SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123102. February 29, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MADELO ESPINA Y CAÑASARES, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated September 4,
1995, of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 14[1] convicting appellant of the crime of murder,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering
him to pay the heirs of the victim the at amounts of P100,000.00, as indemnity,
P15,000.00 as funeral expenses, and P50,000.00 as damages.
Appellant, a 17 year-old jeepney conductor,
was charged with murder for the killing of Ma. Nympha Belen y Melano, a 21
year-old mental retardate.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On July 1, 1993, at about. 12:00 in the evening,
prosecution witness Tolentino A. Colo was sleeping inside a jeepney parked at a
garage in Francisco Homes, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. Suddenly, he was
awakened when a woman cried out "Aruy!". Colo stood up and saw
appellant coming out of a hut located some eight (8) meters away from the
garage. Appellant was holding a curved knife in his hand. His t-shirt, hands,
and knife were drenched with blood. Colo saw a woman inside the hut fall down
on her face. Although it was nighttime, there was a light inside the hut and a
mercury lamp some three (3) meters away which cast enough illumination for Colo
to recognize appellant and the woman as Ma. Nympha Belen. When appellant saw
Colo, he shouted "panglima ire" referring to the victim, and "panganim
ka! referring to Colo. Scared out of his wits, Colo immediately jumped out
of the window of the jeepney and hid in the roof of a nearby house. Appellant
gave chase but when he could not find Colo, he finally gave up and left. Colo
remained on the roof for five (5) long hours. At around 6:00 the following
morning, he gingerly went down and drove the jeepney in his usual route. On
July 2, 1993, at around 7:00 in the evening, Colo was arrested by the police
and brought to the station for investigation. The following day, Colo told Mrs.
Precila Melanio-Belen, mother of the victim, that it was appellant who killed
her daughter.[2]
On August 3, 1993, appellant was charged
with the crime of murder under the following Information:[3]
"I N
F O R M A T I O N
The undersigned
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Madelo Espina y Cañasares of the crime of
murder, penalized under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That on or about
the 1st day of July, 1993, in the municipality of San Jose del Monte, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused Madelo Espina y Cañasares, armed with a bladed weapon and with
intent to kill one Maria Nympha Belen, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and
treachery, attack, assault and stab with the said bladed weapon he was then
provided the said Maria Nympha Belen, a mentally retarded woman, hitting the
latter on the different parts of her body, thereby causing her serious physical
injuries which directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.
Malolos, Bulacan,
August 3, 1993."
Upon arraignment on October 29, 1993,
appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[4] At the pre-trial conference,[5] the sworn statements of Mrs. Precila Melanio-Belen[6] and Tolentino Colo,[7] the post-mortem examination[8] and death certificate of Ma. Nympha Belen[9] were marked in evidence.
During trial, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses: (1) Mrs. Precila Melanio-Belen, mother of the victim, who
testified that her daughter was a mental retardate, and that their family paid
more than P15,000.00. for the funeral of the victim;[10] (2) Tolentino A. Colo, a jeepney driver, who
narrated the events he witnessed in connection with the stabbing incident; (3)
SPO3 Rogelio Encina, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), San Jose
Del Monte, Bulacan, who was tasked to bring to court the knife used in the
killing from the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan;[11] (4) Dr. Juan V. Zaldariaga, Jr., Medico-Legal
Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who conducted the
post-mortem examination and testified that the victim sustained six (6) stab
wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.[12]
For the defense, appellant himself
testified. He stated that in the evening of July 1, 1993, he was having a
drinking spree with Jun, Gusing, Panis, Colo, and some others, at the garage in
San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. At around 10:00 P.M., he left the group and being
drunk, he decided to sleep inside the parked jeepney in the garage instead of
going home. At around 12:10 in the morning, he was awakened by policemen and
brought to the police detachment where he was questioned regarding the killing.
He told the police that he did not know who killed the victim.[13]
On September 4, 1995, the trial court
rendered a decision[14] finding appellant guilty of murder, the dispositive
portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE,
the Court finds the accused Madelo Espina y Cañasares guilty of the crime of
Murder, the court hereby imposes upon the accused the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.
To indemnify the
heirs of the victim P100,000.00.
To pay Precila
Belen P15,000.00 expenses for wake & burial.
To pay P50,000.00
moral damage.
