FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 124680-81. February 28,
2000]
IMELDA R.
MARCOS, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Edpä sc
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil
action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order assailing the resolution of the Sandiganbayan,
First Division,[1] that denied petitioner’s motion to quash two informations
charging her and others with malversation of public funds totalling about
P97,954,000.00.
The facts are as follows:
On April 7, 1994, Special Prosecution
Officer I Rodolfo T. Espinosa filed with the Sandiganbayan two informations
against petitioner and other accused, charging them with malversation of public
finds, one information involving the amount of P57.954 million[2] and the second information involving the amount of
P40 million.[3]
On August 12, 1994, petitioner filed with
the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash/dismiss the two informations, raising the
following grounds, namely: (a) the informations are fatally defective for
failure to adequately inform the accused of the charge against her in violation
of due process guaranteed by the Constitution; (b) the informations state no
offense; and (c) the court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the
accused are protected by immunity from suit.[4]
On August 15, 1994, the Sandiganbayan issued
an order that virtually denied the motion to quash even before the scheduled
date of hearing thereof, ruling that the informations actually state a valid
accusation; that immunity from suit was applicable only to acts upon orders of
the President which are legitimate, and that a motion to quash at that stage
was not proper.[5]
On August 31, 1994, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration insisting on the same grounds raised in the motion
to quash which was still proper at that stage.[6]
On January 16, 1996, one year and four and a
half months from its filing, the Sandiganbayan issued a minute resolution
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, ruling that the motion had
become moot since the original motion to quash had been filed on August 12,
1994, after the accused had been arraigned and trial actually commenced. The
minute resolution was acted upon by the Sandiganbayan, First Division, in this
wise: Edâ p
"Minutes of
the proceeding held on January 16, 1996.
x x x
"The
following resolution was adopted:
"Criminal
Case Nos. 20345-20346 – Peo. vs. Imelda R. Marcos, et al.,
The "MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION", dated August 31, 1994, of accused Imelda R. Marcos,
is Denied.
x x x
"APPROVED:
"GARCHITORENA,
PJ. (Sgd) 1/17/1996.
"BALAJADIA,
J. (Sgd.)
1-18
"CHICO-NAZARIO,
J. (Sgd.) 1/18/96".
indicating that the justices did not
deliberate on the case, but individually acted thereon on different dates.[7]
Hence, this petition.[8]
On September 23, 1996, the Court resolved to
require respondents to comment on the petition, not to file a motion to
dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice.[9]
On November 8, 1996, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (Ombudsman), representing the People of the Philippines,
filed its comment.[10]
On December 13, 1999, we gave due course to
the petition.[11]
At issue is whether or not the Sandiganbayan
acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to quash
the informations filed after she had pleaded thereto.
Rule 117, Section 8 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that: Miä sedp
"Sec. 8.
Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.--The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the
grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and
jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of
this Rule."
Consequently, it is clear that a motion to
quash is not improper even after the accused had been arraigned if the same is
grounded on failure to charge an offense and lack of jurisdiction of the
offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy. In this
case, petitioner’s motion to quash is grounded on no offense charged and lack
of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Hence, the Sandiganbayan erred in
disregarding the plain provision of the Rules of Court and in cavalier fashion
denied the motion.
Nevertheless, the consistent doctrine of
this Court is that from a denial of a motion to quash, the appropriate remedy
is for petitioner to go to trial on the merits, and if an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.[12]
Incidentally, the Sandiganbayan set the
cases against petitioner for trial on continuous setting on December 4, 1995
(more than one year after arraignment) and continued on December 5, 1995, and
on various dates in January, April, May and June 1996.[13] Apparently, however, trial has commenced on December
5, 1995 with witness Examining Auditor Iluminada H. Cortez testifying.[14] On August 21, 1997, the prosecution filed its formal
offer of evidence.[15] On October 29, 1997, the Sandiganbayan admitted the
documentary evidence offered by the prosecution over the objection of accused
Marcos and Zagala.[16] On November 17, 1997, accused Zagala filed a motion
to dismiss (demurrer to evidence).[17] On January 6, 1998, accused Imelda R. Marcos filed a
motion for leave to file and to admit demurrer to evidence.[18] On August 29, 1998, accused Jose Conrado Benitez
filed a demurrer to evidence.[19] The Sandiganbayan has not ruled on these demurrers,
though this Court has not issued a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction. Meantime, on February 12, 1998, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
8493 mandating expeditious trial and disposition of cases in the Sandiganbayan,
as a trial court, and other trial courts. This law is implemented in the
Court’s Administrative Circular No. 38-98, dated August 11, 1998.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for certiorari
and prohibition. However, the Court directs the Sandiganbayan to forthwith
proceed with further proceedings and final disposition of Criminal Case Nos.
20345-20346, in accordance with the mandates of Republic Act No. 8493, with all
deliberate dispatch.
We order the Sandiganbayan to inform this
court of the proceedings in the cases below within ten (10) days of the action
thereon.
No costs. Misoedpâ
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno,
Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
[1] Francis E. Garchitorena, Presiding Justice, ponente, Jose S. Balajadia and Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Associate Justices, concurring.
[2] Information, Criminal Case No. 20345, malversation of public funds against Imelda R. Marcos, Jose Conrado Benitez, and Gilbert C. Dulay, involving the amount of P57.954 million.
[3] Information, Criminal Case No. 20346, malversation of public funds against Imelda R. Marcos, Jose Conrrado Benitez and Rafael G. Zagala, involving the amount of P40 million.
[4] Petition, Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 27-39.
[5] Order, Rollo, p. 40.
[6] Petition, Annex "E", Rollo, pp. 41-48.
[7] Petition, Annex "F", Rollo, pp. 49-50; Cf. Arocha vs. Vivo, 128 Phil. 566, 575 (1967); Commissioner of Immigration vs. Garcia, 156 Phil. 603, 615 (1974); Caoile vs. Vivo, 125 SCRA 85, 97 (1983).
[8] Filed on May 8, 1996, Rollo, pp. 3-23.
[9] Rollo, p. 54.
[10] Rollo, pp. 55-66.
[11] Rollo, pp. 81-82.
[12] Bulaong vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 618 (1990); Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988); Buaya vs. Polo, 169 SCRA 471 (1989); Reyes vs. Camilon, 192 SCRA 445 (1990); Martinez vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126413, August 20, 1999.
[13] Order, dated may 15, 1995, Sandiganbayan Record, Vol. I, p. 334.
[14] Ibid., p. 383.
[15] Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 98-104.
[16] Ibid., pp. 121-126.
[17] Ibid., pp. 145-148.
[18] Ibid., pp. 183-200.
[19] Ibid., pp. 234-242.