it corroborates the alleged relationship between
accused-appellant and Dolly Maglinte. Dela Peña admitted in open court that she
was in love with accused-appellant and would do anything to help him get out of
the case.[34] Her credibility is, to say the least, highly
questionable. In an analogous case where the mother of the accused testified to
corroborate his alibi,[35] the Court held that corroborative testimony is not
credible if tainted with bias, especially where the witness is so closely
related to the accused as to wish to help him evade liability for the crime.
Furthermore, the letter given by complainant
to Dela Peña cannot be interpreted as a confession of love for
accused-appellant. The letter only stated that her reason for giving gifts to
accused-appellant is to mollify him since he appeared angry at her for no
apparent reason. Nowhere is it stated in the letter that complainant was in
love with accused-appellant. Complainant wrote that she noticed an improvement
in accused-appellant’s attitude towards other people and his work. This
certainly cannot be taken to mean that complainant was in love with
accused-appellant. Misedp
As for accused-appellant’s own testimony
that it was complainant’s aunt who caused his arrest and that complainant filed
a case for rape only because she was afraid of her aunt,[36] we find the same to be implausible. His
protestations that complainant loved him and that her only motive for filing a
rape case was her fear of her aunt are so contrary to common experience that
they cannot be deemed worthy of belief. Considering the inherent modesty and
reticence of a typical Filipina, it is highly unlikely that she would fabricate
a tale which would surely cast dishonor on her virtue. No young Filipina of
decent repute would publicly admit she had been raped unless that was the
truth.[37] Even in these modern times, this principle still
holds true.
Besides, even if indeed accused-appellant
and complainant are sweethearts, this fact does not necessarily negate rape.
"A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will. Definitely, a
man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancee and, worse, employ
violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust."[38]
Neither can one say that, because
accused-appellant did not flee after the commission of the crime, he must be
innocent. This is not necessarily the case, especially since the evidence
clearly established accused-appellant’s guilt.
The trial court granted only P50,000.00 as
moral damages in favor of complainant. Moral damages is separate and distinct
from the civil indemnity awarded to rape victims.[39] In accordance with our recent rulings, an award of
P50,000.00 should be given to complainant as her civil indemnity, in addition
to the P50,000.00 moral damages awarded by the trial court.[40]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
223, Quezon City, is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION that an additional amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity is awarded to complainant Dolly Maglinte. Misoedp
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing,
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Per Judge Victorino P. Evangelista.
[2] Records, p. 1.
[3] TSN, p. 3, Nov. 8, 1994.
[4] TSN, p. 5, Sept. 7, 1994.
[5] Id., p. 7.
[6] TSN, pp. 13-16, Nov. 8, 1994.
[7] TSN, pp. 5-10, Sept. 7, 1994.
[8] Exh. B.
[9] Exh. D.
[10] TSN, pp. 3-10, Jan. 23, 1995.
[11] Exh. 4.
[12] Exh. 2.
[13] Exh. 3.
[14] TSN, p. 4, Jan. 23, 1995.
[15] TSN, p. 1, Jan. 11, 1995.
[16] Exh. 1.
[17] RTC Decision, p. 13; Records, p. 226.
[18] Rollo, p. 59.
[19] People v. Panique, G.R. No. 125763, Oct. 13, 1999.
[20] RTC Decision, p. 8; Records, p. 221.
[21] People v. Panique, supra.
[22] Rollo, p. 62.
[23] G.R. No. 107800, Oct. 26, 1999.
[24] People v. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 (1998).
[25] People v. Silvano, G.R. No. 127356, June 29, 1999.
[26] 120 SCRA 847 (1983).
[27] Id., at 854-857.
[28] TSN, p. 13, Nov. 8, 1994.
[29] People v. Caratay, G.R. Nos. 119418, 119436-37, Oct. 5, 1999.
[30] People v. Abuan, 284 SCRA 46 (1998).
[31] See People v. Bayron, G.R. No. 122732, Sept. 7, 1999.
[32] People v. Monfero, G.R. No. 126367, June 17, 1999.
[33] People v. Cervantes, 333 Phil. 704 (1996).
[34] TSN, p. 11, Jan. 11, 1996.
[35] People v. Gailo, G.R. No. 116233, Oct. 13, 1999.
[36] TSN, p. 10, Jan. 23, 1995.
[37] People v. Manahan, G.R. No. 128157, Sept. 29, 1999.
[38] Ibid.
[39] People v. de los Santos, G.R. No. 120235, Sept. 30, 1999.
[40] People v. Bayron, supra.