The accused a
detention prisoner, the Provincial Warden of Malolos, Bulacan is ordered to
commit the accused to the National Penitentiary immediately upon receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED."[15]
Hence, the present appeal. Appellant
contends that the trial court gravely erred in -
I. ...GIVING FULL
FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ALLEGED EYEWITNESS, AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING ACCUSED APPELLANT ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. …ORDERING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM IN THE AMOUNT OF
P100,000.00; TO PAY THE AMOUNT OF P 15,000.00 AS REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE WAKE AND
THE BURIAL EXPENSES; AND P50,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES.
In his brief,[16] appellant assails the credibility of prosecution
witness, Colo considering that the latter was also a suspect in the killing,
and was under detention at the time he gave his statement pointing to appellant
as the killer. Further, appellant claims, Colo had a motive in pointing to
appellant as the assailant since they had a previous quarrel over money.
Appellant also contends that Colo's behavior after witnessing the incident is
not in consonance with normal human behavior, for instead of reporting the
matter to the police, he merely went ahead plying his usual jeepney route.
Appellant also avers that the murder weapon was not positively identified in
court. Lastly, appellant insists that he was convicted on the basis of
insufficient circumstantial evidence. And even assuming that appellant
committed the crime, the lower court failed to take into consideration the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, appellant being only seventeen
(17) years old at the time of the commission of the crime.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor
General[17] contends that Colo was released after investigation,
suggesting the insufficiency of evidence to implicate him. Further, the OSG
belies the imputation of ill-motive on the part of Colo to testify against
appellant considering that the alleged quarrel over money was brought up to
explain why appellant was no longer living with Colo, not why Colo would
implicate appellant. The OSG also contends that there is also no standard form
of behavior when one is confronted with a shocking incident. Hence, the OSG
prays for the affirmance of the conviction for murder since the killing is
qualified by abuse of superior strength. But, it recommends that indemnity be
reduced to P50,000.00 pursuant to existing jurisprudence.
In sum, the issues center on the credibility
of the prosecution witness Colo and the sufficiency of the circumstantial
evidence to convict appellant of the crime charged.
Anent the issue of credibility of witnesses,
the elementary rule is that appellate courts will generally not disturb the
findings of the trial court. The latter is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result
of the case.[18] The rule admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1)
when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the
trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by
the evidence.[19] No inconsistencies in Colo's testimony were pointed
out by appellant. Neither does appellant contend that the trial court erred in
relying on the evidence on record.
Appellant attempts to impeach the testimony
at this late stage of the proceeding. The records show that appellant was
afforded ample opportunity to cross examine Colo and to demonstrate any falsity
or error in his allegedly biased testimony. Appellant failed, however, to
undermine Colo’s credibility.
The fact that a witness may have been
investigated in connection with the commission of the crime and that he had a
previous quarrel with appellant are no grounds for disqualification of a
witness under Section 20 of Rule 130 of he Rules of Court. By itself, prejudice
against an accused cannot warrant the disqualification of witnesses or the
total disregard of their testimonies.[20] Under the same rule, in general, any person can
testify in court, regardless of personal interest in a case. At any rate, these
circumstances may affect the credibility of the witness, the assessment of
which is within the province of the trial court. Anent his motive in
testifying, Colo repeatedly insisted that he offered to testify because he
pitied the mother of the victim who could find no witnesses willing to shed
light on the death of her daughter.[21] The foregoing factors considered, we find no cogent
reason to overturn the factual findings of the trial court.
As to the sufficiency of evidence to convict
appellant, we have likewise held that direct evidence of the commission of a
crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion
and finding of guilt.[22] Under Section 4 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
conviction may be had even on circumstantial evidence provided three requisites
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The following circumstances, when pieced
together, lead to the ineluctable conclusion that appellant stabbed the victim:
(1) Appellant, by his own admission, was at the locus criminis at around
the time of stabbing incident.[23] (2) He was seen leaving the hut, barely seconds
after the killing, by witness Colo.[24] (3) He was seen leaving the hut holding a bloodied
knife, and his t shirt and hands drenched with blood.[25] (4) The knife, which had one blunt extremity and one
sharp extremity , was presented in evidence, was akin to the knife used to
inflict the wounds sustained by the victim.[26] (5) He was heard exclaiming "pang lima
ire" referring to the victim and "pang-anim ka' referring
to Colo.[27] (6) Appellant, still holding the knife, even chased
Colo, but eventually left when he could not find Colo.[28]
The most incriminating piece of evidence
against appellant is Colo's testimony that he saw appellant holding a bloodied
curved knife, with his t- shirt and hands drenched with blood, leaving the locus
criminis. Thus, in People v. Malimit,[29] one of
the circumstantial evidence considered in convicting appellant of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide is the testimony of two witnesses that they saw appellant
holding a blood-stained bolo in his right hand, rushing out of the victim's
store mere seconds prior to their discovery of the crime.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient
to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[30] Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence
can be upheld, provided the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person,[31] a conclusion adequately proven in this case.
Appellant's defense of denial is unavailing.
For the defense of denial and alibi to prosper, it must be clearly established
by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that (1) the accused was somewhere
else when the offense was committed, and (2) it was physically impossible for
the accused to have been physically present at the scene of the crime or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[32] Appellant was right smack in the midst of the locus
criminis at the time of the commission of the crime. Hence, his defense of
denial and alibi miserably failed to comply with the strict requirements of
time and place.[33]
As to the crime committed, the Information
alleged three qualifying circumstances - abuse of superior strength, evident
premeditation, and treachery. The trial court appreciated abuse of superior
strength and evident premeditation without specifying which one qualified the
crime to murder. We find, however, that only abuse of superior strength
qualified the killing to murder.
In several cases,[34] we have held that an attack made by a man with a
deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in
the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.
This is the exact scenario in this case.
Evident premeditation, however, was not
sufficiently proven by the prosecution. The following requisites must be
established before evident premeditation may be considered in imposing the
proper penalty: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination;
and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[35] Given the attendant factual circumstances in this
case, we find them insufficient to establish evident premeditation.
Treachery likewise did not attend the
commission of the crime. The qualifying circumstance of treachery can not be
taken into consideration in the absence of evidence showing the manner of
attack and what ensued inside the hut. Nobody witnessed the actual killing,
only its immediate aftermath. Where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack
must be proven.[36]. It cannot be presumed or concluded merely on the
basis of the resulting crime.[37] When no particulars are known regarding the manner
in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of
the victim began and developed, it cannot be established from mere supposition
that the accused perpetrated the killing with treachery.[38]
The trial court erred in appreciating
nighttime as a generic aggravating circumstance. Nighttime only becomes an
aggravating circumstance when (1) it is especially sought by the offender; (2)
it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the
crime by ensuring the offender's immunity from capture.[39] Here, other than the time of the crime, there is
nothing else to suggest that appellant deliberately availed himself or took
advantage of the circumstances of nighttime. Further, when the place of the
crime is illuminated by light, as in this case, nighttime is not aggravating.[40]
In sum, we find the crime committed by
appellant to be murder because killing was qualified by abuse of superior
strength. At the time of the commission f the crime, the penalty for murder was
reclusion temporal maximum to death.[41] Appellant having been born on May 16, 1976,[42] he was 17 years, 1 month and 15 days old, at the
time of the commission of the crime. The existence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority requires the imposition of the penalty next lower in
degree[43] which is prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
penalty to be imposed upon appellant shall be taken from the medium period of
the imposable penalty, which is reclusion temporal minimum, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor medium.
As to the amount of damages, the death
indemnity should be lowered to P50,000.00 pursuant to existing jurisprudence.[44] As to actual damages, the records do not contain any
receipts for the funeral expenses incurred by the family of the victim. The
mother of the victim likewise did not testify as to the moral damages sustained
as a result of the death of her daughter. Hence, for lack of competent proof,
we cannot award either actual or moral damages.[45]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding appellant
Madelo Espina Cañasares guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION regarding the penalty imposed so that
appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional maximum
as minimum, to twelve (12) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion
temporal minimum as maximum, to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J., on official leave.
[1] Judge Felipe N. Villajuan, Jr., presiding.
[2] TSN (Belen), December 13, 1993, p. 16; TSN (Colo), December 13, 1993, pp. 20- 50; TSN, January 24, 1994, pp. 8-10, 23.
[3] Records, pp. 1-2.
[4] Id. at 17.
[5] Id. at 25.
[6] Exhibit "A", "A-1"; Records, p. 91.
[7] Exhibit "B", "B-1"; Records, p. 92.
[8] Exhibit "C", "C-1"; Records, p. 93.
[9] Exhibit "D"; Records, p. 94.
[10] TSN, December 13, 1993, pp. 7-8, 13-14.
[11] TSN, January 24, 1994, pp. 30-31.
[12] TSN, October 14, 1994, pp. 10-11; Autopsy Report, Exhibit "H," "H-1" to "H-3," Records, p. 102.
[13] TSN, February 20, 1995, pp. 3-12; TSN, April 5, 1995, pp. 2-5.
[14] Records, pp. 116-119.
[15] Records, p. 119.
[16] Rollo, pp. 24-36.
[17] Appellee's Brief, Rollo, pp. 47-76.
[18] People v. Naguita, G.R. No. 130091, August 30, 1999, p. 11; People v. Hubilla, Jr., 252 SCRA 471, 478 (1996); People v. Gomez, 251 SCRA 455, 465 (1995); People v. Bantisil, 249 SCRA 367, 376 (1995).
[19] People v. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167, 175 (1996).
[20] People v. Maldo, G.R. No. 131347, May 19, 1999, p. 11.
[21] TSN, December 13, 1993 (Colo), p. 40.
[22] People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 131151, August 25, 1999, p. 4; People v. Danao, 253 SCRA 146, 150-151 (1996).
[23] TSN, February 20, 1995, p. 3.
[24] TSN, December 13, 1993 (Colo), pp. 21, 23.
[25] TSN, December 13, 1993 (Colo), pp. 31, 43.
[26] TSN, October 14, 1994, p. 8.
[27] TSN, December 13, 1993, p. 23.
[28] Id. at 49-50.
[29] 264 SCRA 167, 172, 178 (1996).
[30] People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 131151, August 25, 1999, p. 4; People v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141 (1997).
[31] People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 131151, August 25, 1999, p. 6; People v. Bionat, 278 SCRA 454, 467 (1997); People v. Grefaldia, 273 SCRA 591, 605 (1997); People v. Salvame, 270 SCRA 766, 773 (1997); People v. Villaran, 269 SCRA 630, 635 (1997); People v. Tabag, 268 SCRA 115, 127 (1997).
[32] People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 110873, September 23, 1999, p. 8; People v. Baniel, 275 SCRA 472, 483 (1997); People v. Patawaran, 274 SCRA 130, 139 (1997); People v. Henson, 270 SCRA 634, 640 (1997).
[33] People v. Bernaldez, 294 SCRA 317, 331 (1998).
[34] People v Amoto, 111 SCRA 39, 46 (1982); People v. Braña, 30 SCRA 307, 315 (1969); People v. Reyes, 20 SCRA 304, 307 (1967); People v. Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122, 1127 (1960); People v. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446, 450; United States v. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612, 614 (1909).
[35] People v. Marcelino, et. al., G.R. No. 126269, October 1, 1999, pp. 10-11; People v. Gutierrez, Jr., 302 SCRA 643, 664 (1999); People v. Realin, 301 SCRA 495, 513 (1999).
[36] People v. Tambis, G.R. No. 124452, July 28, 1999, p. 8; People v. Santillana, G.R. No. 127815, June 9, 1999, p. 15; People v. Asis, 286 SCRA 64, 74 (1998).
[37] Ibid.
[38] People v. Sioc, G.R. No. 66508, November 24, 1999, p. 11; People v. Bahenting, G.R. No. 127659, February 24, 1999, pp. 9-11; People v. Sumaoy, 263 SCRA 460, 469-470 (1996).
[39] People v. Monsayac, G.R. No. 126787, May 24, 1999, p. 13.
[40] People v. Gailo, G.R. No., 116233, October 13, 1999, p. 14; People v. Bato, 21 SCRA 1445, 1448 (1967).
[41] As amended by R.A. No. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, murder is now punishable with reclusion perpetua to death.
[42] TSN, February 20, 1995, p. 5.
[43] Art. 68, second par. of the Revised Penal Code.
[44] People v. Verde, 302 SCRA 690, 707 (1999); People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689, 716 (1997).
[45] People v. Guillermo, 302 SCRA 257, 275 (1999); People v. Noay, 296 SCRA 292, 308 (1998).